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ABSTRACT
The study examines the  in te r re la t io n s h ip s  between tra d e  union 
s tru c tu re s  and fu n c tio n s  du rin g  the  la te  1970s by com parative 
in v e s tig a t io n  o f the  t r a d i t io n s ,  a c t iv i t ie s  and power s tru c tu re s  
o f the  trade  union movements o f B r ita in  and the  Federal 
Republic.
The study inc ludes an h is to r ic a l  review  o f the  com parative 
movements which shaped the  o rg a n isa tio n s  o f the period  
in  ques tion . I t  a lso  takes account o f the academic sources 
o f c r i t i c a l  a n a lys is  o f the  o b je c ts  and methods o f tra d e  
unions published up to  the  end o f the  decade.
Case s tud ies  conducted in  Germany in  1978 and 1979 in v e s tig a te d  
the a c t iv i t ie s  o f se lected  unions in  the  p u b lic  s e rv ic e s , 
m ining and t e x t i le s .  The in v e s tig a t io n  re lie d  upon s tru c tu re d  
in te rv ie w s  w ith  f u l l - t im e  o f f ic e r s .  I t  revealed d e ta i ls  
o f union a c t iv i t y ,  suggesting a lte rn a t iv e  and accommodating 
power s tru c tu re s  w ith in  t h e i r  o rgan isa tion s  correspondent 
to  the changing systems o f  c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing , p o l i t i c a l  
a c tio n  and in te rn a l democracy.
The e m p irica l and com parative h is to r ic a l evidence leads 
to  conclusions about the  dynamic re la t io n s h ip  between union 
s tru c tu re s  and fu n c tio n s  and i t s  impact on the cohesion 
o f the  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  system as a whole. C o lle c t iv e  
barga in ing  remains the p rim ary fu n c tio n  o f trad e  un ions, 
no t le a s t because i t  p rov ides f o r  a s tru c tu ra l fu s io n  o f 
union e ffe c tive n e ss  w ith  dem ocratic c o n tro l.  The methods 
employed to  achieve given tra d e  union o b je c tive s  embrace 
the  'power' s tru c tu re s  o f the  p a r t ic u la r  o rg an isa tion  and 
the w ider IR system. The example o f the 1970s in d ic a te s  
th a t  the parameters o f power s tru c tu re s  w ith in  in d u s t r ia l 
re la t io n s  systems may emerge p a r t ly  h is to r ic a l ly  from the  
s tru c tu ra l and p o l i t i c a l  development o f o rg an isa tion  and 
in s t i t u t io n ,  p a r t ly  from the  ra te  and d ire c t io n  o f change
in  the  economic and s o c ia l c o n d itio n s  a t the tim e o f 
in v e s t ig a t io n .  S ta b i l i t y  w ith in  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  re lie s  
upon 'p o s it iv e  b a rg a in in g ' between p a r t ie s  from p o s it io n s  
o f  s tre n g th . O rgan isa tiona l s tru c tu re s  which are incom patib le  
w ith  p o s it iv e  barga in ing  may d im in ish  cooperation w ith in  
the  system, and th e re fo re  i t s  s t a b i l i t y .
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1During the  1960s and 1970s, the  high incidence o f in d u s t r ia l c o n f l ic t  
in  B r ita in  d ire c te d  p u b lic ,  as w e ll as academic a tte n tio n  to  the  
apparent conduct o f  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  by a form o f  c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing cha rac te rised  a t th a t tim e by u n o ff ic ia l stoppages 
and trad e  union r h e to r ic ,  which suggested, p u b lic ly  a t le a s t,  
th a t B r ita in  was perhaps " s t r ik e  prone".
By comparison, however, m ajor s tr ik e s  in  1978 in  the German docks, 
p r in t in g  and eng ineering  in d u s tr ie s  bore w itness to  a changing 
p a tte rn  o f in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  in  th a t  country which may also 
have been symptomatic o f a change in  d ire c t io n  in tra d e  union 
th in k in g , in  keeping w ith  a changing economic and in d u s t r ia l c lim a te . 
Germany's recovery from  the  recession which fo llow ed the  1973 
o i l  c r is is  had been d is a p p o in tin g . By the mid-1970s th e re  were 
a m il l io n  unemployed. With p r o f i t s  squeezed, wages were depressed 
and the s p i r i t  o f  consensus in  in d u s try  was, i f  not dead, c e r ta in ly  
a i l in g .  In J u ly  1977, the  forum fo r  "Concerted A c tio n " , the  round­
ta b le  counc il o f in d u s try , government and trade  unions fo lde d  
as the union re p re se n ta tive s  p u lle d  o u t.
The dec is ion  o f the  unions to  d isen tang le  themselves from the  
p o l i t ic s  o f  consensus was a t t r ib u ta b le  in  la rge p a rt to  a growing 
d is s a t is fa c t io n  among union rank and f i l e ,  supported by a new 
generation o f more p o l i t i c a l l y  conscious and ra d ic a l f u l l - t im e  
o f f ic e r s ,  w ith  the  rewards i t  o ffe re d . The terms and co n d itio n s  
o f employment on the  shop f lo o r  and in  the o f f ic e  d id  no t r e f le c t  
to  the workforce the  success o f the  p o lic ie s  o f the tra d e  union 
h ie ra rchy  had continued to  pursue in to  the  1970s. The expression 
o f th is  d is s a t is fa c t io n  had e v id e n tly  brought about a s h i f t  in  
power w ith in  the  tra d e  unions which led to  change in  the  p o l i t ic a l  
w i l l  o f the le a d e rsh ip .
The p ro p o s itio n  th a t  the  'B r i t is h  d isease ' had spread to  the  West 
German workforce ra is e s  the  question as to  whether the German 
system o f in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  is  any b e tte r  equipped than the 
B r it is h  to  support the  p o l i t ic a l  c u ltu re  and economic values o f
CHAPTER 1
I n t r o d u c t i o n
2the so c ie ty  in which i t  ope ra tes . Is  i t  reasonable to  suppose 
th a t the  German trade  unions behave fundam entally d i f f e r e n t ly  
f o r  complex s o c io lo g ic a l o r  p o l i t i c a l  reasons?
Rather, the concept o f s h i f t in g  power s tru c tu re s  w ith in  the  
o rgan isa tion s  themselves suggests an a lte rn a tiv e  bas is  fo r  
in te rn a tio n a l comparisons o f tra d e  union behaviour. I t  is
th e re fo re  the p ro p o s itio n  o f th is  study,w hich draws on observa tions
o f trad e  union a c t iv i t y  du ring  the  1970s, th a t the behavioura l 
p a tte rn s  o f trade  unions in  d i f fe r e n t  coun trie s  are a fu n c tio n  
o f s tru c tu ra l fa c to rs ,  g iven th a t  such fe a tu re s  are l ik e ly  to
be themselves in fluence d , i f  not de te rm in e d ,,by h is to r ic a l and
s o c io -p o li t ic a l v a r ia b le s .
The study o f comparative in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  systems on a th e o re t ic a l
le v e l now has a long h is to ry  i t s e l f .  A "general th e o ry " o f the
2
in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  system was f i r s t  presented by J T Dunlop , 
and indeed advanced by A W J Craig in  the 1970s. The model provided 
by th is  approach is  a conceptual device  and not a framework fo r  
em p ir ica l research. I t  assumes the  term "system" w ith o u t o f fe r in g  
a d e f in i t io n  o f i t ,  suggesting th a t  th e re  are s tru c tu re d  re la t io n ­
ships between the moving p a rts  o f  the  whole w ithou t e x p la in in g  
what those re la tio n s h ip s  a re .
4
The ’ Oxford approach' th e o ry  emerged from amongst those academics, 
c h ie f ly  A lla n  F landers, who had c o n tr ib u te d  to  the research o f
5
the  Donovan Commission which reported  in  1968 . E s s e n tia lly ,  
the  Oxford school o f though t concluded th a t in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  
is  the  study o f the in s t i tu t io n s  o f jo b  re g u la t io n . Emphasis 
was placed on the  fu n c tio n  o f  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing as a ru le -  
making process, which describes the  system in  terms o f i t s  "ou tpu t" 
but f a i l s  to  address the ro le  o f economic, techno log ica l o r p o l i t ic a l  
change as fa c to rs  which c o n d it io n  i t s  o p e ra tio n . I t  does.not 
th e re fo re  account f o r  in d u s t r ia l a c tio n  as a prim ary fe a tu re  o f * 
the system6 .
By c o n tra s t and in observing the  in d u s t r ia l re la tio n s  f ie ld  as 
a whole, the in d u s tr ia l s o c io lo g is ts  have defined i t s  main concern 
as "s tudy ing  the re s o lu tio n  o f in d u s t r ia l c o n f l ic t  (more) than 
i t s  gen e ra tio n "7 . W h ils t t h is  model f o r  the study o f the in d u s tr ia l.
3re la t io n s  system is  l im ite d  by i t s  re lia n c e  on s o c io lo g ic a l fa c to rs  
alone, i t s  general 'b e h a v io u ra l' approach to  the re s o lu tio n  o r 
avoidance o f c o n f l ic t  is  thought to  be more h e lp fu l f o r  the  purposes 
o f t h is  study in  observing the  in te r r e la t io n  o f trad e  union s tru c tu re  
and fu n c tio n  w ith in  the  h is to r ic a l and s o c io -p o li t ic a l co n te x t.
The need to  account f o r  in d u s t r ia l c o n f l ic t  as a fe a tu re  o f  an 
in te ra c t iv e  group system o f  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  suggests th a t 
pressures e x is t  w ith in  th a t  system which are in  some way lin ked  
to  the  s t ru c tu ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the  a c to r components by the 
ca pa c ity  o f the  la t t e r  to  c rea te  o r  accommodate those pressures. 
Pressure may be sa id  to  be symptomatic o f  the  re la t iv e  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f power th roughout the  system. Hence the  p ro p o s it io n  th a t  the 
s t ru c tu ra l c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the  a c to r  components c o n d itio n  a 
re la t io n s h ip  between the  e x e rt io n  o f power w ith in  the  system and 
i t s  p rope ns ity  to  c rea te  in d u s t r ia l peace or d isco rd .
This study is  not concerned to  fo llo w  any o f the mainstream th e o rie s  
in  a ttem pting  to  d e fin e  the  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  system as a basis 
fo r  in te rn a tio n a l comparison. In recogn is ing  the 'system ' as 
a mere a b s tra c tio n  o f human behaviour w ith in  a m u l t ip l ic i t y  o f 
abstracted  human systems, the  in te re s t  o f  the  study is  in  the  
in te ra c t io n s  w ith in  the  s tru c tu re s  o f the o rgan isa tion s  which 
re s u lt  from the  e x e rc is in g  o f  power. I t  is  the  a t t r ib u te  o f power 
which makes the  system o f in te ra c t io n  dynamic: the  d is t r ib u t io n  
o f power may s h i f t ;  possession o f i t  by any s in g le  o rg a n is a tio n  
is  not abso lu te , bu t p a r t ia l ,  r e la t iv e  and-fragmented. I t  is  
th e re fo re  no t the  power o f an e n t ire  o rg a n isa tio n  which sets the 
in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  p a tte rn , bu t the sum o f the p a r t ia l  changes 
which occur a t d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls .
The study recognises the  im portan t ro le  o f  p o l i t ic a l  and so c ia l 
h is to ry  in  the  development o f  the  tra d e  union o rg a n is a tio n s .
The legacy o f a p a r t ic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  c u ltu re  is  presumed to  in flu e n ce  
where the  'a c to rs ' w ith in  an in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  'system ' f in d  
themselves in  terms o f t h e i r  s tru c tu re , methods and o b je c t iv e s .
4Moreover, i t  in fluences the  pe rcep tion  and c r it iq u e  o f the academic 
observer in  a ttem pting  to  analyse the  e ffe c tive n e ss  o f trad e  
unions w ith in  a s in g le  c u ltu re .  This p o in t becomes ev iden t 
in  chap ter 5 o f th is  s tudy .
The observa tion  above o f  a changing p a tte rn  o f in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  
in  Germany during the 1970s s ig n a ls  a d e v ia tio n  a t th a t tim e 
from a long-stand ing  t r a d i t io n  o f the  in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  o f 
c o n f l i c t ,  the o r ig in s  o f  which are sa id to  be deeply rooted
p
in  the  paterna lism  o f the  German s ta te  and p o l i t y  .
W ith in  a p o l i t ic a l  c u ltu re  in  which 'p o l i t i c a l  a c t io n ' owed
i t s  b i r t h r ig h t  to  Marxism, a fundamental re je c t io n  o f the  u n io n is a tio n
o f workers as the a r t ic u la te d  o p p o s itio n  in  in d u s try  led d i r e c t ly
to  the  p r in c ip le  o f p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f a l l  workers.,embodied in
the  codeterm ination le g is la t io n  in  the  coal m ining and heavy
eng ineering  in d u s tr ie s  (Montanmitbestimmungsgesetze) and the
Works C o n s titu tio n  Acts (B e triebsve rfassungsgese tze ).
The system o f in te g ra tio n  and c o - re s p o n s ib il ity  was s ta r t in g  
to  show signs o f s t ra in  by the  Jate 1960s. The worker re p re s e n ta tiv e
ii
committees (B e tr ie b s ra te ) had o n ly  a l im ite d  b r ie f  in  respect 
o f c o n s u lta tio n  w ith  management; the  trad e  unions remained ou ts id e  
the  system. The le g is la t io n  o f 1972 in  respect o f the  Works 
C o n s titu tio n  acknowledged a tra d e  union presence a t p la n t le v e l 
fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e w h ils t  i t  broadened the  range o f issues w ith in  
the  purview o f the  B e tr ie b s ra t.  The e f fe c t  was to  a llow  g re a te r 
de fa c to  union involvem ent a t p la n t le v e l,  although one in te rp re ta t io n  
o f such involvement m ight be th a t  t h is  heightened the  degree 
o f in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  o f  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  in some in d u s tr ie s .
In any event, the le ade rsh ip  o f some o f the  trade unions found 
themselves during the  Seventies having to  recognise the  fa c t  
o f  u n c o n s titu tio n a l s t r ik e s  in  the  la te  1960s and the  pressure 
to  break up th a t  symbol o f  in d u s t r ia l consensus, the Concerted 
A c tion  forum.
In B r ita in  during the  same decade, the  trade  unions were seemingly 
he ld  responsib le  f o r  the  n a tio n a l d e c lin e  which fo llow ed  the  
economic c r is is .  In a pe riod  o f  se rious in f la t io n ,  employees
5chasing h ighe r wages jo in e d  the  trad e  unions, b r in g in g  w ith  
them a r e la t iv e ly  new union consciousness o rien ted  towards the  
workplace and a sense o f c o lle c t iv is m  in  p u rs u it o f p r iv a te  
goods. The increase in  shop f lo o r  ba rga in ing , which had begun 
in  the  1960s, meant more work fo r  the  lo ca l o f f ic e r s  o f the 
unions in dea ling  w ith  issues such as p ro d u c t iv ity ,  jo b  e v a lu a tio n , 
procedura l agreements and new techno logy. Furthermore, as members 
became more aware o f t h e ir  r ig h ts  in  respect o f hea lth  and s a fe ty , 
redundancy and u n fa ir  d is m is s a l, so the  demands on the resources 
o f the  f u l l - t im e  o f f ic e r s  increased.
W h ils t union membership was growing o v e ra ll du ring  the 1970s,
g
the p a tte rn  o f employment was s h if t in g ,a s  seen from these f ig u re s  :
Employment Sector Year % o f a l l  workers
M anufacturing 1961 38.4
In d u s try  1974 34.6
Finance, P ro fess io na l 1961 12.6
S c ie n t i f ic  1974 19.7
P u b lic  1961 5.9
A d m in is tra tio n  1974 7.0
From the  same source, the  growth in  trade  union membership over 
a s im ila r  pe riod  f o r  those la rge  o rgan isa tion s  o f p a r t ic u la r
in te re s t  to  t h is  study is  given as fo llo w s ;0 :
1964 Male1974 ^change 1964
Female
1974 ^change 1964
Iotal
1975 ^change
TGWU* (1311-4) 1547.1 + 18.0 (205.7) 279.7 + 3 6 . 0 (1517.1) 1,856,165 + 20.4
GMWU 597.8 598.5 + 0 .1 186.7 285.4 + 5 2 . 8 784.5 8 8 3 . 8 + 12.7
NALGO 214.9 323.8 + 50.7 123.4 218.1 + 76.7 338.3 541.9 + 6 0 .2
NUPE 1 2 3 . 0 186.5 + 51.6 117.0 321.3 +174.6 240.0 507.8 +1 1 1 .6
CPSA 60.5 6 9 . 0 + 14.0 85.9 145.5 + 69.4 146.3 214.4 + 46.5 1
IPCS 53.1 94.8 - 78.4 2 . 0 4.4 +1 2 2 .2 55.1 99.2 + 79.9
NUM 479.1 371.7 - 32.4 - 4.1 - 479.1 375.8 - 31.6 ;
NUTGW 19.6 14.0 - 28.5 9 1 .6 99.3 + 8.5 1 1 1 . 2 113.4 + 1.9
* 1984 figures include membership of the National Union of Vehicle Builders & the
Chemical Workers Union.
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TGWU = Transport & General Workers Union
GMWU = General & Municipal Workers Union
NALGO = National & Local Government Officers Association
NUPE = National Union of Public Employees
CPSA = Civil and Public Services Association
IPCS = Institution of Professional Civil Servants
NUM = National Union of Mineworkers
NUTGW = National Union of Tailoring & Garment Workers
The prospect o f expanding trad e  union fu n c tio n  and in flu e n ce
by in te g ra tio n  and p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  in d u s try  has not been recognised 
in  B r ita in  as i t  was by t r a d i t io n  in  Germany. Worker p a r t ic ip a t io n  
and c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  through tra d e  unions have always 
been regarded as m u tu a lly  exc lus ive  as methods o f conducting 
in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s ,  w ith  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing as the  g e n e ra lly  
p re fe rred  method. The on ly  model o f jo in t  c o n s u lta tio n  to  
have stood the te s t  o f tim e is  the  W hitley Council system in  
the p u b lic  se c to r, but such co un c ils  operate e f fe c t iv e ly  on ly  
w ith in  the  ambit o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  and w ith  exc lu s ive  
rep resen ta tion  o f the  employees' s ide by recognised trad e  un ions.
There is  an acceptance by a l l  p a r t ie s  w ith in  the in d u s t r ia l 
re la t io n s  'system ' in  B r ita in  th a t  c o n f l ic t  is  inhe ren t in  
the method o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing , y e t i t  remains the  method 
most h ig h ly  p rized  and guarded. Indeed, e f fo r ts  by governments 
to  curb c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  in  the  f ie ld  o f wage de te rm ina tion  
have o fte n  led to  g re a te r c o n f l ic t  w ith in  in d u s try  over the  
very p r in c ip le  i t s e l f .
However, the in t r in s ic  q u a li ty  o f the  method o f c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing in  th is  coun try  does d i f f e r  from i t s  German coun te r­
p a r t:  the  p a tte rn  o f  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  in  B r ita in  is  determined 
by the vo lu n ta ry  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the  actors ra th e r than le g is la t iv e  
measures. I t  is  proposed th a t changes in  the support and m o tiva tion  
o f p a r t ic u la r  member groups may m odify the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f * 
power and th e re fo re  the  pressure p o in ts  w ith in  a trad e  union
7o rg a n is a tio n . In Germany, t h is  process is  cond itioned in  p a rt
by b ind ing  n a tio n a l o r re g io na l agreements w ith  associated
lega l fo rm a lity ;  in  B r i ta in ,  w h ils t  the re  is  a degree o f n a tio n a l
ba rga in ing , the  body o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing , i t s  shape, i t s
fo rm a t, i t s  very ex is tence  is  dependent upon the m o b ilis a tio n
o f the  workplace and t h e ir  m o tiv a tio n  to  support i t .  Under
such term s, the  capac ity  o f  the system fo r  c o n f l ic t  is  h igher
and the  commitment o f  the  ac to rs  to  avoid c o n f l ic t  a lso  v o lu n ta r is t ic .
A rguably, th e re fo re , the  le v e l o f  s o c ia l r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  which
rep resen ta tives  o f union and management are ca lle d  upon to
exercise is  h igher in  B r ita in  in  the  maintenance o f in d u s t r ia l
1 1peace than in  Germany. In h is  comment on the 1970s, Tay lo r 
re p o rts  th a t amongst shop stewards d ispu tes were unpopular, 
and they would always p re fe r  the use o f procedure to  m i l i t a n t  
ac tion  in  re s o lv in g  problems and t h is  desp ite  the growth in  
shop f lo o r  barga in ing  beyond the  s in g le  issue o f pay.
'Consensus p o l i t i c s '  w ith in  the  re m it o f the Concerted A ction  
forum in Germany has a lso  found a p lace w ith in  the fu n c tio n s  
o f trad e  union o rg a n isa tio n  in  B r i ta in  in  the form o f  the  
N ationa l Economic Development Council (NEDC) and o the r QUANGOS 
(Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental O rg a n isa tio n s ).
The c r i t ic is m  which trad e  union leaders have a ttra c te d  fo r  
th e ir  involvement in  exerc ises o f  c o - re s p o n s ib il ity  is  i t s e l f  
a r e f le c t io n  o f the expecta tion  o f mutual exclusiveness o f 
the 'p a r t ic ip a t io n ' and 'c o l le c t iv e  b a rga in ing ' fu n c tio n s :
"T he ir in c o rp o ra tio n  in to  the  o f f i c ia l  l i f e  o f t h e ir  co u n trie s  
has m ain ly served to  saddle them w ith  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  which 
have weakened t h e ir  barga in ing  p o s it io n ,  and which has helped 
to  reduce th e i r  e ffe c tiv e n e s s ."
(RM iliband, The S ta te  in  C a p ita l is t  S oc ie ty , London 1969J 2
The cha llenge o f the  shop f lo o r  movement o f the  1970s in  both 
Germany and B r ita in  a lso ra ised  questions o f p r in c ip le  surrounding 
the ’ in d u s t r ia l un ion ' model. The assumption behind the
8E inhe itsgew erkscha ft had been th a t o f the c o n tr ib u tio n  o f
the trad e  unions towards in d u s t r ia l peace and w e lfa re  f o r
a l l  through th e i r  in te g ra t io n  w ith  the  new s ta te  system.
This imposed p lu ra lis m  in  syn thes is  w ith  the German p o l i t ic a l
ph ilosophy o f s o c ie ty  and s ta te  suggests a neatness and s im p l ic i ty
which has been described as a form o f c e n tra lis a t io n ,  even
13w ith in  those in d u s tr ie s  which conduct reg iona l ba rga in ing  .
The German p a tte rn  o f  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  can be sa id  to  
r e f le c t  a h igher degree o f co rpo ra tism , i f  on ly  because the 
s tru c tu re s  f o r  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  on both the  tra d e  union 
and employer sides f a c i l i t a t e  coo rd in a tio n  and corpo ra te  
a c t iv i t y .  W ith in  the  con tex t o f  c o n f l ic t  re s o lu t io n , the  
s ig n if ic a n t  s t ru c tu ra l fe a tu re  o f the  German trad e  union 
o rgan isa tion  th e re fo re  is  no t so much the degree o f  c e n t r a l is ­
a t io n , but o f cons is tency and c o m p a t ib il i ty  w ith  the  system 
as a whole.
In B r ita in ,  by c o n tra s t,  the  employers are not w e ll o rgan ised,
and i t  is  u n l ik e ly  th a t ,  even w ith  in d u s t r ia l unionism and
g re a te r c e n tra lis a t io n  o f tra d e  union o rg a n is a tio n , a g re a te r
degree o f corpora tism  w ith in  the  s o c ia l o r in d u s t r ia l framework
would develop. There is  no cohesion o f barga in ing p o lic y ,
as is  poss ib le  in  Germany; hence the  in flu e n ce  which may
be exerted by the  shop f lo o r  movement, the converse o f which
is  the  not in fre q u e n t wish o f management to  con fine  the  scope
14o f in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  to  the  workplace .
N e ithe r the process o f in d u s t r ia l is a t io n ,  nor the  h is to ry  
o f trad e  union o rg a n is a tio n  has been steered by s ta te  in te rv e n tio n , 
thus confounding the  c o rp o ra t is t  founda tion  o f s o c ia l s t a b i l i t y .
The p u b lic  d e s ire  f o r  and need o f s t a b i l i t y  aroused debate 
in  B r ita in  and Germany du ring  the  la s t  decade as to  the  fu n c tio n  
o f trad e  unions w ith in  the  con fines o f so c ia l p o lic y  and 
re s p o n s ib i l i ty .  In a changing p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and in d u s tr ia l 
environment, the  observed responses o f trad e  union o rg a n isa tio n s  
to  imposed s h i f t s  o f the  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  parameters 
have been described as ranging from c o n c i l ia t io n ,  c e n tra lis m , 
co rpo ra tion  on the  one hand to  antagonism, s e c tio n a lism ,
9What c r i t i c s  may have been observ ing was a lte rn a tiv e  sources 
o f power which enabled the tra d e  union movement w ith in  the 
corpora te  environment to  behave d i f f e r e n t ly  ( in te rp re te d  
by some as more resp o n s ib ly ) to  the  trad e  union movement 
w ith in  an e s s e n t ia lly  v o lu n ta r is t ic  barga in ing environm ent.
Free c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  may appear more d e s ta b il is in g ,  
but on ly  so in  a " lo c a lis e d "  sense; viewed o v e ra ll,  the  system 
o f fragmented barga in ing  breaks down the  propensity  f o r  la rg e - 
sca le  c o n f l ic t ,  thus p reven ting  fundamental d is e q u ilib r iu m .
The negative a t t r ib u te  o f the  B r i t is h  s tru c tu re  o f ba rga in ing  
is  th a t  i t  a lso  prevents the  ac to rs  from acting  c o rp o ra te ly , 
and thus -the y  are unable to  respond p o s it iv e ly  to  corpora te  
d e c lin e .
The c e n tra l hypothesis o f th is  study is  th a t trade  union
fu n c t io n , ie  the  o b je c tiv e s  and methods o f the o rg a n is a tio n ,
ra th e r than what i t  ought to  achieve from any m oral, p o l i t i c a l
o r  economic pe rspe c tive , is  c lo s e ly  lin ke d  w ith  i t s  s tru c tu re .
Trade union s tru c tu re  has been the  su b je c t o f academic studv 
15since the  Webbs . I t  has been described as:-
morphology: the  s ize  and d is t r ib u t io n  o f the membership, 
i t s  com position and boundaries o f recru itm en t
government: the  dem ocratic s tru c tu re  responsib le  fo r  
p o lic y  d e c is io n s , the  e le c to ra l procedures, the  executors 
o f union p o lic ie s  in  r e la t io n  to  the  issues invo lved
in te r-u n io n  re la t io n s :  coopera tion  o r  r iv a l r y  o f d i f fe r e n t  
o rg a n is a tio n s .
The fu n c tio n s  w ith  which the  tra d e  union o rgan isa tion  is  
l i k e ly  to  be concerned are
p l u r a l i s m  on t h e  o t h e r .
the  p u rs u it  through c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing o f an enhanced
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- the p o l i t ic a l  re p resen ta tion  and advancement o f the  member­
sh ip w ith in  the dem ocratic o rd e r,
-  the  streng then ing  o f  trad e  unionism as a movement by extending 
rec ru itm en t and encouraging the s o l id a r i t y  o f the  membership.
The p ro p o s it io n  in  support o f  the  hypothesis to  be explored 
in  the f in a l  chapter is  th a t the  re la t io n s h ip s  w ith in  union 
o rgan isa tion s  which u n d e rlie  t h e ir  s tru c tu re  and a c t iv i t y  
are o f power, the  source o f which is  la rg e ly  h is to r ic a l ra th e r 
than te c h n ic a l,  s o c io -p o li t ic a l ra th e r  than economic.
The co n ce p tu a lisa tio n  o f the  'power v a r ia b le ' as a c a ta ly s t ic  
element o f the  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  system is  intended to  
f a c i l i t i a t e  in te rn a tio n a l comparative assessment o f  in d u s tr ia l 
re la t io n s  systems by breaking down the  t r a d it io n a l components 
o f trade  union s tru c tu re  and fu n c t io n  in to  re la t iv e  'power' 
fa c to rs .
Some e m p irica l work was c a rr ie d  ou t in  Germany during  1979 
in  o rder to  e s ta b lis h  a basic understanding o f trad e  union 
a c t iv i t y  and o rg a n isa tio n  during  a pe riod  when, as has already 
been s ta te d , pressures upon trad e  union s tru c tu re s  were already 
in  evidence.
The trad e  unions se lected  fo r  the  survey were those in  m ining 
(IG  Bergbau und E nerg ie ), t e x t i le s  and c lo th in g  (Gewerkschaft
ii
T e x til-B e k le id u n g ) and p u b lic  se rv ices  (O ffe n tlic h e  D ienste , 
T ransport und V e rke h r). They were so chosen fo r  t h e ir  d iv e rs i ty  
in  in d u s tr ia l and economic s tru c tu re , membership com position, 
le ga l p re s c r ip t io n s , h is to r ic a l ideo logy and p o l i t ic a l  o u tlo o k .
An in tro d u c to ry  p i lo t  survey was conducted during  the  summer 
o f 1978 which invo lved b r ie f  d iscuss ions w ith  a small number 
o f reg iona l and lo c a l o f f ic e r s  o f each un ion . The ir comments 
have in  p a rt been included in  the  b r ie f  in tro d u c to ry  notes 
which fo llo w .
s t a n d a r d  o f  l i v i n g  f o r  i t s  m em b er sh ip ,
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The membership o f GTB (T e x t ile s  and C lo th ing ) is  cha rac te rised  
by the  la rge number o f women in  the  in d u s try . One re g io n a l
ii
o f f i c i a l ,  based in  Monchengladbach, quoted p ropo rtions  o f 
60% and 80% women in  t e x t i le s  and c lo th in g  re s p e c tiv e ly  in  
h is  area o f o rg a n is a tio n . This high percentage o f women in  
the  union presented i t  w ith  an o rg a n is a tio n a l problem p e c u lia r  
to  i t ,  in  th a t  women were seemingly less w i l l in g  to  become 
union o f f ic e r s .  Other groups organised by the union are w h ite - 
c o l la r  workers, who, accord ing to  the  o f f i c ia ls  have su ffe red  
r e la t iv e ly  h ighe r n a t io n a lis a t io n  than the b lu e -c o lla r  and 
who may seek a lte rn a t iv e  re p re se n ta tio n  in  the Deutsche 
A ngeste llten-G ew erkschaft (German S ta ffs  Union); a lso  fo re ig n  
workers, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  sp inn ing  (a f ig u re  fo r  M Gladbach 
quoted 70-80%) which remains ra th e r  poo rly  paid in  comparison 
w ith  the German-dominated weaving p la n ts . The fo re ig n  workers 
n a tu ra lly  a lso  ra is e  problems o th e r than pay w ith  t h e ir  un ion , 
in  p a r t ic u la r  annual h o lid a y , a d d it io n a l tim e o f f ,  re lig io u s  
observance e tc .  W ith in  the  te x t i le s  and c lo th in g  in d u s tr ie s  
some 80-90% o f a l l  Works C o u n c illo rs  were members o f the  union 
GTB and regarded by the  union as shop stewards. The union 
o f f i c ia ls  in te rv iew ed  placed a g rea t deal o f importance on 
the  ro le  o f the  union works c o u n c il lo r  and saw no problems 
a r is in g  out o f a c o n f l ic t  o f  fu n c t io n  o f works c o u n c il lo r  
and shop steward. They adm itted th a t  c o n f l ic t  s itu a t io n s  were 
p o ss ib le , but d id  no t s p e c ify  in  what respect nor how th is  
is  not a problem fo r  the  un ion . The o f f i c ia ls  make e f fo r t s  
to  support the  Works C ounc il, to  process concerns more e a s ily  
f o r  i t s  members and, above a l l ,  to  stave o f f  any poss ib le  
com petition  between Works C o u n c illo rs  and shop stewards.
The emphasis by the  union on the  ro le  o f the Works C o u n c illo rs  
may have depended to  some e x te n t on the  importance to  the  
members o f the  lo c a l ly  nego tia ted  ra te s  o f pay above the  minimum 
la id  down in  the  c o l le c t iv e  agreement; p la n t ra tes are nego tia ted  
by Works Council and Management. The union has gained more 
in flu e n ce  in  p la n t ba rga in ing  since the most recent works 
c o n s t itu t io n  le g is la t io n  o f  1972 which acknowledged union 
backing o f Works C o u n c illo rs . F u ll tim e union o f f i c ia ls  from
T rad e  Union S t r u c t u r e
12
the lo ca l o f f ic e  o r  even re g io n a l o f f ic e  were reported to  
be fre q u e n tly  ca lle d  upon to  a ttend  the  p la n t in  cases o f 
grievance on the p a rt o f t h e ir  members, but such an a p p lic a tio n  
to  b rin g  in  the  union had to  be brought forw ard in  the proper 
manner to  the  union by the  shop stewards o r  Works C o u n c illo rs .
Because o f the  concen tra tion  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  a t the 
reg io na l le v e l,  GTB is  in  terms o f decis ion-m aking fa r  more 
d e ce n tra lise d  than say IGBE (M ining and Energy). C le a rly  
the  s tronges t centre  o f power ou ts id e  the execu tive  committee 
o f  the union is  the  fu n c tio n  o f Regional Secretary (B e z irk s le ite r )  
and p a r t ic u la r ly  in  those reg ions where the te x t i le s  in d u s try  
is  dominant; in  the  c lo th in g  in d u s try , a lthough a l l  Regional 
S ecre ta ries  have in flu e n ce  in  the  n e g o tia tio n s  o f  c o l le c t iv e  
agreements, they are no t respons ib le  f o r  t h e ir  conduct. As 
a poss ib le  consequence o f t h is ,  the  S ecre ta ries  fo r  regions 
in  which the c lo th in g  in d u s try  is  predominant have arguably 
less in fluence  in  the  o v e ra ll o rg a n is a tio n .
As the te x t i le s  in d u s try  has shrunk, so problems o f o rg a n isa tio n
have a risen  fo r  the un ion . Not many years p r io r  to  the  present
p i lo t  survey GTB had brought in  measures to  ra t io n a lis e  the
o rg a n isa tio n  which invo lved  c u t t in g  ou t almost a l l  one-man
lo c a l o f f ic e s .  A l l  the  o f f i c ia l s  in te rv iew ed  agreed th a t
much o f  the d a i ly  work had become in c re a s in g ly  le g a l is t ic
in  content and the one-man branches were thought to  lack
the  e xp e rtise  necessary fo r  the  e f f i c ie n t  handling o f such
work. The reason fo r  the  change in  the  type o f work handled
by the  lo ca l branch was thought to  be the increas ing  ra t io n a lis a t io n ,
which had brought about redundancies and s h o rt-tim e  working
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  t e x t i le s .  I t  had a lso  to  some ex te n t caused
the  lo c a l and reg io na l o f f ic e s ,  as w e ll as lo c a l and ce n tra l
o f f ic e ,  to  cooperate more c lo s e ly  in  handling le ga l m a tte rs .
The a t t itu d e  o f the  German mineworkers w ith  respect to  unionism 
repu ted ly  re lie s  h e a v ily  on two h is to r ic a l fa c to rs :
1) the s ta tu s  o f the  jo b  as compared w ith  those in  o the r 
in d u s tr ie s  up to  the economic c r is is  in  coal m ining in  
the  1960s
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2) the  C h ris tia n  and S ocia l Democratic t r a d it io n  fo rm a lised  
under the p r in c ip le  o f in d u s t r ia l unionism from a syn thes is  
o f the o ld  C a th o lic -C h r is t ia n  and Social Democrat fa c t io n s .
The union boasts some 90% o rg a n isa tio n  o f the to ta l  w o rk fo rce .
1 fi
In a 1970s study o f  the  in d u s try , Treu a ttr ib u te s  th is  to
s tru c tu ra l fa c to rs  o f  the  in d u s try , ie  la rge p lan ts  and, c e r ta in ly
up to  the  coal c r is is ,  a c lose  l in k  between place o f work
and d w e llin g . In a d d it io n ,  the  in d u s try  employs a la rge
number o f fo re ig n  workers who, Treu m a in ta ins, are easy to
o rgan ise . The number o f  w h ite -c o lla r  workers organised by
the  union is  growing and one respondent in  the  p i lo t  survey
claimed a high degree o f o rg a n is a tio n  among the top s a la rie d
employees in the  hard coal in d u s try , which, he asserted, has
increased ( ra th e r  than decreased) s o l id a r i ty  amongst o th e r
mine-workers by p ro v id in g  s tronge r leadersh ip . Follow ing
the coal c r is is ,  IGBE came under severe o rg a n isa tio n a l pressure
to  re ta in  i t s  members. The spate o f ra t io n a lis a t io n  in  the
hard coal in d u s try  broke up many m ining communities and the
union responded by sw itch in g  the  o rg a n isa tio n a l emphasis from
the place o f d w e llin g  to  th e  p la n t .  The membership was sustained
by th is  move and encouraged by the  in tro d u c tio n  a t about the
same tim e o f the  "c h e c k -o ff"  system ,ie  the d ire c t  deduction
o f union c o n tr ib u tio n s  from wages and s a la r ie s . Before the
c r is is ,  moral pressure appeared necessary. Instead o f in c reas ing
expenditure on the  p ro v is io n  o f  b e n e fits , the union invested
17more in  education a t the  lo c a l le v e l . The c r is is  had under­
mined the c o l le c t iv e  s o l id a r i t y  o f the mineworkers and t h e ir  
sense o f id e n t ity  w ith  the  in d u s try , thus the d r iv e  towards 
o rgan isa tion  a t the  p la n t was intended to  c u lt iv a te  s o l id a r i t y  
and bind members and shop stewards to  the ce n tra l body o f 
the  union.
In the  p i lo t  in te rv ie w s , over 90% o f the Works C o u n c illo rs  
were quoted as being union nominees. They and the lo c a l la y  
o f f i c ia ls  a t the  workplace were o f f i c i a l l y  regarded by IGBE 
as shop stewards. Working "s id e  by s ide " w ith  the Works 
C o unc illo rs  is  an e le c te d  "Union P it  Committee" 
(Schachgew erkschafts le itung) whose head is  not a Works C o u n c illo r,
14
/
but whose o the r members may be. I t  is  not the  membership 
which e le c ts  the Committee but the  shop stewards, and they 
have to  be nominated by the  lo c a l o f f i c ia l s .
When questioned about p o te n t ia l c o n f l ic t  between the Works 
C o u n c illo rs  and the o the r shop stewards, one union o f f i c ia l  
adm itted th a t  problems d id  a r is e  from tim e to  tim e because 
Works C o u n c illo rs  recognise themselves as being Works C o u n c illo rs  
f i r s t  and shop stewards second.
A fu r th e r  response by IGBE to  the  ra t io n a lis a t io n  o f the  coal
18in d u s try  had been to  cu t back on f u l l  tim e o f f ic e r s .  Treu 
records a f ig u re  o f 39% reduc tio n  in  the  number o f o f f i c ia ls  
from 1960 to  1973. The reg io na l and d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s  were 
reorganised and reduced from 50 to  24, a cu t o f 52%. At the  
same tim e , the union was able to  extend i t s  o rg an isa tion  to  
the  supe rv iso ry  boards o f the  hard coal in d u s try  under the 
terms o f the codeterm ination laws. The c e n tra lis a t io n  opera tion  
re su lte d  in  a concen tra tion  o f  f u l l - t im e  o f f i c ia ls  a t the  
top o f the  o rg a n isa tio n : Treu g ives a f ig u re  o f 29.4% o f
FTOs in  the  c e n tra l body in  1960 which r is e s  to  40.0% in  1973.
Treu describes the  o rg a n is a tio n  o f IGBE as a s t r i c t  h ie ra rc h y .
Fie comments th a t ,  w h ils t  o th e r unions are run on a bas is  o fi<
what he terms " K o I Ie g ia l i ta t1',  t h is  is  combined in  IGBE w ith  
the  h ie ra rc h ic a l s tru c tu re  to  produce, in  h is  Opinion, a h ig h ly  
e f f i c ie n t  machine. One query about th e  degree o f c e n tra lis a t io n  
in  the  union which arose out o f  the  p i lo t  in te rv ie w s  was the 
in te n s ity  o f c o n tro l o f  the  c e n tra l body over the a c t iv i t ie s  
o f the Regional Committees who ne g o tia te  t h e ir  own c o l le c t iv e  
agreements. The im pression gained from  the  Regional Secretary 
in  Aachen where reg iona l barga in ing  took p lace , was th a t he 
had more freedom and power o f dec is io n  than h is  colleague 
in  Essen who operated a n a tio n a l agreement f o r  the hard coal 
in d u s try . Of course the  membership represented ou ts ide  the 
Ruhr hard coal in d u s try  c o n s titu te s  the  m in o r ity ,  but the 
p o in t is  worthy o f no te .
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The la rg e s t s in g le  group organised by OTV (P ub lic  S e rv ices, 
Transport & Communications) are the  b lu e -c o lla r  workers in  
p u b lic  sec to r employment. Union membership d i f f i c u l t i e s  were 
reported  in  the  p i lo t  survey to  have a risen  out o f the  s ta tu s  
d i f fe r e n t ia ls  between b lu e - and w h ite -c o lla r  members and the 
c i v i l  se rvan ts . The union p o lic y  was to  e ve n tua lly  remove 
such d iffe re n c e s  o f  s ta tu s  f o r  the  good o f the membership 
as a whole. O f f ic ia ls  in te rv iew ed  a lso  expressed a d e s ire  
to  l im i t  the  growth o f the  se n io r c i v i l  se rv ice  in  Germany 
as a fu r th e r  means o f c o n s o lid a tin g  the  fu tu re  membership 
base.
The problem fa c in g  t h is  union was th e re fo re  one o f employee 
a t t i tu d e  and awareness, in  a f ie ld  o f  recru itm en t la ck ing  
any t r a d it io n a l tra d e  union consciousness o r o rg a n is a tio n a l 
h is to ry .  T h is , lin k e d  w ith  a fe a r o f  job  loss in  p u b lic  
employment s ince 1974, had ra ise d  th e  le v e l o f  conservatism  
on the  p a rt o f some sec tions  o f the  membership. P a r t ic u la r ly
ii
a ffe c t in g  the  OTV o rg a n is a tio n  was the  s treng th  o f the  Deutscher 
Beamtenbund (DBB), the  a lte rn a t iv e  o rg a n isa tio n  open to  c i v i l  
se rvan ts . O f f ic ia ls  o f  the  union suggested th a t t h is  body 
c o n s titu te d  fa r  more o f a problem to  them than the DAG whose 
com petition  the  union could presumably co n ta in .
ii
In 1975, OTV la id  down o f f i c i a l  g u id e lin e s  fo r  the  ro le  and 
conduct o f shop stewards. Up to  t h is  p o in t any shop stewards 
had been e lec ted  by th e  members on a pu re ly  vo lun ta ry  and 
f le x ib le  ba s is . A f te r  1975, e le c t io n s :o f  stewards were on ly  
to  be ca rr ie d  ou t in  accordance w ith  new procedures and the 
jo b  o f the  steward was c le a r ly  s p e c if ie d . According to  the  
respondents from the  un ion , reasons fo r  th is  were tw o fo ld : 
to  make the  fu n c t io n  o f  the  shop steward a more e f f ic ie n t  
one, and to  separate out th e  ro le s  o f S ta ff  R epresentative 
(Works C o u n c illo r  e q u iv a le n t)  and shop steward. (This was 
a n o tice ab le  c o n tra s t to  the  stand taken by the o th e r two
ii
unions in  the  s tu d y ). OTV re je c te d  the  p r in c ip le  o f p la n t 
barga in ing  by the  un ion, on the  bas is  th a t ,  f o r  t h e ir  members, 
th e ir s  was la rg e ly  a s in g le  employer, ie  government bod ies, 
and th e re fo re  any v a r ia t io n s  in  pay would be i l lo g ic a l ;  a lso  *
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on id e o lo g ic a l and o rg a n is a tio n a l grounds. This view mayH
have been a s im p le r one fo r  OTV to  take since i t  was r e la t iv e ly  
weak a t p la n t le v e l in  comparison w ith  o the r un ions. In e f fe c t ,
ii
OTV stewards could not take  d ir e c t  a c tio n  on b eh a lf o f  t h e ir  
members; as stewards they could on ly  in form  and r e c r u it ,  as 
prescribed  by law. The union o f f i c ia l s  in terv iew ed appeared 
re lu c ta n t to  encourage a v e r t ic a l extension o f the  union o rg a n isa tio nu
downwards in to  the  S ta f f  R epresentative  C ouncils . OTV d id  
no t regard the S ta f f  Representatives who were members o f the 
union as instrum ents o f  the  un ion; indeed, the  s tren g th  o f 
members as S ta ff  Representatives c o u ld 'e v id e n tly  cause some 
s t ra in  between themselves and the  union d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e .
However, problems arose more f o r  the  union o rg a n isa tio n  where 
the  non-union S ta f f  R epresentatives were s trong , a s itu a t io n  
exascerbated by the  com pe titive  s treng th  o f the DBB.
Again, because o f the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  under
ii
c o l le c t iv e  b a rga in ing , OTV was probably the most d e ce n tra lised  
o f  the th ree  unions:. This was more l ik e ly  a r e s u lt  o f the  
s tru c tu re  o f employment ra th e r  than any d e lib e ra te  p o lic y  
in  favou r o f g re a te r democracy on the  p a rt o f  the c e n tra l 
a u th o r ity  o f the un ion . Moreover, o f f i c ia ls  a t a l l  le ve ls  
o f  o rg a n isa tio n  were reported  to  be involved on superv iso ry 
boards and government bodies as re p resen ta tives  o f th e ir  members 
in  t h e i r  own r ig h t ,  and thus c o n s titu te d  q u ite  separate centres 
o f in flu e n ce  o r a u th o r ity  w ith in  the  union o rg a n is a tio n .
Although the  reg io na l and d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  may have been 
su b jec t to  d ire c t io n  from above, such d ire c t io n  was lim ite d  
r e la t iv e  to  o th e r union s tru c tu re s  by nature o f the  de lega tion  
o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .
The centres o f most in flu e n ce  were again the Regional S ecre ta ries  
s ince  they were invo lved in  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing a t n a tio n a l 
le v e l as w e ll as being d i r e c t ly  respons ib le  f o r  the  conduct 
o f n e g o tia tio n s  a t t h e ir  own le v e l,  and they had in  p ra c tic e  
a c e r ta in  amount o f  personal in flu e n ce  over decision-m aking 
a t d i s t r i c t  le v e l.  T he ir p o s it io n  in  the union may have been 
comparable th e re fo re  to  the  Regional S ecre ta ries  in  the t e x t i le  
s ide o f  GTB.
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From the  emphasis placed by GTB o f f i c ia ls  included in  the  p i lo t  
survey on the  inc reas ing  volume o f le ga l case work a t t h e ir  
d i s t r i c t  and re g io n a l o f f ic e s ,  i t  is  reasonable to  propose 
th a t  a prim ary fu n c tio n  o f the  union had s h ifte d  away from 
n e g o tia tin g  wage increases to  securing b e tte r  severance packages. 
Respondents adm itted th a t  they had no c o n tro l over r a t io n a lis a t io n ,  
nor indeed was i t  t h e i r  in te n t io n  to  stop te ch n ica l p rogress, 
so t h e i r  quote o f a 95% success ra te  in  the law courts  represented 
not 95% o f jobs re ta in e d , but improved terms o f compensation 
fo r  redundancy o r u n fa ir  d ism issa l won fo r  the 95% o f t h e i r  
members who had lo s t  t h e i r  jo b s .
Through " th e ir "  Works C ouncils the union was in  a p o s it io n  
to  have some in flu e n ce  over working co n d itio n s , p iece ra te s , 
work study e tc  a t the  w orkplace, and they invested a g re a t 
deal in  t ra in in g  the  Works C o u n c illo rs  to  become tougher 
barga in ing  agents on th e i r  members' b e h a lf.
IGBE re p re se n ta tive s  seemed p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned w ith  the  
w e ll-b e in g  o f  the  mineworkers in  the  s h o rt-  to  m iddle te rm .
Of p rim ary concern were the  jo b  losses in  the  hard coal mines 
o f the  Ruhr, but co n s id e ra tio n  was a lso  given to  the  s o c ia l 
and c u l tu r a l ,  as w e ll as economic in te re s ts  o f the  m iners and 
th e i r  fa m il ie s .  The o b je c tiv e s  o f the  o f f ic e rs  union remained 
very in w a rd -lo o k in g , w ith  l i t t l e  r e f le c t io n  o f the  fu tu re  ro le s  
o f the  movement as a whole. With the  dec lin e  o f the  in d u s try , 
the  union was concerned to  re -e s ta b lis h  the high economic and 
s o c ia l s ta tu s  once associa ted w ith  coal m ining and i t s  trad e  
un ion . This would correspond w ith  T reu 's  observa tion  th a t  
the  re s tru c tu r in g  o f the  union o rg a n isa tio n  towards g re a te r 
c e n tra lis a t io n  fa c i l i t a te d : ,  a w ider ro le  fo r  i t s  f u l l - t im e
19o f f ic e r s  in  q u a s i-p u b lic  fu n c tio n s  and parliam enta ry  a c t iv i t y  .
His conclusion th a t * th is  has impaired the in te rn a l dem ocratic 
e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f the  union was not in ve s tig a te d  in  t h is  co n te x t.
T ra d e  Union O b j e c t i v e s
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Representatives o f OTV seemed more aware o f the  p o s it io n  o f 
th e  worker in  so c ie ty  ou ts ide  the  union o rg a n is a tio n . They 
spoke o f a " p o l i t ic a l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y "  o f u n io n is ts  to  s tru g g le  
fo r  changes in  the  s o c ia l and economic systems and o f  the  
a c c o u n ta b il ity  o f  the trad e  unions f o r  such c o n tro l over the 
economy as was a lready in  t h e ir  grasp. They also c ite d  more 
pragm atic o r immediate o b je c tiv e s  o f the un ion, such as so c ia l 
and economic s e c u r ity  f o r  t h e ir  members through the mechanisms 
o f n a tio n a l o r  reg io na l c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing , and pa rliam en ta ry  
lobby on issues such as the  in tro d u c tio n  o f new o f f ic e  technology 
on terms which were f a i r  and e q u ita b le  f o r  t h e ir  members; a 
n a tio n a l energy p o lic y  which would no t th re a te n  p u b lic  sec to r 
jo b s ; and the  extension o f p u b lic  se rv ice  employment g e n e ra lly  
to  a llow  redeployment from areas o f  ra t io n a lis a t io n .
O bject and Method o f the  F ie ld  Work
During the  1970s in  Germany, governments and o ther a u th o r it ie s  
became in c re a s in g ly  invo lved in  in d u s t r ia l wage ba rga in ing , 
w h ils t  the  barga in ing  process i t s e l f  became more te c h n ic a lly  
determ ined and r e l ia n t  upon in flu e n ce s  beyond the d ire c t  
in te re s ts  o f the  p a r t ie s  to  the  b a r te r .  Although the  trad e  
unions were expected to  be invo lved in  wage n e g o tia tio n , i t  
was unc lea r as to  how much in flu e n c e  in  p ra c tic e  they now had 
over wage le v e ls ;  t h e ir  p o s it io n  was weakened by the  persuasions 
o f government economic argument, and by the  independent channel 
o f p la n t ba rga in ing  conducted by the  nom ina lly  non-union bodies, 
the  Works C ouncils .
In fo rm a tion  produced by the  p i lo t  study a lso  ind ica ted  th a t  
in c re a s in g  involvement o f  trad e  union o f f i c ia ls  a t the  top  
o f the  o rg a n is a tio n a l h ie ra rch y  in  p u b lic  fu n c tio n s  could 
conce ivab ly  d r iv e  a serious wedge between the  leadersh ip  and 
the  rank and f i l e  membership.
Both developments, emergent in  the  Seventies, suggest a f a i l in g  
on the  p a r t o f the trad e  union o rgan isa tion s  to  c a rry  out t h e ir  
re p re s e n ta tiv e  ro le .  The main body o f research c a rr ie d  out
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in  la te  1979 sought to  in v e s tig a te  the o rg a n isa tio n a l s tru c tu re s , 
the  p a tte rn s  o f communication and the  sources o f in flu e n ce  and 
a u th o r ity  o f f u l l  tim e o f f ic e r s  w ith in  the selected unions which 
enabled them to  fu n c t io n  e f fe c t iv e ly  in  these changing circum stances. 
The re p o rt o f the  case study is  presented in  Chapter 6.
The in v e s tig a t io n  sought to  id e n t i f y  the  o rg a n isa tio n a l s tru c tu re s  
o f the  trad e  unions, c h ie f ly  in v o lv in g  fu l l - t im e  o f f ic e r s ,  which 
had been created to  cope w ith  those fu n c tio n s  o f the  unions 
which the  membership would most re a d ily  recognise, m ain ly c o l le c t iv e  
b a rg a in in g .
Secondly, the means by which o f f ic e r s  could ca rry  ou t t h e i r  
d u t ie s , t h e ir  sources o f in flu e n c e  and a u th o r ity ,  were examined 
in  terms o f communication and con tac t w ith in  the  o rg a n is a tio n  
and w ith  o th e r bod ies. F in a lly ,  the  issues, in  p u rs u it  o f  which 
the  unions were expected to  fu n c t io n , were assessed in  terms 
o f the  workload and concern o f  the  o f f ic e r s  in te rv ie w ed .
During October and November 1979, 34 reg iona l and d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s
ii
o f the  unions GTB, IGBE and OTV were in te rv ie w ed . A lso one
ii
n a tio n a l o f f ic e r  from each. (The OTV n a tio n a l o f f ic e r  was 
o n ly  in te rv iew ed once in  1978; the  o th e r two n a tio n a l o f f ic e r s  
p a r t ic ip a te d  in  both su rveys .)
No o f No o f
Regional D is t r ic t
O ff ic e rs  O ff ic e rs
GTB 5 8
IGBE 4 5
OTV 5 8
In te rv ie w s  were c a rr ie d  ou t according to  the  schedule o f questions 
g iven in  the Appendix to  th is  s tudy . W h ils t a tape reco rde r 
had been used fo r  the  p i lo t  survey, i t  was not used fo r  the  
main body o f in te rv ie w s .
[ In  a d d it io n  to  in te rv ie w s , in fo rm a l v is i t s  were a lso  made a t 
the in v ita t io n  o f IGBE o f f ic e r s  to  the  School a t H a lte rn , the
ii
Sudwestdeutsche Salzwerke AG, H e ilb ronn , and a f u l l  lo c a l branch 
m eeting, Frechen D is t r i c t . ]
A sim ple g raph ica l p resen ta tio n  o f the  responses, based on a 
rank c o r re la t io n  ana lys is  o f the  p r io r i t y  ra tin g s  o f trad e  
union a c t iv i t ie s  by the  union o f f ic e r s ,  is  a lso  g iven in  the 
Appendix.
The observa tions drawn from the  f ie ld  work re p o r t,  to g e th e r 
w ith  the  p ro p o s itio n s  o f the  preceding chapters in  respect o f 
the  s o c io -p o li t ic a l and h is to r ic a l terms o f re fe rence  o f  the  
tra d e  union o rgan isa tion s  in  Germany and B r ita in  are considered 
in  the  f in a l  chapter o f the  s tudy. From the  conc lus ions , a 
'm odel' o f  trad e  union behaviour is  presented, based on o f f ic e r  
access to  'po w e r', de fined f o r  th is  purpose as a u th o r ity  and 
in flu e n c e .
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The S tru c tu ra l and P o l i t ic a l  H is to ry  o f Trade Unions in  B r ita in  
1 The E vo lu tio n  o f  a B r i t is h  Trade Union Movement
The tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f the medieval community in  England to  a ‘modern1 
soc ie ty  was ch a rac te rised  by the emergence o f the s ta te  as the embodiment o f  
n a tio n a l government as the  c e n tra l a u th o r i ty ,  which encroached upon lo c a l 
p o l i t ic a l  and s o c ia l l i f e  and was ab le  to  development the machinery (a 
bureaucracy) to  e f fe c t  i t s  decrees. In t h is  new s o c ie ty , labour a lso  
emerged as a complete and separate e lem ent, made up o f  masters, journeymen, 
app ren tices, described in  Tudor tim es as " o f  the fo u r th  s o r t o f men who 
do not r u le " . 1
I t  was du ring  Tudor and S tu a rt tim es th a t  the  S ta te  developed a c o n t r o l l in g  
in te re s t  in  labour a f f a i r s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the  d ir e c t  re g u la tio n  o f  wages.
As new economic fo rc e s  became a c t iv e  and the  feuda l o rder destroyed by the
onslaught o f  m anufactu ring , the  S ta te  acknowledged the  necess ity  o f  in te rv e n -
2
t io n  to  con ta in  them. P e llin g  re p o rts  cases o f s ta tu to ry  in te rv e n tio n  in  
the  c o n tro l o f  wages o f the  u n s k ille d  as e a r ly  as the  14th cen tu ry , which 
was subesequently extended to  the  s k i l le d  and culm inated in  the S ta tu te  
o f  A r t i f ic e r s ,  1563. This f i r s t  le g is la t iv e  document provided fo r  'one 
sole law 1 on in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  " t o  y ie ld  unto the  h ired  person both in  the  
tim e o f  s c a rc ity  and in  the  tim e o f  p le n ty  a convenient p ro p o rtio n  o f
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wages." To th is  end, J u s tic e s  o f  the  Peace were a l lo t te d  the  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
fo r  de term in ing  annua lly  the  maximum wage ra te s  f o r  a c r a f t  o r tra d e .
The S ta tu te  was replaced by a la te r  Act o f 1604 which attempted to  take  
account o f  the  cos t o f l iv in g  in  wage f ix in g  and se t minima ra th e r  than 
maxima: the  need to  p ro te c t employees had been recognised. Other le g is la t io n  
a t th is  tim e intended to  d ir e c t  the  movement o f labour to  preserve lo c a l 
s t a b i l i t y  by m a in ta in in g  employment. The s o c ia l im p lic a tio n s  o f the  
s t r i c t l y  moral in te rp re ta t io n  o f th is  aim were severe, as re fle c te d  in  the  
le g is la t io n  on app re n ticesh ip  and the  Poor Laws.4 Labour-saving work 
was regarded as a n t i- s o c ia l and employers were o fte n  requ ired  to  p rov id e  
work even a t a lo s s . Fo llow ing a pe riod  o f depression during  the  years 1620- 
24, the  f i r s t  Royal Commission in to  the  causes o f unemployment was se t up.
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CHAPTER 2
The in tense m o n a rch ica l-s ta te  c o n tro l promoted the  e v o lu tio n  o f in d u s try
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and commerce as separate in te re s t  groups alongside labou r, such th a t  
the  c o n s t itu t io n a l d isse n t found a ll ia n c e  w ith  the economic and commercial 
in te re s ts  o f landowners and in d u s t r ia l is t s .  Thus the p r in c ip le  o f 
l ib e r t y  was accompanied by the  clamour f o r  economic freedom, the  la is s e r -  
f a i r e  o f the open market to  secure the  best most cheaply. The im p lic a tio n  
f o r  the  working man was th a t  h is  labour as a raw m a te ria l f e l l  in  
va lue .
The g u lf  between the  ru l in g  and working classes widened as the  des ire
to  preserve the s o c ia l o rde r in te n s if ie d  in  reac tion  to  the  re v o lu tio n a ry
movements on the  European c o n tin e n t. The d is p a r ity  was heightened
by th e  p o lic y  o f in a c tio n  propagated by the philosophy o f la is s e r - fa i r e
which had found resonance in  economic and p o l i t ic a l  th o u g h t, and which
presented the s o c ia l problems o f  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n  as n a tu ra l phenomena
5
f o r  which the re  was no cu re .
The o f f i c ia l  re g u la tio n  o f wages f e l l  in to  dec line  in  the  18th Century, 
w h ile  the increas ing  d is p a r ity  o f in te re s t  between master and man 
led to  the  decay o f the  g u ild  system. The formal system o f re g u la tio n  
was g ra d u a lly  neglected by masters and m agistrates a l ik e .  Journeymen 
began to  combine sepa ra te ly  from  t h e i r  employers w ith  the  aim o f e ith e r  
w ith h o ld in g  th e ir  la bou r, o r to  p e t i t io n  parliam ent f o r  le g is la t iv e  
supp o rt. Some success was wrought by the  weavers whose p e t it io n in g  
re s u lte d  in  the s h o r t- l iv e d  Woollen C lo th  Weavers A c t, 1756 (repealed 
the  fo llo w in g  year) and the  S p ita l f ia ld s  Acts o f 1765 and 1773.6 
However parliam ent was soon to  r e je c t  any r e s t r ic t iv e  wages p o lic y  
and the  le g is la tu re  could no longer be re lie d  upon to  p ro te c t the 
craftsm an from the  in d u s t r ia l fo rc e s  which undermined h is  tra d e . 
Combinations emerged as the  new form  o f defence aga ins t the  onslaught 
o f new machinery and adopted r e s t r ic t iv e  p rac tices  in  e n fo rc in g  o ld  
app ren ticesh ip  re g u la tio n s  to  uphold t h e ir  c ra f ts .  The o th e r not 
in fre q u e n t fu n c tio n  o f com binations was a f r ie n d ly  s o c ie tie s  f o r  insurance 
a g a in s t s ickness, o ld  age o r dea th .
As la is s e r - fa i r e  took a f irm e r  h o ld , so the  m is tru s t o f com binations 
became more widespread. This was re fle c te d  in  the re s o lu tio n s  o f 
the  cou rts  and the  growth in  the  number o f P riva te  B i l l s  in  p a rliam en t, 
o b je c tin g  to  the  p ra c tic e s  o f named com binations. The increased pressure
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on the  combinations caused the  d iv is io n  between th e ir  fu n c tio n s  as wage 
barga iners and f r ie n d ly  s o c ie tie s  to  b lu r r ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  a f te r  the pass­
ing o f the  F rie n d ly  S oc ie tie s  Act in  1799. The Combinations Act o f 1799 
was the  response to  a growing fe a r  o f  com binations associa ted , in  the 
shadow o f the French R evo lu tion , w ith  acts o f consp iracy. The amendment 
o f the  fo llo w in g  year provided fo r  a rb it r a t io n  and p e n a ltie s  f o r  re fu sa l 
to  accept a rb it r a t io n .  Employers' com binations were a lso  p ro h ib ite d  
on the p re te x t th a t  the re g u la tio n  o f the  c o n d itio n s  o f employment was the 
re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f the  le g is la tu re .  Prosecutions under the  Act were few7 , 
however, and the Webbs even venture to  suggest th a t  the ac tion s  o f some
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com binations which served to  enforce e x is t in g  laws were t a c i t l y  accepted. 
Moreover, the  growth o f com binations was not con ta ined ; some f lo u r is h e d  and 
a p a tte rn  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  was e s ta b lish e d . Others resorted  to  
v io len ce  in  response to  the  suppression. Repeal o f the laws re su lted  as 
much from a des ire  to  extend the  l ib e r a l  id ea l to  the freedom to  combine as 
a d e s ire  to  remove the v io len ce  from in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s :
"  the  laws have not on ly  not been e f f i c ie n t  to  prevent Combinations,
e ith e r  o f  masters o f workmen; b u t ,  had a tendency to  produce mutual
i r r i t a t i o n  and d is t r u s t ,  and to  g ive  a v io le n t  cha rac te r to  the Combin­
a tio n s , and to  render them h ig h ly  dangerous to  the  peace o f the  community.
 i t  is  the op in ion  o f th is  Committee th a t  masters and workmen should be
freed  from such r e s t r ic t io n s ,  as regards the  ra te  o f wages and hours o f
9
w o rk in g .."
F rancis Place, a master t a i l o r ,  led the  campaign fo r  the  repeal o f the 
Combination Laws. According to  the  Webbs, " in  a g ita t io n ,  permeation, w ire ­
p u l l in g ,  Parliam entary lobby ing , the  d ra f t in g  o f re s o lu tio n s , p e t it io n s
1 nand b i l l s  - . . . .h e  was an in ve n to r and ta c t ic ia n  o f the  f i r s t  o rd e r."
The Laws o f 1720 and 1767 on wage se ttlem en t in  t a i lo r in g ,  and the 
general laws o f 1800 had fa i le d  to  re g u la te  wages o r prevent s tr ik e s ,  
and i t  was P lace 's  testim ony in  fa vo u r o f  freedom o f c o n tra c t to  the 
S e lec t Committee o f the House o f Commons in  1810 which averted s t r ic te r  
le ga l c o n tro l.  Place had met w ith  h o s t i l i t y  and in d if fe re n c e  in  h is  
campaign. He was however e ve n tu a lly  granted the  hearing before the 
S e lec t Committee to  which he reported  in  m eticu lous d e ta i l .  The outcome 
was a se ries  o f re s o lu tio n s  in  favou r o f complete freedom o f com binations. 
The Combination Law o f 1824 repealed a l l  S ta tu tes  concerning combinations 
from Edward I onwards and assured th a t  the  act o f com bination was no 
longer grounds fo r  prosecution under the  common law.
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The immediate re a c tio n  was an increase in  the number o f com binations, 
o f s tr ik e s  and o f incidences o f v io le n c e . The alarm caused invoked 
a second Committee o f In q u iry  which uncovered a lo t  more evidence on 
com binations than had been presented to  the f i r s t .  The new Act o f 1825
re in troduced  the  ru lin g  o f common law w ith  respect to  consp irac ies  in
re s t r a in t  o f tra d e . The fu n c tio n s  o f combinations were to  be confined 
to  the se ttlem en t o f wages and hours o f labour, thus exc lud ing  r e s t r ic t iv e  
p ra c tic e s . The Act aimed to  p ro te c t the  in d iv id u a l w ith o u t denying 
the  r ig h ts  o f asso c ia tio n  when faced w ith  adverse economic c ircum stances. 
Though com binations would remain vu lne rab le  under common law and i t s  
in te rp re ta t io n  by the  ju d ic ia r y ,  t h e i r  open re co g n itio n  had been secured 
and t h e ir  emancipation e s ta b lis h e d :
" The r ig h t  o f c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , in v o lv in g  the power to  w ith ho ld  
labour from the market by concerted a c tio n , was fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e exp ress ly  
e s ta b lish e d . And although many s tru g g le s  remained to  be fough t before
the lega l freedom o f Trade Unionism was f u l l y  secured, no o ve rt attem pt
has since ben made to  render i l le g a l  th is  f i r s t  c o n d itio n  o f Trade Union 
a c t io n . " 11
Few o f the combinations or tra d e  c lubs o f th is  tim e were very e labora te  
in  s tru c tu re  and most operated on a very narrow lo c a lis e d  ba s is . Only 
the  a r t is a n s ' c lubs o f London and o th e r la rge  towns had any permanent 
o rg a n isa tio n  in  the  sense o f sets o f  ru le s , co n d ition s  o f e n try  and 
an a d m in is tra tio n  e lec ted  according to  agreed democratic p r in c ip le s .
The coalm iners and t e x t i le  fa c to ry  workers had no such o rg a n is a tio n , 
m ain ly because, c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  those in d u s tr ie s , low wages, poor 
education and h o s t i le  employers hindered such development. There had 
been some attem pts in  the North o f England to  form "Trades Unions" o f 
workers in a number o f in d u s tr ie s , such as the "P h ila n th ro p ic  S oc ie ty " 
o r "P h ila n th ro p ic  Hercules" as e a r ly  as 1818, but t h e ir  success is  u n c e rta in . 
In re co g n itio n  o f the  fa c t  th a t  e f fe c t iv e  'g e n e ra l' unionism was dependent 
upon n a tio n a l o rg a n is a tio n , John Doherty, secre ta ry  o f the  Manchester 
Cotton Spinners se t up a "Grant General Union o f the O perative Spinners 
o f Great B r ita in  and Ire la n d " in  1829. The fo llo w in g  year he founded 
the  Nationa l A ssoc ia tion  fo r  the  P ro te c tio n  o f Labour (NAPL), a 
fe d e ra tio n  o f trad e  clubs a t the  lo c a l le v e l,  a f f i l ia t e d  to  a c e n tra l 
c o u n c il.  Both o f  D oherty 's  o rg a n isa tio n s  were s h o r t - l iv e d :  in  1831, 
the  Grand General co llapsed  a f te r  a Manchester-based s t r ik e  and the  NAPL,
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The d e s ire  f o r  n a tio n a l o rg a n isa tio n  was fomented by the  movement fo r
the  reform  o f the fra n ch ise  and the use o f the  general s t r ik e  fo r  p o l i t ic a l
ends. There were some instances a t th is  tim e o f the p re te n tio n s  o f
1 2com binations extending beyond in d u s t r ia l a f fa i r s .  Macdonald records
a s t r ik e  in  the  Glasgow area which led to  the fo rm ation  o f a "Committee
o f O rganisa tion fo r  form ing a P ro v is io n a l Government". Idea ls  o f
coopera tive  p roduction  were ta k in g  ro o t ,  and in  t h is ,  a wealthy employer
and so c ia l re fo rm er, Robert Owen, took a lead. Towards the  end o f 1833,
the  'O wenite ' press was f u l l  o f re fe rences to  the fo rm a tion  o f a "General
13Union o f the P roductive  Classes" and in  January, 1834, Owen h im se lf 
encouraged the fo rm ation  o f the  "Grand N ationa l Consolidated Trades 
Union". Lodges a f f i l ia t e d  to  the  Union sprang up a l l  over the  country 
to  p rovide  s ic k ,  fu n e ra l and superannuation b e n e fits  f o r  i t s  members.
A se rie s  o f s t r ik e s ,  o r " tu rn -o u ts " ,  in c lu d in g  one by the  gas-stokers 
in  London which plunged Westminster in to  p a r t ia l darkness fo r  some 
days, brought the Union in to  d is re p u te , and s h o r t ly  a fte rw ards in to  
c o n f l ic t  w ith  the law. Amid the  hue and c ry  about acts o f s e d itio n  
and consp iracy, s ix  Dorset labourers were found g u i l t y  o f  using a form 
o f r i t u a l  and were tran spo rted  fo r  consp iracy. The h o s t i l i t y  o f the 
cou rts  exem p lified  by the Tolpuddle case severe ly weakened unionism 
g e n e ra lly  and in  p a r t ic u la r  the  Grand N ationa l which could no longer 
w ithstand  the  continued f a i lu r e  o f s t r ik e  a c tio n . T he rea fte r there  
was l i t t l e  more to  be heard o f coopera tive  production o r general unionism.
The p o l i t ic a l  movement which had in s p ire d  Owen found expression in  Chartism . 
I t s  aims were based upon a b e l ie f  in  the  id e n t ity  o f in te re s ts  o f the 
e n t ir e  working c lass  and i t  drew i t s  support from those who had le a s t 
to  gain from in d u s t r ia l change and would b e n e fit  most from p o l i t ic a l  
change. Trade unionism , on the  o th e r hand, survived on ly  among the 
w e a lth ie r  craftsmen who stood to  lose le a s t from in d u s t r ia l innova tion :
"Here i t  is  on ly  necessary to  say th a t  w h ils t  the  C h a rt is t  Movement 
commanded the  support o f the  vas t m a jo r ity  o f the manual-working wage- 
ea rne rs , ou ts ide  the  ranks o f those who were deeply re l ig io u s ,  there  
is  no reason to  b e lie ve  th a t  the  Trade Unions a t any tim e became p a rt 
and parce l o f the Movement, as they had du ring  1833-4, o f the Owenite
weakened by t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  s t r i k e ,  d i s a p p e a r e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r .
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a g ita t io n ,  though some o f t h e i r  members fu rn ished  the most ardent support­
ers o f the  C h a r te r ."14
Some unions ru led  the  d iscuss ion  o f p o l i t ic s  and re lig io n  out o f o rd e r,
15and, according to  F e llin g  , a t le a s t one soc ie ty  in Lancashire decreed 
th a t  no member could c la im  o u t-o f-w o rk  b e n e fit  as a re s u lt  o f 
p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  'any P o l i t ic a l  o r Popular T u rn -O u t'. The o b je c tiv e  
o f the  s u rv iv in g  trad e  unions became the  development o f c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing  and the  a tta inm en t o f  s trong  o rgan isa tions  to  th a t  end. T he ir 
aims were re fle c te d  in  the  instrum ents they chose: the  e xe rc ise  o f r e s t r i c t ­
ive  p ra c tice s  took p r io r i t y  over the  use o f the s t r ik e ,  and p u b lic  
support was recognised as e s s e n tia l f o r  the  e f fe c t iv e  p u rs u it  o f le ga l 
enactment. The d e c lin e  o f Chartism in  the  1840s and the  ra p id  economic 
progress which accompanied i t  helped conso lida te  a trad e  union movement, 
f u l l y  committed to  the  c u rre n t th e o rie s  o f p o l i t ic a l  economy. The re v iv a l 
o f  union o rg an isa tion  gave r is e  a lso  to  a new unionism which dev ia ted  
from  th a t  o f the  c lubs and s o c ie tie s  o f craftsm en, a lready in  ex is te n ce .
The new movement began in  the  North o f England w ith  an upsurge o f organ­
is a t io n  in  t e x t i le s ,  m in ing , eng ineering  and p r in t in g .  One c h a ra c te r is t ic  
o f new unionism was i t s  dogged re s is ta n ce  to  lega l oppression. A lthough 
persecu tion  o f trad e  union leaders had ceased, prosecutions o f rank and 
f i l e  members under the  Master and Servant le g is la t io n  con tinued . The 
newly formed M iners ' A sso c ia tio n  took the  lead in  the  le ga l b a t t le  f o r  
b e tte r  wages and c o n d it io n s . T h e ir s o l ic i t o r ,  W .P..Roberts, became 
famous as the "m ine rs ' a tto rn e y -g e n e ra l" , ac tin g  fo r  a tim e fo r  the  
Northumberland and Durham M ine rs ' Union, then fo r  the Lancashire M iners ' 
Union.
Due to  the  geographical co n ce n tra tio n  o f  m ining and t e x t i le s ,  the  new 
unionism in  these in d u s tr ie s  had l i t t l e  impact in  London, the  cen tre  
o f the  o ld  unionism o f c r a f t  c lubs and s o c ie t ie s . The l in k  between 
London and the  North came w ith  the  o rg a n isa tio n  o f the eng ineering  tra d e s .
In 1851, the various lo c a l and re g io n a l s o c ie tie s  o f m il lw r ig h ts ,  m ach in is ts  
and so on came to g e th e r to  form the  Amalgamated Socie ty o f Engineers 
(M ach in is ts , Sm iths, M illw r ig h ts  and Patternm akers). The ASE, c e n t ra lly  
organised on the  basis o f an e la b o ra te  c o n s t itu t io n ,  w ea lthy , and w ith  
an e lec ted  bureaucracy and f u l l - t im e  se c re ta ry , became a 'm odel' un ion . 
However i t s  h igh fees and e xc lu s ive  membership could on ly  be emulated by
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o the r s o c ie tie s  o f craftsm en and not by those unions w ith  wide ranges 
o f s e m i-s k ille d  workers, as in  m ining o r t e x t i le s .  They, in s tead , had 
un ited  in  1845 under the  um brella o f the "N a tiona l A ssoc ia tion  o f United 
Trades fo r  the P ro te c tio n  o f Labour". Less grandiose than the  Owenite 
movement o f 1833-4 in  i t s  aims, the  N ationa l A ssocia tion  o f United 
Trades provided an expedient channel fo r  coord inated lobbying on behalf 
o f p a r t ic u la r  in d u s tr ia l re fo rm s, w ith o u t encroaching on the  autonomy o f 
any o rgan isa tion  a f f i l i a t e d  to  i t :
"The p e c u lia r  lo c a l in te rn a l and te c h n ic a l circumstances o f each trade
render i t  necessary th a t  fo r  a l l  purposes o f e f f ic ie n t  in te rn a l government
i t s  a f fa ir s  should be adm in istered by persons possessing a p ra c t ic a l
knowledge o f them. For th is  reason i t  is  not intended to  in te r fe re  w ith
1 fithe  o rgan isa tion  o f e x is t in g  Trade Unions".
The re je c t io n  o f Owenism in  the  new s p i r i t  o f moderation was not only
incorpora ted  in to  the p o lic ie s  o f the union leaders, but was a lso re fle c te d
in  the a tt itu d e s  o f the  rank and f i l e .  While coopera tive  production
as an a u x i l l ia r y  to  trad e  union a c tio n  remained a re c u rre n t theme, s tr ik e s
were deprecated and the  no tion  o f a general s t r ik e  as a p o l i t ic a l  weapon
was re je c te d  e n t ir e ly .  U ltim a te ly  i t  was decided to  separate out trade
union and coopera tive  aims: the  N a tiona l A ssocia tion  o f United Trades
fo r  the P ro tec tion  o f Labour undertook to  deal w ith  d ispu tes  w ith  the
employers and to  promote labour in te re s ts  in the House o f Commons, w h ile
the  N ationa l United Trades A ssoc ia tion  fo r  the Employment o f Labour proposed
to  ra is e  c a p ita l w ith  which to  employ members when on s t r ik e .  However,
as coopera tive  estab lishm ents se t up between 1848 and 1852 fa i le d ,  the
id e a l ceased to  be regarded as a m atte r o f "p ra c t ic a l p o l i t ic s "  in  the 
17trad e  union w orld .
The N ationa l A ssocia tion  fa i le d  to  a t t r a c t  the support o f  the m a jo r ity  
o f trad e  s o c ie tie s , y e t the need f o r  a more un ited  movement had been 
recognised and was to  rece ive  more emphasis in  the events which ensued.
The s tru g g le  in the  London b u ild in g  trade  over the n ine-hour day in  1856, 
w h ile  ending in  sta lem ate , created a sense o f s o l id a r i t y  among trade  
u n io n is ts  and led to  the  s e tt in g  up o f the London Trades Council in  1860. 
Trades Councils were a lready in  ex is tence in  a few la rge  towns and the 
London Trades Council fo llow e d  t h e ir  example. The c o n s t itu t io n  o f the 
new Council ascribed to  i t  the  fu n c tio n  o f superin tend ing  "the  general
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in te re s ts  o f labour, p o l i t i c a l  and s o c ia l,  both in  and out o f P a rliam en t".
The small group o f leaders o f the  s tro n g , London-based trad e  f r ie n d ly
s o c ie tie s  who dominated the  London Trades Council came to  be regarded
as the  cab ine t o f the trad e  union movement. Named by the  Webbs as the  
19"Ju n ta ", these f iv e  in f lu e n t ia l  tra d e  u n io n is ts  advocated p o l i t ic a l
and in d u s tr ia l freedom and respected the economic in d iv id u a lis m  o f
t h e ir  in d u s tr ia l opponents. T h e ir p ra c t ic a l approach to  the  problems
o f in d u s try  and t h e ir  e xcep tiona l business acumen enabled them to
develop a d is t in c t iv e  p o lic y  o f "extreme caution  in  trad e  m atters and
2 0ene rg e tic  a g ita tio n  fo r  p o l i t i c a l  re fo rm s". M idd le -c lass opponents
to  trad e  unionism were s tru c k  by the  new type o f leader now emerging
from the  movement. Some o f the  more able were seen to  argue on m idd le -
c lass  terms and could present a pow erfu l case fo r  the ex is tence  o f unions,
as exem p lified  by the pamphlet on "Trades Unions and S tr ik e s "
by Thomas Dunning o f the  Bookbinders. By the  1860s, the  tra d e  unions
had begun to  in flu e n ce  p u b lic  op in ion  by the  respect they had won.
According to  one commentator, "A t no tim e in  the h is to ry  o f  labour
up to  1867 had labour leaders stood h igher in  p ub lic  e s tim a tio n , o r
were trade  unions more f re e  from v itu p e ra t iv e  a ttack than in  the  autumn
2 1o f 1866. I t  almost seemed as i f  o ld  feuds were to  be fo rg o tte n " .
The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f p u b lic  o p in ion  and the need to  gain p u b lic  support 
to  e f fe c t  changes in  the  laws a f fe c t in g  trad e  union a c t iv i t y  and growth 
in s tig a te d  a renewed in te re s t  among the  labour leaders in  p o l i t ic a l  
re fo rm . Yet the in d iv id u a l tra d e s  were not to  be induced in to  ta k in g  
a c tio n  in  support o f p o l i t i c a l  aims. The Junta turned to  the  Trades 
Councils which were to  become the  p o l i t ic a l  centres o f the  trad e  union 
w o rld . In 1864, a N a tiona l Reform Union, composed m ainly o f m idd le - 
c lass ra d ic a ls  was se t up which in fluenced  trade  u n io n is ts  in  fa vo u r 
o f  t h e i r  own w ork ing -c lass  reform  o rg a n is a tio n . The fo llo w in g  yea r, 
w ith  the  a c tiv e  support o f the  London union leaders the Reform League 
came in to  being, and secured f o r  the  ra d ic a ls  unprecendented success 
in  the general e le c t io n .  R ecognition o f t h e ir  success in fluence d  more 
tra d e  u n io n is ts  to  jo in  the  reform  movement, w ith  the  p rov iso  th a t ,
"w h ile  adv is ing  the  g rea t bodies o f  trad e  un ion is ts  thus to  a c t,  we
have no des ire  to  make our s o c ie t ie s  channels fo r  p o l i t ic a l  a g i ta t io n " .
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Meanwhile, the  Glasgow Trades Council in i t ia te d  a n a tio n a l campaign fo r
the  reform  o f the o ld  Master and Servant A c t. I t  has been suggested
th a t  the  pressure o f the  o ld  law, which had e ffe c te d  le g a l d is c r im in a tio n
aga ins t workers in  t h e ir  co n tra c tu a l s ta tu s  w ith  the  employers, had
borne down more h e a v ily  upon S co ttish  workers due to  the  characte r
23o f in d u s try  and the  lega l system in  S cotland. As a r e s u lt  o f the 
a g ita t io n ,  a S e lec t Committee was appointed in  1865, and on the basis 
o f i t s  re p o r ts , an Act was passed in  1867 to  remedy the  most outrageous 
aspects o f the  o ld  le g is la t io n .
Despite the recen t successes o f the  tra d e  unions in ga in ing  p u b lic  
respec t, t h e ir  lega l s ta tu s  remained u n c e rta in . During the  years 
1866 to  1868, a se rie s  o f events took place which threatened th e ir  
very ex is ten ce . The s o -ca lle d  "S h e ff ie ld  Outrages" were the cu lm ina tion  
o f a se ries  o f acts o f v io lence  d ire c te d  aga ins t n o n -u n io n is ts .
Though i t  is  unc lear whether o r not u n io n is ts  were respons ib le  f o r  
these ac ts , p u b lic o p in io n a tt r ib u te d  the  blame to  them. The period o f bad 
trad e  in  1867-68 added fu e l to  the spate o f bad press fo r  the unions.
The union leaders became anxious to  rega in  p u b lic  re sp e c t, and a l l  the  more 
so a f te r  the Hornby v Close judgement, which demonstrated the precarious 
le ga l s ta tu s  o f t h e i r  o rg a n isa tio n s . The unions had assumed th a t under 
the  F rie n d ly  S o c ie tie s  Act o f  1855, t h e i r  funds were p ro tec te d ; y e t,  
according to  the Hornby v Close case, in v o lv in g  the  B o ile rm akers ' S oc ie ty , 
they were e n t it le d  to  no redress from d e fa u lt in g  o f f ic e r s  and members.
The reasoning by which the  judges reached t h e ir  ru lin g  was a l l  the 
more serious fo r  the  trad e  union movement, s ince , i t  was argued, trade  
unions lay ou ts ide  the  scope o f the  A c t, because they were s t i l l  i l le g a l  
o rgan isa tion s  f o r  com m itting actions ' in  r e s t r a in t  o f t r a d e '.
Fo llow ing the  S h e ff ie ld  outrages, a Royal Commission had been appointed 
to  in v e s tig a te  trad e  unionism g e n e ra lly . I t  was e s s e n tia l th a t the 
union leaders should present trade  unionism in  a p o s it iv e  l ig h t ;  to  
th is  end, the tra d e  union nominees t r ie d  to  d ire c t  the  a tte n tio n  o f 
the  Commissioners to  the  la rge  Amalgamated unions, to  present the  unions 
as sober insurance s o c ie tie s  whose a f fa ir s  were e n t ir e ly  b u s in e s s - lik e  
and "above board ". Many employers and t h e ir  a l l ie s ,  f o r  th e ir  p a r t ,  
made a determined e f f o r t  to  d is c re d it  the  movement to  secure the suppression 
o f trad e  unionism by c r im in a l law. The M a jo r ity  Report o f  the  Commission
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was guarded in i t s  recommendations. Registered w ith  the  R e g is tra r 
o f F r ie n d ly  S o c ie tie s , the  unions should no longer be su b je c t to  
p rosecu tion  fo r  a c tin g  ' in  r e s t r a in t  o f  t ra d e '.  The R e g is tra r  would 
be empowered however to  r e je c t  ru le s  which upheld r e s t r ic t iv e  p ra c t ic e s . 
Trade union funds should be p ro te c te d , but "B e n e fit"  and "Trade" 
funds should be kept s e p a ra te ly . The M in o rity  Report was less r e s t r ic t iv e  
in  i t s  recommendations in  th a t  re g is t ra t io n  w ith  the  R e g is tra r  o f 
F rie n d ly  S o c ie tie s  should o f fe r  the  p ro te c tio n  o f funds w ith o u t the  
compulsory r e g is t r a t io n  and v e t t in g  o f ru le s . Thus they would be 
p ro tec ted  from p rosecu tion  as co rpo ra te  bodies.
The B i l l  o f 1871 which fo llo w e d  was described by angry employers
24as "a complete c h a r te r  le g a lis in g  un ions". I t  was however supplemented 
by a penal clause which made the  coerc ion  o f employers o r  employed, 
"m o le s tin g ", " o b s tru c t in g " ,  " th re a te n in g " , " in t im id a t in g " ,  "w a tch ing" 
a n d "b e s e ttin g " , a l l  i l l e g a l .  This amounted to  an e f fe c t iv e  w ithdraw al 
o f r ig h ts ,  s ince the  M o les ta tio n  o f Workmen Act o f 1859, secured 
by the e f fo r ts  o f the  N a tiona l Associa ted, which had exp ress ly  le g a lis e d  
peacefu l p ic k e tin g , was now repea led .
The events o f 1866-68 had provoked trad e  union leaders in to  fu r th e r  
though t o f coopera tion  between trad es  on a n a tio na l b a s is :
"The tim e has a rr iv e d  when the  trades  o f the United Kingdom ought 
to  take ac tio n  c o n jo in t ly  to  re bu t the  lo ck -ou t system now so p reva len t 
w ith  the  c a p i ta l is t s ;  and the  d isp u te  and lo ck -o u t in  the  S h e ff ie ld  
f i l e  trad e  a ffo rd s  an e x c e lle n t o p p o rtu n ity  fo r  c a rry in g  th is  in to  
e f f e c t . " 2^
On th is  re s o lu tio n  o f  the  Wolverhampton Trades C ounc il, the  S h e ff ie ld  
A ssocia tion  o f Organised Trades c a lle d  a conference to  e s ta b lis h  
a n a tio n a l o rg a n is a tio n , the  United Kingdom A llia n c e  o f  Organised 
Trades. The o b je c t iv e  was to  b u ild  up a c e n tra l fund to  a id  members 
in  defensive d is p u te s . U n fo rtu n a te ly  the  c o n s titu e n t o rg a n is a tio n s  
were re lu c ta n t to  pay t h e i r  le v ie s  in  f u l l ,  and the  A llia n c e ,  faced 
w ith  f a i lu r e  to  meet demand, co llapsed  in  1867. The fo llo w in g  ye a r, 
the  Manchester and S a lfo rd  Trades Council had the  idea o f c a l l in g  
a congress o f tra d e  o rg a n is a tio n s  fo r  the purposes o f d iscuss ion  
and p u b l ic i t y .  The in v i ta t io n  sent out by the Council to  the  trades
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s ta ted  th a t  "the  Congress s h a ll assume the cha rac te r o f  the annual meetings 
o f the B r i t is h  A ssoc ia tion  fo r  the Advancement o f Science and the Social 
Science A sso c ia tio n , in  the tra n s a c tio n s  o f which s o c ie tie s  the a rtis a n  
c lass  are almost excluded; and th a t  p re v io u s ly  c a re fu lly  prepared papers 
s h a ll be la id  before  the  Congress on the  various sub jec ts  which a t the 
present tim e a f fe c t  the  trade  s o c ie t ie s , each paper to  be fo llow ed by 
d iscuss ion  upon the  p o in ts  advanced, w ith  a view o f the  m e rits  and dem erits 
o f each question being thorough ly  v e n tila te d  through the  medium o f thenr
p u b lic  p re ss ".
Most o f the  im portan t Trades C ouncils , except Glasgow and London were 
represented, as w e ll as a number o f tra d e s . A second meeting was held 
the  next year in  Birmingham, and the London Trades Council d id  send 
re p re se n ta tive s  th is  tim e . A dec is ion  was taken to  hold the next Congress 
in  London, w ith  a view to  lobbying M.P.s a t Westminster during the  days 
o f the  Congress; f o r  th is  reason, Congress was held over u n t i l  1871, 
when the  government's trade  union B i l l  was to  be in troduced .
At Congress th a t  yea r, a Parliam entary Committee was se t up to  keep the 
pressure up in  the  Lobby a f te r  the  Congress was ove r. Successive Congresses 
appointed a P arliam entary Committee, which thus proceeded to  become 
a permanent in s t i t u t io n .  This s ig n a lle d  the  disbanding o f the Junta 
as the c e n tra l committee o f the  trad e  union movement.
The Parliam entary Committee chose to  take a separate lin e  to  the L ib e ra l 
government in  the  e le c tio n s  o f 1874, in  response to  the  la t t e r 's  fa i lu r e  
to  take fu r th e r  steps to  improve trad e  union law. In the  Parliam entary 
Committee the  movement found a p o l i t ic a l  machine to  d isce rn  and support 
those e le c to ra l candidates most l i k e ly  to  d is p la y  lo y a lty  towards the 
un ions. This independent l in e  o f the  Parliam entary Committee was b lu rred  
however by the two m ine rs ' rep resen ta tives  who entered parliam ent th a t 
year on a L ib e ra l t ic k e t ,  and who earned the name L ib -Labs. The e le c tio n s  
o f 1874 neverthe less i l lu s t r a te d  a new determined e f f o r t  in  organised 
p o l i t ic a l  ac tio n  on the  p a rt o f trad e  u n io n is ts . A new fe e lin g  in  labour 
p o l i t ic s  was demonstrated by the running o f labour candidates aga inst 
both p a r t ie s .  At the  1874 Congress, i t  was reported  th a t  the m iners, 
ironw orkers and some o th e r s o c ie tie s  had voted money to  support pa rliam en t­
a ry  cand ida tu re .
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Yet f o r  t h e ir  e f fo r t s ,  the  Conservative government, which was re turned 
to  o f f ic e ,  d id  no t repeal the  C rim ina l Amendment Act co n ta in in g  the penal 
clause o f the 1871 B i l l .  Ins tead , the government c a lle d  another Royal 
Commission. The f in d in g s  o f the  Commission led to  two new A cts : the 
f i r s t ,  the Conspiracy and P ro te c tio n  o f Property A c t, le g a lis e d  peaceful 
p ic k e tin g  and o ffe re d  a narrower d e f in i t io n  o f 'o ffe n c e s ' in  trad e  d ispu tes . 
The Act a lso  took away the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  from those workers whose 
ac tion s  would c o n s t itu te  a menace to  the community, th a t  is ,  in  the  
se rv ice  in d u s tr ie s  o f gas and water sup p lie s . Secondly, the  o ld  Masters 
and Servants Act was renamed the  Employers and Workmen A c t, under which 
the  pena lty  f o r  breach o f c o n tra c t was lim ite d  to  payment o f c i v i l  damages 
The passing o f these Acts marked the f in a l  lega l re c o g n itio n  o f c o l le c t iv e  
ba rga in ing . Employer and employee had become equal p a r t ie s  to  a c i v i l  
c o n tra c t. In the new c lim a te  o f favourab le  p u b lic  op io n io n , trad e  union 
leaders acquiesced in  m oderation as 'p a rtn e rs ' in  the  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ­
ing process. Employers fo r  the  most p a rt abandoned t h e i r  o b je c tio n  
to  union re c o g n it io n , and even conceded the p r in c ip le  o f the  re g u la tio n  
o f in d u s try  by J o in t C o n c il ia t io n  Boards, o r a r b it r a t io n .
"T w en ty -five  years ago", sa id  Alex Macdonald in  1875, "when we proposed 
the adoption o f the  p r in c ip le  o f a r b it r a t io n ,  we were then laughed to  
scorn by the employing in te re s ts .  But no movement has ever spread so
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ra p id ly  o r taken a deeper ro o t than th a t which we then se t on f o o t . "
The u n io n is ts , fo r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  m anifested cooperation in  t h e i r  acceptance 
o f the  S lid in g  Scale o f wages which supplanted the p r in c ip le  o f the 
minimum wage.
A f te r  1874, economic recession once again set in  which severe ly  weakened 
tra d e  union o rg a n is a tio n . The number o f those represented a t Congress
n o
in  the period 1975 to  1884 was less than h a lf  the f ig u re  fo r  1874, 
which, in  tu rn  narrowed the  scope and in fluence  o f the  P arliam entary 
Committee. As trad e  s u ffe re d , in te rn a l d issen t over tra d e  union p o lic y  
became acute . The loss o f employment by union members dra ined t h e ir  
ou t-o f-w o rk  funds and demarcation d isputes arose out o f c la im s on the 
r ig h t  to  work. The p o l i t ic a l  proceedings o f the annual Congress and 
Parliam entary Committee c o n s titu te d  the on ly  common bond between the 
is o la te d  trade  s e c tio n s , which Congress endeavoured to  m a in ta in  by 
becoming " fo r  ten years l i t t l e  more th a t a gathering o f tra d e  union
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o f f i c ia l s ,  in  which they d e liv e re d , w ith  p la c id  unan im ity , t h e ir  views
29on labour le g is la t io n  and labour p o l i t ic s " .  A l l  tra d e  union problems 
o f o rg a n is a tio n , c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  p ra c tic e  o r le g is la t iv e  
re g u la tio n  in  in d u s try  were d e lib e ra te ly  excluded from the  Congress 
agenda. The d e lib e ra te  avoidance o f in te rn a l d issension a t Congress 
was ins trum enta l in  supporting Congress's o r ig in a l and predominant 
fu n c tio n  as p u b lic is t  and p o l i t ic a l  p ro ta g o n is t o f the movement.
Moreover, s e l f - in te r e s t  on the p a rt o f in d iv id u a l trades hindered the 
development o f any c o l le c t iv e  des ire  to  improve the lo t  o f a l l  working 
men:
" In  the absence o f any f ix e d  o r co n s is te n t idea o f the  c o l le c t iv e  in te re s t
o f the  wage-earning c la ss , o r o f Trade U n ion is ts  as such, every proposal
th a t  any section  demanded fo r  i t s e l f  was accepted w ith  equanim ity by
the Congress, and passed on to  the  Parliam entary Committee to  ca rry
o u t, however in c o n s is te n t i t  m ight be w ith  the  general p r in c ip le s  th a t
30swayed t h e ir  m inds."
Thus the  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t y  o f the movement was l e f t  la rg e ly  to  the 
Parliam entary Committee whose most im portan t proposal in  the la te  1870s 
was f o r  an Employers' L ia b i l i t y  A c t, on compensation f o r  in d u s tr ia l 
neg ligence. However, such reforms as they were able to  exact from 
the new l ib e r a l government o f 1880 were very lim ite d  and d id  l i t t l e  
to  a l le v ia te  the  cond ition s  o f the  working c la s s .
As has a lready been noted, more prom inent tra d e  union leaders had been
converted to  the economic in d iv id u a lis m  o f the L ib e ra l ph ilosophy.
By th e ir  very ex is tence , trade  unions ackowledged the  governing p o l i t ic a l
economy, the reform  o f which would c a l l  in to  question t h e ir  own
ra iso n  d 'e t r e .  In the 1880s, they represented an "im penetrab le  b a r r ie r
31aga ins t S o c ia l is t  p ro je c ts "  , which o ffe re d  l i t t l e  com fort to  the 
armies o f unemployed, u n s k ille d  and s e m i-s k ille d  who had emerged from 
the  slump o f the previous decade. The new mass movement o f in d u s tr ia l 
workers o f few s k i l ls  and no t ra d it io n s  re je c te d  the  premises o f moderation 
and ‘ p a r tn e rs h ip 1 o f the o ld  u n io n is ts . Spurred on by the th re a t o f 
d e s t i tu t io n ,  i t s  members favoured aggression, w ith  no room fo r  compromise. 
The movement found a lle g ia n ce  in  the  new S oc ia lism , acknowledging as 
i t  d id ,  broader o b je c tive s  than was o ffe re d  by the narrow in d u s tr ia lis m  
o f the  la is s e r - fa i r e  unions.
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The period 1889-90 saw an upsurge in  the "New Unionism ", as i t  came 
to  be c a lle d . Aimed a t the  u n s k ille d  and s e m i-s k il le d , the  'new' 
d if fe re d  from the 'o ld '  in  both ta c t ic s  and s tru c tu re . C o n tr ib u tio n s  
were low, th e re fo re  b e n e fits  in  the way o f mutual insurance schemes 
were la rg e ly  n o n -e x is te n t. Such funds as they had were to  support 
aggressive s t r ik e  a c t io n . They o fte n  adopted the term 'genera l un ion ' 
in  t h e i r  t i t l e s ,  to  denote re c ru itm e n t not lim ite d  by occupa tion , though 
some o f them d id  in trodu ce  an element o f e x c lu s iv ity  la te r  to  m ain ta in  
t h e ir  barga in ing p o s it io n .
The sudden success o f the  New Unions in  a period o f p ro s p e r ity  boosted 
the  membership o f the  tra d e  union movement many fo ld .  Non-society 
craftsm en were s tim u la te d  to  jo in  the unions and s o c ie tie s  o f t h e ir  
tra d e . Moreover, the  th re a t  to  the  s ta tus  o f the cra ftsm en, brought 
about by the advances o f m echanisation, induced a gradual change in  
the a t t i tu d e  o f the 'o ld '  unions towards the u n s k ille d . Of the  Engineers 
in  1890, i t  was s a id ,
"Labour-saving machinery is  reducing the  p re v io u s ly  s k i l le d  to  the
le v e l o f u n s k ille d  la bou r, and they must, in  th e ir  own in te re s ts ,  be
32less exc lus ive  than h i th e r to . "
This adaptation by the  'o ld ' unions to  the a sp ira tio n s  o f the  'new' 
is  a lso  ev iden t in  the  endorsement by the  TUC in 1890 o f the  demand 
f o r  the  e ig h t-h o u r day. The c a l l  f o r  the e ig h t-h o u r day was f i r s t  
launched by the Socia l Democratic Federa tion, as e a r ly  as 1883, and 
was secured by the  gasworkers in  1889. The promotion in  th a t  same 
year o f two in f lu e n t ia l  new u n io n is ts , John Burns and Tom Mann, to  
the Parliam entary Committee to  jo in  S o c ia l is t ,  K e ir H ard ie, was to  
have fa r-re a c h in g  consequences fo r  the  subsequent development o f  TUC 
p o lic y .  The P arliam entary Committee, lo y a l to  the L ib e ra l P a rty , was 
not in  a p o s it io n  to  e x e rt p o l i t i c a l  pressure fo r  more e f fe c t iv e  pa rlia m e n t­
ary re p re se n ta tio n , which the  s o c ia l is ts  demanded. The c lash  o f op in ion  
between the s o c ia l is ts  and l ib e r a l is t s  in the  Congress centred upon 
the  e ig h t-h o u r day as the  symbolic issue o f c o n f l ic t .
In 1893, K e ir Hardie secured the s e tt in g  up o f a fund to  sponsor e le c to ra l 
cand ida tes, who, by an amendment, were to  "support the  p r in c ip le  o f 
c o l le c t iv e  ownership and c o n tro l o f a l l  means o f p roduction  and
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d is t r ib u t io n " ,  as w e ll as the c u rre n t programme o f Congress. Hardie 
fa i le d ,  however, to  lu re  Congress away from the L ib e ra l Party as the 
re p re se n ta tive  organ o f the labour movement. In view o f the  worsening 
economic s itu a t io n ,  and the fa i lu r e  o f e ith e r  p a rty  to  ac t on beha lf 
o f the  working c lasses, Hardie decided to  'go i t  a lone ' by c a l l in g  
toge the r a l l  the  lo ca l Labour groups to  found the Independent Labour 
P arty .
This move by Hardie caused anger and je a lo usy  among both h is  opponents 
and h is  a l l ie s .  Among the la t t e r  was John Burns, whose b itte rn e s s  
led him to  propose to  the P arliam entary Council a change in  the standing 
orders o f Congress. The changes, accepted by the Parliam entary Council 
on ly by the  cas ting  vote o f the Chairman, invo lved sw itch ing  from vo tin g  
by show o f hands to  the b lock vo te . This e f fe c t iv e ly  s h ifte d  the power 
in  Congress away from the  Trades C ounc ils , which were predom inantly 
s o c ia l is t ,  to  the la rge  unions. Exclusion o f the Trades Councils was 
also proposed as a means o f e ra d ic a tin g  d u p l ic i t y  o f rep resen ta tion  
a t Congress. K e ir Hardie responded w ith  an a r t ic le  in  the  "Labour 
Leader" in  which he argued,
"Anyone who w i l l  take the tro u b le  to  go through the l i s t  o f delegates 
to  the la s t  Congress w i l l  f in d  th a t  the  on ly  change such a ru le  would 
make would be the exclusion  from fu tu re  Congresses o f the  fo llo w in g :
Henry B roadhurst, John Burns, Thomas B u rt, K e ir Hardie and Tom Mann.
I understand Mr. Burns cla im s to  be a paid o f f i c ia l  o f the Amalgamated 
Socie ty o f Engineers, since th a t  body pays him £100 a year f o r  rep resen t­
ing t h e ir  in te re s ts  in  P arliam ent. He would, th e re fo re , i f  th is  is  
c o r re c t,  be s t i l l  e l ig ib le  to  go to  Congress. Mr B urt is  s t i l l  an
o f f i c ia l  o f the  Northumberland M iners ' Union The new ru le ,  th e re fo re ,
has been framed fo r  the express purpose o f excluding Broadhurst, Mann 
and m y s e lf" .34
The re s o lu tio n  was nevertheless passed a t the 1895 Congress, a severe 
setback fo r  Socia lism  and H a rd ie 's  new p a r ty .
I t  was not u n t i l  1899 th a t Hardie managed to  persuade Congress to  
s e r io u s ly  consider the p u rs u it o f d ir e c t  and independent labour rep resen t­
a t io n . The aggression and instances o f v io lence  which had accompanied 
the b i r th  o f New Unionism had hardened m idd le -c lass  a tt itu d e s  towards 
the labour movement and had encouraged the  growth o f em ployers'
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fe d e ra tio n s . In 1893, W illiam  C o lliso n  had founded the N ationa l Free 
Labour Associa tion  as a fund o f ‘ b la c k le g 1 labour to  be used to  break 
s t r ik e s ,  though i t  had l i t t l e  success. In 1897-8, the re  was a c lash 
between the Employers’ Federation o f Engineering A ssoc ia tions , and the  
A .S .E ., which re s u lte d  in  the  f i r s t  major n a tio na l s t r ik e  or lo c k -o u t.
The lo ck -o u t defeated the  Engineers and caused a shock-wave throughout 
the movement. The TUC Congress responded by e s ta b lis h in g  a c e n tra l 
fund fo r  a id  to  the  Engineers, which marked a departure from t r a d it io n a l 
Parliam entary Committee p o lic y  o f non -in te rfe rence  in  trade  m atters 
and se t a new precedent f o r  the fu tu re .
The lo ck -o u t a lso  rev ived  ideas o f s e tt in g  up a trad e  union fe d e ra t io n .
A spec ia l conference o f a l l  a f f i l i a t e d  unions was c a lle d  in Manchester 
and a new o rg a n isa tio n  by the  name o f the  General Federation o f Trade 
Unions was born. The Federation was however on ly supported by a q u a rte r 
o f the u n io n is ts  a f f i l i a t e d  to  the TUC, and as a mutual insurance s o c ie ty , 
tended in p ra c tic e  to  avoid s tr ik e s  ra th e r than support them.
The estab lishm ent in  1898 o f the  Employers' Parliam entary Council underlined
the urgency o f e f fe c t iv e  trad e  union rep resen ta tion  in  P arliam ent.
Hardie proposed a conference o f a l l  sectors o f the labour movement,
c o o p e ra tis ts , s o c ia l is ts  and trad e  u n io n is ts , to  promote the  re tu rn
o f labour re p re se n ta tive s  to  the House. The idea was supported by the
Dockers, General Labourers, Railway Servants and Shop A s s is ta n ts , and
opposed by the  M iners ' Federation and the Cotton Spinners. The Miners
and Spinners a lso  boycotted the conference, held in  1900, which e lec ted
an executive  committee o f tw e lve , "a c loud , no b igger than a man's hand
36which may grow in to  a United Labour P a rty " . The Labour Representation
Committee (L .R .C .) and th e  General Federation o f Trade Unions (G .F .T .U .)
had been set up to  extend the  fu n c tio n s  o f the TUC in to  areas in  which
37i t  could not operate i t s e l f .  As was suggested by the  Webbs , to  have 
taken on such fu n c tio n s  would have caused in te rn a l d issension and the 
u lt im a te  co llapse  o f the  TUC.
The importance o f the  p o l i t ic a l  wing o f the trade  union movement had 
become ev iden t in  the 1890s, as the  unions recognised th a t t h e ir  lega l 
p o s it io n  was being in c re a s in g ly  undermined by the ju d ic ia r y .  During
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the  1870s and 1880s, the balance o f op in ion  had favoured the com bination 
o f workers to  meet the barga in ing  s tren g th  o f the  employers. Up u n t i l  
1889, the  unions had been r e la t iv e ly  weak and the re  had been l i t t l e  
cause fo r  employers to  re s o r t  to  the law. As unions gained in  s ize  
and s ta tu re , and instances o f v io len ce  a t p ic k e t lin e s  became more 
fre q u e n t, judges concluded th a t  they should be made le g a lly  respons ib le  
f o r  t h e ir  ac tions under common law. The question o f the in c o rp o ra tio n  
o f trad e  unions and l i a b i l i t y  f o r  damages was a t issue in  the T a ff Vale 
Railway case o f 1900. During a s t r ik e  o f railwaymen on the  T a ff Vale 
l in e  in  South Wales, the employers secured an in ju n c tio n  aga ins t the  
union fo r  p ic k e tin g  aga inst b la ck le g g in g . The case e v e n tu a lly  reached 
the  House o f Lords, which ru le d  th a t  union funds were l ia b le  fo r  damages 
in f l ic t e d  by i t s  o f f i c ia l s .  The judgement demonstrated the  am bigu ity 
and weakness o f the law and i t s  complex p o l i t ic a l  im p lic a t io n s . A Royal 
Commission on Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations, in s t i tu te d  in  1903, 
reported  in  1906 th a t  the  judgement had been c o n s is te n t w ith  trad e  union 
law, but th a t b e n e fit  funds should be pro tected  from l i a b i l i t y .  The 
Commission saw "no more reason th a t  the trade  unions should be beyond
38the  reach o f the  law than any o the r in d iv id u a l pa rtn e rsh ip  o r in s t i t u t io n " .  
The recommendations o f the  Report were em pha tica lly  in  favou r o f a 
rea lignm ent o f union s ta tus  a t law. In 1901, in  the Quinn v Leathern 
case, the  House o f Lords ru le d  fu r th e r  th a t f o r  a com bination o f 
persons to  in ju re  another person was a breach o f the  c i v i l  law o f c o n s p ir­
acy. The judgement represented a serious th re a t to  trad e  unions in  
ta k in g  ac tio n  aga ins t an in d iv id u a l employer.
Trade u n io n is ts  re a lis e d  the  importance o f in flu e n ce  over the
le g is la tu re .  The ir main hope was s t i l l  the L ib e ra l P a rty , s ince the
trad e  union group in  Parliam ent remained amorphous and poo rly  o rgan ised.
The s tren g th  o f the LRC was grow ing, however, and by 1906-7, the re
39were almost one m il l io n  members a f f i l i a t e d  to  i t .  The T a ff Vale 
outcome had encouraged sponsorship o f the  LRC, which had now achieved 
permanence. A vo lun ta ry  p o l i t ic a l  levy was in troduced by the  TUC in  
1903 and made compulsory the  fo llo w in g  year. In the e le c tio n s  o f 1906, 
an a llia n c e  o f the  LRC w ith  the  L ib e ra l Party secured 30 LRC seats 
in  Parliam ent, o f which 23 were trad e  union nominees, and 7 were ILP.
A fu r th e r  17 trad e  u n io n is ts  gained sea ts , o f whom 13 were m iners ' 
re p re s e n ta tiv e s .40
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A fte r  much con ten tion  among cab ine t members and government lawyers, the 
le ga l immunity o f organised labour and c a p ita l was guaranteed in  the 
Trades Disputes A c t. This s in g le  piece o f le g is la t io n  f in a l l y  put 
orthodox trad e  union a c t iv i t y  in  trad e  d isputes beyond the  reach o f the 
law. Peaceful p ic k e tin g  was le g a lise d  and no a c tio n  as i l le g a l  in  breach 
o f c o n tra c t.  Section 4 o f the  Act added,
"an a c tio n  aga ins t a trade  un ion, whether o f workmen o r m asters, o r
aga ins t any members o r o f f i c ia ls  th e re o f on beh a lf o f  themselves and a l l
o th e r members o f the  trad e  union in  respect o f any to r t io u s  act a lleged to
have been committed by o r on beha lf o f the trad e  un ion, s h a ll not be
41e n te rta ine d  by any C ou rt."
This represented by no means an end to  the challenges o f the ju d ic ia r y .
In 1909, the  Law Lords upheld an ac tion  brought by the  Walthamstow Branch 
secre ta ry  o f the  Railway Servants to  stop the p o l i t ic a l  le v y . The so- 
c a lle d  'Osborne Judgement* threatened the very ex is tence  o f the LRC, and 
was not reversed u n t i l  a f te r  the L ib e ra ls  were re tu rned  to  power. Under 
Lloyd George, a s ta te  sa la ry  f o r  M.P.s o f £400 per year was in troduced, 
and a new re g u la tio n  on p o l i t ic a l  sponsorship granted in  the Trade Union 
Act o f 1913. Under the  terms o f the A ct, the  p ro v is io n  o f b e n e fit  to  
members o f trad e  unions by t h e i r  o rgan isa tions  was de fined  as a s ta tu to ry  
o b je c t; a l l  o th e r o b jec ts  o f tra d e  unions, in c lu d in g  the  p o l i t i c a l ,  should 
be pursued in  accordance w ith  the  w i l l  o f the  m a jo r ity  o f  the membership, 
in d iv id u a l members being granted the op tion  o f 'c o n tra c t in g  o u t' o f 
payment. According to  th is  Act and the  Lloyd George N a tiona l Insurance 
B i l l ,  trad e  unions were included in  the l i s t  o f "approved so c ie tie s " 
named by the  government to  help adm inster s ick  and unemployment arrange­
ments. Unions had gained the new s ta tus  o f government agents in  w e lfa re  
m a tte rs .
In the  years a f te r  the  Osborne Judgement, Labour Representation was 
weakened, both in  i t s  pa rliam en ta ry  p o s it io n  and in  i t s  p re s tig e  w ith  
the  rank and f i l e .  As a r e s u lt ,  trade  union a c tio n  s h if te d  f irm ly  
back in to  the  in d u s t r ia l arena. P rice  f lu c tu a t io n s  were a c o n tr ib u to ry  
cause o f the  increase in  trad e  d ispu tes . In 1909, the  government had 
in troduced a Trade Boards B i l l ,  according to  which, Wage Boards were 
to  set up to  f i x  minimum wages in  named in d u s tr ie s . However, not a l l  
d isputes were about wages, bu t a lso  over c r a f t  p r iv i le g e s  and o the r
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m atters connected w ith  the  p roduction  process, and non-unionism .
Many re su lte d  from the  growing d is t r u s t  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  by 
the rank and f i l e ,  and were expressions o f re v o lt  aga ins t union d is c ip l in e .  
D iscussion in  tra d e  union c ir c le s  revo lved around in d u s t r ia l unionism , 
synd ica lism  and the  use o f the general s t r ik e ,  the p r in c ip le  common 
to  a l l  being the need fo r  in d u s t r ia l re s tru c tu r in g  and a g re a te r cohesion 
o f the  movement. Tom Mann had re tu rned  in  1910 from t ra v e ls  abroad 
w ith  h is  new ph ilosophy o f synd ica lism . He soon r a l l ie d  support f o r  
h is  id ea ls  in  the  main in d u s t r ia l ce n tre s , most p a r t ic u la r ly  among 
the  younger m iners o f the South Wales c o a lf ie ld s .  Mann be lieved  th a t  
e x is t in g  trade  unions were moribund: by accepting the ph ilosophy o f 
l ib e ra l- c a p ita l is m ,  they had fo s te re d  the  entrenchment o f c r a f t  d iv is io n s  
in  in d u s try , which was an impediment to  the  success o f organised labour 
in  the campaign aga ins t the c a p i ta l is t  employers. Mann advocated in d u s t r ia l 
unionism as the  o p e ra tive  medium fo r  the  general s t r ik e ,  and founded 
h im se lf the  "N a tiona l T ransport Workers' Federa tion ".
The period o f general s o c ia l un rest p r io r  to  the outbreak o f war in 
1914 gave r is e  to  a se rie s  o f reck less  and impassioned ac tion s  by un ion­
is t s .  In 1911 and 1912, the re  were n a tio n a l s tr ik e s  by the  m iners 
and the  tra n s p o rt workers and dockers which caused r io t in g  and lo o t in g ,  
and brought l i t t l e  success to  the  unions invo lved . The weakness o f 
the  new s y n d ic a lis t- in f lu e n c e d  movement la y  in  the passion and e xp lo s iv e ­
ness o f the membership under the  leadersh ip  o f such fo rc e fu l p e rs o n a lit ie s  
as Mann and Ben T i l l e t t .  The unions lacked the cohesion and t r a d it io n s  
o f the  c ra f ts ,  and the  reck less a t t i tu d e  o f the mob d is tu rbe d  the  TUC 
and o th e r more orthodox re p re se n ta tive s  o f labour: when questioned 
by an American jo u r n a l is t  about the s y n d ic a lis t  movement, K e ir Hardie 
re p lie d ,
"We have no such th in g  in  Great B r i t a in  The e f fe c t  o f the  tra n s p o r t •
w orkers ' s t r ik e  o f  t h is  year has been d is a s tro u s , and has shown more
than anything e lse  could have done the  f u t i l i t y  o f t r y in g  to  f ig h t
42the  c a p i ta l is ts  by what are known as s y n d ic a lis t  methods."
That year Congress voted to  waive any o f f i c ia l  committment to  support 
in d u s t r ia l unionism , in  re c o g n itio n  o f the  fa c t  th a t the  achievement 
o f  w orkers ' c o n tro l in  in d u s try  by e v o lu tio n a ry  means, i . e .  by the  
methods o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing , c o n c i l ia t io n  and a r b it r a t io n ,  was 
more acceptable to  the  m a jo r ity  o f  u n io n is ts  than synd ica lism .
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There were some a ttem pts, however, to  achieve a c lo s e r  u n ity  w ith in  
the  movement. The Railwaymen succeeded in  1913 in  e s ta b lis h in g  an in d u s t­
r i a l  union where o thers fa i le d :  th re e  m ajor ra ilw a y  unions came to g e th e r 
to  form the  Nationa l Union o f Railwaymen, though the  Associated S ocie ty  
o f Locomotive Engineers and Firemen and the  Railway C le rks ' A ssoc ia tion  
remained independent. The id e a l o f mutual support among d i f fe r e n t  unions 
led a lso  to  d iscuss ions o f  a "T r ip le  A llia n c e "  o f the  M iners, Railwaymen 
and Transport Workers in  June, 1914, which came in to  being in  December,
1915.
The co n d itio n s  o f war enhanced th e  p u b lic  p re s tig e  o f  the  trad e  unions
by drawing them in to  government a d m in is tra tio n  in  t h e i r  own r ig h t ,  and
not as an appendage o f  p a rty  p o l i t ic s .  From the o u ts e t, the  Parliam entary
Committee e lected  to  support the  war e f f o r t  and recommended to  a l l  unions
a f f i l i a t e d  to  the  TUC th a t  "a se rious attem pt should be made by a l l
concerned to  reach an amicable se ttlem en t before re s o r t in g  to  s t r ik e  
43o r lo c k -o u t" .  A f te r  a sho rt pe riod  o f unemployment, which had re su lte d  
from the  panic in  business and in d u s try  a t the  outbreak o f war, the  
shortage o f  labour in  in d u s tr ie s  e s s e n tia l to  the  war e f f o r t  g re a t ly  
increased the  barga in ing  power o f workers in  those in d u s tr ie s .  S tr ik e s  in  
eng ineering  and s h ip b u ild in g  over wage issues m erely v e ile d  the  d isco n te n t 
o f  workers a l l  over the  coun try  a t the government's f a i lu r e  to  ta c k le  the 
s o c ia l and economic problems a r is in g  from the  war and the in d u s tr ia l 
tru c e  to  which t h e i r  leaders had pledged them selves. The government 
was keen to  increase the  ou tpu t o f  m unitions and sought trad e  union co­
ope ra tion  in  the re linqu ishm en t o f  r e s t r ic t iv e  p ra c tic e s  and the  acceptance 
o f re g u la tio n  by a r b i t r a t io n .  This "enormous d r a f t  on the  p a tr io t is m  
o f the rank and f i l e " 44 was fo rm a lly  in s t i tu te d  in  a Treasury Agreement 
o f March, 1915 between the  P arliam entary Committee and the  rep resen ta tives  
o f  some 34 unions and the  Government. Under the terms o f the  Agreement, 
the  unions undertook to  recommend t h e i r  members to  s e t t le  d ispu tes by 
a r b it r a t io n ,  re la x  trad e  customs and accept the  d i lu t io n  o f labour.
The M unitions o f War Acts o f  1915, 1916 and 1917 went fu r th e r  than the 
Agreement by in tro d u c in g  the  s ta tu to ry  end to  r e s t r ic t iv e  p ra c tic e s , 
a 'c o o lin g  o f f '  period  in  d is p u te s , w ith  compulsory a r b it r a t io n  a t the  
d is c re t io n  o f the  Boards o f  Trade, the  c o n tro l o f  p r o f i t s  and wages, 
and a system o f 'Leaving C e r t i f ic a te s ',  which e f fe c t iv e ly  c o n tro lle d
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the movement o f labou r. The Acts were accepted by successive tra d e
union and Labour Party conferences, and i t  has been suggested th a t  the
trad e  union leaders were more s o l id ly  behind the war e f f o r t  than e ith e r
45the  s o c ia lis ts  o r the  p o l i t ic ia n s .  The le g is la t io n  had a sobering 
e f fe c t  on in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  g e n e ra lly , but s t r ik e  a c tio n  was by no 
means wiped o u t. In 1916, compulsory co n s c r ip tio n  in to  the  Services 
was brought in  and augmented in d u s t r ia l d isco n te n t:
" I t  was a serious aggravation o f t h is  ’ in vo lu n ta ry  s e rv itu d e ' th a t  the 
r ig id  enforcement o f compulsory m i l i t a r y  se rv ice  - extended s u c c e s s fu lly  
from s in g le  men to  fa th e rs  o f fa m il ie s ,  from 18 years o f age to  51 -  
had the  in c id e n ta l e f fe c t  o f e n fo rc in g  what was v i r t u a l ly  ' in d u s t r ia l  
c o n s c r ip tio n ' on those who were l e f t  f o r  the indispensable c iv i l i a n  employ­
ment; and the  in d iv id u a l workman re a lis e d  th a t  the pena lty  f o r  any f a i lu r e  
o f im p l ic i t  obedience to  the  foreman m ight be in s ta n t re le g a tio n  to  the  
tre n c h e s ."46
In the  same year, a M in is try  o f Labour was created out o f the  Board o f 
Trade and the M in is try  o f M un itio ns , which occasioned the  in c o rp o ra tio n  
o f more leading trade  u n io n is ts  in to  the  government machine.
The g u lf  between the o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f ic ia l  trade union le ade rsh ip  
in e v ita b ly  widened as the  o f f i c ia l s  were accused o f becoming "p a r ty  to  
re a c t io n " .  In 1917 the  government appointed a number o f Commissions 
o f Enquiry in to  in d u s t r ia l u n re s t. Summarising the re p o r ts , the  chairman, 
George Barnes, l is te d  as some o f the  ro o t causes o f the un rest "th e  fe e lin g  
th a t  the re  has been in e q u a lity  o f  s a c r i f ic e ,  th a t the government has 
broken solemn pledges, th a t  the  tra d e  union o f f i c ia ls  are no longer to  
be re lie d  upon, and th a t  th e re  is  a woeful u n ce rta in ty  as to  the  in d u s t r ia l 
f u tu r e " .47
One o f the recommendations o f the  Report was the a b o lit io n  o f the  'Leaving 
C e r t i f ic a te s ' had caused so much f r u s t r a t io n  and worker e x p lo ita t io n .
I t  a lso  recommended the  adoption o f the  W hitley Report o f the  Committee 
on R e la tions between Employers and Employed, which had been appointed 
in  1916, in  view o f the  a c c e le ra tio n  o f  in d u s tr ia l u n re s t. I t  had been 
viewed w ith  susp ic ion by many tra d e  u n io n is ts , and the Miners re je c te d  
the  whole basis th a t  'good r e la t io n s ' in  in d u s try  were p o s s ib le . The 
Report proposed the  es tab lishm en t o f J o in t  In d u s tr ia l C ouncils , J o in t  
Works Committees, the  s ta tu to ry  re g u la tio n  o f wages in  in d u s tr ie s  where
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trad e  unionism was not y e t e s ta b lis h e d , extended powers fo r  the Trade
Boards, a permanent c o u rt o f a r b it r a t io n ,  and g re a te r a u th o r ity  fo r  the
M in is te r  o f Labour to  in q u ire  in to  trad e  d isp u te s . Seventy-three J o in t
In d u s tr ia l Councils were se t up in  in d u s try  and c i v i l  a d m in is tra tio n
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and 33 In te rim  R econstruction Committees, though the  Works Committees 
were less popu la r, s ince they were seen as th re a te n in g  the  barga in ing  
fu n c tio n s  o f management and shop re p re s e n ta tiv e s . The In d u s tr ia l Courts 
Act o f  1919 recognised the need f o r  a r b it r a t io n  on a v o lu n ta ry  bas is , 
whereby the  recommendations o f the  In d u s tr ia l Courts would not be le g a lly  
b ind ing  upon the  p a r t ie s .
I t  was by no means c e r ta in  th a t  the  TUC would id e n t ify  i t s e l f  permanently 
w ith  the  Labour P a rty . In 1918 the  Labour Party adopted a new c o n s t itu t io n  
and programme to  win w ider s o c ia l is t  support ou ts ide  the  ranks o f the 
tra d e  unions. The d ie -h a rd  Lib-Labs advocated a clean break from the  
P a rty , but the concession o f a m a jo r ity  o f trad e  union seats on the  Party 
execu tive  was enough to  persuade the P arty  Conference to  adopt the c o n s t itu ­
t io n .  At Congress th a t  yea r, i t  was e v iden t th a t  a la rg e  number o f trad e  
u n io n is ts  were s t i l l  c lo s e r  to  the  L ib e ra l Party in  s o c ia l and economic 
ou tlook  and s t i l l  bore a d is t r u s t  o f m idd le -c lass  in te l le c tu a l s o c ia l is ts .  
Under the  new c o n s t itu t io n ,  the  aim o f the  Party was c le a r ly  the c re a tio n  
o f a s o c ia l is t  system o f s o c ie ty  as a means o f securing a g re a te r degree 
o f s o c ia l ju s t ic e .  Among tra d e  u n io n is ts ,  th is  was a c o n tro v e rs ia l means 
o f ach ieving  an agreed end, as one de lega te  s ta te d :
" I  am a n o n -S o c ia lis t ,  and I venture to  say th a t  the  m a jo r ity  I represent
are a lso  n o n -S o c ia lis ts . W hile the  Labour Party was c a rr ie d  out in  the
way i t  was formed f o r  th a t  was a l l  r ig h t .  I t  was formed on a working
arrangement between S o c ia lis ts  and n o n -S o c ia lis ts  and would i t  not
have been b e tte r  f o r  the  o ld  p a rty  to  have kept upon the  o ld  lin e s ,  so
49as not to  have outraged any man's conscience?"
The high hopes o f s o c ia l reform  w ith  which the Labour P a rty , backed by 
the  TUC, entered the 1918 e le c tio n  were dashed by the  overwhelming success 
o f Lloyd George. The loss o f  some lead ing  Labour pa rliam en ta rian s  and 
the d is in te g ra t io n  o f the  L ib e ra l P arty  meant a weakening o f the  p o l i t ic a l  
arm o f the  movement and augmented tra d e  union re lia n c e  upon in d u s tr ia l 
a c t io n . The unions had grown in  s ize  and s ta tu re  du ring  the  war years 
and, desp ite  a number o f "bad barga ins" w ith  the  government, emerged in
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The th re a t o f a M ine rs ' s t r ik e  in  support o f demands fo r  a s ix -h o u r
day, a 30% wage increase and worker c o n tro l in  the in d u s try  was warded
o f f  by the government's d e c is io n  to  appoin t a Royal Commission to
look in to  wages and th e  prospect o f n a t io n a lis a t io n  o f the  mines.
The government a lso  c a lle d  a N a tiona l J o in t in d u s tr ia l Conference
o f employers and un ions, bu t th is  co llapsed on the  la te r  w itndraw ai
o f  the  laDour re p re s e n ta tiv e s . The union members o f tne  J o in t  Committee
o f the  conference added a Memorandum to  the re p o rt on "The Causes
and Remedies fo r  Labour U nrest" in  which they s ta ted  th a t ,
"Labour is  cha lle ng in g  the  whole s tru c tu re  o f c a p i ta l is t  in d u s try
as i t  now e x is ts  I t  demands a system o f in d u s tr ia l c o n tro l which
50s h a ll be t r u ly  dem ocratic in  c h a ra c te r ."
This sharp c o n tra s t to  the  op in ions  o f u n io n is ts  expressed o n ly  a 
year o r two before demonstrates the  growth o f s o c ia l is t  ideas w ith in  
the  movement and in  i t s  in d u s t r ia l p o l ic ie s .
The M iners, and the  T r ip le  A llia n c e  which backed them, had fa i le d  
to  secure Congress support f o r  'd i r e c t  a c tio n ' by means o f the  n a tio n a l 
s t r ik e ;  however, they  won the  p o l i t i c a l  support o f  the TUC and the 
Labour P a rty , who launched a jo in t  campaign under the  t i t l e ,  "Mines 
f o r  the N a tion ". Furtherm ore, th e  fo llo w in g  year saw a new wave o f 
in d u s t r ia l s t r i f e  and an unprecedented demonstration o f  in d u s t r ia l 
a c tio n  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  purposes. The Miners had been demanding TUC 
a c tio n  aga ins t the  governm ent's a n ti-R u ss ia  stand, and the  dockers 
were re fu s in g  to  load sh ips o f m un itions headed fo r  Poland. The TUC 
and Labour Party again combined fo rce s  to  in fluence  the  government, 
and combined in d u s t r ia l a c tio n  was th rea tened .
A n a tio n a l s t r ik e  by the  Railwaymen in  1919 once again brought the  
unions in to  c o l l is io n  w ith  the  government. The NUR cameinto the  s t r ik e  
la rg e ly  unprepared, bu t the  government had forced the  issue and the  
union execu tive  had had l i t t l e  cho ice . The Transport Workers Federation 
c a lle d  a conference to  se t up a committee to  r a l l y  support f o r  the 
railwaymen. This committee acted as m ediator in  the  d isp u te  between 
the  government and the  NUR and became known as the M edia tion Committee. 
A f te r  the d isp u te , the  P a rliam enta ry  Committee received s trong
t h e  p o s t w a r  economic  boom a l l  t h e  s t r o n g e r  and more a c t i v e .
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c r i t ic is m  fo r  having taken a back seat in  the  handling o f the  s t r ik e .
The need f o r  coord inated a c tio n  in  the  event o f  m ajor d isputes had been 
e s ta b lish e d  and a C oord ina tion  Committee o f 15 members was du ly  c o n s titu te d  
from re p re se n ta tive s  o f the  Parliam entary and M edia tion Committees and 
the  union side o f the  N ationa l J o in t In d u s tr ia l C o unc il. This committee 
drew up a re p o rt and presented i t s  recommendations to  a spec ia l Congress 
c a lle d  in  December. The proposal o f re p la c in g  the  Parliam entary 
Committee by an annua lly  e lec ted  General Council was upheld by the m a jo r ity  
vo te , though both the  pro and con tra  fa c tio n s  were d iv id e d  in  th e ir  
reasons f o r  vo tin g  th e  way they d id .
The new General C ounc il, w ith  i t s  in d u s tr ia l sub-committees and the
succession o f amalgamations among unions which took p lace in  the e a r ly
1920s, brought hope o f a reduc tio n  in  the number o f in te r-u n io n  d ispu tes .
More im ag ina tive  a s p ira tio n s  o f in te r - in d u s try  coopera tion  founded
however w ith  the  co llap se  o f the  T r ip le  A llia n c e  in  1921: faced w ith
q u ite  d i f fe r e n t  in d u s t r ia l and o rg a n is a tio n a l c o n s id tio n s , the  NUR and
T ransport Workers Federation could no t a ffo rd  to  support the miners in
th e i r  f ig h t  aga ins t wage c u ts . As the  depression dragged on, in d u s tr ia l
m ili ta n c y  was fo rced  in to  subm ission, and hopes were again pinned on
e le c to ra l success. The f i r s t  Labour government took o f f ic e  in  1924,
but proved to  be no more a 'un ion* government than any o th e r . A fte r
a dockers ' s t r ik e ,  Ernest Bevin is  a lleged to  have commented,
" I  on ly  wish i t  had been a Tory government in  o f f ic e .  We would not have
been fr ig h te n e d  by t h e i r  th re a ts .  But we were pu t in  the  p o s it io n  o f
51having to  l is te n  to  the appeal o f our own peop le ".
The re c o g n itio n  o f the  d ive rg e n t in te re s ts  o f  tra d e  unionism and Labour 
government were brought home a t the  1925 Congress, th a t  "the  trade  unions
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had d i f fe r e n t  fu n c tio n s  to  perform  than the  fu n c tio n s  o f  government".
The a ff irm a t io n  o f tra d e  union fu n c tio n  ou ts ide  p a rty  p o l i t ic s  encouraged 
TUC support f o r  the  m ine rs ' s tru g g le  to  the  e x te n t o f  sym pathetic in d u s tr ia l 
a c t io n . With the  slump in  tra d e , the  coal-owners were asking fo r  fu r th e r  
wage cu ts  and an e ig h t-h o u r day. The government, a s trong  Conservative 
government, in tervened w ith  a second Royal Commission. The recommendations 
o f t h is  Commission, pub lished in  1926, were acceptable to  n e ith e r s id e , 
and, w ith  the  TUC pledge o f support, a general s t r ik e  th rea tened . When 
the  government stood f ir m ,  the  s t r ik e  was c a lle d  on May, 4 th . The m iners, 
t ra n s p o r t workers, p r in te r s ,  b u ild in g  workers, iro n  and s te e l,  heavy
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chemicals and power workers came o u t. The engineering and s h ip b u ild in g
workforce jo in e d  them a week la te r ,  but the fe ve r had a lready begun
to  abate by then . The s t r ik e  fa i le d  and le f t  the m iners to  go on f ig h t in g
a lone. The leaders o f th e  movement gained nothing and had co s t the
53country 30 m il l io n  pounds. The p re s tig e  lo s t  by the  unions was re fle c te d
in  a f a l l  in  t h e ir  membership o f h a lf  a m il l io n  between 1925 and 
541927, and in  the new government le g is la t io n  on in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s .
Under the  Trade Disputes and Trade Union A ct, s tr ik e s  and sym pathetic 
s t r ik e s ,  "designed o r c a lc u la te d  to  coerce the Government e i th e r  
d i r e c t ly  o r by in f l i c t in g  hardsh ip  on the community" were banned.
The Act a lso  ammended th e  law on 'c o n tra c t in g -o u t' o f  payment o f  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  make i t  a choice to  ' c o n t r a c t - in ' .  The 
c i v i l  se rv ice  unions were to  be excluded from the TUC, and those 
employed in  the  p u b lic  se rv ice s  o r a d m in is tra tio n  would be l ia b le  
f o r  p rosecution fo r  breach o f c o n tra c t,  i f  "the probable consequences 
o f h is  so do ing, e i th e r  alone o r in  combination w ith  o th e rs , w i l l
55be to  cause in ju ry  o r  danger o r  grave inconvenience to  the  community".
The Act reduced the  Labour P a rty 's  income by a th ir d  and the  Party 
and the TUC found common ground in  demanding i t s  re p e a l. The Act 
d id  not in  any re a l sense in h ib i t  the  a c t iv i t ie s  o f the  tra d e  un ions, 
bu t i t s  in te n tio n s  and th e  background o f Labour's h u m ilia t io n  a t 
i t s  conception invoked t h e i r  resentm ent.
S tu l t i f ie d  by d e fe a t, th e  TUC reso lved to  strengthen the  movement 
by a re v is io n  o f o rg a n is a tio n  and d o c tr in e . The General Council 
appealed to  i t s  a f f i l i a t e s  f o r  more vo lun ta ry  co o rd in a tio n  and amalgam­
a t io n , and propagated p o lic ie s  o f c o n c il ia t io n  a n d -p a rt ic ip a t io n  
w ith  in d u s try . The new ph ilosophy o f the TUC was espoused by some 
leaders o f b ig  in d u s try  and led to  a Conference on In d u s t r ia l Reorgan­
is a t io n  and In d u s tr ia l R e la tions  in  1928. Headed by S ir  A lfre d  Mond, 
Chairman o f Im peria l Chemicals In d u s tr ie s , and Ben Turner, Chairman 
o f the General C ounc il, the  Conference was attended by delegates 
from both sides o f in d u s try .  The recommendations from the  Conference 
included measures to  improve and extend e x is t in g  machinery f o r  n e g o tia tio n  
and c o n c i l ia t io n ,  which would keep d isputes and grievance procedure 
f i r m ly  in  the  in d u s t r ia l ,  ra th e r  than p o l i t ic a l  arena.
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U n fo rtu n a te ly , the depression prevented the scheme from becoming 
r e a l i t y ,  but the theme o f m oderation and c o n c il ia t io n  was not lo s t .  
Throughout the  t h i r t i e s ,  TUC leaders p ro ffe re d  coopera tion  w ith  government 
and in d u s try . The General Council won the  respect o f  government 
and were rewarded w ith  g re a te r c o n s u lta tio n  on m atters o f in d u s tr ia l 
o rg a n is a tio n . As the war w ith  H i t le r  approached, the  trade  union 
leaders f e l t  co n fid e n t th a t  t h e i r  p o l ic ie s  would be in c re a s in g ly  
adopted and th e ir  power and in flu e n c e  co rrespond ing ly  extended.
In 1939, the  government had no plans f o r  the  c o n tro l o f labour, 
as th e re  had been in  t h e , f i r s t  war. A N ationa l J o in t  Advisory Council 
o f rep resen ta tives  o f employers and unions was se t up to  advise the 
government on in d u s tr ia l p o l ic y ,  bu t t h is  proved unproductive as 
long as the re  was no sense o f urgency. Nor were the  unions p a r t ic u la r ly  
disposed to  plans fo r  the  d i lu t io n  o f labour, as long as th e re  were 
s k i l le d  workers employed in  n o n -e ssen tia l in d u s tr ie s  o r even unemployed. 
The com petition  among employers in  e s s e n tia l in d u s tr ie s  fo r  s k il le d  
labour se t o f f  a wages and p rice s  s p i r a l ,  but the  TUC o ffe re d  no 
com fo rt in  t h e ir  in trans igence  over wage c o n tro l.
When, in  1940, the  Chamberlain government f e l l ,  the  union p o s it io n  
was strengthened by the  high p ro p o rtio n  o f Labour rep resen ta tives  
c a lle d  to  government o f f ic e ,  and most p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the  f ig u re  
o f Ernest Bevin as M in is te r  o f  Labour. Immediately th a t  Bevin took 
o f f ic e ,  proposals f o r  the  reg im en ta tion  o f in d u s try  go t underway.
W hile appealing to  h is  fe llo w  u n io n is ts  f o r  support, he fo llow ed  
the  lead o f the  government in  in tro d u c in g  d ire c t  c o n tro ls .  Under 
the  C onditions o f Employment and N a tiona l A rb it ra t io n  Order No. 1305, 
stoppages were to  be avoided, and i f  necessary, d ispu tes were to  
be brought before a N ationa l A rb it r a t io n  T r ib u n a l. There was an 
acceptance o f s ta te  c o n tro l over the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f labour between 
the  Services and in d u s try , and the  l i a b i l i t y  to  m i l i t a r y  se rv ice  
was again a d e te rre n t to  in d u s t r ia l u n re s t. There were a number 
o f o th e r fa c to rs  which co n tr ib u te d  towards in d u s t r ia l peace: the  
machinery f o r  jo in t  co n s u lta tio n  w ith in  in d u s try  was now b e tte r  developed 
and less vu lnerab le  to  ou ts ide  in te r fe re n c e ; the re  was a degree o f 
p o l i t i c a l  consensus, w ith  v ic to ry  in  the  war as the common o b je c t iv e .
There were some u n o f f ic ia l s t r ik e  waves aga ins t the  p o lic ie s  o f the
48
o f f i c ia l  union le a d e rsh ip , bu t they were o f much s h o rte r d u ra tio n  than 
those o f the  f i r s t  war.
There were s t i l l  no o f f i c i a l  wage c o n tro ls , but the  government pursued 
a p o lic y  o f s ta b le  p r ic e s  in  e s s e n tia l supp lies and s e rv ic e s . Under 
the  E ssen tia l Work (General P ro v is io n s ) Orders o f 1941, the d ire c t io n  
o f labou r, necessary f o r  the  war e f f o r t ,  was combined w ith  spec ia l sa fe ­
guards aga inst any d e te r io ra t io n  in  the  terms o f employment. The Orders 
co n tr ib u te d  g re a t ly  to  the  smooth running o f in d u s try  by e s ta b lis h in g  
recognised standards. The way was paved fo r  the expansion o f c o l le c t iv e
ba rga in ing : f i f t y - s i x  J o in t  In d u s tr ia l Councils were e s ta b lish e d  between 
561939 and 1946. Bevin se t up s ta tu to ry  Wage Boards in  in d u s tr ie s  where 
o rg a n isa tio n  had no re a l t r a d i t io n  and the vo lun ta ry  n e g o tia t in g  machinery 
was in e f fe c t iv e .  In 1945 he went fu r th e r  w ith  the Wage Councils Act 
which replaced a l l  Trade Boards by Wages Councils and in troduced new 
Wages Councils in  in d u s tr ie s  where e x is t in g  vo lu n ta ry  machinery was deemed 
inadequate. Representative o f la bou r, employers and government, Wages 
Councils were to  p resen t recommendations to  the M inste r on a v a r ie ty  
o f in d u s t r ia l m a tte rs , in c lu d in g  wages, which would then be considered 
by him, before being pu t to  P a rliam en t.
The government, as w e ll as the  TUC had been preparing  plans f o r  the  
re c o n s tru c tio n  o f the  peacetime economy. The government produced White 
Papers in  1944 on S oc ia l Insurance and Employment P o lic y .  In the  same 
yea r, the TUC issued a Report on Post-War R econstruc tion , which emphasised 
the  need fo r  f u l l  employment and c o n tro lle d  p r ic e s . The Report included 
proposals f o r  a new N a tiona l In d u s tr ia l Council to  advise governments 
on economic p o lic y  issues, and suggested p rov is ions  f o r  the  appointment , 
o f trad e  union nominees to  the  boards o f in d u s tr ie s  to  be n a t io n a lis e d . 
D espite these attem pts a t p re p a ra tio n , the unions were no t equipped to  
deal w ith  the  new frame o f re fe rence  presented to  them by the  postwar 
p o lic a l and economic environm ent. Per fo rce  o f h is to ry  the  tra d e  unions 
had le a rn t to  b a t t le  w ith  economic depression, the o v e rr id in g  symptom 
o f c a p ita lis m , and the  successive governments who had fa i le d  to  con ta in  
i t s  e f fe c ts .  This s ta te  o f  a f fa i r s  had served to  d e l im it  the  o b je c tiv e s  
o f trad e  unions by d ire c t in g  t h e i r  in te re s ts  and t h e ir  power towards 
a s in g le  p o lic y  o f supporting  the  value o f labour by aggressive economism. 
The unions emerged from the  war w ith  s treng ths which they had never
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p re v io u s ly  enjoyed. They had once again captured p u b lic  respect and 
t h e i r  p o p u la r ity  and th a t o f Labour P arty  idea lism  was re fle c te d  in  the 
e le c t io n  re s u lts  in  1945. The unions found themselves no longer in 
o p p o s itio n  to  the  government, bu t in  the  d r iv in g  seat themselves.
They had proved t h e ir  c a p a b il i t ie s  in  accepting re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
government a d m in is tra tio n  during  the  war years and were now presented 
w ith  the  cha llenge to  govern w ith  a c le a r  Labour m a jo r ity .
The new government was quick to  embark upon an extens ive  programme o f
n a t io n a lis a t io n  during  the immediate postwar pe rio d , which, tru e  to  the
n o n -S o c ia lis t  t r a d it io n s  o f the  tra d e  unions, was aimed a t "p u b lic  c o n tro l
57o f in d u s try , ra th e r  than w orkers ' c o n tro l as such". The long lamented 
Trade D isputes Act o f 1927 was f i n a l l y  repealed and the  le ga l s ta tus  
o f unions re turned to  what i t  had been under the  1913 A c t.
Aga inst such successes o f the  c o lla b o ra tio n  o f the  two wings o f the 
Labour movement have to  be se t the  problems o f postwar recovery which 
they in h e r ite d . A balance o f payments c r is is ,  created by the  a c q u is it io n  
o f massive fo re ig n  debt, was the f i r s t  o f  a se ries  s ince the  war which 
have induced government pressure upon unions fo r  pay r e s t r a in t .  When in  
1948 i t  appeared th a t the s u rv iv a l o f  the  A tt le e  government was a t s take, 
the  General Council supported a p o lic y  o f  wage r e s t r a in t  and a curb ing o f 
s t r ik e  a c t io n . This held ou t u n t i l  the  outbreak o f the  Korean war when, 
under pressure from p r ic e  r is e s  and a growing lack o f c o n v ic tio n  among 
the  membership, the  unions w ithdrew t h e i r  coopera tion .
In August, 1951, the government f i n a l l y  dropped the wartime Order 1305, 
which was proving to  be no longer e f fe c t iv e  in  c o n t ro ll in g  wages and 
s t r ik e  a c tio n , and replaced i t  by the  In d u s tr ia l D isputes Order 1376.
This re -e s ta b lis h e d  the vo lu n ta ry  basis o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing , w ith  
the  p ro v is io n  o f vo lu n ta ry  a r b it r a t io n  by an In d u s tr ia l Disputes 
T ribu na l whose pronouncements would be le g a lly  b in d in g , bu t would not 
l im i t  the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e .  The v o lu n ta r is t  p o lic y  was to  be continued 
under the  Conservative government: the  in te rv e n tio n  o f government in  
in d u s t r ia l a f fa ir s  was re s tr ic te d  to  c o n c i l ia t io n ,  v o lu n ta ry  a rb it r a t io n  
and Courts o f In q u iry . The success o f th is  s tra te g y  was soon thwarted by 
the  in f la t io n  which fo llow ed the  Korean boom and i t s  im p lic a tio n s  fo r  
government p o l ic y .  Theunions were unprepared fo r  in f la t io n ,a n d  could
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a r t ic u la te  no e f fe c t iv e  o p p o s itio n  to  the government's monetary p o lic y .
The f r u s t r a t io n  o f the  tra d e  union movement manifested i t s e l f  in  the  
growing in d u s tr ia l tro u b le s . Wage r e s tr a in t  had become a c e n tra l issue 
in  the government's a n t i - in f la t io n a r y  s tra te g y , and in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  
a m atte r fo r  n a tio n a l debate.
The un ion 's  p o s it io n  v is  a v is  the  government had fundam enta lly  changed 
-  not because th is  was a Tory government, but because the  government 
had incorporated in  t h e i r  p o l ic y ,  indeed as th e ir  m ajor ins trum ent, 
the  one c e n tra l o b je c t o f  tra d e  unionism , the c o n tro l o f wages.
Moreover, the  government had emerged from the war era as the la rg e s t 
s in g le  employer, th e re fo re  i t s  in te re s t  and in fluence  in  wage p o lic y  
would always be doubled-edged:
"There was thus a genuine dilemma co n fro n tin g  both governments and
trad e  unions. The unions were faced w ith  issues concern ing the  p u b lic
weal which they had not designed to  deal w ith , and the  s o lu tio n s  o f
which, i t  could be he ld , were incom patib le  w ith  the  un tram elled exe rc ise
o f t h e ir  t r a d it io n a l r ig h ts  and d u t ie s . The e sse n tia l fu n c tio n  o f
a union was to  f ig h t  on b e h a lf o f i t s  own members aga ins t in tra n s ig e n t,
over-m ighty employers, no t to  make common cause w ith  o th e r un ions,
w ith  which i t  m ight w e ll be in  r iv a l r y ,  and less s t i l l  to  submerge
i t s  own avowedly s e c tio n a l aims in  the  defense o f the  common good o r
58even o f the 'w orking c la s s ' as a w hole".
The major s tr ik e s  o f the  m id - f i f t ie s  resu lted  la rg e ly  from in te r -u n io n  
r iv a l r y .  The General Council made h e s ita n t moves towards in te rv e n tio n  
in  the d ispu tes . G enera lly  conse rva tive  in i t s  o u tlo o k , the  Council 
sought to  mediate be fore  stoppage, but withdrew from any s tru c tu ra l 
o r  c o n s t itu t io n a l reform s o f the  TUC unions.
TUC p o lic y  a lte re d  q u ite  co ns ide rab ly  in  the la te  F i f t ie s  and S ix t ie s  
w ith  the change o f p e rs o n a lit ie s  a t the top . In 1956, Frank Cousins 
took over as leader o f  the  m ighty T ransport and General Workers' Union, 
s ig n a llin g  the  break up o f the  u n ite d  leadership o f the  General C ounc il. 
Under the  le ft-w in g  in flu e n c e  o f Cousins, who was by fa r  the  s tro n g e s t 
p e rs o n a lity  on the C o unc il, the  number o f stoppages increased and the  
g u l f  in  the p o l i t ic a l  stance o f government and TUC widened. The 
government continued i t s  appeals to  unions and employers fo r  pay r e s t r a in t ,
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but only with a hardening hostility on the part of the TUC to any form of 
Tory pay policy. In 1957 the government instituted an independent 
Council on Productivity, Prices and Incomes in an attempt to remove 
the regulation of industrial pricing and production from the political 
arena; the TUC refused to cooperate with the Council and rejected wage 
control in any guise at their Congress that year. During a strike 
over pay by the London Busmen in 1958, the government were seen to 
adopt a new, less conciliatory policy on industrial conflict and sub­
sequently abolished the Industrial Disputes Tribunal.
During these years, the TUC also became more estranged from the Labour 
Party, though this was attributable rather more to the policies of 
the Party than the unions. Following the electoral defeats of 1951 
and 1955, a section of the Party leadership was in favour of an abandonment 
of Clause IV of the 1918 constitution which pledged the Party to 
Socialist ideology. Hugh Gaitskell moved a motion to this effect at the 
1960 Conference, but was defeated on this and on the issue of disarmament 
by the trade union and left-wing forces at the Conference, led by Cousins. 
Despite this defeat, the right wing continued to denounce sectional 
interests and came into office under Harold Wilson in 1964 on the basis 
of a centrist policy. The success of the political moderates at the 
polls effectively threw down the gauntlet to the proponents of trade 
union influence in party politics.
During the period of the late fifties, early sixties, wage-push inflation 
had become politically topical. The public had blamed the trade unions 
for the run of official strikes, restrictive practices and overmanning 
which were harming Britain's competitiveness abroad. Prime Minister 
Macmillan wanted to return to a policy of non-conformation with the 
unions, to which end he encouraged Edward Heath, the then Minister 
of Labour, to revive the Joint Consultative Committee of the National 
Joint Advisory Council. By 1961, however, sterling was again under 
pressure and the Chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, was persuaded by the Treasury 
that intervention in collective bargaining was important, even at the 
risk of antagonising the trade unions. The uncooperative attitude 
of the individual trade unions was offset marginally by talks between 
the General Council, led by George Woodcock and the government, which 
resulted in the setting up of the National Economic Development Council.
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The success of planning in France, which had influenced the government 
in favour of the NEDC, prepared the way also for a reconciliation 
of government and trade unions when Labour returned to power. The 
Labour government introduced a national economic plan, but was also 
pledged, in its manifesto, to a national incomes policy. The success 
of both depended on the long-term support and commitment of the trade 
union movement. Any tradition of cooperation between the government 
and the TUC had broken down under the 13 years of Conservative rule.
The unions had lost their prestige and influence with their members 
and the wider public, while political differences among the trade union 
leaders were echoed within the Party ranks and the basis of partnership 
and unity within the Cabinet was very shaky.
The government remained silent at first on the problems of industrial 
relations, but for its commitment to reverse the effects of the Rookes 
v Barnard judgement of 1964. The case referred back to 1955, when 
an employee of BOAC sued the leading members of his union branch for 
damages after dismissal for resigning his union membership. The union 
involved was the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, 
and the local branch had, by threatening strike action, put pressure 
on the management to sack Rookes to maintain full union membership 
in the shop. Rookes at first won his case, then lost in the Court 
of Appeal. In 1964, the Law Lords again reversed the judgement to 
reveal a loophole in the law of 1906, making union officials liable 
for damages for threatening strike action in breach of contract.
The new Labour government was quick to close the loophole with the 
Trade Disputes Act of 1965.
Domestic economic problems were soon to stifle any hope of cooperation 
between the government and the trade unions. Wilson's pledge to the 
electorate that "Government must govern" was soon challenged over 
issues of collective bargaining and the role of incomes policies. The 
Minister for Economic Affairs, George Brown, issued a Joint Statement of 
Intent on Productivity, Prices and Incomes which he had worked out with 
George Woodcock within the first six months. A White Paper was drawn 
up setting out the principles, criteria and machinery for an incomes 
policy, all of which were passed by a majority of the General Council, 
on the basis of the guaranteed flexibility in negotiation over
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productivity, the movement of labour, low pay and differentials. A 
Bill on Prices and Incomes was introduced in Parliament after the 1966 
election which returned Labour to office.
A Seamen's strike over pay led to a State of Emergency in the same year. 
The settlement was the first to break the pay code, and the pressure 
on the pound increased. The government reacted quickly and without prior 
consultation by introducing a wage freeze, to be followed by a period 
of "severe restraint". Frank Cousins, now a member of the Cabinet, 
resigned his post and returned to his union.
The balance of payments crisis had forced the ditching of the national
plan and the planned growth of incomes, and had replaced them by measures
to abruptly and severely deflate the economy. All attempts to reconcile
the industrial and political objectives of the trade union movement had
been abandoned as a result. The Labour government and trade unions by
modernising socialism "in terms of the scientific revolution the
Britain that is going to be reforged in the white heat of this revolution
will be no place for restrictive practices or out-dated methods on either 
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side of industry". In stating this, Wilson acknowledged the fact that 
Britain's survival on the competitive markets of the world depended on 
the productivity of her manufacturing industries, and this was related 
in no small measure to the effective operation of the industrial relations 
system. The strike record in Britain, in coal-mining, engineering and 
motor industries and the docks in particular, was a sad reflection of 
the state of industrial relations. The public were being grossly incon­
venienced by relatively small, unofficial stoppages, which could cripple 
vast sections of industry. The out-dated constitutions and customs of 
the unions granted a disproportionate share of power to small groups 
whose activities could no longer be contained by their leaders.
The government had appointed, in 1965, a Royal Commission to look into 
the practices of trade unions and employers' associations. As the Comm­
ission was preparing its report, the Conservative Party in opposition 
drew up its own proposals for legislation on industrial relations. The 
government had openly acknowledged the need for reform by setting up 
the Commission, and had gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the 
Commission would not listen unsympathetically to the union case.
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Nevertheless, since total immunity at law had already been secured for
the trade unions, their leaders might be forgiven for their misgivings,
since any changes in the law on industrial relations had to be to their
disadvantage. The Commission's proposals were not very radical in fact,
and supported the continuance of voluntarism in any changes in the system
to be undertaken. In line with this principle, the Report also concluded
"that the law should intervene as little as possible in what is essentially
fin
a voluntary system," although it called for some codification of labour 
law to eradicate the disjointed effects of ‘piece-meal1 judicial ruling.
The majority view among the Commissioners in favour of upholding the 
voluntaristic nature of industrial relations in Britain was criticised 
by the one outstanding dissenter, economist, Andrew Shonfield. He was 
most dissatisfied with the lack of perspective reflected in the Commission's 
evaluation of the system. He complained that the Report
" barely concerns itself with the long-term problem of accommodating
bodies with the kind of concentrated power which is possessed by trade
fi 1
unions to the changing future needs of an advanced industrial society."
The basis of the Report, presented in Chapter 3, described the "two systems 
of industrial relations" in Britain, the formal and the informal, which 
were in conflict with each other; the second system, described as "largely
fip
informal, largely fragmented and largely autonomous", was the more 
powerful, and, in the view of its anarchic nature, was less likely to 
be ordered by legislative measures. Shonfield objected to the notion 
of the sovereignty of the workshop above the needs and concerns of a 
wider society. Industrial relations should be conducted within the context 
of the community at large, and not in ignorance of the common good.
From this viewpoint, non-intervention by the state in the conduct of 
industrial relations is a nonsense in an advanced society:
"It seems inconceivable in the long run that in a society which is increasing­
ly closely-knit, where the provision of services to meet the elementary 
needs of a civilised daily life depends more and more on the punctual 
performance of interrelated work tasks of a collective character, trade 
unions will be treated as if they had the right to be exempt from all
fiO
but the most rudimentary legal obligations."
Shonfield's Note of Reservation illustrated the narrowness of the analysis 
presented in the Report. The economic and political implications of 
the voluntarist system had been omitted, and in the social and economic
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climate of 1968, when the Report was published, the proposals for 
'voluntary self-reform' of the system were no longer acceptable to either 
politicians or public. More politically endearing was the Conservative 
Party's "Fair Deal at Work", which favoured legislation. For the 
government, Barbara Castle had succeeded Ray Gunter as Secretary of 
State for Employment. In contrast in her predecessor, she had no 
reservations about intervention in collective bargaining and thought 
the Report's recommendations inadequate. In the face of apparent support 
for the Tory proposals, she could not afford, politically, to think 
otherwise. The Shonfield proposals went too far, however, and were 
too closely echoed in "Fair Deal at Work". After much deliberation,
Castle summed her own recommendations in " n Place of Strife: A Policy 
for Industrial Relations". The White Paper succeeded where the Commission1 
Report had failed in placing the emphasis "on the public interest and 
not on the sanctity of bipartite voluntary collective bargaining".
It proposed new legislation with respect to the containment of industrial 
unrest and government intervention in collective bargaining issues, 
based on a thorough analysis of the historical evolution of labour legislat 
ion and a forthright critique of the current industrial situation.
Apart from offering incentives to the actors in the industrial relations 
system to initiate reform from within, the White Paper proposed the 
establishment of a Commission on Industrial Relations and, in contradiction 
to the Report's recommendations, an Industrial Board, a quasi labour 
court, which could enforce its decisions by financial penalty. In cases 
of dispute, the standing procedures for settlement were to be fully 
exhausted; where they were not, the Minister might enforce a "conciliation 
pause" of 28 days before strike action could be initiated, or the Minister 
could insist on a strike ballot.
The measures contained in the White Paper were clearly aimed at a 
restructuring of the procedural framework of industrial relations as 
a means of creating the conditions for industrial peace. All measures 
were to be backed up by legal sanction, contempt of which could result 
in imprisonment. The White Paper was received, understandably perhaps, 
with hostility by the trade unions and a section of Labour M.P.s.
There were some conservative trade unionists who welcomed the package 
as a means of strengthening their organisation and the official leader­
ship, but the weight of the movement stood behind the leaders of the
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TGWU and AEU, Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon, in opposition to it. The 
proposals and the sanctions were deemed "misguided, unacceptable and 
unworkable", the principle of state intervention unjestifiable. The 
government took heart from Woodcock's acceptance of the chairmanship 
of the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) but misjudged the political 
implications of Vic Feather succeeding him as Acting General Secretary 
of the TUC, Feather was not only more left-wing, but weaker than Woodcock 
among his colleagues on the General Council, and was not likely to 
do anythingto lose standing with them. His appointment thus lent more 
weight to Jones and Scanlon within the Council.
A national campaign was launched by the unions which included a May 
Day strike of over 100,000 workers. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Castle 
and representatives of the TUC held a series of talks which forced 
the government to abandon the legal sanctions contained in the Bill 
in return for a "solemn and binding undertaking" on the part of the 
TUC to attempt to curb unofficial action. This may have been a warning 
to the next Conservative government to review its own plans for industrial 
relations reform, but was not heeded. The Party drew courage instead 
from the obvious disappointment of the public at large that the govern­
ment had failed. The low standing of the unions in public opinion was 
for the Conservatives an electoral weapon and their subsequent success 
at the polls appeared as an endorsement of their industrial programme.
On the crest of public acclaim, the Tories produced their Industrial 
Relations Bill. It was quickly prepared, since most of the work had 
been done in opposition, and was introduced early in the Parliament 
so that the benefits from the legislation would begin to show before 
the next election. This eagerness for political success led the government 
to rush at the Bill too quickly without allowing sufficient time for 
consultation with the unions. This put the onus on the government for the 
success or failure of the Bill, as Vic Feather was quick to remark:
"It is called a consultative document but it is not. Two days earlier 
Mr. Robert Carr had told the Conservative Party Conference much the same 
thing. He announced that there was no going back on the central proposals" 
the government's attitude was"a wilful denial of the facilities for
consultation that has been accorded to the TUC by every government
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for at least the past 30 years."
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The TUC offered the Tories no more than they had offered Wilson and 
Castle. On rejection of their proposals for vouluntary reform, the 
TUC launched a public campaign far more intensive than the demonstrations 
against “In Place of Strife". With communications between the government 
and the TUC effectively severed, the unions were free from any moral 
obligation to restrain the anger and indignation of any single minority 
group directed against the Bill.
The Industrial Relations Act came into being nevertheless in August 1971. 
Unlike the trade unions, the Parliamentary Labour Party was hamstrung by 
their own earlier attempts at reform and, with the guillotine acting 
against them, could rally no constructive opposition in debate. The 
Act introduced registration of trade unions and employers’ associations 
and the vetting of rules by the new Registrar. Registration conferred 
corporate status, though this was rendered superfluous by the fact 
that under the Act, unregistered organisations could be sued in their 
own names. However, immunity from civil liability was confined to 
registered organisations. "Unfair Practices" of employers or unions 
were declared illegal at all events, the right to strike being limited 
to instances not in support of "unfair industrial practice". The 'closed' 
shop' was outlawed and substituted by jointly agreed 'agency shops'.
The Act pursued broadly the same objectives as the Castle Bill but 
was much more rigorous and uncompromising in its approach and execution. 
There was a much heavier emphasis on legalism and resort to sanction, 
the enforcement of which was guaranteed by the establishment of specialist 
judicial machinery. The TUC responded by refusing to cooperate in 
the implementation of the Act, though, it has been suggested,66 the 
effects of the Act on the process of collective bargaining and the 
power of the trade unions would have been far more limited than was 
feared, compounded as it was "of useful but minor reforms and tiresome 
but hardly fatal irritants to the trade unions".67 The legislation 
was nevertheless openly flouted by individual unions, first in the docks 
where unofficial action led to 'blacking', now outlawed by the Act.
The TGWU was found by the Industrial Court and the House of Lords to 
be responsible for the unlawful actions of its shop stewards, and fines 
were paid accordingly. In the autumn of 1971, the government took 
on the miners over a wage claim above the recommended 8%. A national
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strike by the miners cut off supplies of coal to the power stations and 
the public and industry had to suffer severe and sudden power cuts.
A Court of Inquiry was set up to examine miners pay and came up with 
a settlement figure of 20% based on a study of relativities. Pressure 
was on the Coal Board to settle and the miners eventually obtained 
concessions in excess of the Inquiry figure.
The government was forced to abandon its hard-line policy of 'confrontation1. 
In the face of rising unemployment, the prospective entry of Britain 
into the EEC and the possibility of a general election in 1974, Prime 
Minister Heath chose to talk with the TUC and CBI on economic issues.
He introduced into the series of talks the prospect of a new prices
CO
and incomes policy as "a more sensible way of settling our differences".
The programme he had in mind was a sophisticated one, involving a complex 
and detailed investigation of.the wages structure. By this stage, 
the government was desperate for cooperation, but cooperation on the 
part of the TUC was of course subject to the repeal of the Act. Some 
unions were weakening on the policy of non-cooperation with the Industrial 
Court, while others, such as the AEU, were strengthening in their resolve; 
repeal of the Act was now vital to the unity of the movement. The 
government and CBI were, for their part, anxious to avoid further 
prosecutions under the Act, without actually repealing it.
Agreement was not reached between the TUC and government, but Heath 
can take credit for having broken down the barriers to communication 
and established a relationship with a small number of important union 
leaders which had not existed before. Discussions finally broke down 
in November, 1972 when Heath announced a statutory 90-day freeze on 
pay, prices, dividends and rents. The freeze was actually reasonably 
effective, since most of the public sector services settled their pay 
awards either before it or waited for the next phase of the policy.
In the next phase, the government set up two new agencies, the Pay 
Board and the Prices Commission to superintend the policy, with which 
the TUC again refused to cooperate. Yet, despite the hostility of 
the unions, Stage II did gain support among the rank and file: many 
unionists appreciated the fairness attempted by the £1 + 4% formula 
which gave greater benefits to the lower paid while maintaining differen­
tials. There were other concessions on hours and annual holidays in the
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Stage III was to run from Autumn 1973 for twelve months. If there was to
be an election the following year, the government had to succeed in
its pay policy in terms of controlling inflation, without confrontation
in industry: "The pay policy was, in fact, as much an elaborate and
comprehensive conciliation exercise to avoid confrontation in the 1973-
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74 wage round as it was a counter-inflation operation." At this 
stage however, the government had nothing more to offer the unions 
to secure their cooperation. Some unions were already saying that 
Stage III was unworkable. There was to be more 'flexibility1 in wage 
settlements, but the evaluation and control of anomalies which produced 
a host of claims for 'special cases' indeed presented a serious problem 
of implementation.
The deusex machina which finally destroyed the basis of the policy 
was however the oil crisis. This, in combination with the overtime 
ban by the miners in support of a pay claim again in excess of the 
policy, induced the government to declare a State of Emergency. To 
conserve power supplies, the government went further and introduced 
a statutory three-day week for industry, and refused to give in to 
the miners. In February, the miners ballotted to call an all-out national 
strike; the government called an early general election in reply.
While the unions found it easy to blame the government for 'confrontation' 
tactics, the Conservatives made "Who Governs Britain?" the election issue.
The trade unions were concerned to unite the Labour movement under 
a new government. They had set up a Liaison Committee with the Labour .
Opposition in 1972 which had produced a joint statement on future policy: 
a concordat on TUC terms. In conjunction with the talks with Heath 
at that time over issues far beyond the scope of collective bargaining, 
the TUC had evolved a programme of expectations which blurred the establish­
ed division between the industrial and political functions of the union 
movement. This change of attitude towards governments of either party 
was accentuated by the personalities of certain trade unionists who 
had emerged at this time as political leaders outside the party and 
Parliament, such leaders were to play a considerable role in the drafting 
of Labour's programme in office. Labour took office with a minority
S ta g e  I I  p a c k a g e  t o o .
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government on the basis of its traditional relationship with the trade
unions. In October, a second election was fought with the backing of
a proposed "Social Contract" between government and unions, and Labour
secured a narrow majority of five. The Social Contract appeared as
yet another voluntary incomes policy, operating, according to Wilson,
"between Government, industry and trade unions with all three willing
to make sacrifices to reach agreement on a strategy to deal with rising 
70prices". Whether in fact industry was an equal 'social partner' in 
this agreement is speculative, since the Social Contract had been composed 
by unionists and sought to give legitimacy to a wages 'free-for-all', 
made inevitable by the breakdown of statutory measures. Since it was 
politically impossible to tackle the unions over wage restraint, the 
government had to rely on meeting their demands, economic and political.
The TUC responded favourably by encouraging the voluntary continuance 
of Heath's Stage III until July, but the 'special case' clause held 
out little hope for restraint.
The attention of the public was again fixed on inflation. Before the 
election in October, pressure upon the TUC to hold unions to the guidelines 
on pay settlements was mounting. By December, it was evident that the 
General Council's contribution towards the ordering of Britain's economic 
affairs had made very little impression. There was the largest ever 
balance of payments deficit, production was falling and unemployment 
had risen 200,000 on the previous year. The government chose to tackle 
the balance of payments issue, rather than reflate the economy, which 
amounted to a direct contradiction of TUC economic policy proposals. 
Chancellor Healey accused the unions of pricing their members out of 
work, and came into open conflict with TUC General Secretary, Len Murrary. 
However, both unions and politicians were aware of the political damage 
that a split in the movement might cause in terms of government credibility 
and the survival of the Social Contract.
It was Jack Jones who came up with a formula for a policy on future 
wage rises. He recommended a flat rate of £6, tied to the cost of living 
index in return for a freeze on prices. The proposal was described 
as "rough justice", but justified on the grounds that "until pay restraint 
begins to act on prices....prices will go up faster than wages".71
61
The Jones formula formed the basis of a government White Paper, "The 
Attack on Inflation", to be followed up by a Stage II, set out in "The 
Attack on Inflation: the Second Year". Under Stage II, the new pay 
limit was 5% with a ceiling of £4. In both stages, the TUC wrought 
considerable economic concessions from the government, and published 
its own assessment of their agreements in "The Development of the Social 
Contract" and-"The Social Contract 1976-77" which appeared at the same 
time as the White Papers.
The success of the Social Contract was dealt a serious blow by the sterling
crisis of September, 1976. The unions were already seeking a return 
to orderly free collective bargaining but continued to accept further 
cuts in public expenditure and higher indirect taxation. It was unlikely 
that members would accept pay restraint for much longer; there were 
signs of growing militancy from early on in 1977 and the major unions 
soon came into conflict with each other about the future of the pay 
policy. The government introduced its third stage in the summer of 
1977 which recommended settlements around 10%, without formal agreement.
The flexibility of this Stage III was as destructive as under the previous 
government. It nullified the success of the first two stages and signalled 
the end of the Social Contract.
There were changes in the leadership of the top two unions, the TGWU
and the Engineers, now the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers.
As may be understood, such changes effected a change in the balance 
of power and opinion in the General Council. The new leaders, Moss 
Evans and Terry Duffy, were less knowledgeable and experienced than 
their predecessors, and they actually resented the centralised talks 
with government which had become established in the last years. Their 
appointments thus augmented the pressure upon the government and the 
General Council for a return to free collective bargaining.
The government nevertheless forged ahead with Stage IV. The proposal 
of a 5% limit on wage settlements was interpreted as a challenge to 
the concept of free collective bargaining, as well as a challenge to 
those unions which ahd already demanded its reinstatement. The TUC 
could offer no further commitment to the suspension of free collective 
bargaining. The Labour movement was split once more, and despite a
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joint statement published in February, 1979 on "The Economy, the 
Trade Union Responsibilities", in terms of practical politics, the 
breach was not healed in time for the elections in May that year.
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The wave of so-called "new unionism" which emerged in Britain in the 
1880s was characterised by its establishment among the unskilled and 
semi-skilled. The new unions were not based upon a single principle 
of organisation, but attempted to fill the gaps left by the existing 
pattern of trade unionism in the changing tide of industrial organisation. 
In 1887 Ben Tillett founded a Tea Operatives and General Labourers1 
Association at the London Docks. In 1888 Mrs. Annie Besant, middle- 
class socialist and Fabian, encouraged the match-girls' strike at 
Bryant & May, and the following year another socialist and member of 
Ben Tillett1s Association, Will Thorne, organised a union among his 
fellow workers at the gasworks in East Ham. The gasworks were near 
the docks and many gasworkers moved into the docks for casual work 
during the summer months. Successful action by Will Thorne's organis­
ation to secure the eight-hour shift inspired the dockers in the West 
India Docks to strike for higher pay. The strike for the "Dockers'
Tanner" (and 8d on overtime) spread to all the London docks. Supported 
by leading socialists, Tom Mann and John Burns, the action was successful 
and resulted in the founding of a dockers' union, the Dock, Wharf, 
Riverside and General Labourers' Union. The organisation later spread 
to Bristol, the Medway, East Anglia, Hull and South Wales.
On Tyneside, a National Labour Federation, founded in 1886 as an offshoot 
of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers was to compete in 1889 with 
the stronger Tyneside & National Labourers' Union. This was an organis­
ation of less-skilled workers in the shipyards on the North East Coast 
which spread to similar groups in engineering, iron and steel, chemicals, 
glass, flour-milling and the building trades.
During the 1890s a number of unions were established among local authority 
employees. The Municipal Employees Association (1899), formerly an 
organisation of London council workers, expanded into a national organis­
ation after 1900. Between 1900 and 1905, the organisation absorbed 
the National Municipal Labour Union and a number of local unions in 
Glasgow, Belfast, Hull, Camberwell and Stepney.
2 Case H i s t o r i e s
"New U nionism " and t h e  Growth o f  t h e  G eneral Union
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The basis of recruitment of the new unions among the less skilled
72made them inevitably vulnerable in periods of depression. Yet 
most survived, only to sacrifice their aspirations as 'general' 
organisations. To some extent, the 'new' unions had to revert back 
to the strategies of the 'old': on the defensive, the leaders of 
the new movement were more inclined to reinforce restrictive barriers 
against 'blacklegs' than to spread trade unionism as men like Tillett 
and Thorne had originally intended. The 'local' branch fell into 
natural divisions, according to trades, places of employment and
so on, rather than operating as local groups of 'general' workers.
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This was particularly true of branches outside London, and their 
survival depended largely upon their strengths in certain industries 
rather than on their ability to recruit indiscriminately. On the 
strengthof a few large works branches, the unions could 'ride the 
storm' of depression: the gasworkers relied upon their membership 
among the gas and municipal employees in Bristol, Leeds and Lancashire, 
but among the metal trades in Birmingham, the tin plate and tubes 
in South Wales, shipbuilding and engineering in the North East, 
iron and steel and pit-top men in Barnsley and Nottingham and the 
dockers and shipyard workers in Hull.74 The recruitment of such 
varied groups also enabled the 'general' unions to spread the risk 
of employer action which was unlikely to hit all of their constituent 
industries at any one time. This gave them an elasticity which 
other unions lacked, enabling them to exploit areas not pursued 
by 'old' unionism.
The principle of ’general' unionism was however in other respects 
undermined. The original objective of 'one big union', the unification 
of all labourers' societies providing for fluidity of membership 
between trades, foundered on the stronger practice of local job 
monopoly. The fear of 'blacklegging' and loss of recognition encouraged 
local unions to try to enforce the 'closed shop'. This was especially 
important in the London docks where casual labour had long undermined 
the efforts of the dockers' representatives. Furthermore, the closed 
shop and the fear of membership loss caused disputes between unions, 
directly contravening the principle of the 'one big union'. The 
more members a union lost, the more it fought to keep the members 
it had. There were clashes among the 'new' unions as well as between
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them and some craft unions who had begun to organise their own sections 
of unskilled labour.
In an attempt to form a truly 'general' union, Tom Mann founded "The 
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Workers' Union". In the early years, branches of the union sprang 
up and collapsed, reaching at most a total membership of only 5 000.
The Workers' Union fell a long way short of achieving its original objectives, 
most obviously in its type of recruit: it failed to recruit the general 
labourers for any length of time, and although it had set out to encompass 
all types of workers, in practice it had no intention of trespassing on 
the territory of the craftsmen's unions. The recruitment of the Workers'
Union concentrated on the semi-skilled, rather than unskilled, and 
mostly in engineering; the other main sphere of influence was in agricul­
ture. After 1911 there was an overall boost in trade union membership 
in Britain which lifted the general unions, and in particular the 
Workers' Union. By 1914 it was challenging the Gasworkers as the 
largest 'general' union.
Membership
1910 1920 1923
All unions 2 565 000 8 346 000 5 428 000
Gasworkers 32 000 490 000 221 000
(later National Union
of General Workers)
National Amalgamated
Union of Labour 16 000 143 000 53 000
Municipal Employees
Association 12 000 65 000 41 000
Workers' Union 5 000 450 000 140 000
London Dockers 20 000 120 000
Source: H.A. Clegg, General Union in a Changing Society
During the depression years, collective bargaining ceased to be a 
function of the Workers' Union and it relied upon the provision of 
limited insurance facilities in order to survive as an organisation.
This illustrates further features which the general unions had in 
common with the 'old' unions, the National Amalgamated Union of Labour,
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formerly the Tyneside and National Labourers' Union fixed its contribu­
tions above those of the Gasworkers, originally at 3d, then 4d and 
finally 3£d in 1891. The union offered dispute benefit - strike 
lockout, and victimisation pay - an accident insurance and funeral 
benefit. Strongly influenced by the craft unions of the North East, 
the NAUL also had a system of shop stewards. In 1892, the Tees 
district of the union reported that "the shop stewards have 'worked
like niggers' and several disputes between the Platers and the Platers'
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helpers have been satisfactorily settled". Thus shop stewards had 
already been granted functions beyond the simple collection of subscript­
ions, though this development was strongly resisted in the branches 
of other 'general' unions such as the Gasworkers.
The years of depression subdued the ambitions and aggressive leadership
with which the new movement had started out. Survival had become
the watchword and switched the emphasis from aggression to caution
and cooperation. In 1892, Thorne told his members, "We should therefore
be very judicious....in treating with the employer on matters connected
with work and wages"77, and a year later warned his members of the
risks and disadvantages of strike action. Without the barrier to
good relations in the industry posed by the closed shop and other
restrictive practices, as with the dockers and seamen, the Gasworkers
were in a position to pursue a strategy of caution in the extension
of collective bargaining. William Stanley, leader of the NAUL, also
supported this policy, with the view that "all the employers require
is a fair, full and accurate statement of the case of the men in order 
78to give redress". Neither union could afford strikes and restricted 
their usage to struggles for recognition. For regulation in the industry 
other than by collective bargaining and arbitration, such unions resorted 
to parliamentary and municipal action to achieve their objectives.
As socialists, the leaders of the 'general* unions were keen to promote 
Labour representation in Parliament and in the local authorities.
Their activity took on new strength after the founding of the Independent 
Labour Party in 1893, particularly among the Gasworkers whose members 
became prominent Councillors all over the country. Following the 
Taff Vale decision, the unions eagerly joined the newly formed Labour 
Party (LRC) in order to change the law. The Gasworkers1 Union was 
one of the first to affiliate and became prominent in its affairs.
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The increase in inter-union conflict gave rise to early attempts to 
unite all the general unions under a General Labourers' National Council, 
but its effectiveness was thwarted by the heavy unemployment which 
weakened its affiliates. In 1910 the NAUL and Gasworkers' Union reached 
their lowest point in terms of organisation since 1889. After 1911 
the economy entered a boom period which was maintained until 1914 when 
war employment began. During the war, the 'general' unions expanded 
their membership as a result of high employment combined with the respect­
ability won by the trade unions under the Whitley recommendations of 
1917.
In 1919 partial amalgamation of the general unions was achieved by 
the formation of the National Amalgamated Workers' Union between the 
NAUL, the Municipal Employees Association and the Workers' Union.
This was not to last, however, following disagreements between the 
unions over the position of officials in the new organisation. At 
the same time, the Gasworkers, now the General Workers Union, tried 
to join with the Dockers and failed. They approached the NAWU, But 
personality clashes at the top prevented any progress being made.
The docks Inquiry of 1920 revealed the bitter price workers were paying 
for their disunity. In his brilliant presentation of the Dockers' 
case before the court, Ernest Bevin exposed the scandalous conditions 
in the docks. Immediately following the Inquiry, the Dockers' union 
set about making organisational unity a reality and opened discussion 
with the National Union of Dock, Riverside and General Workers. Delegates 
of twelve unions met in the same year and a conference of 19 unions 
was called for December 1st, representing all docks and road transport 
workers, plus some others. The title of the new union agreed upon 
at that conference was the Transport and General Workers' Union.
The collapse of the NAWU and the economic slump of the early 1920s 
prompted new discussions between the General Workers, the NAUL and 
the Municipal Employees. Prior to the war there had been much argument 
in favour of industrial unionism. Industrial unionism as propagated 
by the craft unions and the Miners brought them into increased competition 
with the 'general' unions in their industries. The incentive towards 
amalgamation for the general unions was therefore self-defence, and 
the National Union of General and Municipal Workers came into being in 1923.
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All amalgamated unions after the First World War adopted the organisational
pattern of trade alliances and industrial sections first instituted
by the Dockers during the prewar period. The greater flexibility which
this principle offered the two great amalgamations of general unions
explains their rapid growth in the 1920s. The history of the general
unions reflects their adaptability in the face of industrial change.
Their development has been incidental rather than of political design,
their strengths after 1911 due more to industrial and economic circumstance
than political inspiration. The aspirations of the early socialist
leaders of the 'new' unions to unite all workers, and mainly the less-
skilled, against capitalist employers, gave way to their more pragmatic
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function as "residual" unions, embracing pockets of workers neglected 
by conventional unionism. On this premise, 'general* unions found 
a source of growth, first as sectional, later as amalgamated organisations 
and it is to this which they owe their present structure and basis 
for expansion.
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As one of the key industries of the nineteenth century, cotton spinning 
and weaving were among the earliest sectors to become unionised. The 
hand-mule spinners were already organised early in the century and 
succeeded in maintaining their principles of unionisation after the 
introduction of automation in the 1830s and 1840s. Factory techniques 
in cotton manufacture took off in the 1860s when "limited companies" 
came into being. The technological change in the industry, particularly 
in the 1830s, gave rise to widespread conflict between employers and 
operatives. The unions responded by developing customs of work group 
control, especially in spinning where, until the 1870s, bargaining 
on wage rates took second place to control of entry, apprenticeship 
and promotion. In weaving,wage rates took priority and a standard 
wage list for power-loom weaving in the Blackburn area was established 
as early as 1853.
Cotton manufacture has throughout its history been exposed to the rigours
of overseas trade. The industry prospered for much of the period 1850
to 1873, interrupted only by the American Civil War, a period which
brought advantages to both sides of industry and fostered the growth
of collective bargaining in an atmosphere of conciliation and compromise.
The commercial crisis which competition from overseas sparked off in
1873 encouraged greater labour intensity in production and strengthened
the bargaining position of the operatives. The growth of the industry
was drastically cut back after 1877-79. The employers switched to
a higher grade of product to maintain the value of output which naturally
changed the terms of pay and working conditions of the operatives.
The absence of fundamental technological innovation in both spinning
and weaving meant that existing methods of manufacture were exploited
to the limit. More spindles were added to self-acting mules, while
more looms were allotted to each minder in weaving. Some large limited
companies in coarse spinning might have 100 000 spindles with 10 000 
80operatives. In such highly capital-intensive plants labour costs
were relatively low, around 10% and up to 30% in the manufacture of 
81finer yarns. In weaving, the proportionate cost of labour was much 
higher and was therefore more subject to short-time working and unemployment 
when demand fell away.
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The comparatively low wages in spinning were offset by the "family 
earnings of wives and children, granted by the opportunities in the 
industry for female and juvenile employment. The proportion of females 
over 13 years of age in the industry was 54-58% during the second half
of the nineteenth century. The highest concentration of women in weaving
82was 62.4% in 1890, and in spinning preparation as high as 75%. Until
the first World War the cotton unions were the only ones to organise
women effectively, accounting in 1896 for 90 000 women workers and
835/6 of all organised women in Britain.
The employment of members of the same family at any one firm contributed
to a unique consciousness and sense of identity among cotton workers
84and a greater degree of factory solidarity. According to Burgess; 
the cotton community was characterised by the strength of patrimony 
and the importance of the family as an economic unit - all the more 
so among the weavers where earnings of wives and offspring were more 
significant. The philosophy of self-help which this engendered encouraged 
the traditional association of the cotton community with friendly societies, 
savings banks, cooperative stores and even community outings and holidays. 
Home ownership and share-holding in the limited companies were regarded 
as worthy objectives which cut across traditional class barriers and 
contributed to the alienation of the cotton workers from the rest of 
the working class.
Estranged from labour militancy in other industries, the cotton unions 
rejected the pursuit of socialist ideals and espoused the use of political 
agitation for only limited ends. The geographic concentration of the 
cotton industry in Lancashire and Cheshire granted them greater "muscle" 
in applying local pressure for legal enactment, and only they and the
85Miners were in a position to develop effective machinery for this purpose.
Yet they denounced state welfare as "mollycoddling" and rejected the 
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Eight-hour day, preferring to confine their interests to the issues 
of pay and conditions at the place of work.
The geographic location of cotton manufacturing also lent itself to 
industry-wide bargaining. Yet specialisation of production added local 
variation to the collective bargaining system, accentuated by the differing 
rates of development of spinning and weaving.
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In spinning, job demarcation was largely determined by length of experince: 
two mules would be minded by one team, consisting of a senior spinner, 
or minder, and two assistants, a "big piecer" and a "little piecer".
The teams were supported by operatives who prepared or "carded" the 
cotton for spinning. The work teams earned on a piece rate. The senior 
spinner was paid by results, but the piecers received a weekly wage 
from the senior spinner which did not reflect variations in production 
so exactly. The operatives in preparation were paid by time. The product­
ivity of the spinners also depended on the length of the mule and the 
number of spindles, as well as the speed of the mule. Since the piecers 
earnings were unaffected by speed, the speed-ups of the late 19th 
centuary benefited only the senior spinners, which led to a widening 
of differentials in the team. The elitist position held by the senior 
spinners was maintained by their strict control of the conditions and 
prospects of the piecers.
The disparities in workload and remuneration were less marked in weaving 
than in spinning. In weaving only the setting up of the loom was a 
manual process, and jobs were graded according to the different stages 
of setting up the loom. Of these, the most responsible position was 
that of the "taper" or "sizer" who prepared the thread for weaving by 
applying a flour and tallow mixture. There was some widening of different­
ials which resulted from the speed-up of the looms, but this was moderated 
by the growth of the industry which encouraged some loosening of promotion 
controls.
The dependence of the family unit on the total effort of its members 
led to the acceptance of the work ethic as the cultural norm of the 
cotton community. The ideology of competitive individualism within 
the context of family or community enterprise forged a sympathy among 
operatives with their employers in the face of foreign competition and 
encouraged a respect for cooperative action. Such an ethos of paternalism 
placed the employers in a very strong position to reject trade unionism.
Only as profits were squeezed and good relations with the operatives 
became essential did the employers come to recognise the workers' 
representatives, who were not prepared to challenge the governing structure 
of authority in the factory anyway. By maintaining good relations with 
the spinners' organisations and their publication, The Cotton Factory
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Times, the employers hoped to keep the operatives away from the influences 
of "New Unionism" and to quell the waves of illegal and unofficial strikes.
The traditions of paternalism in the factory and the lead given by the
employers to the recognition of representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining encouraged the bureaucratisation of the unions
and theprocessof collective bargaining itself. The "wage lists", drawn
up in the 1870s and 1880s in Bolton and Oldham, gave the spinners union,
the Amalgamated Association of Cotton Spinners, control over most of
the wages of its members. These intricate wage lists inflated the importance
of bureaucracy by demanding of the union leaders a degree of competence
87in arithmetic rather than political charisma.
88In 1888 the union density reached 90% across the industry, almost
89100% among the senior spinners in Bolton and Oldham "in good years".
Not more than half the piecers were organised in spinners' unions, and
even then on inferior terms. The Cardroom was even slower to organise.
The Spinners had approached the question of the inclusion of the piecers
90with some ambiguity, but were not interested in organising the cardroom 
at all. An Amalgamation of Cardroom Operatives was established in 1886 
and by 1889 was strong enough to organise its own dispute in Oldham. 
Furthermore, it secured a wage increase in 1890 on a new general list 
for Oldham, and the same year entered into negotiations with the Spinners 
over a possible amalgamation for mutual support in disputes. The idea 
failed, however, because of the disparity in resources of the two organisa­
tions and in recognition of the fact that only the Cardroom could gain 
from such an arrangement.
The pattern of organisation in weaving varied from that of spinning, 
owing to the greater homogeneity of the workforce. The 'elite' among 
the weavers, the "sizers", constituted less than 1% of all workers and 
job differentiation was not so closely related to sex. The first weavers 
to become organised were the less skilled and lower paid, developing 
a pattern of 'open' unionism in the 1850s. Later, in the Eighties and 
Nineties, the more skilled weavers formed 'closed' unions, not unlike 
the spinners' association. The weaving unions also developed highly 
bureaucratised disputes procedures which consolidated the position of 
the leaders and led to the decline of member influence in policy-making.
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After a long strike in 1878, a joint committee was established for settling
disputes on a trade-wide basis in 1881; this promoted the formation of the
Amalgamated Weavers' Association in 1884. In 1888 only 40% of the weavers
were organised, yet over half the members were women. The men relied upon
rises in women's wages as much as their own, since they were on the same
lists, which meant that weaving offered the highest rates for women's 
91work.
Collective bargaining as a means of regulation of industrial conditions 
had developed most rapidly among the weakest groups, the cardroom operatives 
and the weavers. In spinning the negotiation and implementation of 
the price lists and the bargaining over piece rates were conducted 
by local sectional leaders thus maintaining a fragmented bargaining 
pattern. The Spinners' unions had been reluctant to relinquish their 
local autonomy until after 1870 when the market went into decline and 
industry-wide bargaining was introduced.
The Oldham (1886) and Bolton (1887) lists included conciliation procedures 
in instances of dispute. The union full-time officials were formally 
recognised as responsible for settling disputes which placed them in 
an equivocal position, not always favourable to the membership to whom 
they were not accountable. Yet there was no permanent drop in the 
number of stoppages, reflecting the growing rank and file militancy.
Though Bolton was relatively dispute-free in the 1890s, from 1883 to
921893 there were 3 000 disputes recorded by the Oldham Spinners' union.
Most were attributable to speed-up, and especially to "bad Spinning" when 
the speed of the mule caused the thread to break. This provoked unofficial 
action among the piecers, particularly from 1885 onward, who could expect 
little official support from the Spinners. As a result, a Lancashire 
Piecers Union was founded in 1890.
The unofficial action could no longer be contained by the union officials
after trade picked up in 1896. By 1899, the Spinners' Amalgamation
gave notice to exclude all "bad spinning" disputes, amounting to some
9390% of all disputes, from the new grievance procedures negotiated with 
the employers, under the so-called Brooklands Agreement of 1893. The 
Brooklands Agreement on wages and disputes procedures was the outcome 
of a lock-out for wage cuts from November, 1892 to March, 1893.
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The settlement was to a very large extent on the employers' terms, 
fixing a 5% ceiling on wage adjustments and alienating union officials 
still further from the rank and file by incorporating them into elaborate 
negotiating machinery.
In weaving joint negotiation had also been established since 1878 and
there were comparable problems of alienation of officials and rashes
of stoppages. As the speeds of looms were increased, there were more
disputes, countered by fines for lateness, indiscipline and inferior
work. There were problems too with the "overlookers", who were paid
94by results and were tempted to "drive" the weavers, they in turn 
drove the juvenile "tenters" who subcontracted work from them.
The overall pattern of trade union development in the cotton industry 
is dominated by a trend towards greater institutionalisation and centralis­
ation of the collective bargaining machinery. While the Spinners' 
Amalgamation demonstrated a singular indifference towards a more uniform
policy on wages for the industry and "tolerated a significant diversity
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between districts in both rates and earnings for similar work" , they 
finally adopted large-scale collective bargaining chiefly as a result 
of employer pressure to do so. The Weavers, on the other hand, with 
their 'open' organisation depended to a very large extent upon uniformity 
among mills in order to maintain wage agreements. Their strength lay 
in centralised bargaining and industry-wide conciliation procedures.
The brief introduction to the story of the textile unions is intended 
to illustrate certain characteristics in the growth of British Trade 
Unionism and is supplemented by a short discourse on the development 
of industrial relations in other branches of the textile industry.
Trade Union Organisation in the Woollen, Worsted and Finishing 
Trades
In contrast to the strengths of organisation in cotton spinning and 
weaving, trade unionism in the related industries of woollens, worsteds 
and finishing has a much weaker tradition and a less convincing history. 
Like cotton, the woollen and worsted trades are concentrated geographically,
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in Yorkshire, while the finishing trades are distributed across both 
Lancashire and Yorkshire. The manufacturing processes of cotton, wool 
and worsted feature many allied occupations and use much machinery 
in common, and all three industries are exposed to foreign trade cycles. 
Yet the patterns of industrial relations in the cotton and woollen 
textile trades have developed quite differently.
The woollen industry has a much longer history than cotton in this
country, and there are reports of weavers* combinations as far back
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as very early in the eighteenth century. As Yorkshire and Lancashire 
became the chief textile regions, the combinations of woolcombers, 
weavers and calico-printers moved in, to become well established in 
the early nineteenth century in company with organised spinners, cloth- 
workers, dyers and bleachers.
The adoption of the power-loom was much slower in wool and worsted 
than in cotton. Woollen weavers and clothiers combined to limit the 
use of new machines, the number of apprentices, spindles and looms 
by individual manufacturers. These were mostly domestic workers in 
competition with the big manufacturers, but there were some combinations 
of factory operatives as well. The Yorkshire "General Union of Weavers 
and Spinners", formed at Dewsbury in 1822, included factory workers, 
as did the "Leeds Trade Union" of 1830, an equivalent to Doherty's 
National Association for the Protection of Labour and based mainly 
on the woollen and worsted trades. The general collapse of combinations 
in the 1830s stifled these young organisations and there was to be 
no revival until after the 1860s when the influence of the strong cotton 
unions spread to other textile trades.
First, overlookers' societies sprang up in the main woollen and worsted 
centres and later formed a Yorkshire federation. A number of twisters' 
unions became established and the warpdressers organised across Lancashire 
and Yorkshire in imitation of their cotton counterparts, and in the 
finishing trades around Bolton, the unions which became established 
united along the lines of the Spinners' Amalgamation to form the "Bolton 
Amalgamated Dyers, Bleachers and Finishers". An attempt by Bradford 
Dyers in 1871 to do the same failed, but was successfully revived in 
1878.
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This pattern of elitist organisation among the skilled operatives of 
the textile trades bore no relation to the mass unionisation of other 
industries. The units of production in the woollen and worsted industries 
was smaller and more scattered than in cotton with comparatively little 
specialisation, thus less conducive to the development of worker solidarity. 
The power-loom weavers began to organise in the 1880s, but few organisat­
ions survived and then often on an informal basis without solidarity 
or regular financing.
The boost to organisation in the Yorkshire textile trades came from 
the "New Unionism" of the 1890s. Leeds in particular became a stronghold 
of New Unionism among its garment workers and gas workers, and was 
encouraged by the revival of organisation among the miners of the out­
lying districts. The Trades and Labour Councils came to life and provided 
a medium of communication amd mutual support between the unions. In 
1890, the Huddersfield Weavers' Union became involved in a Bradford 
strike and emerged from it as the West Riding Power Loom Weavers' 
Association. The organisation, renamed in 1900 the General Union of 
Weavers and Textile Workers, never really achieved the status of the 
cotton Weavers Association which it was said to emulate, gaining barely 
5 000 members at its height:97
1888 700
1892 4 700
1900 1 800
The situation in Bradford was described as "heartbreaking" and in Halifax 
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as "hopeless". In 1900, the General Union formed a Yorkshire Textile 
Workers' Federation with the Leeds Dyers' Union, Bradford Woolsorters 
and Combers and a few other smaller organisations; together the membership 
only amounted to around 4 000. Meanwhile, the Gasworkers and General 
Labourers' Union began to organise the operatives in the worsted and 
finishing trades not covered by the skilled unions of dyers in wool 
and worsted, the Huddersfield, Bradford, Bramley and District Dyers 
and Finishers (1851) and the already mentioned Bradford and District 
Amalgamated Society of Dyers (1878). There was also a West Riding 
Dyers and Finishers Association (1891) which secured conciliation boards 
in Huddersfield in 1892, and Bradford in 1893.
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In 1894 the Huddersfield and Bradford Dyers formed an alliance to eliminate 
competition. They succeeded in establishing agreements with the employers 
on "union security" and set up joint negotiating machinery for the 
regulation of wages, prices and shop relations. After this, the Yorkshire 
Dyers emerged as a stronger organisation than their Lancashire counterparts 
with whom they later formed a federation, the National Federation of 
Dyers, Bleachers and Kindred Trades.
One of the weaknesses of organisation in these non-cotton trades was 
the excess of male labour. Spinning in worsted was a woman's job, 
but a man's in wool. The result was that instead of men pulling up 
the wages and conditions of women, women were dragging the men down, 
and the situation could only deteriorate as fashion dictated a switch 
from woollens to worsteds. There was also a greater degree of poverty 
among the Yorkshire workers which suppressed their willingness to pay 
regular contributions. As a result there was little collective bargaining 
anywhere in the industry. The power-loom weavers had to accept the 
employers' lists which laid down wage maxima, and each mi 11-owner could 
impose his own piece rates. The generally higher political awareness 
of the Yorkshire textile worker was thus channelled away from unionism 
and into the local political movements: in 1891 the Bradford Labour
g q
Union emerged as a "pioneer of a new type of local political organisation".
In the second national wave of general labour unionisation which preceded 
the First World War, union membership in the dyeing and finishing trades 
reached some 75%, but the overall density in woollens and worsteds 
remained at only 1 5 % Thus the modern pattern of unionisation in 
the woollens, worsteds and finishing trades is seen to reflect its 
heritage in the general unionism of the late nineteenth century in 
the examples of the large, open single union in non-cotton textiles, 
now the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers, and 
the not insubstantial sections of the woollen and allied industries 
now organised by the 'general' unions, GMWU and TGWU. There are a 
small number of closed unions in non-cotton textiles, but these are 
so minor as to have contributed no significant measure to the major 
developments in textile unionisation. 1
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Coal, along with iron, was an industry born out of the Industrial 
Revolution, with no customs, no traditions of craft, no limit to entry. 
There were large numbers of colliers, largely unskilled, culled in 
the early industrial days from agriculture.
Traditions of collective activity were established among the miners 
even before 1850. Early unions grew up in the various mining villages, 
but few survived the employers' resistance. A Miners' Association 
of Great Britain and Ireland, formed in 1842, adopted a policy of restrict­
ion of output to "obtain the highest possible amount of wages for the
10 2
labour of the Miner" and set up a legal fund to defend miners prosecut­
ed for breach of contract. The Association later collapsed after a 
four-month strike in the North-East collieries. Local discontent with 
the national leadership had also led to the emergence of pit committees 
where miners could aquire experience in collective organisation and 
where traditions of militancy came to develop. Thus, the "pit lodge" 
became the nucleus of union activity.
The physical and geographical constraints of coal-mining in terms of 
regional variation and the unique nature of the occupation have conditioned 
the pattern of industrial relations and the development of collective 
bargaining and a degree of inter-district rivalry. There were, moreover, 
significant differences in production for inland and export markets 
and related variations in labour utilisation: regional variations in 
coal extraction required varying divisions of labour and combinations 
of pay groups, the conditions of underground work meant a lack of 
management supervision and a tradition of job control by the hewers.
The physical danger of work below ground encouraged an interdependence 
among workers, in pairs or in teams, thus work methods alone developed 
a uniqueness and solidarity within mining districts.
Mining communities were set apart from other groups of workers also 
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by their culture. The failure of the established Church to gain 
a foothold among the mining villages signalled the growth of non-conformist 
groups. Combined with the non-conformity of mining as a trade, this 
religious singularity contributed to the community solidarity. Regional 
variations in Methodism made for a regional pattern in worker traditions,
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according to the individualism of Calvinism or the non-conformist theology 
on principles of worker combination and the right to strike. This 
actually reflected an ambiguity in the theology towards the notion 
of a common identity, since social mobility was regarded as a demonstration 
of individual moral worth which isolated the interests of the individual 
from those of the community. Evangelism and the principle of self- 
help in industry became the basic tenets of secular community leadership. 
The non-conformist institutions, mainly democratic in organisation 
provided a training ground for such, although the ideology of Methodism 
produced a type of leader among the miners whose philosophy was largely 
conservative, provincial and shallow. Supportive of the current political 
economy, the early union leaders demonstrated little concern for social 
deprivation, were strong and effective, yet removed from the everyday 
problems of the rank and file, the strength of community propagated 
by Methodism lent itself to combination, while the respectability of 
the leaders gave force to their demands through their ability to present 
their case in a more favourable light to employers of like religious 
views. Their philosophy is also reflected in the traditional adherence 
of the miners until into the twentieth century to the Liberal Party, 
which shared their values of community self-help and their moderate 
approach to reform by legislation rather than industrial revolution.
During the prosperous period in the coalfields from 1850 to 1875, more 
permanent district unions were established. In 1862 the Northumberland 
and Durham Trade Union came into being, but local militancy was too 
strong for supra-district loyalty and the organisation only survived 
in Northumberland under the moderate leadership of Thomas Burt. A 
Durham Miners Association (DMA) was formed in 1869 which procured substan­
tial concessions from the employers in the early 1870s.
In Lancashire, there was no collective consciousness among the miners, 
owing to the small size of the collieries. There were some small unions 
in South Lancashire, but almost all were destroyed by the depression 
which came towards the end of that decade. Thus collective bargaining 
developed much more slowly here than in the North East. In Yorkshire, 
in the late 1850s, two associations of miners were founded, the South 
Yorkshire- and West Yorkshire Miners' Associations. In West Yorkshire, 
local militancy was recognised by organisation on the basis of a federation
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of districts which retained considerably autonomy, particularly with
respect to strike action. Early in the 1860s, spontaneous strike activity
in Derbyshire caused the South Yorkshire union to establish branches
at Grassmoor and Chesterfield which led to the formation of the Derbyshire
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and Nottinghamshire Miners' Association in 1863-4. It has been stated 
that the structure of industry in this area hampered trade union growth 
and that no formalised collective bargaining was recorded. A Welsh district 
union came into being in 1864 which provoked the establishment of three 
strong employers' association, the Iron-masters' Union of South Wales, 
the Steam Coal Collieries' Association and the House Coal Masters' 
Association.
In 1870 only 15 collieries remained unorganised. Those who were refused 
to negotiate with the miners' union, who in turn refused to affiliate 
with and draw strength from the larger, English-based organisations.
In Scotland, there were no permanent district unions until the 1870s 
coal boom. The Scottish miners tried to emulate the Northumberland and 
Durham organisations; but only one district had any real authority, the 
United miners of Fife and Clackmannan. Reliant upon export trading, 
this district was the most stable mining area of Scotland, while the 
other coalfields were too fragmented and the labour force too heterogeneous.
The most successful district leaders, Burt of Northumberland and William
Crawford of Durham, were not disposed to relinquish any of their powers
to a national organisation. The Miners' National Union (MNU), formed 
in 1863 under the presidency of Alexander Macdonald, was thus denied 
responsibility for industrial action, leaving it entirely to the districts. 
Though this policy benefited leaders such as Burt and Crawford in the 
stronger districts, it led to the virtual annihilation of trade unionism 
in the less we11-organised coalfields, due to lack of funds during strikes 
and lockouts in 1868.
A new national union, the Amalgamated Association of Miners, was founded
with the explicit purpose of creating a central fund for aid in local
disputes. Run by a centralised and directive leadership, the Amalgamation 
won members in all the poorly organised areas of Wales, Lancashire, the 
Midlands and the South West. Burgess gives membership figures for 1873 
as follows:105
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Amalgamated Association 99 000
M N U 123 000
The viability of the Amalgamated Association hinged on its success in 
limited battles, and keeping most of its members in work in order to 
maintain union finances. In the recession of 1874, coal prices fell 
and employers locked out in support of wage cuts; the Amalgamated Association 
collapsed and the South Wales miners were advised to join the MNU, which, 
by 1880, was itself only effective in Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire.
Only in these areas were disputes procedures established and retained 
as a part of collective agreements. In the North-East collective bargain­
ing covered wages and some company by-laws, while joint committees were 
set up for arbitration and conciliation in disputes. Union recognition 
was founded on the ability of leaders to work out dispute settlement 
procedures and the reliance of employers upon the full-time officials 
to contain local militancy and curb absenteeism and "insubordination" among 
the workforce. The strength of the union was likewise concentrated in 
the areas where the industry was strongest and the union leaders could 
obtain concessions from the employers during boom periods to keep grievances 
at bay. Neither the employers nor the union leadership wanted disputes, 
as reflected in their acceptance of arbitration and the introduction fo 
the sliding scale of wages. The sliding scale was accepted by the Staffordshire 
miners in 1874 and the South Wales miners in 1875. This led to wage 
reductions rather than rises and was insensitive to price rises for the 
duration of the scale agreement, thus effectively reducing the scope of 
collective bargaining.
The 1880s saw a resurgence in organisastion, particularly among the 'inland*
C '(
mining areas. In Lancashire, twelve small organisations of amalgamated and 
new unions were formed in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. The greater 
militancy of these inland districts was fired by the rise in coal prices 
towards the end of the decade, and wage movements were largely successful.
An informal collaboration on industrial strategy between the Lancashire, 
Yorkshire and Midlands districts led to discussions of a new formal alliance 
in 1889. The upshot was a new federal organisation of the Yorkshire, Notting­
hamshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire, North Wales, Staffordshire, Warwickshire 
and Leicester unions, the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB).
The MFGB concentrated on articulating pressure for legislative regulation of
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the conditions in the mines, and although they demanded basic increases 
in the wages of the miners, they made allowances for regional variations 
in wage rates and left the responsibility for settling disputes in the 
hands of the district affiliates. The founding of the MFGB had the 
effect of extending collective bargaining to some areas where miners 
had previously lacked the bargaining strength to hold their employers 
to collective agreements. In 1889, the Federation had organised 
36 000 miners, and, with 200 000 members by 189310^, could claim to be 
among the most highly organised industries.
Only the North-East districts could afford to remain aloof from the 
Federation: with the most sophisticated collective bargaining system of 
all the mining regions, the North-East unions had already secured 
substantial increases in wages and an eight-hour day underground, 
therefore the interests of the MFGB and its efforts in this direction 
were of no benefit to them. Northumberland and Durham had abandoned the 
sliding scale, but their main divergence from the MFGB districts was on the 
eight-hours issue and in their handling of pit disputes by means of their 
long-established practices of arbitration and conciliation. Having been 
the backbone of the conservative MNU, the union federations of the North- 
East became tainted in the 1880s with "New Unionism" and the new socialist 
movement. After a series of struggles over wage cuts in both Northumberland 
and Durham, the Durham miners finally joined the MFGB in 1892, shortly 
followed by Northumberland. The alliance was however shortlived: 
following the disagreement over the eight-hours issue, the Durham districts 
left the Federation in 1893, again followed by Northumberland.
The formation of the MFGB prompted the establishment of a coalowners' 
federation throughout the areas not operating the sliding wage scale, 
which contributed still further towards the institutionalisation of 
collective bargaining. The advances in collective bargaining granted 
the union leaders greater prestige and strengthened their authority.
The constituent unions gained a greater control over piece rates and 
therefore an even stronger position of influence in the community.
The influence of the Federation and its officers was demonstrated during 
the slump of the 1890s, when, faced with a sixteen-week lockout for a 25% 
wage cut in 1893, the Federation aroused public sympathy for the miners and
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their families. The lockout of 300 000 miners began in June. In
October, the economic effects of the lockout alarmed the business world
and the government intervened for the first time in an industrial dispute
After conciliation by Lord Rosebery, wages were not cut, but fell by
10% the following year. Earnings were further supressed by short-time
1 nft
working after the lockout. Burgess gives figures for the average 
days worked in mining areas covered by the conciliation agreement:
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1894 4.44
1895 4.38
1896 4.62
1897 4.89
1898 5.14
1899 5.38
The inability of miners in some areas to pay their union dues meant 
a further deterioration in industrial relations at a number of collieries 
In Lancashire and Cheshire, areas which had been instrumental in setting 
up the MFGB, trade unionism remained ineffectual owing to the relative 
poverty of the colliers. In the early 1890s, collective bargaining 
was almost non-existant in South Wales where such organisation as there 
was under the leadership of William Abraham, ‘Mahon1, primarily exist­
ed to administer the sliding scale agreements. Dissatisfaction among 
the Welsh miners in view of the recent successes of the MFGB increased 
their support for the MFGB against Mabon's association. After a long 
lockout and heavy defeat for the miners in 1898, membership of the 
MFGB became essential. The South Wales Miners' Federation, formed 
that year, had a membership of 60 000, in contrast to Mabon's association 
with only 18 000 out of 120 000 to 140 000 colliers. The following 
year, the SWMF joined the MFGB and by 1901 constituted a third of the 
Federation's total membership with 128 OOO.109 In 1903, the sliding- 
scale committee was replaced by a conciliation board in common with 
the English districts.
The district conciliation boards set the basic wage standards and other 
minimum conditions and settled grievances. Thus the institutions of 
collective bargaining reflected the regional differences and market 
conditions in mining. The strength of leadership in the pit or lodge
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determined the deviations from the district 'norms' and the colliery price 
list remained the central issue of collective bargaining at the pit, even 
after district negotiations had been completed. Wages remained by 
far the most important issue in dispute because of the susceptibility 
of coal to market forces, combined with labour costs as a high proportion 
of total costs.
To talk of the miners of the late nineteenth century as an undifferen­
tiated worker group would be quite wrong. Each of the major coalfields 
had its own geographical and industrial characteristics, its own community 
culture and political tradition. Some regions were much more prosperous 
than others, making for quite different patterns of industrial relations: 
"Wigan, the Lancashire coal centre, and Chesterfield, the Derbyshire 
coal centre, are only fifty miles apart 'as the crow flies'. They 
might be five hundred if a difference in spirit depended on geography.
In Derbyshire the demand for a minimum wage is based on economic theory 
supported by a sense of comradeship with less favoured districts.
In Lancashire, the men will tell you it is a matter of life and death.
For years the history of the Lancashire coal industry has been a history 
of miserable strikes following strikes in weary and often futile repetition, 
of lock-outs and actions at law. The cumulative effect is an estrangement 
between masters and men such as exists nowhere else except in South 
Wales. For this, the nature of the coalfield even more than human 
beings is to blame."110
Such regional variations in the industrial strength of organised mineworkers 
was a factor which determined the miners' leaders' preference for legal 
enactment in the regulation of conditions in the mines. In fact, state 
intervention in the mining industry extends back to the mid-nineteenth 
century. From the 1840s onward there has been a series of legislation 
on safety and employment conditions in the mines. The owners accepted 
such interference in recognition of the fact that accidents and other 
stoppages costing money would be reduced. Miners' representatives 
soon established the tradition of influence in Westminster as a result.
The miners were in a much stronger position than other worker groups 
to pursue legal enactment by parliamentary representation. The 
concentraion of employment in the mining communities and the organisation 
and direction of the local union enabled the miners' leaders to channel
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pressure via the ballot box. Following the extension of the franchise 
in 1884, Thomas Burt, the sole miners' representative in the House of 
Commons since 1874, was joined by five more in 1885. The danger of 
legal prosecution as a result of industrial action enforced the appeal 
of political measures. This became particularly apparent in the struggle 
for the eight-hour day:
"Eighty thousand engineers had for six months been fighting by their
unions to get the Eight-hours day adopted, and their families had been
starving and trade had been driven out of the country and yet to all
appearances they were no nearer their object than at the beginning.
The miners believed they ought to have an Eight-hours day, and the best
111method of getting it was by legislative enactment."
After the 1885 election, Keir Hardie called for a parliamentary fund
for the return of even more miners' candidates, yet from 1885 to 1900
11 ?
only nine new candidatures succeeded. c This was due to the comparative 
scarcity of vacant mining seats and the problem of finding sufficient 
candidates among the miners' leadership acceptable to the running party, 
the Liberals. In 1900, Ben Pickard, president of the MFGB, suggested 
the creation of a new election fund to strengthen the Liberal representation 
in Parliament. Since 1889, the MFGB had presented bill after bill on 
the Eight-hours day, only to have them rejected by successive Tory govern­
ments. Pickard's view was that only the return of a Liberal government 
would grant the miners their demands. The Taff Vale judgement prompted 
a wave of new recruits to the LRC, and the Lancashire and Cheshire miners' 
unions joined them. Not until 1909 did the MFGB abandon its own scheme 
for Lib-Lab representation and join the Labour Party. The success of 
the Labour Party in the mining districts however remained a regional 
phenomenon: the claims and objects of socialism could hardly expect 
the same resonance in affluent Derbyshire as in impoverished Lancashire. 
Nevertheless, the roots of Labour representation had been firmly planted, 
the tradition of Labour loyalty among coalminers well founded and from 
the Great War onwards, the mining constituencies were to consistently 
provide the Party with its safest seats.
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A Short History of the Structural Development of Trade 
Unions in West Germany__________________________________
CHAPTER 3
1 The Establishment of a German Labour Movement 1800-1848
It is estimated that the Industrial Revolution arrived in 
Germany some fifty years after it had taken root in England.
The revolution in England was a long and gradual process compared 
to the harsh and sudden change which overcame Germany in the 
mid-nineteenth century.
ii
Around the year 1800, Germany was still a "Standestaat", a
class-ordered society of peasant-farmers, weavers, craftsmen
and aristocracy. Four-fifths of the population were peasants 
2
and farm hands. Under the banner of political Liberalism, 
the economic change from this rural and craft society to an 
industrial one came about in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, producing in its wake a "fourth estate", the proletariat. 
Kurth cites the growth in the number of mill workers from 
272 in 1806 to 5,838 in 1814 as early evidence of this.8
In the pattern of this well ordered society, the craftsmen 
and their journeymen were regulated and protected by theirH
guilds, or "Zunfte". The guilds regulated entry into the
craft, thus ensuring employment and acceptable wage levels
for the journeymen. The journeymen themselves formed "fraternities"n
or "Bruderschaften" which, like the craftsmen’s guilds, provided 
protection of their members’ rights and privileges as well 
as serving as insurance clubs in case of illness or accident.
Even the peasant farmers held certain feudal rights in this 
pre-capitalist society in the form of dependence for food 
and shelter upon the wealthy land aristocracy. Only the free 
wage-earners, whose numbers were increasing with the spread 
of industrialisation, were not part of the old social structure 
and possessed no such claims.
The situation was sharpened by the Stein-Hardenburg reforms
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of 1807-8. These reforms took the form of two Emancipation 
Edicts which aimed to suppress class division and abolish serfdom. 
Essentially this meant that the aristocracy's rights over the 
lives of those who worked the land ceased and every man was 
free to ply his own trade. This, along with the founding of 
the German customs union in 1834, the boom in population and 
the spreading of the railway network, paved the way for the 
upsurge of German industrialisation. The freeing of so many 
peasants from their subjection also took away their security 
and served in the event to benefit only their masters. Without 
skills or capital, this peasant proletariat, although freed 
by political liberalism, found itself chained by economic
4
liberalism:
"But in fact, working people, unlike those who owned a share 
of capital and the means of production, now had nothing but 
their capacity to work, which, if they wanted to live, they
5
had to trade as a commodity."
By the same laws, the restrictive practices of the guild had 
been weakened and the number of craftsmen increased beyond the 
number of possible positions, which in turn came under great 
pressure from industrial competition. The unemployed turned 
hopefully in the 1830s and 1840s to industry. The expanding 
factories ruined the smaller home industries thus increasing 
the supply of labour still further. Despite higher levels of 
production, an "industrial reserve army" remained to keep wages
fi 7
at the lowest levels and hours the longest. Limmer notes 
that in 1800 the working day was generally 12 hours, yet in 
the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s it rose to 13,14 even 17 hours.
In addition, he points out that in the 1840s about 10% of all 
factory workers were children, working the same hours.
Underlying this economic suppression of the German worker was 
a political deprivation, since the working classes could neither 
vote not combine and were therefore politically powerless.
II O
Kollman estimates that this "fourth estate" comprised some 
80% of the population of Germany in the 1840s.
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Perhaps the earliest record of workers' combination is a society 
of belt-makers' journeymen in Breslau in 1329 who sought better 
pay. Again, 1791 marks the first known "Generalstreik" by
9
craftsmen in Hamburg. Although the journeymen's "Fraternities" 
may be regarded as forerunners of the trade unions in Germany, 
they were nevertheless an integrated factor of the social order 
and remained entrenched in guild traditions. Thus they presented 
a form of organisation of labour whose aims were not vastly 
different from those of their masters and employers. In the 
1830s and 1840s, some workers' education societies and circles 
were set up, but these tended not to reach the workers themselves 
and contributed little to the organisation of labour.
Organisation was however taking root in the centres of industry.
In 1840, the Leipzig printers demanded a collective agreement
on wages and conditions; the masons' journeymen in the Hansa
10towns went on strike over pay in the same year.
In 1848, Stephan Born, a typesetter in Berlin, having already 
organised the printers, set about organising the whole of the 
labour force. He called a General German Workers' Congress 
in Berlin which set out its aims of parliamentary democracy 
based on universal suffrage, the right to combine and a health 
insurance service. For the first time, clear trade union demands 
were hammered out: a minimum wage, determined jointly between
employer and employee; state-provided unemployment benefit; 
employment exchanges run by local union offices. Out of the 
Congress came the formation of the "Workers' Fraternity"■I
(Arbeiterverbruderung).
A second workers' congress took place in the same year in Frankfurt
which founded the General German Workers' Union (Allgemeiner
11Deutscher Arbeiterverein). Yet all such associations were
to be banned by law in 1854 and only non-political church-based
12workers groups were allowed to meet.
2 The Emergence o f  S e c t i o n a l  U nion ism  1 8 4 8 -1 9 0 0
It is worth commenting here that the activities of labour through­
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out the 1840s and 1850s were not closely linked with those
13of the revolutionaries of 1848-9. According to Dowe , the 
labour movement in Germany did not acquire a class consciousness 
until around 1860. Before then the movement took the form 
of attacks on industrialisation itself by means of the strike 
or, as in the case of the Silesian weavers in 1844, the wreckage 
of a machinery - 'Luddism', as it had come to be called in 
England.* This was not a class struggle; the actions of the 
workers were neither planned nor organised. At the time, Socialism 
as such was led by a group of middle-class intellectuals centred 
around Karl Marx. Although, as in England, the leaders and 
agitators of the union movement were greatly influenced by 
Marxist ideology, it was in reaction against the theorists 
that men such as Stephan Born felt compelled to set up organising 
bodies in order to achieve practical results for the workers.
The labour movement had however been politically divided by
the events of 1848. Rather than follow the Marx-Bebel-Liebknecht
line and their "grossdeutsch" policy for Germany, most workers,
certainly until 1863, felt that their interests were best represented
by the Liberal "kleindeutsch" view. Indeed, at this stage,
14economic demands were largely insignificant. The increase 
in trade and industry of the fifties had strengthened the Liberal 
Progressive Party, whilst the economists of the day propounded 
the Ricardian theory of self-help and free competition. One 
such economist was Schulze-Delitsch who founded a large number- 
of working-men's friendly societies. He had a considerable 
following among the higher classes of craftsmen, whereas in 
the more industrially advanced towns, some workers remained
15sceptical of the viability of the Schulze-Delitsch doctrine.
Under the influence of English and French socialism, a breakaway 
group centred itself at Leipzig around Ferdinand Lassalle.
* In 1811 in England, a man called Ned Ludd led an attack 
on weaving machines, after which he gave his name to other 
such actions by workers.
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The ban on worker combinations had been lifted in Saxony in
1861 and the following spring, Lassalle delivered to a suburban
workers' association a paper in which he put forward his "Labour
Programme". The paper was almost wholly Marxian, yet differed
from the Communist Manifesto on one important point, the role
of the State. Lassalle insisted that in order to bring about
changes in the workers' conditions, it would be necessary to
change the political system through parliament and universal
suffrage, not through revolution. Lassalle's concept of the
State was closely linked with the "nation" - the "kleindeutsch”
theory. The alternative Marxist interpretation was only supported
17by the few, and those mainly in the Rhineland area.
In 1863 Lassalle formed what is regarded as the first political 
labour party in Germany, the General German Labour Union 
(Allgemeiner deutscher Arbeiterverein*):
"Organise yourselves into a general German labour union for
the purpose of legal and peaceful, yet untiring, unrelenting
agitation for the introduction of universal, direct suffrage
18
in all German states."
Lassalle rejected the liberal economic theories and argued that 
the workers' lot would remain unchanged under the "iron wage 
law" which he had formulated:
"..that the average wage will always be held down to the necessary
subsistence level customarily required for the limitation of
19existence and for procreation."
After the sudden death of Lassalle in 1868, the ADAV ran into 
financial difficulties and problems of leadership. At length, 
the leadership fell to Von Schweitzer and Fritsche who, at a 
conference in Berlin established a General German Trade Union
* Not to be confused with the Labour Union set up in Frankfurt 
in 1848, as mentioned above, although in German their titles 
are the same.
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Federation, (Allgemeiner deutscher Gewerkschaftsverband),
constituted of 32 highly centralised trade groupings or
20"Arbeiterschaften". Some unionists dissented from the new
leadership of the ADAV and combined with Bebel and Liebknecht
who in Eisenach had formed the Social Democratic Labour Party.
Their union organisation consisted of local trade federations
21under socialist leadership.
It was in the Sixties that the Liberal Progressive Party realised 
the need to win the support of the working classes. They sent 
one of their number, Max Hirsch, to England to investigate 
the Trade Union movement there. From his observations, Hirsch 
developed a Liberal trade union theory which was then propagated 
by publisher, Franz Duncker. Hirsch had failed to impress 
the Berlin congress of 1868 with his Liberalist model and decided 
to "go it alone". The upshot was the "Hirsch-Dunkersche 
Gewerkvereine" which although organised along the lines of 
the English Trade Unions, were more than an extension of the 
Progressive Party machine. Duncker himself admitted,
"He helped to found them with the acknowledgement and cooperation 
of the Progressive Party in order to counter the Schweitzer
22demagogy which at that time was organising its batallions".
The Union Movement under the Anti-Socialist Laws, 1878-1890
In both 1872 in Erfurt and 1875 in Gotha attempts were made 
to combine the two socialist parties and union organisations 
under Schweitzer and Bebel. Although they succeeded in merging 
the parties at Gotha to form the Socialist Democratic Party 
(SPD), they failed to revive the unions which had virtually 
collapsed under government pressure in 1874.
During the 1870s, it was the conservative, right-wing parties 
who won Bismarck's favour. As the national economy boomed, 
Bismarck changed his tack from allying with the Liberals against 
the Church and Centre Party to ally with the Centre and Right 
against the Liberals and, in particular, the Social Democrats.
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Whole federations and local groups of Social Democrats and
unions were banned until the final blow of the Anti-Socialist
Law (Sozialistengesetz) of October, 1878. Many left the party
or emigrated; sixty-seven Social Democrats were expelled from 
23Berlin. From the figures, however, it would appear that
the party suffered rather less than the union movement - in
24the elections the SPD was still winning votes. After all, 
the unions were virtually illegal, whereas the party, under
25Bebel's guidance held on to its legality as a recognised party.
The union movement was kept alive during these years by an 
underground propaganda machine working through the various 
trade societies and benefit clubs set up around 1879-80. The 
Prussian government seemed to favour trade societies in the 
hope that such alternative organisations might outrun Social 
Democracy and the Labour movement and lead to some form of
nr
state socialism. With the same aim in view, the government 
passed various laws on welfare insurance in the 1880s:
1883 Sickness insurance
1884 Accident insurance
1889 Old Age & Disability insurance
The workers used this opportunity in 1883 to set up sickness 
benefit clubs which provided a medium for a loose maintenance 
of communications within the labour movement, as is illustrated 
by the following figures:
1886 81 200 members 1889 121 647 members
1888 89 700 members 1890 320 000 members
Source: Kurth 0 Geschichte der Gewerkschaften , 1962
To the same end there were also "tramping1 support funds, such 
as that of the tobacco workers set up in 1882, which operated
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as a form of labour exchange.
Such friendly societies were in many cases stronger centres
of trade union organisation than the trade clubs (Fachvereine),
also permitted under the law. It was the trade clubs however,
which provided the most predominant union structure, although
a growing tendency towards centralisation of organisation became
27evident during the second phase of the Anti-Socialist laws.
The Nineties and the Establishment of Sectional Unionism
In Germany, as in Britain, it had been the craftsmen who had 
originally provided the leadership potential necessary for 
trade union organisation. Only the skilled workers could afford 
to run a successful organisation offering friendly benefits 
and a centre of social activity; only the strongest organisations 
were to survive the periods of depression apparently inherent 
in "laissez-faire" capitalism. However, banned in the 1850s 
and again in the 1870s and 1880s, these trade clubs and worker 
education groups began to break away from the craftsman traditions 
of conservative behaviour and emerged in 1890 with new ideologies 
and led by a new generation of leaders.
By the beginning of the 1890s, there were as many industrial
28
workers as agricultural. The period 1870-1890 had been one 
of migration from land to town. The exploitation of employee 
by employer increased, yet any worker initiative was suppressed 
either by the iron rule of the entrepreneur, or by his paternalism.
In 1890, the Anti-Socialist laws were repealed, leaving a bitter­
ness among workers which gave rise to a wave of strikes and 
an upsurge in union organisation. During the last decade of 
the nineteenth century, three forms of trade unionism had become 
established:
29Liberalist. The Hirsch-Duncker trade unions, so named after 
their founders, were modelled on the liberal trade unions in
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Britain. Entirely pragmatic in their approach, the HD unions, 
recognising the weaknesses of reformism, did not aim to change 
the system, but act within it. The members of the HD unions 
were mostly craftsmen and skilled operatives, organised according 
to occupation. Their objectives, like those of their British 
counterparts, included raising wages, reducing hours and improving 
conditions. This involved the use of restrictive practices 
in order to control competition for jobs in the trade and to 
exercise unilateral regulation of workshop conditions, and collective 
bargaining for joint regulation with the employer. Financially 
strong, the HD unions could offer their members good insurance 
services, thus binding them more closely to the organisation.
They held a moderate view of the use of the strike and restricted 
its role to that of an industrial weapon, rather than a political 
one.
Social Democratic. The main body of German trade unions, the 
Social Democratic unions, re-emerged in 1890 after twelve years 
of suppression under the Anti-Socialist Laws. In that year 
they took the opportunity of reforming under a central organisational 
body, the General Commission, headed by Carl Legien. Legien 
was a pragmatist and revisionist, keen to fight only for the 
attainable according to a policy of 'safety and success'. After 
the experiences of the suppression and near-collapse of the 
movement under Bismarck, Legien recognised a need for a strong, 
centralised union structure which could function independently 
of the political wing of the labour movement.
Under Legien's leadership, the reformed "Free" unions, as they
now preferred to be known, grew stronger than the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) and embarked upon a 'new course'. With their pragmatic
approach, they secured participation rights in the trade courts
and conciliatory bodies under the Trade Courts Act, 1890, which
led to the signing of written collective agreements. They sought
to improve hours and conditions at work further by legal enactment,
but the new industrial code passed in 1891 fell short of their
30demands on hours and factory safety. They were still particularly
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weak in heavy industry where autocratic management was the 
order of the day, especially in the Saar where the suppression 
of Social Democracy continued.
Christian Conservative. The third union organisation which 
became established during the 1890s, and which had played a 
far greater role regionally before then, is the Christian Union 
movement.
Though the principles of Catholic and Protestant ethics differ, 
they tend to overlap to some extent on questions of discipline 
of the individual in society and an acceptance of a 'general 
order' to life. From the Catholic viewpoint, there is a natural 
universal order of which the individual is one tiny and subserviant 
part, whilst the Protestant churches profess the social responsibility 
of each individual. This fundamental conservatism on the part 
of the Church as a whole was to have important political consequences 
for those of its members, Catholic or Protestant, within the 
working classes.
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there were many Catholic
and non-Catholic journeymen's and workers' friendly societies.
As early as 1848, the later Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel
von Kettler began writing about the Church's role in aleviating
the misery of the workers. By the end of the sixties, the Catholic
31
workers had begun to organise. In 1871, Kettler and colleague, 
Moufang, drew up a programme for the protection of labour, but 
the movement was weakened by the then raging Bismarckian anti­
clerical policy, the "Kulturkampf
ii
For the Protestants, Adolf Wagner and Adolf Stocker founded 
in 1877 the "Central Society for Social Reform on a Religious 
and Constitutional-Monarchical Basis". The purpose of this
body was to find a peaceful solution to the social problem within
32the framework of the given social structure.
In setting out on a similar footing, the two Christian labour
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movements stood side by side, ideologically opposed to the 
secular internationalist socialist labour movement whose aim 
was to fight and defeat the class system.
The growth in popularity of social democracy prompted Pope 
Leo XIII to issue an Encyclica entitled "Rerum Novarum" ("Of 
New Things") which removed official Church opposition to workers 
combinations, though it failed to suggest any positive means 
of improving the workers' lot. Its message was anti-capitalist, 
yet patriarchal and failed to grasp the reality of the workers' 
piight:
"... The labourer shall not be regarded as a serf; he shall
be granted that personal dignity which he deserves as a
Christian" ... and the worker "... shall honour to the full
that which has been agreed upon freely and justly in his work
contract; in his work situation he shall keep from harming
33his employer's property or person."
Although the Christian workers' societies encouraged by the 
Encyclica were not to entirely reject the use of the strike, 
their aim, it was said, should be to bring about harmony between 
employer and employee. They should form committees jointly 
with the employer for purposes of conciliation and to ease 
the placing of unemployed workers.
In response to the labour question, some lay members of the
Catholic Church pursued an independent, inter-denominational
Christian-socialist policy. This gave rise to a wider debate
as to whether they should join the Free Unions and tackle the
Labour problem as a united movement, or whether the workers'
societies should confine themselves to the religious questions
34
leaving economic problems to the unions. In 1894 the Christian 
mineworkers united in an interconfessional union and, five 
years later, the first Christian union congress met at Mainz.
This congress rejected "Rerum Novarum" and the following year 
approved the setting up of inter-denominational union federations.
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There was to be no organisational principle laid down; in Mainz
they discussed industrial unionism, but in the end clung to
35the trade principle, on the basis of class difference.
Thus by 1900, there were three well-established and quite separate 
trade union organisations:
the socialist Free Unions, 
the Liberal Hirsch-Duncker Unions 
and the Christian Unions.
A fundamental difference between the Christian Unions and the 
others was in their socio-philosophical viewpoint that worker 
and entrepreneur have interests in common. They were particularly 
at odds with the socialist unions and their polarisation of 
interests contributed considerably to the organisational expansion 
of both, leaving the Liberal unions behind, as seen in the 
figures below:
Membership Figures
Free Unions 
Christian Unions 
H-D Unions
1891
277 659
55 661
62 643 
(1890)
1900 
680 427 
76 744 
91 661
1910
2017 298 
316 115 
122 571
1922
7895 065 
1049 406 
230 612
Source: Kurth J Geschichte der Gewerkschaften , 1962.
Despite their differences, the three organisations manifested 
certain common characteristics of structure. The unions of 
all three types were highly centrally structured. Each union 
based its structure on trade groupings, centrally organised 
throughout the Reich. The unions were affiliated to a central 
body to ensure united action; this was itself then supported 
from below by a network of sub-federations, or cartels, at 
district level (Ortskartellen). The central organisations of each 
were as follows:
Free Unions The General Commission of Trade Unions
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Christian Unions
Hirsch-Duncker
Unions
in Germany (later called the General 
German Trade Union Federation - 
Allgemeiner deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
- ADGB) headed by Carl Legien 
Confederation of Christian Unions 
Gesamtverband der christlichen 
Gewerkschaften
Federation of German Trade Unions 
Verband der deutschen Gewerkvereine.
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Already by the first years of the new century, the German trade 
union movement manifested its weaknesses created by structural 
division as illustrated by the table below:
3 Union D eve lop m en t  by 1919
Free Unions Chr. Unions H-D Unions
Member
figs*
No. of 
unions
Member
figs*
No. of 
unions
Member
figs*
No. of 
unions
1900
1905
1906 
1910
680( 58{ 76c
188'
1690b 51b 320b 29b
2017b 53b 295a
* Membership figures given in 1 000s
119 23
Others : Independent Central Union Federations -
13 708 members in 11 unions
Independent Unions - 
73 132 members in 6 unions
Localists and Syndicalists - 
13 140 members in 11 unions
Assoc, of Commercial and Privately Employed
Clerks -
456 038 members in 26 unions
Technicians' Unions -
104 316 members in 16 unions
"Yellow" Workers’ Associations - (Company organisations 
not to be considered as trade unions - see p. below)
55 000 members in 50 associations
(Figures for the year 1906)
Sources: a Schumann H-G Nationalsozialisinus und
Gewerkschaftsbewegung , 1958. 
b Kurth J Geschichte der Gewerkschaften
1962
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There was obviously a great deal of overlapping of interests 
among the many organisations, resulting in disorder and 
inefficiency. The competition between the different federations 
served only to augment their individual weakness and ineffective­
ness. This became particularly obvious in the area of collective 
bargaining where agreements might have to be reached by employer
q c
and a possible ten or more representative union organisations.
By the time the news of the Russian Revolution reached Germany, 
in 1905, the Labour movement had already been jolted by the 
Ruhr miners' strike of the same year. The suppression of the 
workers by their employers had increased with the worsening 
economic situation. The slump was not a severe one, but was 
sufficient to sap the vitality of the Labour movement as a 
whole. Under conditions of increasing unemployment, the 
employers were able to cut wages, lengthen hours and impose 
lock-outs. The weakness of the unions is reflected in the 
figures for the numbers involved in work stoppages during this 
period:
1905 507 960
1906 316 042
1909 126 883-131 244 (slump year)
1910 369 011
Source: Schorske C E German Social Democracy,
1905-1917 , 1955
The Miners' Movement 1900-1914
August Schmidt relates that, since the successful miners'
strike of 1889, relations in the mines between employers and
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employees had worsened rather than improved. From 1900 onwards 
the employers tried to maintain their competititve position 
by reducing wages and forcing up productivity. Schmidt quotes 
a fall in the average yearly wage of the Ruhr miners of 9.3% 
in the period 1900 to 1904, and a rise in the price of coal 
of 5.9% in the first of these years alone.38
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The colliery owners were well organised by this time. As early 
as 1858, they had formed the "Association for the Protection 
of Mining Interests", on top of which there were also numerous 
sellers* rings which after 1893 united to form the Rhine-Westfalia 
Coal Syndicate. In 1903-4 the syndicate closed down nine 
collieries, threatening some 10 000 men with redundancy and 
adding to the already serious problem of housing.
In contrast, and to their cost, the mineworkers in the Ruhr 
were poorly organised: of the 270 000 workers, only 110 000 
were organised in no fewer than four main unions - the "Old 
Union" (ADAV affiliate), the "Union of Christian Mineworkers", 
the "Polish Trade Union", formed in 1902, and the Hirsch-Duncker 
group of around 2 000 miners. The last two of these unions 
had as good as no finances at all and the Old Union and Christian
3Q
Union had 734 901 RM and 271 101 RM respectively. They were 
therefore in no position to lead a strike against their employers 
which would inevitably result in their bankruptcy.
Trouble began however on December 5th, 1904 at the Stinnes 
"Bruchstrasse" mine in Oberhausen. The employer, Stinnes had 
tried to force a lengthening of hours which, after the break­
down of negotiations, culminated in a strike by the entire work­
force. This was on January 7th. The union leadership tried 
desparately to confine the action to the one plant, but the 
trouble quickly spread to all the mining areas of the Ruhr.
By January 9th, 12 039 miners were out; by January 12th, 64 137.40 
At this stage, the four unions decided to form a committee, 
the "Siebener-Kommission" (seven-man commission) which drew 
up their joint demands and took them the next day to the employers' 
association.
Their fourteen-point plan, which included union recognition, 
was rejected by the employers and a general strike was called 
on January 16th.
The highest figure for the number of strikers was reached on
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January 19th when some 217 593, 78% of the workforce (87.48%
of the underground workers) were recorded. The problem for
the unions was one of finance rather than solidarity, and by
February 9th, 10 000 were forced to return to work in order
41
to feed their families. One effect of the strike was to force 
the State to abandon its neutrality. The majority of representatives 
in the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag were undoubtedly behind 
the mining entrepreneurs, yet felt forced to intervene. They 
called for a new law which promised to meet at least some of 
the union demands. With funds exhausted, the union leaders 
called off the strike on February 10th in the hope of•favourable 
legislation. They had backed down therefore neither having 
concluded negotiations with the employers, nor having secured 
union recognition. The strike could not be regarded as having 
been successful.
The amending law on coal mining was passed on July 14th, 1905.
Under the 3-class-vote system used in Prussian elections, the
legislation passed by the Landtag could hardly be expected to
be favourable towards the lower classes. Likewise, the new
law provided for workers' committees at all pits of a hundred
men or more, but added such conditions of election onto those
committees that it was virtually impossible for them ever to
be effective, if indeed they could be formed at all. Neither
hours worked nor productivity levels were clearly regulated 
42by the law.
After 1908, the employers extended their already formidable 
system of blacking strikers and unionists to;.a comprehensive 
system of blacklisting. This meant that all "offenders" would 
be registered centrally and would be prevented from obtaining 
any other position in mining. In 1909 the employers decided 
to make the system "less severe" by introducing a certificate 
of good conduct which every miner seeking a new position would 
have to obtain from the central employment office.
Whoever had broken the terms of contract of his last employment 
would be locked out for a period of fourteen days; those who
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had taken part in strike action would suffer the same for three 
months.
The unions tried to persuade the employers to include union 
representation in the organisation and distribution of the 
certificates; but to no avail. Nor did the government offer 
them very much sympathy - rather the Reichstag passed a law 
in 1910 making the certification system compulsory.43
With falling wage levels and longer hours, the unions became 
increasingly concerned with safety in the mines. Three out 
of four unions would have been prepared to take action to secure 
better safety regulations; the Christian Union declined. This 
disunity was once again met by strength on the employers' side.
The unions demanded independent state-appointed safety inspectors 
which the employers regarded as an infringement of their privileges 
in their own collieries. The employers again brought pressure 
to bear on the members of the Prussian Landtag and a law was 
passed to introduce, instead of independent inspectors, "safety 
men", who were to be employed by the collieries. Without the 
support of the big Christian Union, the others were not in a
position to oppose the move. Although the "safety men" were
to be elected by the workforce from among the union representatives, 
they were unable to carry out their job effectively because 
of the terms of their employment, and many gave up their positions 
altogether.
Wages continued to fall after 1910. There had been a slight
recovery that year after the stagnation of 1908, but by 1912
they had almost reached the 1907 level.44 Again the three unions, 
without the Christian Union, clubbed together to put their demands 
to the employers' association : they wanted improved wages, 
an 8-hour shift, equal union control over work certificates 
and factory discipline, and better insurance. The demands were 
rejected by the employers, This, the last of a line of rejections 
and disappointments for the unions, brought them again to the 
decision to take strike action. The Christian Unions were reluctant
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to join the others after the appearance of a proposed increase 
in wages by the employers in the newspaper, the "Rheinisch-
ii
Westphalische Zeitung". They wanted to wait and see rather 
than take immediate action. The other three unions however, 
greatly influenced by the progress of the mass strike by the 
British miners, intended to go through with it, despite the 
fact that they lacked the unity of organisation and the solidarity 
to which the British miners owed their success. Compared with 
a figure of 374 000 miners in the Ruhr, only 246 257 mineworkers 
in the whole of the Reich were organised in the four big unions:
Old Union = 114 062
Christian Union = 77 967
Polish Union = 50 903
H-D Union = 3 325
Source: Schmidt A Lang war der Weg , 1958
It is reasonable to conclude that a substantial number of the 
Ruhr miners were not organised at all.
ii
After mediation by State Secretary Delbruck had failed, the 
three unions voted 507 to 72 in favour of a strike on March 
10th, 1912. To the delight of the employers, the Christian 
Union, while recognising the demands of the strikers, announced 
its readiness to break the strike: "We'll stop any strike if
it kills us!" (Geisbert, Union representative and member of 
the Reichstag).45
The solidarity of the mineworkers behind the strike action is 
given by the percentage of strikers to non-strikers. On the 
first day of the strike, this was a mere 50.1% which fell to 
38.3% by March 20th.45 On March 19th the unions resolved to 
back down and the strike was regarded as a bitter defeat for 
the Old Union.
Repression and punishment after the strike was bitter and hard. 
Women and babies were among those thrown into prison, and in 
total 31 years and fines of 16 345 RM were meted out.47
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From 1911 onwards, the legal persecution of trade unions 
increased. The unions and SPD tried in vain to secure a reform 
of the old law on combinations. By the end of 1913, the pressure 
for restrictive legislation against the unions reached a height 
and with the threat of an imminent outbreak of war, the unions 
feared dissolution:
"On the eve of the world war the senior representatives of
the trade unions had to emphasise more strongly than for many
years the antagonism of interests between worker and entrepreneur
 as a result of well-founded fears of grave dangers threatening
49the whole development of the trade unions."
The unions were also weakened at this time by flexibility 
in the labour market brought about by heavy unemployment.
Yet their fears proved unnecessary when, in 1914, war was 
declared, since government found itself rather at the mercy 
of the workers whose support and efforts the country needed 
to progress the war. And so, .the unions gained recognition 
at last when war broke out.
This development might arguably have been linked with the
unions' own somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the war.
The agreement that proletarian should not fight proletarian,
as laid down at the Second International of 1912, would appear
to have been swept away by the patriotic and nationalist fervour
of the German Labour movement of 1914. It is true that a
substantial majority of the working classes and their representatives
sincerely believed the war to be a defensive one, engineered
at the outset by the Triple Entente. The workers came to
identify themselves with the State and regarded national greatness
as a value to be defended, completely consistent with Marxism
50and necessary to defeat Czarism.
The executives of the Free Unions met on August 1st and 2nd 
1914, voted for collaboration with the government and the 
military and agreed to suspend all further official strike 
action. August Schmidt suggests that the latter was merely
The F i r s t  World War and I t s  A fterm a th
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out of a fear that in the case of a strike the government
would not hesitate from now on to send in the military to
squash it, ban the unions and confiscate their funds. Secondly,
the wave of patriotism was so strong among the workers that
it would have been difficult to have achieved sufficient solidarity
51to carry out strike action. In return for their cooperation,
the unions hoped to secure and strengthen their organisation,
thus providing for their members a bulwark against the social
and economic upheaval, unemployment and the fall in living 
52standards.
In fact, the union organisation was greatly weakened by the 
conscription into the Forces of its members and officials, 
while rising unemployment sapped union finances. The rise 
in membership initiated at the beginning of the war by government 
concessions to the unions dropped as the war got underway, 
reducing also union income:
Membership in 1 000s F.U. Income
F.Unions Chr.Unions H-D Unions in RM
1913 2 574 343 107 82 177
1915 1 159 176
1916 966 174 34 120*
1918 1 665 405 113
* This figure must be understood as being very low
in a period of high inflation 
Sources: ** Schumann H-G Nationalsozailisinus und 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung , 1958
*** Hirche K Die Finanzen der Gewerkschaf ten’ , 1972
While the unions agreed to a wage freeze, the employers were
using war-time conditions to exploit the worker and force
wages down. By 1915, the employers had changed their attitude
53towards the unions and no longer wanted to cooperate. They 
gave wage increases only if the General Command stepped in.
There were already rumblings on the shop floor in opposition 
to the official unions' policy and there sprang up a network
ii
of unofficial left-wing "Revolutionare Obleute", revolutionary 
stewards. The first "wild-cat" strike took place in 1916 
against the total exhaustion of the workforce. The "exploitation"
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of the workers was accelerated by the "Hilfsdienstgesetz"
54of 1916, the law for increasing the war effort.
Cooperation over this new law brought the unions into economic 
and social policy-making and secured for them the setting 
up of workers committees in the factories and union representation 
on arbitration councils. As the war continued, the widespread 
belief in the defensive war waned. Trouble continued to brew 
on the shop-floor as workers more and more associated the 
union leadership with "the establishment" of military and 
civil service; both SPD and unions became divided over policy 
as a result. Numerous protest strikes, led by shop stewards, 
took place to express their political demands: peace without 
annexation, demilitarisation of factories, freedom for political 
prisoners, democratisation of the State.
Numbers of those involved in strikes and lock-outs during 
the war:
1914 130 414
1915 47 010
1916 422 591
1917 1467 306
1918 715 697
Source: Kurth J, "Geschichte der Gewerkschaften",
1962
The union executives tried to win back the workers to their
organisation by putting their own socio-political demands
to the government, but it was already too late to regain the
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confidence of the workers.
Following the sailors' mutiny of 1917-18, a revolution broke 
out in Munich on November 8th, 1918 which spread across the 
Reich involving most workers and soldiers. Union officialdom 
and its political counterpart, the Majority Social Democratic 
Party, (the remainder of the SPD after the left-wing had broken 
away) decided to stick:to a middle-of-the-road policy in order
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to be in a position to gain influence later. The employers
too feared for their survival and suddenly offered negotiations
to the unions. The outcome was a central joint council, the
purpose of which was "to safeguard both parties against severe
injury and to facilitate the overcoming of the difficulties
57of reconstruction". To it was attached a 13-point programme 
which included union recognition and other demands raised 
by the unions since the strike of 1905. This gave rise to 
a boom in the membership figures, particularly for the Free 
Unions.
The boom lasted into the Weimar Republic almost as long as
the joint council itself which broke up under economic pressure
in 1924. Kurth notes however that-of the 4.5 million new
members recruited up to 1922, most were workers with no real
conception of trade unionism who had, up to this point, shown
little sympathy for the movement or its aims. This, Kurth
argues, added to the weakness of the Labour movement in the
58Weimar Republic which led to its collapse in 1933.
Membership (1 QQOs)
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ADGB
(Free Unions)
Chr.Unions H-D Unions Total
1918 1 665 405 113 2 183
1919 5 479 858 190 6 527
1920 7 890 1 077 226 9 193
1921 7 568 986 225 8 779
1922 7 895 1 049 231 9 175
1923 7 138 938 217 8 29-3
1924 4 618 613 147 5 378
Source: Schumann H-G Nationalsozialismus und
Gewerkschaftsbewegung , 1958
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The workers' revolt in Germany had appeared spontaneous. To a
degree it illustrated a gulf which had developed between the
leaders of the Labour movement and the led, leaders who in
1918 immediately took over as heads of state and declared the
Republic. The trade unionists who were now to share in the
government of the Republic feared the new workers councils and
even regarded them as a distraction to workers from the "real
59aims" of trade unionism. One result was that, despite many 
new economic and social changes, the basic order of society 
in the young Republic remained the same as during the Reich - 
democratisation remained confined to parliamentarism; the Army, 
the Law, the Church, the Civil Service were all retained intact.
The left-wing groups who alone supported the workers' councils 
were divided and unable to resist. The Revolution had failed.
Following the boost in prestige, all three union-'groups set 
about reorganisation. The Free Unions headed up to now by the 
General Commission reformed themselves under the General German 
Trade Union Federation (ADGB) to which was now also affiliated 
the General Free Federation of Salaried Employees and the General 
German Federation of Civil Servants. The Christian Unions joined 
up with the Federation of German Staffs Unions to form the German 
Federation of Trade Unions (DGB). Finally, the Hirsch-Duncker 
Unions combined with other associations of salaried workers 
and civil servants and the General Railwaymen1s Union to form 
the Ring of German Workers1 and Civil Servants' Unions.50
Problems of organisation were very much in the forefront at 
this time. Industrial concentration had been greatly accelerated 
during the war years with which the organisation of workers 
on the basis of trade groups was no longer compatible. In a 
large plant trade union aggression was much diminished by organisational 
division among trade groups and federations. An example of 
this situation is given by August Schmidt. He cites a single 
colliery in Essen in March, 1919 where 1 522 employees were
4 T rad e  Unions  i n  t h e  Weimar R e p u b l i c  1919-1933
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organised thus:
475 Old Union
410 Christian Union
89 Polish Union
41 Hirsch-Duncker Union
30 German Metalworkers' Union
68 Christian Metalworkers' Union
2 German Factory Workers' Union
2 Transport Workers' Union
3 Construction Workers' Union
7 Central Union of Christian
Construction Workers
2 Union of Christian Masons
7 Christian Woodworkers' Union
1 Union of Private Civil Servants
1 Union of War Invalids
1 Union of Technical and Industrial Civil
Servants
1 Technicians' Union
3 Central Union of Painters and Sprayers 
3 Machinists' Union
2 Horticulturalists' Union
1 Foremen's Union
1 249 Total - leaving 273 unorganised
Under such circumstances, the different groups had to negotiate 
the terms acceptable amongst themselves before they could put 
their demands to the employer. Schmidt adds that organisation 
among the white-collar workers was even more complicated, and 
therefore that much weaker in bargaining.
The passing of the Works' Council Act in 1920 served only to 
increase the power of the employers over.the workforce. The 
significance of this Act in respect of the role and power of 
the trade unions will not be discussed here, but suffice it
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to say that the Act fell far short of union expectations under 
the Weimar constitution and even further form the high ideals 
of those who had hoped for the evolution of a worker-state.
The 1920s saw a steady collapse of the economy and the political 
system. By 1923, most of the trade unions' achievements had 
been eroded: the 8-hour day as a norm had been removed by
a new law on working hours, while the right to strike and free 
collective bargaining were hampered by State arbitration. 
Inflation benefited those who could already afford to hold 
their wealth in the form of less liquid assets and it ravaged 
any wages policy. Union membership sank, taking with it such 
finances as there were to pay out benefits and the wages of 
their full-time officials. Compared with the year 1920, the 
Free Unions had lost half their members and income:
ADGB Chr.Unions H-D Unions
1923 7 138 938 511
1924 4 618 613 408
1925 4 156 588 431
1926 3 977 532 439
Membership in 1 000s*
Finances of ADGB in 1 000 RM**
Income Expenditure
1924 97 69
1925 147 126
1926 148 135
1927 182 129
Sources: * Schumann H-G ' Naa tiona lsoz ia lism us und
Gewerkschaftsbewegung , 1958 
** Hirche K; Die Finanzen der 
Gewerkschaften , 1972
In 1923 the paper Reichsmark reached its lowest level. Numerous 
governments crashed because of their inability to take control 
- with unemployment yet to reach 4.4 million, they could hardly 
afford to pay out the unemployment benefit. In 1929, the Wall
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Street collapse put an end to whatever political or economic 
stability had been possible.
n
After the fall of the Muller government in 1930, the unions,
on top of their financial crisis, once again disagreed over
the course of action to be taken. The chief cause of their
disunity lay in their organisational structure, both in the
pattern of trade groupings, as described above, and in the
high degree of centralisation not known in the union organisations
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of Britain or France. They were further weakened by the 
existence of so many other small breakaway groups such as the 
"yellow" workers' club.* Even between the ADGB and its white- 
collar wing, the so-called AFA-Bund, there were policy differences 
on issues concerning industrial action and finance. A great 
deal of energy was wasted on internal quibbles, each union 
trying to push its own candidate for a place on the central 
executive, which in turn only weakened the central organisation. 
Internal quibbles resulting from trade parochialism, political 
division and misplaced ideology contributed greatly to the 
inherent weakness of a labour movement bereft of solidarity 
and the common cause. In this condition, the German trade 
unions were poorly equipped to resist the effects of fascist 
control which led to their dissolution.
* "Yellow unions", sometimes known as "sweetheart unions" 
in Britain, were workers groups in industry which aimed at 
collaboration with employers for the benefit of the company.
Though they called themselves unions in some instances, they 
had quite a different purpose to the trade unions which represented 
the interests of the workers.
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Hampered themselves by political immaturity and inter-party 
rivalry, the democratic Parties stood helplessly by as National 
Socialism took over. The "Iron Front" of left-wingers and 
unionists failed to rally the forces they had at their disposal.
As in 1914, the union leaders hoped that by not resisting they 
might save their organisations. All three union organisations 
tried to negotiate with the NSDAP: in March, 1933, the Christian
Unions declared themselves "apolitical" and Leipart, leader 
of the ADGB, announced their readiness to sever all links with
CO
the SPD and work together with the employers. Paralysed 
by external economic and political conditions and internal 
differences, the union movement was blind to the implications 
of its actions and to the true objectives of the new ruling 
Party. Compromise was to prove suicidal: a vain attempt "to
prevent organisational murder by political suicide". The 
Nazis began by infiltration of the higher echelons of the union 
administration by the replacement of political "undesirables", 
and in the factories by the National Socialist Factory Unit 
Organisation (NSBO) set up in 1929 to propagate National Socialism 
in the plant. When Hitler declared 1st May, 1933 "National 
Labour Day", the unions encouraged their members to celebrate.
By 2nd May, the SA and SS had taken over the union buildings 
and offices and arrested many of their officers.
On 6th May, the entire working population was organised into 
the German Labour Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront) headed by 
Dr Robert Ley. For the workers' part, many of them believed 
it to be their longed+for united labour movement, but Robert 
Ley intended only “to place under the absolute command of the 
Party everything which leads the people of Germany, apart from 
the Army."54
Organisation of the DAF
The single organisation was based on fourteen trade groupings 
which together formed the "Association of German Workers".
5 The T h i r d  R e ich  1933-1945
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In addition, there were nine white-collar groups in an "Association 
of German White Collar Workers". The two associations together 
came under the Central Bureau of the DAF which had itself eleven 
administrative departments.
Each of the associations was disguised as a democratic organisation 
by each having offices at regional and local levels. Also 
in keeping with a democratically run institution, the DAF had 
supervisory bodies, the Small and Great Assemblies composed 
as follows:
Small Assembly 
Dr Ley
2 Association heads 
11 Department heads 
Head of NSBO
3 representatives of 
National Socialist 
Department of Economics
3 representatives of 
entrepreneurs
1 economic advisor
2 others selected by 
Dr Ley
Great Assembly
24 + 32 regional leaders 
of NSDAP
13 regional leaders of 
DAF
23 leaders of the trade 
groups and white-collar 
groups
(+ after 25th June, a further 
30 representatives of 
industry)
92 (122)
In reality, neither of these assemblies had any power but were 
merely forums for debate. After the later reform of the DAF, 
they only met once more.
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S t r u c t u r e  o f  DAF
C e n t r a l  Burea u o f  DAF------------ > 11 d e p a r t m e n t s
14 Trade Groups 9 White Collar Groups
13 regions
areas
i
local branches
The illusion of democracy and the representation of interest 
groups given by the early structure of the DAF was soon to 
be destroyed in the reorganisation. The NSBO, which had been 
a sop to the left-wing of the Party, was slowly removed from 
the factories. By an Act passed in January, 1934, the Worksti
Councils (Betriebsrate) were replaced by Nazi Trust CouncilsH
(Vertrauensrate). These were not representative of the workforce,
ii
but acted in accordance with the "Fuhrer" principle in the 
plant to the advantage of the employer.
Membership of the unions 1st January# 1933*
Blue-collar unions 282 805
White-collar unions 122 527
Total 405 332
Membership of the DAF**
July Oct Dec June Sept Sept
1933 1933 1933 1934 1939 1942
Blue collar 4 000 7 199
White collar 1 320 1 933
5 320 9 132 9 360 16 000 22 000 25 000
Figures in 1 000s.
(Total figures rounded up after 1934 by Nazi Party) 
Sources: *Kurth J Geschichte der Gewerkschaften , 1962 
**Schumann H-G Nationalsozialismus und 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung , 1958
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Despite their failure to prevent the rise of National Socialism,
it was the leaders of the German Labour Movement who were the
first, the strongest and the most resolute in resisting against 
65the new rulers. Resistance took many forms: meetings of
opposition Parties at church services, funerals even; abstention
in Trust Council elections in the factories (until the elections
ceased altogether); contacts made at social gatherings; illegal
fifi
publications; organisations in exile. People resisted both
individually over time and spontaneously as a group, motivated
by solidarity. The centre of organised group resistance was
the Leuschner Circle led by Wilhelm Leuschner (ADGB) and Christian
Unionist, Jakob Kaiser. They were in contact with most of
the former union leaders and worked out detailed plans for
the reconstruction and leadership of the unions after Hitler.
Rather than linked with the Communist resistance front, the
Leuschner Circle was in league with the conservative resistance
67
movement under Goedeler.
By 1939 225 000 Germans were imprisoned on political grounds,
6ft
90% of whom were members of the Labour movement. Another 
30 000-35 000 had left Germany for political reasons59, among 
whom were the unionist groups in exile in Sweden, London, USA 
and Switzerland. One particular union-prientedremigrant group 
was the "Overseas Representation of German Trade Unions"
(Auslandsvertretung der Deutschen Gewerkschaften) under the 
leadership of Heinrich Schliestedt and, after 1938, Fritz Tarnow. 
Another such group was the "Expatriate Group of German Unionists 
in Great Britain".70
The transport and public services unions with the United Union 
of Railway Workers set up another resistance group, centred 
around Hannover.
All the resistance groups and illegal Parties either in Germany 
or in exile devoted much of their time to planning a new society 
and in particular a new union organisation. Since many of
Union R e s i s t a n c e  in t h e  T h i r d  Reich
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the former trade unionists re-emerged in 1945 to take part 
in the reconstruction of Germany, their plans and aspirations 
were not without influence during the immediate post-war period, 
1945-46.
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After capitulation on May 8th, 1945, the allied forces took 
over the reorganisation of Germany. Socialists and trade 
unionists returned from concentration camps and from exile 
abroad to help in the reconstruction, bringing with them plans 
for the setting up of a new democratic social, economic and 
political order in Germany. All envisaged the organisation 
of labour in a single, centralised union which, democratically 
run, would ensure the fair and effective representation of 
labour in the economy and prevent the future misuse of capital.
The new union would be independent of all political parties
and religious denominations, thus avoiding ideological division
within the movement. This was not an altogether new idea:
in 1931 Theodor Leipart had written an article in the official
ADGB press "Concerning the Unity of the Trade Union Movement".
In it he outlined a future form of union organisation which
would exercise political neutrality, maintain freedom of religion
for its members and safeguard against Communism. There was
an attempt in 1932 by the union leaders to combine their
organisations, but they did not meet officially again until
71April, 1933 when their days were already numbered.
The first attempts to reorganise labour were at plant level.
The pre-1934 works councils, abolished by the Nazis, took the
initiative to rid the factories of Nazism. Former trade unionists
were already active in the councils by April/May, 1945. Their
actions were spontaneous and in considerable disregard of the
occupying forces - a wave of activity not unlike the Soviet
7?
movement in Germany of 1916-1920.
In a perverse way, the DAF had achieved the long-awaited united 
organisation and, despite its fascist designs, its structure 
of centralisation, the closed shop and grouping according to 
industry held some attraction for the planners in 1945.73 
However, not all the unionists interpreted the model of a single 
union in the same way. The Leuschner Circle had at first considered
6 B i r t h  o f  a New Union O r g a n i s a t i o n
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a reform of the DAF, but then Leuschner himself dropped this
idea in 1942 and convinced Goerdeler that no such organisation
should be incorporated in the new society. Instead a "German
Trade Union" based on trade groups should be established to
74represent employees interests in a new class society. Tarnow,
on the other hand, had led a unionist working party since 1943
which had also come up with plans for a single union, centralised
at first then reorganised according to trade or industry. Tarnow's
group went further than Leuschner on the subject of economic
75democracy and envisaged a socialist planned economy. The 
exiles in London had quite clearly been influenced by the British 
Trades Union Congress and planned a federated, decentralised 
structure, based on industrial or trade groups. They thought 
it best to organise from the base upwards to safeguard democracy 
at all levels of organisation. They clearly rejected any reform
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or adaptation of the DAF.
Various union groups sprang up in different parts of the country.
The first, in Aachen, provided the model to be emulated in many 
areas of the Lower Rhine.77 Its central body was the "Free 
German Trade Union Federation" to which all workers and civil 
servants belonged. The organisation would exercise strict political 
neutrality,although the model itself was conceived under Communist 
influence as could be detected in the strong links the union 
aimed to have with the Works Councils and shop stewards.
ii
Hans Bockler had been in contact and had worked out his ideas 
with Leuschner and Kaiser during the Nazi years, but he had 
also been influenced by Walter Hansen who had returned form 
exile in London in 1945. In March, 1945 a committee of sevenit
(Siebenerausschuss), including Bockler and representing socialist,
it
Communist and Christian unions met in Cologne. This "Bockler 
group" favoured a single union, rather than a federation, with 
17 trade groupings. The union would be highly centralised, 
without the closed shop. The British, who noticed the Bockler 
group in June, 1945, did not object at first and the first 
conference of the new union was held in August of that year.
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Most of the trade unionists who re-emerged in Lower Saxony
were from the underground resistance movement rather than from
exile. They, under the leadership of Albin Karl, came up with
78the idea of a "General Union". Again the format was a single
union with industrial or trade sub-divisions. The relationship
between unionists and occupying forces in Hannover was rather
better than in the rest of the British zone during the period
79immediately after capitulation. After the first union conference 
on May 24th, 1945, the General Union was refused permission 
to hold any meetings at local level until November, and had 
to wait until February, 1946 for its first "Land" conference. 
However, by comparison, local meetings were deferred for much 
longer in Rhineland-Westfalia. A further organisation was 
the "Hamburger Model1" set up by Franz Spliedt. This decentralised 
model was most favoured by the British, who, like the Americans, 
were very wary of an centralised organisation which might 
resemble the DAF.
At the Potsdam conference, the Allies agreed that the rebuilding
of the trade unions had to begin at the local level. Following
the Potsdam agreement, the British announced the setting up
of unions in their zone. This at first encouraged those who
were already working hard to re-establish unionism. In a later
announcement, the British issued a 15-point programme for the
building process. Point 1 prescribed that the German people
should decide on the form the new union organisation should
take; point 15 however provided the legal basis for the slowing
up of the process by the military in its insistence that the
80building of any union organisation be slow and steady. Other
points stressed that the unions be representative and point
5 even provided for Christian unions if there was any demand
for such. The "slow and steady" clause invited many varied
interpretations in the different regions and effected an uneven
81development of union organisation throughout the zone.
The attitude of the occupying powers was governed by the state 
of East-West relations and the advent of the Cold War. Fear
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of Communism turned the western allies against the central
union and in favour of a decentralised structure on the lines
of the AFL in the United States. The Americans, for their
part, were in a position to influence the French and the British
82
because of their financial strength.
"Industrial Relations Directive No 16", April, 1946 prescribed 
a three-stage programme for the union reorganisations:
I Union organisation at local level only; meetings could
be held
II Union dues could be collected, recruitment carried out,
offices set up
III Unification at zone level of all union organisations.
None of the three stages could be embarked upon without the
permission of the British "Manpower Division" which contributed
to further delays and meant that in some instances, local meetings
83could not be held until the second quarter of 1946.
Struggle over the Centralised Union and its Subsequent Collapse
Directive No 16 meant that all existing union organisations 
had to be disbanded and, in accordance with phase I, begun 
again at local level. The Hamburg union tried to hold out 
but the British insisted on its dissolution. In Rfiineland-
H
Westfalia, Hans Bockler's committee took the initiative by 
applying to the military government for permission to set up 
their centralised union. The government had instructed that 
they were to choose their own form of union organisation, but
H
after nine months of deliberation, they refused Bockler to 
84enter phase II. He was informed that his proposal was "too
85ambitious" and too much like the DAF.
Yet the local organisations in the Rhineland had already adopted
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the Bockler concept and were in the process, albeit illegally,
86of linking up to form a union network among themselves.
a
Bockler himself could not understand why the "General Union" 
was still forging ahead in Lower Saxony while a similar organisation 
was not permitted in Rhineland-Westfalia.
H
Bockler held the view that decentralised unions would be insufficiently
effective in securing social rehabilitation and codetermination,
but the British had greater fears of radicalism in a highly
centralised movement. They suggested instead a confederation
87of unions as a safeguard of democracy.
In Hannover, Albin Karl continued to fight for his organisation
ii
long after Bockler had given up. Because of Ally restrictions,
the General Union reached the same stage of organisation in
November as it had reached in May. The first union conference
was held in January, 1946. Its secretariat was thereby legalised
as representative of its members; full recognition of the union
88by the military government ensued at the second conference.
ii
Bockler, however, had resigned himself to defeat. Once he 
had done so, it was only a question of time before the other 
industrial areas conformed to the pattern set by Rhineland- 
Westfalia. Karl wrote to the British about his "General Union" 
and the support it commanded in Lower Saxony. It was not clear 
in Lower Saxony why the unionists in the Rhineland had spent 
nine months arguing, only to have given in in the end without 
a struggle. It is reported that they were concerned for their 
members and were eager to get on to phase II; they perhaps 
thought that the structure could be changed later:
"It is high time we were recognised so that we can get on with 
the job. But how do we do that? It would be possible if we 
altered our plans a little; that is to say, we must first set
up independent unions, without losing sight of our long-term
11 8Q
overall objectives" (Bockler, 1945).
ii
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The argument over union structure became heated at the first
zonal conference held in March, 1946. Strongest criticism
of British interference in trade union affairs came from Karl.
He repeated his criticisms mroe fully in a paper, "The New
Trade Union Movement", which he distributed to all the unions
in Lower Saxony. In support of his General Union, he argued
that, unlike the DAF, membership was not compulsory, nor could
the union be an instrument of party or state, being democratically
structured to reflect the wishes of its members. The federation
idea could offer nothing more and would produce a wasteful
duplication of administration in terms of offices, officers,
90clerks and paperwork.
Nevertheless, in the event Karl could not rally sufficient 
support for his union at the conference following the change 
of policy of the Rhineland-Westfalia representation. Nor could 
Spliedt sell his Hamburg model. At the second zonal conference
ii
held in August, 1946, Bockler proposed that the principle of 
federated industrial unionism provided the most effective form 
of organisation. Karl fought on, but was defeated 267 votes 
to 78.91
The German Trade Union Federation
The principle of industrial unionism was first accepted by 
the ADGB as a desirable structural basis for union organisation 
in 1925; yet in 1946 it was no more easily enforced than it 
had been in 1925. In all three western zones unions were broadly 
organised according to industry but some continued with trade 
groups or other such lines of demarcation: for example, the
Unions in Education and Science, Arts or indeed Public Services, 
Transport & Communications, which used some commercial boundaries
go
and some boundaries determined by the employer structure.
There were questions also as to the proposed role and relative
strength of the central federative body: this would depend
very much on whether it held the purse strings or whether,
as turned out to be the case, it was to be dependent upon its 
93
member unions. All those who had supported the single union
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concept like the "General Union" were in favour of a strong
federative body and some wanted to levy as much as 38% of each
union's income for the centre. By 1949, it had become clear
that the central body was to be weakened since the financial
strength lay firmly in the lap of the member unions and a figure
of 15% was agreed upon; this was reduced four years later to
12% by which time all thoughts of a centralised union had been 
94forgotten.
April, 1947 saw the founding of the "German Trade Union Federation"
ii
(DGB) in the British zone with Hans Bockler as its chairman.
In the French and American zones union organisation was not 
yet allowed beyond "Land" level, as follows:
Free Trade Union Federation in Hessen* founded 24th August, 1946
ii
Trade Union Federation Wurttemberg-Baden, founded 29th August, 1946
■I
Trade Union Federation South Wurttemberg/Hohenzollern, 1947 
Bavarian Trade Union Federation, founded 27th April, 1947 
General Federation of Trade Unions Rhineland Palatinate, 
founded 2nd May, 1947 
Trade Union Federation in Baden, founded 18th July, 1947
In May, 1947, a union council for the British and American 
zones was instituted at Frankfurt. The Erench unions joined 
in November, 1:948. The council agreed upon the formation of 
sixteen industrial unions which together would constitute the 
German Trade Union Federation in the three western zones.
The founding of the DGB took place on October 13th, 1949 in
QC
Munich. The 16 member'unions were as follows:
Industrial Union for Building, Construction & Quarrying
Industrial Union for Mining & Energy
Industrial Union for Chemicals, Paper & Ceramics
Industrial Union in Printing
Union.of Railwayworkers in Germany
Union for Education & Science
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Union for Horticulture, Agriculture & Forestry
Union for Commerce, Banking & Insurance
Union for the Wood & Synthetics Industries
Union for the Arts
Union for the Leather Industry
Industrial Union for Metalworking & Engineering
Union for Food Processing, Catering & Entertainment
Union for Public Services, Transport & Communications
German Postworkers' Union
Union for Textiles & Clothing
DAG - DBB - CGB
The principle of industrial unionism raised problems for the 
salaried employees and civil servants in West Germany who felt 
that such a pattern of organisation could not adequately represent 
their interests. The "German Staffs Union" (Deutsche 
Angestelltengewerkschaft) came about in the British zone in 
1947, then in the Republic in 1949.
Likewise the "German Civil Servants' Federation" (Deutscher 
Beanrtenbund) was set up to provide alternative representation 
outside the DGB for civil servants. In 1955, a minority of 
Christian-Socialist officials within the DGB withdrew. They 
had expressed grievances over DGB policy for some time and 
finally withdrew over the issue of rearmament. They formed 
the Christian Trade Union Movement in Germany which changes 
its name in 1959 to the Christian Trade Union Federation.
The separate movement has never attracted significant numbers 
and has not played a very important role in the trade union 
movement of West Germany as a whole.
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S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  DGB
16 Member* Representative Structure Executive
Unions of DGB Structure of DGB
MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE
Delegates 
elected by 
membership
FEDERAL
CONGRESS FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
COMMISSION OF 
AUDITORS
EXECUTIVE
BOARD
Delegates 
elected at —  
'Land' level
Delegates 
elected at
district level
REGIONAL (LAND)
A DELEGATE REGIONAL
CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE
it
(9 Lander)
DISTRICT
-A
DELEGATE
v
DISTRICT
✓ CONFERENCE > EXECUTIVE
(280 approx)
Delegates 
elected at
local branch
(2 500 approx)
LOCAL A LOCAL
CARTELS
7
EXECUTIVE
* Also affiliated from 1977 The German Police Union
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S im ple  S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  Member Unions
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Postscript
Hugh Clegg notes that "the structure of many unions reflects
the state of technology and industrial organisation at the
96time of their birth and growth". This chapter has endeavoured 
to present the case that, in Germany, political ideology and 
social philosophy were equally responsible for the evolution 
of a model of trade unionism which suffered fragmentation, 
disorder and collapse, prior to the procreation of industrial 
unionism, born of that same political heritage and idealism.
By the late 1970s and 30 years on, the industrial sector model 
of trade union organisation had appeared for the most part 
to have stood the test of time in meeting the aspirations of 
its membership as well as those of the society in which it 
was required to operate. The crucial issue of how this idealised 
structure could respond to the pressures of the 1970s is directly 
related to the functions which may be required of it in changing 
political and economic circumstances.
In the following chapter, further consideration is given to 
the historical basis of trade union consciousness and purpose 
within German society, which may condition those functions.
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The Evolution of Political Tradition and Purpose in the German 
Labour Movement
CHAPTER 4
Probably the most dominant factor of early trade union development 
in Germany was the political and economic hegemony of the aristocracy 
and upper middle class of the Bismarckian era. Quoted in the literature 
as having made a significant contribution towards the collapse of 
the labour movement in 1933 , the political suppression of the working 
classes in the early stages of their development was certainly a factor 
of some influence in the evolution of trade union thought and tradition 
in that country. The balance of power after 1870 rested firmly in 
the hands of the Prussian landed gentry, industrialists and bankers.
The political rule of the nobility in Prussia remained undisputed, 
upheld by the "three-class-franchise" which allotted the number of 
votes according to tax assessment. The bourgoisie was granted access 
to political and social standing by adopting the pattern of behaviour 
of the nobility and by developing an autocratic manner in all spheres
o
of life which corresponded to the monarchic and authoritarian.
Economic slump in the early 1870s and harsh industrial competition 
led to an unscrupulous exploitation of the workers by their ruler- 
employers. In accordance with the "Master of the House" principle, 
if the industrialists did not reject social policies out of hand, 
then they ruled their workforce with a strict paternalism which 
penetrated all aspects of their existence, both in private and 
at work, leaving little room for initiative or political action.
"Enjoy what is granted to you. Your work accomplished, remain in
the circle of your family,......As for the high politics, do not
waste your time. Higher politics requires more time and a greater 
insight into conditions than are given to the workers. You are doing 
your duty if you elect candidates recommended to you by those whom 
you trust. You will do nothing but damage if you try to interfere 
with the helm of the legal order..." (Krupp, 1877)3
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The political and social paralysis of some 80% of the population,
combined with the technical backwardness of the economy, provided
for a corresponding lag in the development of any worker or trade
union consciousness in Germany. Early attempts to organise or take
spontaneous collective action were swiftly and easily suppressed by
4
the employers or authorities, and not until the 1860s did there emerge 
any semblance of organised class consciousness. Attempts to set up 
worker organisations failed accordingly: Marx had some success in 
the Rhineland and Westphalia in the Fifties but little success elsewhere.5 
Socialism as such remained the ideal of middle-class intellectuals 
until Lassalle's ADAV provided the vehicle for the articulation of 
workers' frustrations, and the foundations of a social democratic 
labour movement were finally laid. Yet Lassalle's concept of worker 
organisation was clearly one of party politics rather than trade unionism, 
a controversy which was to dog the labour movement throughout its 
subsequent history. Doubts about the value of industrial action caused 
a split in the Social Democratic Party even after its founding congress 
in 1875, at which it was formally agreed that:
"...it is (therefore) the duty of all workers to join the trade union 
which is active in their industry, or if there is no such organisation 
as yet, to found one themselves."7
In a traditionally authoritarian state and under Lasselle's influence, 
use of the strike was relatively restricted in Germany at this early 
stage of union development. Workers' organisations functioned chiefly 
as friendly societies and made more use of petitioning to employers 
and governments to secure a better life. Even as friendly societies, 
worker organisations were subject to strict control by the state, 
which recoiled from allowing any independant action by the working 
classes.8
The growth in the number of strikes in the 1870s gave the union move­
ment a degree of independence from the political movement. Workers 
began to learn directly from their own experiences and recognised 
the importance of the role of trade unions in securing their emancipation. 
They also came to realise that the strength of the trade union move­
ment depended on it establishing itself independently of the Party.
D e te r m i n in g  Trade Union F u n c t i o n .
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This led unionists to favour the establishment of occupational unions,
pursuing a more pragmatic policy, but with broader aims in common
g
with a political party.
Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Laws, first passed in 1878, marked the end
of the first developmental stage of the union movement. Under the
Laws, unions had to find means of appearing, at least formally, as
organisations quite separate from Social Democracy in order to survive.
In the 1880s, shifts in industrial organisation brought about changes
in the social structure in the way of greater urbanisation and with
it, a recognition on the part of the labour force of their collective 
10fate. The boom years of 1881/2 and 1885/6 gave rise to surges of 
interest in union organisation and the emergence of a mass movement.
In addition to the welfare functions developed by the clubs and friendly 
societies, particularly during the period of suppression, petitioning 
by worker groups increased, following the successful petitioning by 
the Essen miners in 1881/2. Such action was denounced by the socialists, 
even though it had to some extent been inspired by Social Democracy 
and did succeed in articulating workers' grievances in a period of 
severe political repression.
Trade union activity was kept alive however by the dispersed strike
11
committees, as in the case of the Carpenters, and striking did continue, 
although continually suppressed as 'socialist agitation'. As the 
economy improved in 1887/8, the number of strikes increased as workers 
became embittered by the government's lack of consistency in its measures 
of repression, and turned more readily to Social Democracy.
Worker organisation was most effectively sustained during the period 
of anti-Socialist legislation by the trade union organisations of 
the Liberal and Christian political movements which had been allowed 
to flourish. This explains how the miners of the Ruhr, a group of 
workers with no socialist or strike tradition, were in a position 
to organise successful large-scale action in 1889. Predominantly 
Catholic and generally very conservative, the Ruhr miners had shown 
little inclination to transform their lodge friendly societies into 
active trade unions. Yet liberalisation of markets and the passing of
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the mines from Prussian to private ownership had brought the miners 
a loss of status and privilege among working men which they had held 
for a hundred years. The industrialisation of the mines, mechanis­
ation and the division of labour had destroyed the partnership of
employer and employee and, by the 1860s, the large mines were run
12
with a military-like discipline. Petitions were repeatedly ignored
by employers and state alike, and the lodge societies gradually became
centres of a "collective wiH", though political differences among
the miners hindered effective organisation. In 1887, grievances about
low wages and high profits came to a head and, by force of events,
the miners found themselves able to articulate their demands at a
conference held in March, 1889. On the basis of the successes of
other organised groups, in particular the British unions, the miners
resorted to the strike, not for political reform but for higher wages,
and in doing so, alienated themselves from a long tradition of obedience
13
and honour to their employers.
The miners’ strike, 1889, marked the beginning of change for the trade 
union movement in Germany; Both ideology and organisation had been 
boosted by its success and the way was paved for the establishment 
of the General Commission and permanent machinery for collective action.
Towards a Trade Union Consciousness.
Organisational strength was still largely dependent upon the 
economic cycle and during the 1891-1894 slump, the barganing power 
of the unions and therefore their credibility was much reduced. One 
third of all strikes organised by the Free unions during these years 
were unsuccessful.14 They recognised the need to rationalise the 
organisation and their strike behavour. Local autonomy had to be 
cut back and, in view of the increasing division of labour, recruitment 
needed to be continued on an industrial basis. They also saw the 
need for unemployment benefit to help stablise the membership.
The crisis also had a political effect on the unions: union strength 
had weakened in relation to the Party. Furthermore, the SPD had 
enjoyed some success in the elections of 1890 and 1893 and needed 
the unions' strength much less. The socialists believed that capitalism
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moreover that capital concentration was already too great for any
15union action to be effective.
Union consciousness was also hampered from within by the political
convictions of some of their own leaders, including Legien, that the
unions functioned as a "training ground" of the party, ‘'Vorschule"
1 fi
for the political education of the workers:
"The trade unions are the schools of Socialism. In the trade union 
organisations the workers are trained in Socialism, because it is 
there that the struggle against Capitalism is happening in front of 
them day after day." (Karl Marx)
In 1894, the German Free trade unions were still lagging behind the
17unions of most other industrial countries in their development.
The craft unions were still the most wealthy, able to provide more
strike pay, legal aid and other benefits and, because of the skill
value of their members, were in a position to run their own labour
exchanges. Overall unionisation was strongest in the small and medium-
18
sized industries right up until 1914. The low level of union subscrip­
tion meant that most unions functioned as little more than strike
19organisers, in pursuit of higher wages and shorter hours.
However, at that time they were also beginning to infiltrate the admin­
istration of local public bodies, such as the welfare boards or the
20government employment exchanges. They became increasingly aware
of the need for a government unemployment benefit scheme, on social
as much as organisational grounds, which they then also adopted
21as one of their objectives.
Following the great depression, the unions did gain some strength
which they were able to reinforce by expanding their friendly society
function. The congress at Frankfurt in 1899 concentrated on
organisational and pragmatic policy matters, in particular the extension
of collective bargaining and a further area of cooperation with the
77
would soo n c o l l a p s e ,  r e n d e r i n g  t h e  u n i o n s  s u p e r f l o u s ;  Babel  a r g u ed
a u t h o r i t i e s , f a c t o r y  i n s p e c t i o n .
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Particularly in the light of organisational difficulties, the issue 
of political neutrality again arose. There had been discussion of
a possible amalgamation of the Free unions with the Christian unions ,
or at the very least a strict adherence to party neutrality in order
to attract non-socialist workers to their organisation - this was
chiefly important in coal mining where Christian unionism was
24particularly strong.
The problem of political neutrality was not merely a technical disagree­
ment between the reformist and orthodox Marxists, as Steinberg has 
25
suggested. Precisely because of their party political activities, 
the Prussian police had always kept a close watch on the trade unions 
and continued to do so even after 1890. Under the combination laws 
of 1899 and 1908, the Free trade unions were still in danger of ban 
and imprisonment of personnel if found to be political associations.
This particularly affected their strike and picketing activities,
27
and in 1909 attempts were made in parliament to ban the 'union shop'
Again with their existence in the balance during those pre-war years, 
the issue of political allegience presented itself as both help and 
hinderance to the trade unions: they were under threat as long as 
the Party to whom they owed their allegience remained divided and 
weak, yet were conscious of their constant requirement to pursue their 
own political goals. In contrast to the British trade unions, the 
German movement had not sought to form its own machinery for representation 
in parliament, which would have competed, in any event, with the estab­
lished socialist factions. The argument between partyists and unionists 
reached a climax in the first decade of this century over the issue 
of the General Strike. Party Marxists, in particular Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht, felt that the unions should be instrumental in 
promoting a General Strike, planned to spark off the revolution when 
the time was right. They had been inspired by the successes in other 
European countries of similar action by trade unionists. The union 
leaders, on the other hand, were wary of any wild mass movements which 
might put at risk the growing organisation which they had taken such 
pains to build. In face of the continuing suppression by employers 
and authorities following the fall of the Anti-Socialist Laws, the
23
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risks of reprisals by the authorities seemed very high, and, as Legien
pointed out at the Party conference in 1903, the workers might withhold
their contributions if they were led to believe that the revolution
28would succeed, leaving the organisation helpless.
At the union congress in Cologne, 1905, it was formally agreed that
the unions should forge ahead with their economic function and should
avoid risking their success by political strike. They had neither
the funds to organise and support such a strike, nor the experience
among their members to guarantee its success. Rather they would sacrifice
29such strength as they did have.
There were in fact some spontaneous political strikes by groups of
workers in that same year in favour of electoral reform, and Legien
did not condemn them. Tbe movement itself however lost momentum after
the after the failure of the Russian Revolution, and the SPD had to
3D
rethink its proposal of "guaranteed success" of mass strike action.
The following year a resolution to the conflict was found. At the 
Jena Party conference, Kautsky proposed a separating out of the roles 
of Party and unions, as a preferably alternative to a bowing of unions 
to Party supremacy. Babel, on the other hand, pointed out the weakness 
of both under such an arrangement and that the Party could do nothing 
without union backing. In recognising this fact, Bebel was able to 
bring the conference to a compromise in order to hold the movement 
together:
"I recommend, therefore, that trade unions should keep out of party
politics and religious debate, but I also recommend that they should
all the more keenly pursue labour policy and the class struggle."
Legien was likewise eager to avoid clashes with the Party which might
harm the unions and an agreement was signed in which the union leaders
agreed to the general strike as a last resort when the goal was deemed
worthy of the sacrifice. The party correspondingly agreed that any
political demonstrations during working hours would be subject to 
32union veto.
The Mannheim Agreement, 1906, formally recognised the confusion and 
weakness of the traditional relationship of SPD and unions. In it, 
the unions were acknowledged as the real leaders in the class struggle
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since the Party was quite clearly dependent on them for finance and 
political muscle. The original class conflict ideals of the Party 
now had to take a back seat to union reformism based on strength of 
organisation.
Collective Bargaining
Modelled on the British unions, it was chiefly the liberal HD unions 
which pursued collective barganining as a means of securing benefits 
for their members. Like the British unions, they also functioned 
as friendly societies, having introduced their own unemployment funds 
as early as the 1880s. Hampered in this respect by old ideologies, 
the Free unions remained sceptical towards collective bargaining as 
an effective method until the turn of the century. Lassalle's "iron 
wage law" had meant that any form of bargaining was ineffective and 
the unions affiliated to the ADAV functioned primarily as instigators 
of the political strike.
"For my part, I have never made a secret of the fact that this right
(to strike for better pay) can only bring relief in a few fleeting,
short-term and exceptional cases for particular groups of workers,
but it can never secure any real improvement in the situation of the 
33working class."
The Eisenacher league of unions, headed by Bebel and Liebknecht however
had provided "tramping", sickness, retirement and burial benefits 
34whenever possible. Combined in 1875, the unions continued these 
functions and expanded them as the Free union organisation gained 
stability in the 1890s.35
In 1903, the Free unions overcame their scepticism of collective agree­
ments as "contracts of peace and friendship" and recognised them as 
"one stage in the class struggle" enabling a rearmament for further 
struggle and "the securing of successes previously wrought". The 
agreements also granted the unions a degree of recognition by the
employers. By 1905, 1 505 agreements had been signed by the Free
37
unions on behalf of some 257 000 workers.
Kurth records a figure of two million workers covered by collective
38
agreements by 1913. Increasingly, governments and other authorities
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intervened to bring the two sides in industry to agreement. In the
Ruhr miners' strike of 1905 the employers' refusal to recognise either
unions or collective agreements resulted in state intervention and
new legislation on worker representation in mines with over one hundred
employees. The realisation on the part of the mineworkers of the
importance of an effective negotiating machinery strengthened the
39movement as a whole.
Basic wages rose considerably during the period 1903-1907, but not 
so real wages. Again it was the mine workers who presented the greatest 
single challenge to the employers in 1912. Again the employers refused 
to recognise their demands. Unlike the other two large-scale strikes 
by the Free unions in the mines, this time three unions, the Old Union 
(Free), the HD union and the Polish Miners Union, combined and the 
strike failed. Solidarity among the strikers barely reached 60% of 
the workforce without the support of the mightly Christian Miners 
Union and was denounced in the Reichstag and throughout Prussia as 
a political cock-fight between the Free and Christian unionists.40
The state intervened a second time, but this time to restore order
by sending in police and troops against the strikers, The Free unions
had been heavily defeated, having lost money, members and a great
deal of prestige as a result of the strike. The Christian unions
had successfully demonstrated how isolated Social Democracy still
was and how a strike in the Ruhr could not be carried through without
their support. By showing their loyalty to the state and the national
interest they had hoped to secure special negotiating rights with
the employers. The Free unions had failed to take account of such
41possible designs they might harbour.
1912 to 1914
One outcome of trade union agitation of the first decade of the century 
was that employers' organisation was tightened up in retaliation.
Apart from threatening measures such as blacklisting which, just before 
the outbreak of war, became discredited in the public eye, employers 
stepped up measures to tempt workers away from unions: they offered
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welfare benefits, housing, canteens, food, fuel, and profit-sharing:
42they also set up 'company unions' as substitutes for trade unions.
In addition, because of their public administrative role in social 
insurance and employment exchanges, dating back to 1881, union leaders 
were struggling for influence, not only against employers, but also 
against the state: they functioned within the state machinery even
43as the state sought to oppress the labouring classes they represented.
As they approached the outbreak of war, neither Party nor unions had 
much infleunce over the economic or political developments: the Party 
remained divided over policy aims, while the unions drifted further 
from the Party as they sought pragmatic means of withstanding the 
immense pressure from organised industry and governments towards both 
the labour movement and any form of social policy, labelled "the social 
burden".44
The unions had hoped to secure many of their social policy objectives
but by 1913, they had to concentrate all their efforts on defending
the right to exist. For fear that the "social burden" might hamper
economic growth, the captains of industry united in an anti-Social
45Democratic cartel 1. Not all the members of the cartel 1 agreed on 
the union question: some negotiated with them, others, including heavy 
industry, did not. Others, such as the Hansa League, did not join 
the cartel 1, but sought tougher legislation against the unions. Since 
this would not have succeeded in parliament, pressure upon the Prussian 
unions was devolved to the local authorities: in Berlin, the unions 
were again declared political organisations and prosecuted under civil
Afi
law. In 1911, two more laws were passed in the Reichstag to limit
the influence of the Social Democrats - the one covering the activities
of white-collar workers, the other, a social insurance Act which
effectively reduced union powers in the administration of welfare.
47According to von Raumer , still more restrictive measures intended 
by the government were in fact thwarted by the sudden outbreak of 
war.
At their congress in 1914, the unions agreed to the use of the general 
strike to obtain changes in social policy. This was to be organised
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organisations, and was in no way linked to revolution. It was never
48achieved because of the outbreak of war.
1914 to 1919
With the passing of the war credits in the Reichstag, Social Democracy
ceased to be an independent political movement but was absorbed into
49the political, economic and social functions of the state. A change 
in attitude of the authorities towards the labour movement came about 
after it had become apparent that the trench war was going to be a 
long one. A strongly organised and highly disciplined labour force 
was required if the war was to be won and labour leaders suddenly 
found themselves appointed to high administrative posts during the 
war years. As it was, by the end of the war, the labour movement 
was the only remaining organised group with its leadership intact.
Already on August 2nd, 1914, the unions signed an agreement on industrial
50peace with the employers1 federations. This brought them recognition
by employers and governments alike which was extended by the 1916
Hilfsdienstgesetz, the law intended to increase the war effort, and
which brought the unions into economic and social policy-making.
Under this law, works councils were introduced in the arms factories
and joint conciliation boards were set up on a basis of parity between
employers and union representatives. This the trade unions regarded
51as a great achievement. The unions also worked with the employers
52on various welfare councils during the war years, and in 1918 handed 
to the government an 18-point plan on labour and social policy, based 
largely on labour-capital cooperation and including a provision for
53standing joint conciliation committees for settling industrial disputes.
On May, 22nd, 1918, paragraph 153 of the Industrial Code for the Reich
which had declared it an offence to put pressure on a person to join
a union by “means of physical force, by threats, or by damaging his
54honour or reputation," was lifted.
One of the unions' designs was the setting of of a central body for 
cooperation between labour and capital (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft).
q u i t e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  P a r t y  in  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  u n io n
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The concept appealed to the leaders on both sides of industry who 
had worked side by side throughout much of the war. During the winter 
of 1917/18, the leaders met with a view to discussing the prospects 
and purpose of continuing the war, though the future was clearly too 
uncertain to agree on any permanent cooperative programme. The collapse 
of the Reich in 1918 finally forced the issue. The employers recognised
the need to seek an understanding with the unions before the end of
55the war in July, 1918. In October, informal meetings between the 
leaders began and a number of demands by the unions were nominally 
agreed to by the employers' leaders: full recognition, free collective 
bargaining, parity representation on labour exchange boards and concili­
ation committees and the elimination of company unions. The revolution
however granted more bargaining power to the unions and they raised
56
their sights, to include the 8-hour day in their demands. An agreement 
was signed nevertheless on November 15th by the industrialist Hugo 
Stinnes and ADGB chief, Carl Legien, under the terms of which joint 
councils were set up to organise demobilisation and industrial growth, 
including the administration of reparations production and distribution. 
Recognition of union organisations was confirmed by the new Reich
constitution of August 11th, 1919, article 159 of which guaranteed
57the negative and ppsitive freedom to combine.
Codetermination and the Works Councils Act 1920
The Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft (ZAG) was the creature of a few leaders 
of the unions and employers, and had been achieved without recourse 
to their respective memberships. Legien was continuing his strategy 
of cooperative reformism even in 1918 when the employers were clearly 
on the defensive. Eager to extend the organisational machinery in 
order to secure a better bargaining position with the industrialists, 
he failed to exploit the revolutionary mood of the time to realise 
labour's full barganining potential. It has been agreed that in 1918 
the judgement and opinion of the labour leaders was clouded by a fear 
of Bolschevism which resulted in a mistaken assessment of their part
of the value of the revolutionary soviet movement and a missed opport-
58
unity to strengthen the new democratic order. The leaders, it is
said, would have won more respect had they not shown quite so much
59enthusiasm for the ZAG; as it was, in the revolutionary atmosphere,
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some groups of workers were questioning the purpose of union organisations 
at all. The basic concepts behind the strategy of unions in the Weimar 
period were products of the pre-war era: limited in their actions 
by conditions in the Obrigkeitsstaat (the authoritarian state), the 
labour leaders had been committed to reformist tactics. Since during 
the war, the unions had secured most of their main pre-war objectives, 
the path of reformism was reaffirmed, whether or not the labouring 
masses were of the same mind.
The unions favoured legal regulation of social policy50 and, on the 
basis of the cooperation with both employers and state which they 
had enjoyed ruing the war years, they sought to secure by legislation 
democracy in industry and parity with employers in other economic 
and social policy-making bodies. Democratic control of industry as 
an intermediary stage towards 'socialisation' of the economy was an 
idea put forward by economists Wissell and Moellendorf in their work 
in 1919, on the planned economy. It first took root in the mining 
industry where, in 1919, a new Coal Council of both industrialists 
and union leaders was set up to manage the industry. The intention 
was to extend to the labour representatives a degree of control in 
the monopoly industries as a means of stablising the economic as well 
as political democracy. Naphtali reported later however that the 
'socialisation' of the industry in fact had little effect on its manage­
ment, since in practice the employers held a majority of seats on 
the Coal Council.51
There were two other laws on socialisation passed in 1919 which were 
never applied: the Socialisation and Electricity Acts. Naphtali suggests 
two reasons whey these laws were never effective: first, that there 
were no public finances to run industry on a nationalised basis, mainly 
because of the conditions of the Versailles Treaty; secondly, and 
clearly tied up with the first, a period of reaction was setting in 
which denounced all calls for industrial democracy and demonstrated 
a general reversal of social trends in favour of retaining private 
ownership.52
As a result of this general "cooling off" of the revolutionary climate 
of two years previous, the law on industrial democracy passed in 1910,
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the Works Councils Act (Betriebsraetegesetz) produced a greatly watered-
down version of the demands raised during the soviet movement. Proposed
by the unions after the Kapp'Tutsch',' it went some way to answer the
demands of the rebelling groups of workers who had already been setting
63
up their own workers' councils. It represented steps towards the
socialisation of industry by the government and furthered the discussion
of industrial democracy. The Act provided for joint industrial councils
at regional and Reich level as well as works councils in the plant.
The works councils had few rights and were effective in social policy
only, having no say in the economic affairs of the plant or in the
recruitment of labour. The employers were in no way accountable to
64
the councils whose political activity was strictly controlled.
They had no rights of codetermination on wages and conditions, therefore
their function was entirely defensive. Unions in mining, textiles,
transport and the public sector, were amongst those which demanded
the extension of council functions to include supervision and participation
65
in plant decisions, although the traditional "classical" craft
66
unions (for example, the woodworkers and builders) showed no enthusiasm 
for this form of industrial democracy at the work place.
The joint industrial councils also proved unsatisfactory. The Reich
council had been intended as the highest body in the democratic structure
in the economy with legislative and executive powers, though these
67
remained undefined. In any event, the Reich industrial council
had been set up as a "temporary" body and never really graduated from
this status. Its function was restricted to that of advisor to the 
6ft
government. The regional councils never existed.
Collapse of the ZAG
The ZAG never fully achieved the structure and funciton it had originally
intended. As early as 1919/20, its role was usurped by the various
government economic bodies, such as the Reich Coal Board and the Iron
Industries Federation, and it became a largely bureaucratic body.
Moreover, the ZAG was built upon an apolitical foundation which could
not hold out, as demonstrated by the events surrounding the Kapp“Putsch",
1920, in which Legien had called a general strike in full anticipation
6Q
of employers' support to save the Republic. Most, save RAG Chemie,
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did nothing and even blamed Legien for destabilising the ZAG
by the strike call. A row over payment of worker compensation broke
out as a result, and by 1922, the majority among the unions in favour
of the continuation of the ZAG was already paper-thin.70 The cooperative
basis of the ZAG was itself inflationary - employers would grant wage
concessions to the employees if they could recoup their losses elsewhere,
that is, in higher prices or productivity. The unions had agreed
that producer-orientation was more important than a consumer-
orientation and that Germany had to export to survive under the conditions
of the Treaty of Versailles. Yet this made the functioning of the
ZAG very dependent upon the economic situation which worsened after 
711920. The ZAG could therefore offer the workers no long-term advantages
in periods of inflation, industry protected itself by paying paper
72money for higher productivity and longer hours. Inflation sapped
union funds and the disappointed members left the organisations.
The metal workers' union had abandoned the ZAG early on in 1919, the
builders' union did likewise in 1922, followed by the white-collar
73
organisations of both the Free and HD unions in 1923.
The unions in the ZAG had cooperated with the employers under the 
illusion that it functioned as a form of codetermination in economic 
affairs, particularly in the administration of the export industries. 
Feldman suggests that the ZAG organisation was in reality far less 
functional and more a mere product of the 'organisation-mania' which 
had gripped Germany at the end of the war.74
The Decline of Collective Bargaining
In the early days of the ZAG, the unions did achieve their main objective 
of better wages and conditions, either by negotiation or by legal 
enactment through their ties with the SPD. During the 1920s however, 
while the unions were weakened by inflation, the employers were organis­
ing on a very large scale; rationalisation and resultant high levels 
of structural unemployment were lending more strength to the employers 
and their use of the lock-out. Economic and political instability 
meant increasing state intervention, and arbitration, once a temporary 
measure, became a permanent feature of wage settlement. There was 
no free collective bargaining in the Ruhr after 1921, with both sides
151
finding it easier to leave settlement to a third party. As mentioned
above, not only were unions losing their grip over wages, but as the
ZAG neared collapse, also working hours and conditions. The increasing
dependence upon arbitration weakened the sense of responsibility for
wage bargaining on both sides of industry. In 1928, with the SPD back
in power, the unions took a tougher line in bargaining, making high
claims in the hope of securing higher awards from the arbitrator.
This was not without retaliation from the employers who record some
76
bitter conflicts during the years 1927-29.
77In 1925, Tarnow complained that labour was losing its political strength.
The only strength the unions had left was in influencing the government
and parliament, and in 1928, Fritz Naphtali published his work on
industrial and economic democracy as a means of extending the legal
rights and functions of the trade unions. The unions could no longer
fight the employers without government support, but both they and the
78SPD over-estimated the chances of influencing the political machine.
The world recession of 1929 put the unions again under pressure from 
the employers and made them uneasy. Their struggle for unemployment
ii
benefit brought down the SPD Muller government the following year 
and brought in a Bruning government which they did not want.
The unions were not to appear as a democratic force to be reckoned 
with again: they were trapped, wishing neither to tolerate suppression, 
falling wages and cuts in social policy, nor to risk a political and
ii 7Q
economic catastrophe by forcing Bruning out of office. They chose 
to support the government and adopt a role of subservience to it.
At first, wage cuts applied only to plant agreements,but by the winter 
of 1930, the government had allowed substantial cuts in earnings in 
order to support its monetary and foreign trade policies. Arbitration 
awards now turned against the unions.
80In 1931 unemployment reached 5 million. The misery of the masses
encouraged radicalism to the left and right, much of it aimed at the
81unions who sought a middle course. Leipart, now leader the ADGB, 
clung to his code of responsibility and common sense at all times, 
failing even to retaliate in the face of a second coup d'etat in 1932.
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"We have learnt over the course of centuries, in respect of the heavy
sense of responsibility which we have always felt, to calculate our
demands and formulate our proposals such that to meet them would not
ft?have i11-effects on the rest of society." (Union Congress, 1931)
Furthermore, having recognised the weakness of the SPD/KPD as a political 
agent of the unions, the union leaders turned to the right-wing parties 
including the left-wing of the NSDAP in the hope of establishing some 
working relationship. Under the Papen government, the bargaining rights 
of unions were greatly reduced within an economic and social-policy frame­
work which favoured the employers. Strikes against employers became 
pointless under such conditions of state control of prices, wages and
the labour market. Thus the offer of participation with the Schleicher
83
government seemed advantageous. It was the anticipation of attaining 
an integrative social position beyond the function of collective bargaining 
which drew the unionists closer to the notion of a single united union 
organisation, on the lines of the German Labour Front (Deutsche 
Arbeitsfront) to be formed later, and played straight into the hands of 
the National Socialists. In an essay on "The Services of the Unions to
ii
the Nation and State" (Leistungen der Gewerkschaften fur Volk and Staat),
Leipart suggested that the unions laid "a path along which the proletarian,
released from all ties of place and tradition, might find his way to the
84homeland of the people" The unions were not immune to the new mass 
ideology of neo-conservatism and national socialism which had replaced 
republicanism. Losing all perspective of socio-economic power, they 
had shifted their base from class unionism to concentrate on the new 
concept of national unionism. More than merely an anti-communist, anti­
fascist league, Leipart, Tarnow and others held a vision of a corporate 
"German Union" which would function as a stablising factor in German
politics and society. Yet the illusions of their own future greatness,
85
the emphasis on "organisation, not demonstration" blinded the leaders
OC
and robbed them of their freedom of action. Thus the defeat was an 
ideological one as well as a political one.
Summary.
The discontent in the workshops which found expression in the early craft
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unions was not pursued and articulated so immediately and directly 
in Germany as it had been in England. Though the Liberal Hirsch-Duncker 
unions followed the craftsmen’s strategy of collective bargaining and 
unilateral regulation in industry, the main core of union tradition 
in Germany did not develop in this direction. For the vast majority 
of German workers, trade union ideology emerged out of the political 
gatherings of the mid-nineteenth century which propagated class politics 
handed down from the more educated socialists. In this way, Marxist 
ideology penetrated the labour movement in Germany at its conception 
and workers came to learn of unionism through political teaching, rather 
than any initiative of their own to combine.
The authoritarianism of the German polity and society was so complete 
that labour ideology was inevitably founded on a desire to change the 
system. Moreover, under the strict guidance of the paternalism of 
Germar employers and the discipline of the Church, initiative at the 
base, in the factory and workshop, was not forthcoming. Instead, it 
had to be chanelled by the political leaders of the day through organis­
ations such as Lassalle's German Workers' Association before unionisation 
became possible. This led to a degree of radicalism in the movement 
which prevented it from ever uniting the workforce in a common cause. 
Fraught with internal division the politicisation of the German labour 
force was to develop into a polarisation of revolutionists and reformists, 
a situation made all the more complicated by confessional differences. 
Dependence on the political party was always a source of weakness for 
the largest trade union body in Germany, the Free Unions. Conceived 
by the Party, the movement lacked initiative and failed to ever develop 
a clear programme of its own. It was crippled by party suppression 
in its infancy, but dependence on the economic cycle denied it the 
strength to break away. The political allegience of the unions also 
prevented any cooperation with other union organisations; inter-union 
rivalry extended beyond demarcation disputes to contradictions of union 
objectives and purpose. The Christian unions, with their tradition 
of discipline and cooperation had flourished under the Anti-Socialist 
Laws, which only deepened the fact of the labour movement along with 
its legacy of conservatism. The conceptualisation of trade unionism 
on the part of their political leaders as contributing to a political 
movement continually overshadowed their attempts to set up an independent
154
trade union movement which was never achieved in the British sense.
Their concern with the political rights of workers led them to seek 
participation with employers and government in order to gain influence 
in social policy-making, but they tried to achieve this without first 
establishing an offensive position. They succeeded only in antagonising 
government as well as employers.which produced an anti-union alliance 
which they were unable to contain. Attempts to rationalise and centralise 
their organisation activities never sufficiently compensated for the 
fundamental deficiencies of the German trade union movement. Without 
clearer, more pragmatic aims the trade unions failed substantially 
as a reforming social force. Even after their formal separation from 
the party organisation, their labour policy objectives remained bound 
up with the political movement:
Collective bargaining and the effective use of the strike as an economic 
weapon - indeed the essence of British trade unionism - remained compar­
atively underdeveloped. Their defensive stance gave rise on the one 
hand to an extension of their friendly society functions and interest 
group activity such as petitioning, so actively encouraged- by the 
inadequacies of the German polity; and on the other to an increasing 
dependence upon government intervention in wage settlements.
The limits of this strategy were tragically demonstrated by events 
after 1930. Dependence upon government machinery became subservience 
to it, and the principle of independent trade union organisation as 
a credible social and economic agent was to remain unpractised until 
a new political order was established after 1945.
A wealth of debate has since developed on the issue of trade union 
effectiveness in post-war German society, much of it critical of the 
role which the machinery of industrial unionism has seemingly ascribed 
to itself during the first 30 years of its life. The main issues 
of this debate, along with similar critique of the functions and 
effectiveness of British trade unionism are presented in the following 
chapter.
155
1 S c h um a nn op c i t  p 12
2 G r e b i n g  o p  c i t  p 70
3 i b i d  p 74
4 Dowe op c i t  p 52
5 i b i d  p 63
ii
6 G Huck, Z tm  V e r h a l t n i s  v o n  T h e o r i e  u n d  P r a x i s  b e i  H e s s ,  L a s s a l l e ,  L a n g
u n d  D i e t z e n ,  i n  R e u l e c k e  o p  c i t  p 33
7 U B o r s d o r f ,  H-0 H e m m e r ,  M M a r t i n y  ( e d s ) ,  G r u n d l a g e n  d e r  E i n h e i t s g e w e r k s c h a f t ,
1977,  p 36
8 W a c h e n h e im  o p  c i t  p 196
9 i b i d  p 146
10 R i t t e r ,  T e n f e l d e  o p  c i t  p 70
11 i b i d  p 80
12 G l a d e n  o p  c i t  p 117
13 i b i d  p 126
14 R i t t e r ,  T e n f e l d e  o p  c i t  p 88
n
15 H J  S t e i n b e r g ,  D i e  E n t v i c k l u n g  d e s  V e r h a l t n i s s e s  v o n  G e v e r k s c h a f t e n  u n d  
S o z i a l d e a o k r a t i e  b i s  z u r  A u s b r u c h  d e s  E r s t e n  V e l t k r i e g s ,  i n  V e t t e r  op c i t
p 128
16 i b i d  p 129
17 W a c h e n h e i m  o p  c i t  p 295
18 i b i d  p 297
19 i b i d  p 299
20 i b i d
21 R i t t e r ,  T e n f e l d e  o p  c i t  p 315
22 W a c h e n h e i m  o p  c i t  p 315
23 S t e i n b e r g  op c i t  p 130
24 W a c h e n h e i m  o p  c i t  p 317
25 S t e i n b e r g  o p  c i t  p 131
26 E i c k h o f  o p  c i t  p 170
27 i b i d  p 162
28 W a c h e n h e i m  o p  c i t  p 400
29 i b i d  p 406
30 i b i d  p 414
31 B o r s d o r f ,  H e m m e r ,  M a r t i n y  o p  c i t  p 46
R E F E R E N C E S
156
32 W a c h e n h e im  op c i t  p 417
33 B o r s d o r f , H e m m e r , N l a r t i n y ,  o p  c i t  p 24
34 i b i d  p 24
35 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 175
36 W a c h e n h e im  op c i t  p 394
37 i b i d  p 397
38 K u r t h  op c i t
39 G l a d e n  op c i t  p 140
40 i b i d  p 145
41 W a c h e n h e im  op c i t  p 125
42 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 158
43 E N a p h t a l i ,  W i r t s c h a f t s d e r a o k r a t i e ,  1977,  p 165
44 W a c h e n h e im  op c i t  p 512
45 i b i d  p 576
46 W a c h e n h e im  o p  c i t  p 582
47 v o n  Raum er i n  H o p p e n s t e d t s  W i r t s c h a f t s - A r c h i v ,  D e r  Weg zum I n d u s t r i e l l e n  
S p i t z e n v e r b a n d ,  1956,  p 105
48 W a c h e n h e im  op c i t  p 582
49 i b i d  p 602
50 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 147
51 O t t o  op c i t  p 62
52 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 148
53 O t t o  op c i t  p 63
54 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 148
55 v o n  Raum er op c i t  p 107
56 i b i d  p 110
57 E i c k h o f  op c i t  p 149
58 H S k r z y p c z a k ,  Z u r  S t r a t e g i e  d e s  F r e i e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  i n  d e r  W e i m a r  R e p u b l i k ,
i n  V e t t e r  o p  c i t  p 201
59 G O  F e l d m a n ,  D i e  F r e i e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  u n d  d i e  ZAG 1918- 1924,  i n  V e t t e r  o p  c i t
p 238
60 N a p h t a l i  op c i t  p 53
61 i b i d
62 i b i d  p 82
63 P v o n  O e r t z e n ,  D i e  P r o b l e m e  d e r  W i r t s c h a f t l i c h e n  N e u o r d u n g  u n d  d e r  
M i t b e s t i m m u n g  i n  d e r  R e v o l u t i o n  v o n  1918,  1964 ,  p 28
64 i b i d  p 53
65 i b i d  p 59
66 i b i d  p 60
157
67 v o n  R aum er  op c i t  p 205
68 i b i d  p 206
69 F e l d m a n  o p  c i t  p 245
70 i b i d  p 246
71 i b i d  p 247
72 v o n  R aum er  o p  c i t  p 114
73 i b i d  p 203
74 F e l d m a n  o p  c i t  p 249
75 H Mom m sen, D i e  D e u t s c h e  G e v e r k s c h a f t e n  z v i s c h e n  A n p a s s u n g  u n d  W i d e r s t a n d  
1930- 1944,  i n  V e t t e r  o p  c i t  p 184
76 v o n  R a u m e r  op c i t  p 214
77 W a c h e n h e i m  op c i t  p 635
78 Mommsen o p  c i t  p 286
79 S k r z y p c z a k  op c i t  p 213
80 i b i d  p 215
n
81 G B e i e r ,  D a s  l e h r s t u c k  v o »  1 u n d  2 M a i  1933,  1975,  p 21
82 S k r z y p c z a k  op c i t  p 216
83 Mommsen o p  c i t  p 289
84 B e i e r  o p  c i t  p 26
85 i b i d  p 24
86 Mommsen o p  c i t  p 290
158
The Functions of Trade Unions in West Germany and the United Kingdom 
- A Critical Review
CHAPTER 5
Society and State
How trade unions conduct themselves and the functions they perform 
must reflect in no small measure their political and cultural 
contexts. The term "political culture" is defined by Almond
■j
(1970) as "a particular pattern of orientations to political 
action" in which every political system is embedded. The term 
is a useful one as a notation for the political and cultural 
characteristics of a system or society, but should not mislead 
the reader to conceive of it as being identical with a given 
political system or general culture. Almond himself is aware 
of this danager, and it is important particularly in an industrial 
relations context that "political culture" is understood in 
its widest sense, reflecting an overall approach towards politics 
and ideology.
Leibholz (1967) deals with aspects of the political culture 
of Britain and Germany in terms of the relationship of state 
and society in those two countries. He states that before 1933, 
while the nation-state was at the centre of French political 
ideology, Prusso-German political thought was dominated by the 
state as such. Propounded by Hegel, the almost deification 
of the state as guarantor of the common good in nineteenth- 
century Germany was to have severe consequences for the country's 
social development and political expression :
"People, Nation, Democracy smacked of revolution at the time 
(1948) and those who employed such terms were counted as
revolutionaries who wanted to overthrow the political
2
order".
The philosophy of state hegemony was continued under Bismarck 
before it was usurped by the National Socialist ideology of 
people and nation. Characteristic of the traditional Prussian 
philosophy was its negative evaluation of the society, since
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this was regarded essentially as lying outside politics. Society 
was assumed to be the sum of the economic and apolitical interest
3
groups. Seeking their own advantage, such interest groups 
may not be acting in the best interests of the whole and must 
not be allowed to interfere with the state, which does serve 
the common good, nor diminish its political character (Rousseau). 
The free individual in society is effectively reduced to a "man 
of straw" without public status.
The antagonism of state and society is thus clear; the parliament 
is intended as an intermediary, representing both the political 
interests of the state and the particular interests of the 
individuals and social groups.
Almond points out that in Weimar neither parties nor interest
groups were able to function effectively because of their 
4
interpenetration. Leibholz attributes this unworkability of 
the Weimar constitution to the depoliticisation of the parties
5
by the interest group power within their ranks. The state 
had become the organisation of the society and had been destroyed 
by it (Carl Schmitt).
In contrast to the European and, more particularly, the German 
approach, political thought in Anglo-Saxon countries centres 
upon the concept of society rather than the neutral state.
From the Anglo-Saxon viewpoint, the state performs only one 
of several sets of functions of the society, estimated by John 
Stuart Mill to represent perhaps a tenth of the total. There 
exists therefore no such antagonism between society and state 
as is present in continental political systems, nor can the 
state be destroyed by society. "Society" in the Anglo-Saxon 
sense is to be equated with"community" rather than "civil 
society" against which Hegel was so ready to wage war in order 
to save the state and nation. The subordination of the individual 
to the society and the society to the state which so dominates 
European thinking is reversed in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. The 
society is not an end in itself but merely the means to an end, 
which is to serve and respect the individual:
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"It is the primacy of the individual over the community, of 
the community over the state which gives to English society 
its unique character" (Barker, 1947),7 and
"The French think in terms of family and the nation, the English
Q
tend to think in terms of the individual and society" (Mailland).
For the purposes of analysis, can the Anglo-Saxon system be 
described as having a political and social order in the continental 
sense? According to Burke's study of the American Revolution, 
individual freedom is limited by a respect for social and historical 
tradition. The limitations to freedom are just, in that they 
are based on a toleration of the freedom of others and require 
no further formulation or justification. This is founded on 
the notion that the individual is primarily an animal of good 
sense, capable of controlling his expressions of emotions even 
in the political arena. Such self-control and reservation clearly 
does not feature in continental tradition and can perhaps account 
for the higher degree of toleration in Britain of the opinions 
of others and the protection of minority groups. Leibholz points 
out that it is this tradition of liberalism which has up until 
recently conditioned party policy in Britain; only since the 
Second World War, with the emergence of Labour governments has
g
the emphasis in political thought shifted in favour of egalitarianism. 
The Philosophy of the Social Market Economy
Increasing state intervention in the twentieth century was regarded 
by the supporters of both laisser faire harmony and Marxist 
determinism as less of an arbitrator among the political parties 
and more of a force to be recruited in their favour. The pressure 
groups on both sides felt that state intervention could only 
and should only act as support to their own social and economic
ii
power. Motteli cites two decisive elements in the way in which 
a fine balance was struck between classical Liberalism and the 
Socialism and tradition of state intervention which had emerged
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in Weimar by the Social Market Economy of the Federal Republic: 
these were, in the first place, the research into Social 
Liberalism, conducted chiefly by Walter Eucken at the "Freiberg 
School" during the 1930s, and in the second place, a known and 
respected personality in the field of political economics who 
had the courage to put the theory into practice, Ludwig Erhard.10
The practice of the Social Market Economy was indeed a gamble 
on the part of Erhard since it involved the implementation of 
an as yet untried theory of social philosophy. The roots of 
this philosophy lay in Social or Ordo-Liberalism, as already 
stated; this represented a clear break with nineteenth- 
century Liberalism in its rejection of laisser faire and the 
adoption of a principle of social and economic order, related 
in some way to the Catholic approach to ordered society.
This ordering of social and economic activity was aimed to 
strive towards a social harmony which, again in breach of old 
Liberalism, would not be otherwise automatically apparent.
The new Liberalism was related to the old in the John Stuart 
Mill sense of ensuring the freedom of the members of society
to "pursue our prosperity in our own way, as long as we do not
deprive others of theirs or hinder their efforts...." (Principles 
of Political Economy, 1848).
The emphasis of Ordo-Liberalismismerely more heavily laid 
on the second part of this extract rather than the
ii
first. Franz Bohm criticised the classical liberals as 
follows:
"They greatly underestimate the size of the conscious social
and cultural contribution involved in the development of
the given possibilities of order and they thought it
sufficient to remove privilege, introduce freedom of
employment and avoid state intervention in order to create
a socio-political framework which would allow ‘Nature1 to
take care of the rest. And so it came about that the era
of freedom of employment did not create a competitive order
1111
b u t  m e r e l y  a s y s t em  o f  l a i s s e r  f a i r e ,  l a i s s e r  a l l e r .
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The competitive market economy is based on a coordination 
rather than subordination which must be guaranteed by 
the democratic order. The state is to take a role in 
the control of the economic system, but by employing
u
indirect means only to maintain order. Motteli summarises 
Social Liberalism as follows:
"In accordance with the liberal principle of private
ownership of the means of production, there is to be
created a market-economic order of competition to prevent
the use of private ownership against the general interest
by depriving the monopolists of their position of power.
The market form of complete competition presents the
"ordre naturel", this is Ordo-, in which the model of
the constitutional framework for an economy based on
12free competition is to be perceived."
Two further aspects of Social Liberalism remain in this 
analysis of the theory of the Social Market Economy; 
one is that of social security, generally attributed
ii
to what Motteli calls Neo-Socialism; another is the
ii
principle of Subsidiaritat. the concept of state guidance 
to the smaller community, formally associated with Roman 
Catholic social tradition. Neo-Socialism is perhaps 
best described as a dual economic order of market forces 
and state intervention. Heralded by Lord Beveridge's 
"Welfare State" in the 1940s, Neo-Socialism came to 
be associated with increasing state management and planning 
in the economy. At the end of the war the SPD and DGB 
in the western zones of Germany were also taken by similar 
ideas and promoted the synthesis of state planning and 
the free market economy in order to prevent further 
starvation and to secure clothing and housing for the 
German people.
Balanced against the tendency towards Neo-Socialism, 
and indeed towards Liberalism in Germany, has always
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been the Catholic social doctrine. Like Neo-Socialism, 
Catholic influence was potentially most strong during 
the years immediately following the war. Catholic 
teaching had played an important role in the spread 
of Fascism in some countries and had been articulated 
most clearly in the Papal Encyclica of 1931, "Quadragissimo 
Anno", built on a previous Encyclica of 1891 "Rerum 
Novarum". It was the sacrifice of the individual to 
the community in the Catholic teaching which smacked 
of totalitarianism and which was rejected after the 
war for that reason, despite its usefulness to law and 
order in the chaos during the early years. Both the 
Catholic and Social Liberal theories express an ordering 
of social and economic life based on private ownership, 
neither subscribing to laisser faire notions of either 
natural harmony or Marxist determination.
Neo-Socialism, Catholic class society and Social Liberalism 
all appear to acknowledge the existence of a strong 
state, standing above party and group interest, the 
first to support the principle of egalitarianism, the 
second to watch over the social order, the last to
ii
ensure the decentralisation of power. Motteli suggests 
that the decisive differences between them are to be 
found in the way in which each theory seeks to achieve 
a balance in society: whereas Neo-Socialism tends to 
over-burden the state with interventionist authority, 
the Catholic teaching leaves the responsibility for 
order squarely on the shoulders of the social classes;
Social Liberalism on the other hand, is an attempt to 
bridge the gap between these two extremes, allowing 
for both state intervention and freedom of contract
13and combination in'so far as is possible without conflict.
It was along the lines of Social Liberalism that the 
concept of the Social Market Economy (SME) was first
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developed in the 1930s. The brain-child of the "Freiburg
ii
School" headed by Walter Eucken and Franz Bohm, the 
model of the SME was adopted and implemented by Dr. 
Erhard. Its name was coined by one of Dr. Erhard's 
closest advisors, Professor Muller-Armack, who defined 
the concept as follows:
"The ideas of the Social Market Economy, if we look 
at its spiritual roots, has its origin in Neo-Liberal 
economic ideas, or in that revival of economic service 
which stressed the vital function of the principle of 
competition and at the same time sought to establish, 
in contrast to old fashioned Liberalism, a competitive
order in accordance with the ideas of Walter Eucken
" 14and Franz Bohm."
The "competitive order" was in Eucken's view the most 
efficient and humane market form which could be adopted. 
Based on Eucken's notion of "complete competition" as 
opposed to "pure competition", the new economic order 
was not anti-interventionist but measured state inter­
vention according to its quality rather than its extent.
"The basic principle does not simply require that certain
measures of economic policy should be avoided............
Far more essential is a positive policy which aims at 
bringing the market form of complete competition into 
being, and which thereby fulfills the basic principles.
It is here that the policy of the competitive order 
differs completely from the policy of laisser faire 1
The guidlines of this intervention were laid down 
in principles of two basic types: constituent and
regulating. The most important constituent principle 
was "the primacy of monetary policy". The maintenance
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of "open" markets was also essential to the competi­
tive order which involved the removal of state 
controls on private industry, the banning of 
restrictive practices, the assurance of maximum 
freedom for an individual to practise his trade 
or profession etc. Perhaps the most important 
regulating principle was the need to control the 
tendency of industries towards monopoly. Other 
aspects of regulation included the possibility 
of minimum wage fixing, limits on tax progression 
so as to preserve investments, and the control of 
social costs imposed by individual firms eg pollution. 
Such welfare expenditure as was available was to be 
preserved for those who really needed it and social 
policy should otherwise be concentrated in insurance 
and self-help. Eucken's model was almost unique in 
its comprehensiveness, and clearly not of the same 
order as the traditionally impassive laisser faire. 
State intervention was to be based on data sets which 
effected the economy as a whole, of which there were 
six: the needs of the people, the natural resources, 
the available labour force, the stocks of goods already
produced, the level of technical knowledge and the
16
legal and social order.
Eucken professed to have found a system which was
both efficient and humane, yet his model has been
criticised on the grounds that it centres upon
the individual and it fails to encourage a sense
of the "common good", that it proffers no positive
values but merely "sacrifices society to the fetish 
17of market forces".
In response to this, Social Liberalism claims to 
encourage a responsible society of individuals in 
which each is aware of his position within the whole.
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As an ethical programme, this may fail to endow society 
with the same spiritual significance as do the Catholic 
or Neo-Socialist, but it offers more in this direction 
than the critics of Social Liberalism have implied.
Its proponents reject likewise the argument that the 
society is subservient to the market forces and proffer 
the view that the markets and competition are so ordered 
as to serve society.18
Clearly the Social Liberalism of post war Germany 
is imbued with the traditional view of state and society.
ii
The early works of Eucken and Bohm in particular reflect 
strongly a view of the neutral state standing above 
society and acting independently of it in favour of 
the common good. It is now an accepted view in German 
political thought that the "common good" must reflect 
the needs of the society and the political parties 
are expected to function as communicators between 
society and state. A political counterpart to Eucken's 
"competitive order" is thought to be provided by the 
written constitution of the "Basic Law" which sets 
out the conditions of the Rechtsstaat. This sets 
out a basic foundation for the state legislature, 
executive and judiciary and establishes certain funda­
mental human rights which the state must observe.
It grants the state a system of administrative justice, 
one of the oldest features of the German Rechtsstaat, 
and allows for the existence of an unwritten moral
code above the written law which represents an innovation
19in traditional German jurisprudence.
Pluralism and Corporatism in the Industrial Societies 
of Germany and Britain
Trade Unions in Germany were only one type of many pressure 
groups thrown up by the laisser faire economy of the nine­
teenth century. Not only wage levels, but the provision of 
work was subject to the rises and falls in the various
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free markets. As has been discussed in previous chapters,
rights of combination were at first recognised in principle,
only to be suppressed as some trade associations came to be
20linked with the Social Democratic movement. Political 
persecution and economic change hampered the development of 
the trade unions in favour of other pressure groups, most 
particularly the landowners and industrialists. Protectionism 
and the rapid development of production gave rise to antagonism 
between these two giants which led ultimately to the formation 
of the mighty industrialist-capitalist block of industry, 
banking and commerce, later known as the "Kartell der Schaffenden
Hi
Stande".
During the First World War, both state and industry recognised 
their need of the Social Democrats and the trade unionists and 
in return for their cooperation, granted them full recognition.
The new powers of decision-making granted to the unions provided 
for strong organisation; however the basic structure of economic 
organisation remained the same and, under the inflation which 
followed, Capital once again developed into a much more powerful 
force than Labour. Industrial concentration increased, encouraged 
by the activities of the big banks. The trade unions were left 
behind without power in economic life.
The number of other pressure groups greatly increased during the
years of inflation, particularly among the middle classes; for
21example, the white-collar employees, civil servants. The 
political concentration, which after the 1929 economic crisis 
mirrored the economic concentration and the subsequent "Gleichschaltung" 
of the totalitarian state, did not succeed in wiping out this 
tradition of pluralism, but merely replaced the interest groups by
22which has been described as a "polycracy of totalitarian organisations."
The two-block party system of the Federal Republic again allows 
for the devleopment of many differentiated pressure groups.
The "Volkspartei" is a more cumbersome instrument for 
political action which has given rise to a variation in 
types of organisation and degree of corporatism among 
interest groups. There perhaps remains a trend towards polycracy 
owing to the number of mergers between groups and the extent
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Writing in 1951 Carlo Schmid posed the question whether a mass
23society does not require mass organisations to uphold democracy.
Yet it is precisely this trend towards the integrated, mass 
organisation which has caused students of the trade union movement 
in Germany much concern.
24For some twenty years writers such as Fraenkel clung to the
pluralist theory of trade unions in West Germany, but the principle
of the Einheitsgewerkschaft is as combersome in this respect
25as the new Volkspartei. Moreover, the pluralist theory as 
related to trade unions has more recently been called into question
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both in Germany and in Britain and a more critical, less 
simplistic analysis of union function is required.
Writing in 1964, V.L. Allen described the integration of the
trade unions into society as having gone further in Britain
than elsewhere, in institutions which perform "politically necessary
28and industrially useful functions". Liberalism and other
terms associated with it are used very loosely in Britain
and often refer to any action which is "easygoing, unconstrained
29and vaguely progressive."
Economic liberalism was strong in Britain in the nineteenth
century and unionism grew very slowly. Nevertheless, as unions
were gradually accommodated to the British political system,
30so too did liberalism accommodate itself to collectivism.
A predominantly liberal pattern of industrial relations persisted 
even after the Second World War. The government abstained from 
involvement in industrial issues and the law remained individualisti- 
cally liberal. However, not all the features of post-war political 
consensus were strictly compatible with the traditionally liberal 
model. The political and economic systems of post-war Britain 
adopted a new characteristic fundamentally opposed to liberalism 
- that of corporatism. The economy remains in private hands 
but the stability of the system is ensured by the integration
o f  t h e i r  i n t e g r a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  s t a t e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e s s e s .
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of political, economic and social forces. Beer describes 
the quasi-corporatism of interest groups in Britain according 
to the degree of involvement of their bureaucrats in government 
administration and other public bodies.
The political structure of Britain traditionally concentrates 
activity at the ministerial level and this tendency was strengthened 
by the introduction after the war of the welfare state and 
the controlled economy. The adoption of Keynesian economic 
policies brought about a change in ideology and cultural 
values for all sections of society in the sense that it brought 
out a new set of rules for government, individuals and interest 
groups: the rights and obligations of private property were
redefined, changing the relationships of Labour, Capital 
and Government. Party consensus to support the welfare state 
provided an integrating framework, thus actively reshaping 
social values and interests. It meant moreover that certain 
major trade union ideals had been achieved, while others 
it was thought, would be more easily secured in the future.
The Functions of Trade Unions
The social and political upheaval of the war years and the 
period which immediately followed produced in Britain and 
West Germany new terms of reference for the trade union movements 
whose functions changed accordingly. In the beginning, trade 
union function was essentially protective, described by the 
Webbs as:
"A trade union, as we understand the term, is a continuous
association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining
32or improving the conditions of their employment."
It is argued that in both countries this protective function 
has been extended to include attempts to reform the capitalist 
system, an argument which has gained ground with the increasing
31
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involvement of union officials in state decision-making and 
the opportunity to influence economic development.
In a survey of academic comment compiled in the early 1970s,
33Mayer proposes that such changes in the terms of reference
of trade union activity have invited conflicting criticism:
some critics suggest that the unions are losing sight of
their original ideals as opponents df the capitalist system,
while others argue that such notions belong in the past and
more is to be gained for their members by attempting to stabilise 
34the system. It is more probable that trade union behaviour 
consists of a combination of the two, an observation acknowledged
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by critics in both Germany and Britain . Beier makes
a similar distinction between what he calls the short and
middle term aims of trade unions which by their nature support
the system, and the long term aim of changing the system
to remove the class structure. Under these two broad definitions,
union function may change in emphasis and content over time
as the system itself develops. Von Beyme adds that emphasis
38also varies from country to country.
39Mayer describes union function as operating in three spheres:
- the political sphere
- the macroeconomic sphere
- direct services to the members
This approach of breaking down the pattern of trade union
behaviour for the purposes of analysis is one proposed also 
40by Hartwich who suggests that for any analysis to be meaningful, 
union behaviour must be assessed at different levels:
- in the light of conditions and development in the economic 
system
- in the light of conditions and development in the political- 
administrative system
- unions as partners in the collective bargaining process
- unions as interest groups, that is, as elites.
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Such an approach offers a means of detecting the variations 
in emphasis of union function as expressed in the literature. 
This is of particular significance when comparing German 
and British sources which, in their emphasis, tend to suggest 
that the industrial relations systems of the two countries 
operate on different levels of analysis. In spite of this 
apparent difficulty, it is hoped that, by reviewing a selection 
of the literature from Germany and Britain, some conclusions 
may be drawn as to the nature of union function in the two 
countries.
The Political and Public Service Functions of Unions
The mass democracies of Britain and Germany have created 
a revised framework for the modern interest group. The new 
situation has extended the functions of trade unions still 
further and has placed their leaders as representatives of 
a now heterogeneous labour force in new and difficult roles 
of public office.41 This integration of the trade unions 
into the capitalist system has had the two-fold effect of 
constraining union activity as an interest group and of expanding 
the areas of influence of labour. The extent of the combined 
effects is open to interpretation and has given rise to much 
speculation and controversy both in Britain and Germany.
Conservative schools of thought in Germany see the change 
in union function in terms of the classical analysis of the 
relationship of society and state. One writer of such a 
school is Goetz Briefs who, by comparing the "classical" 
unions of the nineteenth century to the "established" unions 
of the post-First World War period, arrives at the conclusion 
that the trade unions have achieved a position of independent 
power which is threatening to the state. Influenced by 
Catholic social doctrine, Briefs views trade unions as part 
of an interest group structure, integral to economic and 
political Liberalism. The integration of unions into state 
institutions represents for Briefs the opportunity for the 
unions to use the state to increase their power. Briefs' 
model of "organic pluralism" is designed to re-order the
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the relations of State and interest groups to prevent any 
single group obtaining uncontrolled advantage over another.
The state must maintain a position of strength as trustee 
of the common good. All other institutions and interest 
groups, particularly the trade unions, must all act as inter­
mediaries between the state and the individual to keep society 
under control by means of incomes policies, curbs on strikes 
and so on.
The dilemma of trade unions established in the neo-liberal 
state, which Briefs actually terms the "third phase" of liberalism, 
is that while taking on public functions, the unions lose 
certain internal functions which directly affect the members.
This causes an alienation of the rank and file from the leadership 
which itself becomes more centralised and bureaucratic.
In his model of organic pluralism, Briefs limits the role 
of the unions to one of adapting to the capitalist system 
and not one of promoting the demands of the membership.
With the "common good" or "national interest" as the criterion 
for union function, the values to be adopted by the movement 
are oriented towards maintaining the status quo, and not 
towards the representation of the interests of a particular 
class or social group.
The principle behind Briefs conceptualisation of union function
is the same as that of unions as pressure groups. Varain
describes the role of pressure groups as intermediaries between
43individuals and the legislature and cites the trade unions
ii
as being among their number. Kruger supports this idea by 
attributing to pressure groups an important function as communi­
cators of information between the state and the society.44 
By consultation with the pressure group or groups concerned, 
the state can be assured of a higher degree of acceptance 
of a bill or ruling by the electorate. Moreover the pressure 
groups in Germany may carry out directly tasks which in other 
countries, for example Britain, are usually the responsibility 
of the state. Examples of such may be contained in the contractual 
agreement between trade unions and employers organisations 
which, one signed, become legally binding in Germany.45
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In criticising Briefs' argument, Mayer points out that the
concept of the "classical" union function on which it rests
is inadequately dealt with. By concentrating on union
practice, Briefs fails to acknowledge the revolutionary ideology
of the socialist unions which was in fact very quickly abandoned
47by the DGB unions in the 1950s. As a result, Briefs' 
conclusions about the development of post-war unionism, based 
on a comparison with pre-war unionism, mislead him to interpret 
the strategy of the DGB as threatening the security of the
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state rather than contributing in any way to it.
Based on Briefs' analysis of the modern trade union, Ernst
Benda concludes that "organic pluralism" should be guaranteed
by law.49 In recognising the trade unions as an indispensible
body within the highly industrialised state, Benda proposes
that a specific public service function should be granted
to them by law to legitimise their role, alongside the employers'
organisations, in maintaining the political and social order.
The guarantee that unions would uphold their role as an
Ordnungsfaktor is to be observed in their own behaviour:
Benda asserts that the unions, particularly the Industrial
Union for Building and Construction in Germany (IG Bau-Steine-
Erde), wish to be recognised as such, as interest groups
50alongside other interest groups. Benda does express some 
reservations about the present extent of trade union integration 
into the state systems on the grounds that it has not yet 
been carried far enough: more could be done within the limits 
of the Constitution to institutionalise conflicts of interest.
This would facilitate state intervention in collective bargaining 
which would close any loopholes in the state control of union 
function.
Benda's model of "organic pluralism" a system of state-controlled
norms governing a plurality of interest groups, approaches
the "totalitarian pluralist" model referred to earlier in 
5'1this chapter. Other conservative critics favour the unrestrained 
pluralism of rival interest groups and the devolution of 
administrative power to the strongest groups - nebenstaatliches
» " 5?
Standeverwaltungssystem", (Werner Weber, Rudiger Altmannc) .
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Accompanied by a higher degree of state authority, the "pluralism 
of oligarchies" is presented as an ideal system for a balanced 
distribution of power in society.
Conservative critics of the function of modern trade unions 
seek to institutionalise group interests to the extent of 
depoliticising the trade unions altogether. This involves 
them abandoning their function as representatives of a particular 
social group in favour of supporting more general economic 
and political ideals. This is not the view taken by the 
liberal pluralists whose model is based on voluntary compromise 
and cooperation between competing groups for the good of 
all.
In adopting Briefs' description of the "established" union,
Joachim Weber interprets the public functions of the large
centralised organisation as essential to the well-being of
53
the modern welfare state. The analysis involves the rejection
of the classical division of society and state. Whereas
once state authority was required to guarantee free competition
among particular interests, the state is now expected to
support the political organisations of such interests in
correcting the economic imbalance of society. Thus the actions
of the interest groups are legitimised in respect of "social
autonomy" and in their capacity to influence government measures.
Among the strongest interest groups, the trade unions will
make use of both these means to exercise influence over the
economic and social processes. This decentralisation of
power removes the old antagonism between society and state
and replaces it with a new and complex system of mutual restraint.
In such a system, bargaining between groups takes on a particular
significance and the balance of power is precarious. Under
these circumstances, trade unions as bargaining agents are
expected to voluntarily integrate their special interests
54into an overall social policy (Hirsch).
It is the liberal pluralist approach to industrial relations 
which predominates in the British literature. Chiefly attributed 
to the 'Oxford School', the pluralist approach was adopted 
by the Donovan Commission investigation into industrial relations
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which reported in  1968: "Thus the ' v o lu n ta r is t ic 1 nature
o f in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  in  B r ita in  - what has been v a r io u s ly  
termed 'c o l le c t iv e  la is s e z - fa ir e ' and ’ l ib e ra l c o l le c t iv is m '
- was recognised and re in fo rc e d  ra th e r than challenged by 
the  R epo rt."55
"Recognition o f the  fa c t  th a t  the in te re s ts  and preferences 
o f in d iv id u a ls  and groups are d i f fe r e n t  according to  the  
perspective  o f each o f them is  embodied in  the s tru c tu re  
o f in d iv id u a l tra d e  unions and in  the Trade Union Movement 
as a whole. R ecognition o f  the  le g itim acy  o f d is t in c t .a n d  
o fte n  d ive rg ing  in te re s ts  is  a lso the basis o f barga in ing  
between trade  unions and employers. Bargaining depends on 
each side recogn is ing  the  le g itim a c y  and re p re se n ta tive  capac ity  
o f  the o th e r. A barga in  is  a method o f re c o n c ilin g  d iffe re n c e s
in  the in te re s ts  o f  both s id e s  " {Donovan Report, Section
1:85)
The s ta te  is  ascribed the  ro le  o f "second best" re g u la to r  
in  areas where tra d e  unions are not competent, but since 
th e ir  competence is  g e n e ra lly  thought to  e x is t ,  " I t s  a t t i tu d e  
is  one o f a b s te n tio n , o f  form al in d iffe re n c e . In o th e r words, 
i t  recognises th a t  these jobs are being done by tra d e  unions, 
by fre e  c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g ."  (Donovan Report, Section 
1:90) In view o f the  increased ro le  o f the s ta te  in  the  
system o f in d u s t r ia l r e la t io n s  in B r ita in  a f te r  the  la te  
1960s, the Report was c r i t ic is e d  some 10 years la te r  f o r  
i t s  inadequate conception o f the  s ta te :
" P lu r a l is t  accounts o f  the  in d u s t r ia l e n te rp rise  need sca rce ly  
consider the  s ta te  a t a l l ;  o r  may regard the government 
as merely one s takeho lde r whose in te re s ts  have a lso  to  be 
considered; o r  may regard i t  as having specia l fu n c tio n s  
in  p rov id ing  the  c o n d itio n s  w ith in  which in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  
problems can be solved by e n te rp r is e  le ve l c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  
between the p a r t ie s ,  the  p o s it io n  adopted by the Donovan
R eport The Commission fa i le d  to  foresee the  e x te n t
to  which s ta te  involvem ent in  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  would
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grow, and i t  c e r ta in ly  d id  not advocate o r welcome such develop­
m ents."56
This is  in  c o n tra s t to  the  German l ib e r a l - p lu r a l is t s  who 
a t t r ib u te  a much s tronge r ro le  to  the  s ta te  in  preserving 
the  p lu r a l is t  model. According to  H irsch , the s ta te  remains 
above p lu ra lis m  as re fe re e  o r c o o rd in a to r o f the various 
group demands and as support to  the weaker groups.
I t  is  s ig n if ic a n t  th a t the  concept o f  p lu ra lis m  in  the Donovan
Report and in  much o f the  l i te r a tu r e  concerning the fu n c tio n
o f  trade  unions in  B r ita in  is  debated a t the in d u s tr ia l le v e l.
This concen tra tion  o f d iscuss ion  a t one le ve l is  perhaps
re fle c te d  by the co n s is te n t use o f  the  term " In d u s tr ia l R e la tions"
to  describe  the  frame o f  re fe rence fo r  trad e  union fu n c tio n
in  the English language: "A term which seems to  imply th a t
the  processes o f union-management accommodation are somehow
detached from the  broader dynamics o f  socio-economic a c t iv i t y  57and s t ru c tu re ."  Much o f the  c r i t ic is m  o f the l ib e r a l - p lu r a l is t  
theo ry  o f in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  deals w ith  trade  union fu n c tio n  
a t th is  same le ve l o f  a n a ly s is . Fox, having f i r s t  propoundedCO
the  theory o f p lu ra lis m  from the managerial pe rspective , 
la te r  a ttacks h is  own th e s is  on the  grounds th a t in d u s tr ia l 
o rg a n isa tio n  does not produce the balance o f power on which 
the  p lu r a l is t  argument re s ts .50 Mayer60 d isputes the v a l id i t y  
o f  the German p lu r a l is t  th e o r ie s  on s im ila r  grounds, however 
in  th is  ins tance , the d iscuss ion  takes place on a more general 
le v e l o f p o l i t ic a l  a n a ly s is . Defending the p lu r a l is t  argument, 
Clegg6 proposes, in  c o n tra d ic t io n  o f  both Fox and the German 
p lu r a l is ts ,  th a t  the  p r in c ip le  re s ts ,  no t on an even d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  power, but on the  respect o f  each o f the  p a rtie s  fo r  the 
laws o f p lu ra lis m  and the  r ig h ts  o f  the  opposing group.
The mechanism o f concession and compromise holds the  p lu r a l is t  
system to g e th e r : ' in  in d u s t r ia l r e la t io n s ,  th is  mechanism 
is  c o l le c t iv e  b a rga in ing , the  ru le s  o f which both p a rt ie s  
must obey.
The Donovan Report has been c r i t ic is e d  fu r th e r  fo r  the narrowness 
o f i t s  approach w ith in  such a lready lim ite d  terms o f re fe rence :
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"The Royal Commission had become p r im a r ily  a Royal Commission 
on c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g . Very l i t t l e  was said about the 
ro le  o f trad e  unions in  re la t io n  to  th e ir  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  
economic p lann ing , o r  in  general in  re la t io n  to  t h e ir  w ider 
s o c ia l purposes."
Professor Kahn-Freund's c o n tr ib u tio n  to  the Commission Report 
expressly emphasised the  market aspects o f the w orkers ' ro le  
in  the p lu r a l i s t i c  model. He suggested th a t "the  le g it im a te  
expecta tions o f la bou r" should be defined very narrow ly as 
"a reasonable measure o f  job  s e c u r ity " ,  s te a d ily  inc reas ing  
wages, and the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  " i f  th is  is  necessary".
The Commission thus l im i t  the p o l i t ic a l  ro le  o f unions to  
in d u s tr ia l m a tte rs :
"The main way in  which trad e  unions in fluence  the p o lic y
o f the Labour P a rty  as a method o f fu r th e r in g  trad e  union
o b je c tive s  is  by fo rm u la tin g  broad p o lic ie s  on in d u s t r ia l
m atters which are then debated g e n e ra lly  w ith in  the  Movement.
The sponsoring o f candidates fo r  Parliam ent is  o f secondary
and q u ite  l im ite d  im portance." (Donovan Report, Section
5:152) This view o f trad e  union behaviour has a lso  been
63expressed by o th e r tra d e  union c r i t i c s :  Anderson complains
th a t  B r it is h  tra d e  unions have no " b u i l t - in  s o c ia l is t  h o rizo n s ".
U n like  a s o c ia l is t  p a r ty , the trade  unions possess on ly  a
se c to ra l p o w e r-p o te n tia l w ith  n e ith e r the resources o f the
possessing c lass  nor the  in te l le c tu r a l d r iv e  o f a p o l i t ic a l
p a r ty . Producing o n ly  a s e c to ra l,  corporate consciousness,
the  union movement is  immobile, lack ing  "the f l e x i b i l i t y
and v e r s a t i l i t y  o f  a re v o lu tio n a ry  p a r ty ."  Other c r i t i c s ,
and to  some e x te n t the  remainder o f the Anderson c r i t iq u e ,
assume the " In d u s t r ia l R e la tions" perspective  and associa te
even the p o l i t ic a l  ro le  o f  trade  unions w ith  jo b  c o n tro l
64ra th e r than co n te s tin g  the a u th o r ity  o f the system.
In c o n tra s t, the  im p lic a tio n s  o f the German p lu r a l is t  model 
(H irsch ) are th a t  the  fu n c tio n s  o f the  large in te re s t  groups 
such as the  tra d e  unions is  no longer lim ite d  to  engaging 
in  a d ire c t  b a t t le  w ith  t h e ir  opponents in  order to  secure 
b e tte r  economic and p o l i t ic a l  co n d itio n s ; they have instead
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become p a rt o f  a d if fe re n t ia te d  s o c ia l in fra -s tru c tu re  as
"s o c ia l le g is la to rs " ,  as p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  the government o f
s o c ia l,  economic and p o l i t ic a l  a f f a i r s .  This argument is
65a lso  supported by Varain who s ta te s  th a t in te re s t  groups 
are consulted very e a r ly  on in  the  planning o f le g is la t iv e  
proposa ls. I t  is  indeed taken fo r  granted th a t the  trade  
unions and em ployers' fe d e ra tio n s  be brought in to  the d iscussions 
and o fte n  form a jo in t  committee to  d ra f t  the proposa ls.
F o llow ing  up th is  p ro p o s it io n , H irsch suggests th a t  the trad e  
unions in  Germany are no longer merely in te re s t groups but 
have a tta ined  p o s it io n s  o f a u th o r ity  by th e ir  in flu e n ce  over 
the  s ta te  and over t h e ir  own membership which can on ly  be 
countered by s treng then ing  the  s ta te  and union democracy.
Hartw ich also considers the  s tre n g th  o f trad e  unions as s o c ia l 
e l i t e s ,  but f a i l s  to  reach H irs c h 's  conclusions th a t  the 
unions are in  a p o s it io n  to  th rea ten  the s e c u r ity  o f the 
s ta te .57 Moreover, the in d ir e c t  in flu e n ce  which the unions 
may e xe rt upon the le g is la tu re  through sympathetic members 
o f parliam ent is  a lso  here acknowledged to  be lim ite d .  Varain 
p o in ts  out th a t  union supporters w ith in  the  SPD may come 
in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  the p a rty  l in e  should they choose to  promote 
union proposals and cannot n e ce ssa rily  be re lie d  upon to
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speak as u n io n is ts  ra th e r than members o f a "V o lk s p a rte i" .
The more the unions seek to  achieve th e ir  aims by th is  method,
the  more l ik e ly  i t  is  th a t  they may become mere s a te l l i t e s  
69o f the p a rty . I t  is  t ru e  th a t  the re  is  a t r a d it io n  o f
union rep resen ta tion  in  the  S oc ia l Democratic governments
o f Germany which has been es tab lishe d  since the F ir s t  World 
70War. G enera lly , u n io n is ts  were o ffe re d  posts which most 
a ffe c te d  labour in te re s ts ,  most obv io u s ly , the M in is try  o f 
Labour: indeed Labour was no t se t up as a government M in is try  
in  many coun trie s  u n t i l  the  tra d e  union movements had grown 
to  be so powerfu l -  1917 in  B r ita in  and 1918 in  Germany - 
and in  B r ita in  the  unions on ly  gained re a l government power 
under the f i r s t  Labour government in  1945.
L im ita tio n  w ith in  l ib e r a l - p lu r a l i s t  th in k in g  presents i t s e l f  
in  the  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  the  freedom to  bargain c o l le c t iv e ly  
and to  take in d u s tr ia l a c tio n  is  being in c re a s in g ly  r e s t r ic te d .
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The autonomy which trad e  unions re q u ire  to  a c t iv e ly  promote 
the in te re s ts  o f t h e ir  members and on which the l i b e r a l is t  
th e s is  re lie s  is ,  a rguab ly , being eroded not on ly  by law 
and o the r d ire c t iv e s  o f the s ta te , but by the q u a s i- le g a l
71re g u la tio n s  agreed to  by the  barga in ing  p a rtie s  them selves.
As has a lready been made c le a r ,  the  t r a d it io n  in  in d u s t r ia l
re la t io n s  in  B r ita in  is  not one o f soc ia lism  o r the c lass
s tru g g le , but a p a r t o f the  B r i t is h  c u ltu ra l h e r ita g e , th a t 
17o f "v o lu n ta r is m ". The des ire  o f the trade  unions to  manage 
t h e ir  own a f fa i r s  according to  t h e ir  own preferences stems 
from a very e a r ly  re lia n c e  on in d u s tr ia l ra th e r than p o l i t ic a l  
pressure to  achieve th e ir  o b je c tiv e s . The Webbs reported  
the  in e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f le ga l enactment as a trade  union method 
under n in te en th  century  la is s e z  f a i r e  and quoted the  Report 
o f  the  Committee o f  P e tit io n s  o f A rt is a n s , 13th June, 1811:
"They are o f  the  op in ion  th a t  no in te rfe re n c e  o f the  le g is la tu re  
w ith  the freedom o f trade  o r w ith  the  p e rfe c t l ib e r ty  o f 
every in d iv id u a l to  dispose o f h is  own tim e and o f  h is  labour 
in  the way and on the  terms which he may judge most conducive 
to  h is  own in te re s t  can take place w ith o u t v io la t in g  general 
p r in c ip le s  o f the  f i r s t  importance to  the p ro s p e rity  and 
happiness o f the  community, w ith o u t e s ta b lis h in g  a most pe rn ic ious  
precedent o r  even w ith o u t aggravating a f te r  a very sho rt 
tim e the  pressure o f the  general d is tre s s  and imposing obstacles 
aga ins t th a t  d is tre s s  ever being removed."7^
Most unions instead  chose to  develop the  method o f c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing  to  achieve t h e ir  ends which they have s ince fought 
hard to  keep o u t o f the law c o u rts . T h e ir d is t r u s t  is  indeed 
o f the courts  ra th e r  than o f the  le g is la tu re ,  s ince the  e f fe c t iv e ­
ness o f t h e ir  o th e r methods o f re g u la tio n  are dependent upon 
t h e ir  lega l s ta tu s .74 Moreover they have repeated ly turned 
to  the  le g is la to r  f o r  redress aga ins t ru lin g s  o f the  ju d ic ia r y .
75The s tru g g le  between the  ju d ic ia r y  and the le g is la tu re ,  
between Common Law and the needs o f so c ie ty  in d e fin in g  the 
r e s t r ic t iv e  ro le  o f  the law in  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s 76 has 
endowed the B r i t is h  systems o f in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  w ith  
p e c u lia r i t ie s  and a com plexity  which s in g le  i t  ou t from o the r
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systems, and which render system atic  comparisons d i f f i c u l t .
The laws concerning in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  passed in  1859,
1871, 1875 and 1906 granted the  tra d e  unions imm unities from
a ttacks  by the judges. Th is s itu a t io n  was challenged in
the  1960s by the Rookes v Barnard case (1964)77 but was im m ediate ly
secured again the fo llo w in g  year by the le g is la tu re  by the
Trade Disputes Act (1965). Thus "where the  scope o f the
le ga l immunity is  u n c lea r, the  ju d ic ia r y ,  as guardian o f
the  l ib e r a l t r a d it io n  o f Common Law, is  l ik e ly  to  re v e r t
to  a lo g ic  o f reasoning h o s t i le to  co m b in a tio n s ." '0 English
Common Law has remained f i r m ly  in  the  in d iv id u a l is t  l ib e r a l
t r a d it io n  under which almost a l l  ac tion s  by combinations
7Ql ik e  trade  unions are l i k e ly  to  be i l le g a l :
"The h a b its  you are tra in e d  in ,  the  people w ith  whom you 
m ix, lead to  your having a c e r ta in  c lass o f ideas o f such 
a nature th a t ,  when you have to  deal w ith  o the r ideas, you 
do not g ive  as sound and accurate judgement as you would
w ish   Labour says 'Where are your im p a rtia l Judges?
They a l l  move in  the  same c ir c le s  as the employers, and they 
are a l l  educated and nursed in  the  same ideas as the  employers.
How can a labour man o r a tra d e  u n io n is t  get im p a rtia l ju s t ic e ? 1 1 
(Lord Ju s tice  S cru tto n , 1920).83
Despite the in flu e n ce  o f  th e  Western A l l ie s  on the p o l i t ic a l
and economic re c o n s tru c tio n  o f West Germany, the re  is  l i t t l e
tra ce  o f e ith e r  B r i t is h  o r  American in fluence  in  the  p ra c tic e
o f German labour re la t io n s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  in  re la t io n  to  the  
81law. The p a tte rn  o f in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  in  the Federal 
Republic were se t w ith  the  s ig n in g  o f the Hattenheim Agreement 
in  1950 between the  DGB and the  DBA. The p r in c ip le s  la id  
down in  th is  Agreement (rep laced in  1954 by the Margaretenhof 
Agreement) were based on a d e s ire  o f  the  two in d u s tr ia l 
"S o z ia lp a rtn e r" to  s e t t le  d is p u te s . The o b je c tiv e  was to  
se t up the machinery f o r  j o in t  c o n c i l ia t io n  w ith o u t s ta te  
in te r fe re n c e ; the Agreement inc luded peace clauses and provided 
fo r  in d u s tr ia l ac tio n  on ly  as a la s t  re s o r t.  In 1953 the  
s ta te  acknowledged the autonomy o f the  S o z ia lp a rtn e r: " . . t h e
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S o z ia lp a rtn e r would be able to  re co n c ile  t h e ir  in te re s ts  
in  t r u s t f u l  cooperation w ith o u t d is ru p tio n s  o f the  economy 
and d is tu rbance o f the community caused by serious labour 
c o n f l ic t s . " 82
Quite apa rt from th is  signed Agreement between the  c e n tra l 
o rgan isa tion s  o f Labour and C a p ita l to  which no t a l l  member 
o rgan isa tion s  need n e ce ssa rily  adhere to  the same degree, 
the laws on in d u s t r ia l ac tio n  in  Germany have tended to  be 
very s t r i c t l y  in te rp re te d . The C o n s titu tio n a l p ro v is io n s  
fo r  the r ig h t  to  organ ise are ambiguous on the su b je c t o f 
the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e .  The Basic Law merely s ta te s :
"The r ig h t  to  form assoc ia tions  to  safeguard and improve
working and economic co n d itio n s  is  guaranteed to  everyone
and to  a l l  trades and p ro fess io ns . Agreements which r e s t r ic t
o r seek to  h inder th is  r ig h t  are vo id ; measures d ire c te d
towards th is  are i l l e g a l . "  (Basic Law, A r t .  9 :3 ) The primacy
o f s ta tu to ry  law leaves the  judges a wide range o f d is c re t io n
by recogn is ing  these C o n s titu tio n a l p rov is ions  as p a r t o f
subs tan tive  law. There fo re , as Aaron concludes, " i t  is  d i f f i c u l t83to  gene ra lise  about the s ta tu s  o f  the  s t r ik e  in  th a t  c o u n try ."  ° 
The le g itim a cy  o f in d u s t r ia l a c tio n  was le f t  even more to  the 
d is c re t io n  o f the  judges by the in tro d u c tio n  o f the  no tio n  
o f  the "s o c ia l e q u ity " (S o z ia le  Adaquanz) o f  in d u s t r ia l 
a c tio n . This e f fe c t iv e ly  s idesteps the C o n s titu tio n a l re co g n itio n  
o f  the r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  w h ile  avo id ing open condemnation o fOn
in d u s tr ia l a c tio n . ^
The second aspect o f  c o n tro l on trade  union a c t iv i t y  is  the
use o f government incomes p o lic ie s  o r o the r stand ing  arrangements
between Labour, C a p ita l and the  S ta te . With regard to  incomes
p o lic ie s  in  B r i ta in ,  Brown s ta te s  th a t as a re s u lt  o f  B r i ta in 's
economic d e c lin e , governments have become in c re a s in g ly  concerned
to  implement p o l ic ie s  o f wage re s t ra in t  as a m ajor p a r t o f85measures designed to  check in f la t io n .  Economic c r is e s
in  the 1960s led to  attempts by B r it is h  and German governments
to  c o n tro l trade  union a c t iv i t y  by means o f both le g a l r e s t r a in t
and moral suasion in  the  form o f  incomes p o lic ie s  in  B r ita in
86and the "Concerted A c tio n " in  Germany.
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Such measures, defended as being in  the  "n a tio n a l in te r e s t " ,
d e lib e ra te ly  ignore the  p o l i t i c a l  im p lic a tio n s  o f wage r e s t r a in t .
Because the  e ffe c ts  o f incomes p o lic y  va ries  from in d u s try
to  in d u s try  w ith  d i f fe r in g  ra te s  o f  p ro d u c t iv ity ,  the o v e ra ll
p r ic e  le v e l is  not he ld co n s ta n t. Bergmann e t  a l conclude
from th is  th a t  incomes p o lic ie s  can on ly  b ring  lim ite d  success
as long as dec is ions on p r ic e s  and investment continue to
87be l e f t  to  the  in d iv id u a l em ployers.
Faced w ith  economic recession in  1966, the German unions
were keen on s ta te  in te rv e n tio n  in  the  economy. They were
w i l l in g  to  cooperate in  the  Concerted Action which c o n s titu te d
an in s t i tu t io n a l  arrangement f o r  concensus on wage p o lic y .
Combined w ith  the S t a b i l i t y  and Growth Act passed in  1967,
the  e f fe c t  on the Concerted A c tio n  was to  moderate wage cla im s
in  accordance w ith  the  ru le  o f c a p i ta l ,  in  some cases reducing
88re a l income le v e ls .
The Concerted A ction  operated on t h is  cooperative basis u n t i l
1970. Follow ing a surge o f  in d u s t r ia l unrest a t th is  tim e ,
the  trade  unions were fo rced  to  take  a more m il i ta n t  stand
in  n e g o tia tio n s  which h i t  a c r is is  in  1974. The blame fo r
the  breakdown o f the Concerted A c tio n  was la id  a t the fe e t
o f the government who had doggedly pursued an economic p o lic y
which in te rp re te d  wage-push in f la t io n  as the cause o f the
economic in s t a b i l i t y .  The use o f macro-economic da ta , o f
which on ly  wages were to  remain f ix e d ,  as the basis o f the
Concerted A ction  had to  be abandoned, and the in s t i tu t io n
89o f the Concerted A ction  was d is c re d ite d .
In d iscuss ing  the question  o f coopera tion  or c o n fro n ta tio n
over incomes p o lic ie s ,  Bergmann e t  a l ca tegorise  the c h a ra c te r is t ic s
o f trad e  unions which induce coopera tive  o r m i l i ta n t  behaviour
on the basis o f o b je c t iv e  (economic) and su b je c tive  (rep rese n ta - 
. gn
t iv e )  e v a lu a tio n . The co op e ra tive  union can on ly  su rv ive
in  tim es o f p ro s p e rity  and w ith  a submissive membership.
I t  tends not to  use i t s  f u l l  power p o te n tia l because i t  p re fe rs
to  operate w ith in  the  l im i t s  se t by the cond itions  o f s t a b i l i t y
and grow th. In accordance w ith  t h is  p o lic y  i t  is  not aga ins t
the  in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  o f  c o n f l i c t  and trade  union le g is la t io n ,
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since th is  le g it im is e s  i t s  ac tions before i t s  membership.
I t s  des ire  fo r  economic s t a b i l i t y  tends to  lead on the  one 
hand to  c e n tra lis e d  o rg a n isa tio n  and on the o the r to  increased 
apathy among the  membership. The m i l i ta n t  union th r iv e s  
in  tim es when the  in te re s ts  and demands o f the membership 
exceed the  concessions o f c a p ita l.  The m il i ta n t  union tends 
to  push i t s  power to  i t s  rea l l im its  and because i t s  demands 
exceed i t s  power, i t  has to  take a stand which opposes the  
c a p i ta l is t  system. In o rde r to  m ain ta in  m ilita n c y  w ith in  
the  membership, much decis ion-m aking has to  be d e ce n tra lise d  
w h ile  in d u s t r ia l a c tio n  must be c e n tra lly  coord ina ted . C le a r ly  
these c h a ra c te r is t ic s  se t ou t by Bergmann e t  a l represent 
s te reo types , bu t fu r th e r  e m p ir ica l research may demonstrate 
th a t in d iv id u a l unions do reac t in  a p a r t ic u la r ly  c h a ra c te r is t ic  
way to  g iven s itu a t io n s  on the basis o f observed o b je c t iv e  
and s u b je c tiv e  fa c to rs .
The im p lic a tio n s  fo r  union fu n c tio n  o f increased s ta te  in v o lv e ­
ment in  the  economic sphere have given r is e  to  a number o f 
in te rp re ta t io n s  which may be categorised in to  th e o rie s  o f 
c o n f l ic t  re g u la tio n  and c o n fro n ta tio n .
C o n f l ic t  R egulation
Theories on the  re g u la tio n  o f in d u s tr ia l c o n f l ic t  cen tre
around the in s t i t u t io n  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing which has
come to  be associated w ith  the pragmatism o f es tab lishe d
91union movements. F ir s t  described by the Webbs , c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing  was the method o f re g u la tio n  used by the  most 
h ig h ly  developed unions though the machinery fo r  i t s  e f fe c t iv e  
im plem entation was a t th a t  tim e s t i l l  la rg e ly  underdeveloped.
I t  is  the  two c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  which 
rank i t  among the measures which accomodate trade  unionism 
to  the c a p i ta l is t  system: one is  the "element o f compulsion"
upon a l l  those who are covered by the agreements; the  o th e rQO
is  the  in d u s t r ia l peace which a bargain seeks to  ach ieve.
The breakdown o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  re s u lts  in  in d u s t r ia l
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a c tio n  which leads the  Webbs to  suggest th a t the s t r ik e  is
more c lo s e ly  associated w ith  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing than w ith
trad e  unionism. The Webbs' theo ry  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing
was taken a stage fu r th e r  by F landers who m ainta ins th a t
c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  e s ta b lish e s  "a ru le  o f law" in  employment 
93re la t io n s .  The re g u la tio n  o f c o n f l ic t  by c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  
may be p o l i t ic a l  as w e ll as economic, drawing up ru le s  fo r  
management as w e ll as m arkets.
G enera lly  accepted by the  th e o re t ic a l p lu ra l is ts  and no tab ly
the  authors o f the Donovan Report o f whom Flanders was one,
th is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  takes l i t t l e
account o f s ta te  involvement in  the  economy and the  l im ita t io n s
on the freedom to  ba rga in . In h is  study o f "mature unionism ",
94Leste r takes the case o f s ta te  in te g ra tio n  over the long 
term  which produces h ig h ly  c e n tra lis e d  o rgan isa tions  o f Labour 
and C a p ita l, each w ith  p ro fe s s io n a l bureaucracies. In the 
process o f ba rga in ing , the s ta te 's  ro le  is  lim ite d  to  p rov id ing  
the  lega l framework o f a r b it r a t io n  and co n trac tu a l o b lig a t io n ,  
in  o rde r to  speed up consensus and thus also the process 
o f in te g ra t io n .  U lt im a te ly , m ili ta n c y  among the unions is  
o b lite ra te d  and the d is t r ib u t io n  o f s o c ia lo g ic a l and p o l i t ic a l  
power remains secure. In assuming th a t  c o n f l ic t  can be solved 
in  th is  way, Lester eva luates c lass  consciousness w ith in  
the  tra d e  union movement as m erely a d is tra c t io n  from the 
more d e s ira b le  aims o f in te rg ra t io n  and coopera tion .
96W eitbrecht assesses the  in s t i t u t io n a l  mechanism o f wage 
re g u la tio n  in  terms o f a system atic  ana lys is  o f the so c ia l 
and o rg a n is a tio n a l requirem ents o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing .
I f  the  barga in ing  pa rtne rs  have to  depend on c e n tra lly  determined 
g u id e lin e s  instead o f t h e i r  own economic data then the e f fe c t iv e ­
ness and le g itim acy  o f  f re e  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing is  in  doubt.
Under such circumstances i t  may be more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  a compromise 
to  be reached and fo r  the agreements to  be enforced upon 
the  membership. Union fu n c t io n  is  lim ite d  to  encouraging 
among t h e ir  membership a general s a t is fa c t io n  w ith  the d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  incomes granted by the  s ta te  incomes p o lic y .  Unions can 
best be brought to  compromise i f  they possess the barga in ing
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s tre n g th . This is  achieved by ensuring th a t they adopt a 
quasi-dem ocra tic  s tru c tu re  whereby n e g o tia tio n s  are conducted 
by a c e n tra l leadersh ip  and in flu e n ce  by the  rank and f i l e  
is  e f fe c t iv e ly  e lim in a te d  w ith o u t th re a te n in g  union d is c ip l in e .  
This requ ire s  the  in co rp o ra tio n  o f a process o f apparent 
member p a r t ic ip a t io n  in to  the union s tru c tu re  w ith o u t reducing 
the  re a l powers o f decision-m aking o f the  f u l l  tim e o f f i c ia ls  
and union e xp e rts .
In W e itb re ch t's  model, d ire c t  s ta te  in te rv e n tio n  in  c o l le c t iv e  
ba rga in ing  can be avoided since p u b lic  and government pressure 
on the n e g o tia t in g  p a rt ie s  is  s u f f ic ie n t  to  ra is e  the p ro b a b il ity  
o f  compromise. The unions are ob liged  to  m ain ta in  the  s ta tus  
quo in  the long term  w h ile  t h e ir  members are subdued by d is c ip l in e  
from w ith in  and the  prospect o f a longer term high le ve l 
o f  consumption from w ith o u t. The in s t i t u t io n  o f c o l le c t iv e  
ba rga in ing  is  thus used to  implement wage p o lic ie s  which 
support in d u s try , y e t re lease the s ta te  from any re s p o n s ib i l i ty  
f o r  n e g o tia t io n s .
Both -Lester and W eitbrecht base t h e ir  analyses on the  model
o f fre e  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  as the on ly  e f fe c t iv e  means
o f dea ling  w ith  c o n f l ic t  between the employers and the  employed.
Other c r i t i c s  envisage the vo lu n ta ry  in te g ra tio n  o f the trade
unions in to  a s ta b le  economic and p o l i t ic a l  system as they
take on more re s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  the economy as a whole.g6
According to  G le itz e , since the economy is  no longer governed 
by the fre e  m arket, the unions are fo rced to  recons ider the 
value o f  autonomous a c tio n . Union fu n c tio n  in  the economic 
sphere must be re fo rm ula ted  and the concept o f codeterm ination 
in te rp re te d  to  in vo lve  the unions in  developing the means 
to  s ta b i l is e  economic growth: "The tran s fo rm a tion  to  the
members o f the  in te re s t  groups o f the  re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  
the  economy as a whole w i l l  o f course always crea te  in te rn a l 
problems fo r  the  unions. That is  the o th e r s ide o f the  coin 
w ith in  an economic democracy (W irtschaftsdem okra tie ) but i t  
is  the tru e  a lte rn a t iv e  to  every type o f planned economy 
in  which fre e  unions help determine the  economic course".
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G le itze  is  supported in  h is  th e s is  by Sohn who re c a lls  
th a t a f te r  the s e tt in g  up o f  the  Concerted Action in  the 
recession o f 1966/7, those in  fa vo u r o f the u n lim ited  cooperation 
o f the unions ca lle d  fo r  a change in  the o rg a n isa tio n a l s tru c tu re  
to  in te n s ify  in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  cooperation and make i t  more 
e f fe c t iv e .  Free c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  would cease to  fu n c tio n  
s ince there  was now a need to  coo rd ina te  the wage p o lic ie s  
o f  the in d iv id u a l unions. U lt im a te ly  th is  would mean the 
abandonment o f the fe d e ra l s tru c tu re  o f the DGB in  accomodation 
to  the changes in  the  economic and p o l i t ic a l  s tru c tu re s .
As the degree o f in s t i t u t io n a l is a t io n  o f cooperation grows, 
so too w i l l  the readiness o f  unions to  support "common" economic 
aims.
In co n tra s t to  vo lu n ta ry  economic cooperation which, according 
to  the c r i t ic s ,  strengthens the  trad e  union o rg a n isa tio n , 
compulsory cooperation would seem to  weaken i t .  In h is  view 
o f the "New In d u s tr ia l S ta te " , G a lb ra ith  observes a reduction  
in  t h e ir  ro le :
" A ll o f these changes here examined -  the s h i f t  in  power 
from ownership and the  en trepreneu r to  the technos truc tu re , 
techno log ica l advance, the  re g u la t io n  o f markets and aggregate 
demand, and the im peratives o f  p r ic e  and wage re g u la tio n  
-  have had an e f fe c t  on the  p o s it io n  o f the union. In every 
case they have subtracted from  i t s  r o le . " 05
In the modern in d u s tr ia l system, power passes to  the techno­
s tru c tu re , thus lessening the  c o n f l ic t  o f in te re s t between 
employer and employee which gave the  union much o f the reason 
fo r  i t s  ex is tence . The re g u la t io n  o f aggregate demand, the  
high le ve l o f employment and a general increase in  w e lfa re  
reduce the need fo r  trad e  un ions:
"The union belongs to  a p a r t ic u la r  stage in  the development<
o f the in d u s tr ia l system. When th a t  stage passes so does
QQ
the  union in  anything l ik e  i t s  o r ig in a l p o s itio n  o f power".
97
G a lb ra ith  reasons from th is  th a t  the  in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n
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o f c lass c o n f l ic t  cannot be regarded as the " f in a l  trium ph" 
o f  the unions but m erely belongs to  an h is to r ic a l phase in  
c a p i ta l is t  development in  which successfu l n a t io n a lis a t io n  
and ra t io n a lis a t io n  o f the p roduction  process is  not ye t 
combined w ith  permanent and system atic  s ta te  in te rv e n tio n .
The on ly  fu n c t io n  remaining to  the unions is  as a se rv ice  
in  the in d u s t r ia l system "By he lp ing  to  frame the ru le s  
(c o lle c t iv e  ba rga in ing ) and by p a r t ic ip a t in g  in  t h e ir  adm in i­
s t ra t io n  through the  grievance m achinery, the union serves 
in v a lu a b ly  to  m it ig a te  the fe e lin g  th a t  such systems o r t h e ir  
a d m in is tra tio n  are a rb it r a ry  o r u n ju s t " .100
Unions also p lay  a prom inant ro le  in  "w inning the approval 
o f the p o lic y  o f re g u la tin g  aggregate demand", im portan t 
in  the p lann ing o f the  in d u s tr ia l system. More importance 
in  th is  area is  a lso  the  union ro le  in  s tanda rd is ing  wage 
costs between d i f fe r e n t  f irm s , p a r t ic u la r ly  by means o f in d u s try ­
wide b a rga in ing .
G a lb ra ith  concludes th a t the in d u s t r ia l system has now " la rg e ly
encompassed the  labour movement", d is s o lv in g  some o f  i t s
most im portan t fu n c tio n s  and moulding i t s  o the r opera tions
to  i t s  own needs. In a comparative work, C lark Kerr e t  
101a l a lso  th in k  i t  probable th a t  the  unions w i l l  become 
a conse rva tive  fo rc e  in  s o c ie ty . Under pressure from s ta tu to ry  
in te g ra t iv e  coopera tion , the ro le  which unions f u l f i l l  as 
p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  an autonomous re g u la to ry  mechanism is  o f 
on ly  passing im portance: the  in s t i tu t io n a l is a t io n  o f c lass 
c o n f l ic t  is  on ly  one stage on the  road to  the f u l l y  developed 
in d u s tr ia l s o c ie ty . In th is  model however, the s ta te  has 
a p a r t ic u la r  ro le  as co o rd in a to r and p i lo t  to  a c t iv e ly  encourage 
economic and te c h n o lo g ica l progress by p lann ing . Thus re la t io n s  
between management and managed e f fe c t iv e ly  come under s ta te  
c o n tro l;  the  unions have a much reduced frame o f re fe rence 
and perform the  fu n c tio n s  o f a feed-back between the  dece n tra lised  
system o f c o n tro l and the c e n tra l p lann ing  a u th o r ity .  In 
both the  models o f in te g ra tiv e  cooperation as presented by 
G a lb ra ith  and C lark  Kerr e t  a l the fu n c tio n  o f the trade  
unions is  l im ite d  and moulded according to  the ru les  o f hegemonic
*  A u tho r's  own brackets
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techno logy. A number o f o th e r c r i t i c s  a r r iv e  a t a s im ila r  
conclusion o f the loss o f fu n c t io n  o f the trade  unions, argued 
from d i f fe r e n t  p e rspe c tives .
102Mandel agrees th a t  s ince  the  1940s, the  a cce le ra tion  o f
technology and long term  investm ent p lanning have co n tr ib u te d
to  a reduction  in  the t r a d i t io n a l  f ie ld  o f a c t iv i t y  o f the
unions. The id e a l model o f  organised c a p ita l o f general
s o c ia l and economic programming, which allow s the g ia n t concerns
to  coord ina te  th e ir  investm ent, exe rts  pressure upon governments
fo r  incomes p o lic ie s  and c o rp o ra tiv e  a c tio n , such as the
Concerted A c tio n . Such measures remove the  freedom o f c o l le c t iv e
ba rga in ing , preven ting  the  unions from making gains from
any advantageous market p o s it io n  they may ho ld , fo r  example,
108in  times o f f u l l  employment. W itje s  makes reference to  
the law o f 1967on S ta b i l i t y  and Growth which, w ith  the  Concerted 
A c tio n , forced the fu n c t io n a l in te g ra t io n  o f the tra d e  unions 
in to  the permanent re g u la to ry  m achinery. W a lra ff104 considers 
severa l aspects o f the  l im i ts  o f  union fu n c t io n . He presumes 
p r im a r ily  th a t the  w orkforce  has now overcome a l l  i t s  under­
p r iv i le g e s .  Secondly th e re  are now worker rep resen ta tives 
o th e r than trade  un ions, f o r  example, p o l i t ic ia n s  and p a rt ie s  
sym pathetic to  labour, coopera tives and, most im p o rta n tly , 
works c o u n c ils . Works c o u n c ils  are ga in ing  in  confidence 
and s treng th  and employers are now in  a p o s it io n  to  p lay 
works counc ils  and tra d e  unions o f f  aga ins t one another.
W a lra ff concludes th a t  in  modern so c ie ty  many large o rgan isa tion s  
are lo s ing  t h e ir  forrner r o le ,  in c lu d in g  the  Church, the S ta te , 
and the trade  unions. To the  e x te n t th a t  the trade  unions 
are on ly  one form o f worker re p re s e n ta tio n , they can no longer 
c a rry  out th e ir  fu n c tio n s  on the  basis o f  idea ls  such as 
c lass  s o l id a r i ty .  However, W a lra ff adds th a t  they w i l l  remain 
the  dominant re p re s e n ta tiv e s , i f  on ly  because they have the 
re a d y -b u ilt  machinery, the  experience and the con tac ts , and
th e re fo re  " w i l l  be in  the  h e a rt o f the d iscussion  before
105the  others reach the d o o r".
Other s tud ies  take a less p e s s im is tic  view o f the e ffe c ts  
o f in te g ra tio n  on trad e  union fu n c t io n . In h is  study o f
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the  American tra d e  un ions, K irchhe im er108 describes the  in e v ita ­
b i l i t y  o f union in te g ra t io n  in to  the  s ta te  a t the end o f 
the  Second World War. The unions were o rg a n is a t io n a lly  weak 
w ith in  a h ig h ly  concentrated in d u s t r ia l s tru c tu re . S tate 
in te rv e n tio n  on b e h a lf o f  t h e i r  members fu r th e r  undermined 
union in i t i a t i v e  and the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e ,  w h ile  they and 
t h e i r  members became passive b e n e fic ia r ie s  o f s ta te -guaranteed 
agreements. As a r e s u lt  these unions adopted an a t t i tu d e  
opposed to  deve lop ing t h e ir  p o s it io n  as a c o u n te rv a ilin g  
power in  the  economic sphere. In K irchhe im er's  model, group 
antagonism can be n e u tra lis e d  under the pressure o f in te rn a tio n a l 
co m p e titio n : e i th e r  the unions cooperate under a c e n tra l 
p o lic y  o f "c o o rd in a tio n  o f group in te re s ts  and o b je c tiv e s " 
and agree to  suppress those groups which may th rea ten  the  
c o o rd in a tio n , o r ,  as under fascism  "undes irab le  groups" must 
be suppressed by fo rc e .
According to  a study by the  F ra n k fu rt In s t i tu te  f o r  S ocia l 
107Research, the  German government's p o lic y  on income re g u la tio n  
in troduced a t the  end o f the  1960s served to  in s t i tu t io n a l is e  
the  wage c o n f l i c t ,  making i t  an instrum ent o f the s ta te .
The unions had l i t t l e  choice bu t to  support th is  p o lic y  since 
the  government o b je c tiv e s  o f economic s t a b i l i t y  and f u l l  
employment promised to  f u l f i l l  the  t r a d it io n a l trade  union 
aims o f h ighe r wages and jo b  s e c u r ity .  To th is  e x te n t, the 
In s t i t u te 's  re p o r t agrees w ith  the  ra tio n a le  o f the s tud ies  
on union in te g ra t io n  discussed above. The In s t i tu te  takes 
a d i f fe r e n t  l in e  o f argument th e re a f te r  however in  i t s  re c o g n itio n  
o f  a co n tin u in g  c lass c o n f l ic t  in  labour re la t io n s .  The 
peace form ula presented by the  th e s is  o f  cooperation ensures 
th a t  c lass c o n f l ic t  cannot be a r t ic u la te d ,  but does no t prevent 
i t s  la te n t  ex is tence  -  i t s  inc idence is  sim ply s h ifte d  to  
a new in s t i t u t io n a l  le v e l:
"However, the  s p e c if ic  form o f c o n f l ic t  changes under the 
c o n d itio n s  o f a fu n c tio n in g  incomes p o lic y ;  i t  s h if ts  to  
the  fo rm u la tio n  o f government economic po licy-m aking , to  
the  c a lc u la t io n  o f aims and m easures."10^
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In te g ra tio n  presents the  union o rg a n isa tio n  w ith  a dilemma 
by o f fe r in g  p a r t ia l b e n e fits  to  the  membership w h ile  a t the 
same tim e in s t i t u t io n a l ly  p rese rv ing  the present d is t r ib u t io n  
o f  income and w ea lth . The In s t i tu te  suggests th a t the  unions 
have two a lte rn a tiv e s  open to  them: the  f i r s t  is  to  take 
advantage o f t h e ir  new p o s it io n  o f in fluence  in  the in teg ra ted  
s ta te . In view o f West Germany's dependence on her export 
m arkets, the unions should concentra te  on evo lv ing  p o lic ie s  
which encourage s t a b i l i t y  and growth in  the fo re ig n  markets 
w h ile  pursuing an aggressive wages p o lic y  in  the home m arkets. 
With the support o f a complementary s ta te  economic p o lic y  
the  unions should be able to ,e x p lo it  the given economic cond ition s  
to  secure h igher le v e ls  o f  w e lfa re  fo r  t h e ir  members. The 
second a lte rn a tiv e  must be pursued however i f  the unions 
wish to  achieve more than a h ighe r le ve l o f w e lfa re , th a t  
is ,  in  terms o f a r e d is t r ib u t io n  o f  life -c h a n c e s .
The In s t i tu te  m ain ta ins th a t  p o lit ic a l-e c o n o m ic  measures 
can on ly  be achieved by c o n f l ic t ,  but the unions must f i r s t  
seek redress from the  s ta te  f o r  the  unde rp riv ileges  which 
the  incomes p o lic y  has in f l ic t e d  upon them and th e ir  members. 
C le a r ly  such challenges to  the  s ta te  and economic system 
re q u ire  th a t the  unions be p o l i t i c a l l y  m otivated and th a t  
they use th e ir  p o s it io n  in  the  in te g ra te d  s ta te  not merely 
as a f i l t e r ,  but as the  a r t ic u la t io n  o f the d ive rg e n t, c o l le c t iv e  
needs o f the workers.
The In s t i tu te 's  re p o rt overlooks the  question o f union conscious­
ness and m o tiva tion  towards such ends. This theme is  taken up 
109by Wyniger who observes th a t  union p ra c tic e  has deviatedh
l i t t l e  from the D usse ldorf programme o f 1963. Wyniger, and 
1 1 0lik e w is e  Weingart , reproaches the  trade  unions fo r  t h e ir  
lack o f th e o re t ic a l in s ig h t .  The p u rs u it o f " in te g ra t iv e  
pragmatism" prevents the  unions from developing any a n t ic ip a to ry  
a n a ly s is ; they f a i l  to  recognise s o c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  change, 
ta k in g  i t s  causes a t face  value as they occur w ith ou t considera­
t io n  o f th e ir  rea l consequentia l co n te x t.
1 1 1
V.L. A lle n  c ite s  the  B r i t is h  case as a f in e  example o f
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the v ic io u s  c i r c le  in  which the  trad e  unions now f in d  them selves.
The on ly  saving grace fo r  the  trad e  union movement is  to
recognise the trends  and " re -s o c ia l is e "  th e ir  o rg a n isa tio n s .
They must h a lt  the  b u re a u c ra tis a tio n  and re v e rt once again
to  t ra d it io n a l m il i ta n c y .  This m ilita n c y  must then be app lied
not on ly  to  in flu e n ce  economic markets but also to  achieve
the  longer term o b je c tiv e s  o f system reform . The F ra n k fu rt
In s t i tu te  supports A lle n 's  suppos ition  th a t  aggressive wage
barga in ing  is  in s u f f ic ie n t  to  guarantee a b e tte r  d is t r ib u t io n  
1 1 2o f incomes. Under, incomes p o lic ie s  the impotence o f trade
union a c t iv i t y  is  in s t i t u t io n a l ly  assured and unions are
faced w ith  the a lte rn a t iv e  o f e ith e r  accepting the re s t r ic t io n s
on th e ir  barga in ing  autonomy o r using th e ir  p o s it io n  o f in flu e n ce
1 1 3to  pursue th e ir  p o l i t i c a l  goa ls .
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Mayer concludes from th is  th a t  in  o rder to  asce rta in  to  
what ex ten t the in te g ra t io n  o f unions under incomes p o lic ie s  
has brought about a change in  union fu n c t io n , i t  is  necessary 
to  in v e s tig a te  the  p o l i t ic is a t io n  o f t h e ir  economic fu n c t io n s . 
Economic c r is e s  now have p o l i t ic a l  overtones because governments 
are ob liged to  take  measures to  con ta in  them ra th e r than 
leave them to  the  fre e  market mechanism. Such measures inc lude  
the re g u la tio n  o f incomes. Furthermore, since government 
p lanning in  the economic and so c ia l spheres is  s t i l l  guided 
by the dec is ions o f p r iv a te  in d u s try , the unions are the 
v ic tim s  o f an in cons is tan cy  in  government po licy-m aking ; 
codeterm ination becomes in conseq uen tia l, succeeding on ly  
in  d iv id in g  the  leaders from  the led :
"Every attem pt to  d iv id e  the  unions from the workers by co­
de te rm ina tion  r e s t r ic t s  the  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f rep resen ta tion  
through s o l id a r i t y  and d is to r ts  the  workers ' r ig h t  to  emancipation
1 1 C
in to  t h e ir  s e r v i l i t y  to  the  m arke ts ." (Leminsky )
P o l i t ic a l  C o n f l ic t
The conserva tive  and l ib e r a l approaches to  the problem o f 
union fu n c tio n  in  the  modern s ta te  conclude th a t the s ta te
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must be assigned a f a r  g re a te r ro le ,  e f fe c t in g  a reduction  
in  the p u b lic  fu n c tio n s  o f  the  trad e  un ions.116
In  c o n tra s t to  th is  in te rp re ta t io n  o f  union in te g ra tio n  which
transposes union fu n c tio n  in to  a ve h ic le  o f  so c ia l o rde r
( O rdnungsfaktor), the re  is  a school o f thought which s t i l l
perce ives trade  unions as f i r s t  and foremost rep resen ta tives
o f  the unde rp riv ileged  c lass  o r s o c ia l group. From th is
v ie w po in t, changes in  union fu n c tio n  re s u lt in g  from a changed
re la t io n s h ip  o f the unions and the  s ta te  must bear upon democ r a t ic
progress. Union in te g ra tio n  must be accompanied th e re fo re
by a p o l i t ic is a t io n  o f union fu n c t io n  in  o rder to  remain
a c tiv e  on beha lf o f t h e ir  members. Such an argument was
put forward in  1952 by A lfre d  Weber who proposed th a t  the
t ra d it io n a l fu n c tio n  o f unions in  the  economic sphere should
be combined w ith  the p o l i t ic a l  o b je c t iv e  o f e s ta b lis h in g
a new p o l i t ic a l  o rder in  West Germany. This p o l i t ic a l  fu n c tio n
o f unions should be on-going in  the  process o f con tinu ing117in te g ra tio n  o f s ta te  and s o c ie ty . 1 By th e ir  involvement 
in  s ta te  processes, the  unions are in  a p o s it io n  to  p ro te c t 
and promote the  dem ocratic r ig h ts  o f t h e ir  members aga ins t 
any r e s t r a in t  o r re a c tio n a ry  development.
Stammer a lso envisages a c o n tin u a tio n  o f the extension o f 
union fu n c tio n  in to  the  p o l i t ic a l  sphere. ' In  view o f the 
increas ing  ra t io n a lis a t io n  o f economic and soc ia l in s t i tu t io n s ,  
the  d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  o f  o ld  c lass s tru c tu re s  and increased 
jo b  s p e c ia lis a t io n , an expansion o f s ta te  ju r is d ic t io n  has 
accompanied the emergence o f "an a n ta g o n is tic  so c ia l system 
o f d if fe re n t ia te d  group in te re s ts ."  In o rder to  preserve 
the  p lu r a l i t y  o f the dem ocratic s tru c tu re , unions and o th e r 
s o c ia l groups must p a r t ic ip a te  in  the  p o l i t ic a l  process as 
much as the s t a te . 115
Hirsch-Weber extends Stammer's ana lys is  by considering  the 
a tt itu d e s  and s e lf-p e rc e p tio n  o f the  unions themselves.
The h is to r ic a l aims o f the  s o c ia l is t  trade  unions o f c re a tin g  
a new so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  o rder as w e ll as seeking to  improve 
the  lo t  o f the working classes w ith in  the  present o rde r presents
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c e r ta in  im p lic a tio n s  f o r  fu tu re  union po licy-m ak ing : i f
the  unions regard themselves as merely another in te re s t  group,
they w i l l  see t h e i r  fu n c t io n  in th e  fu tu re  as e q u iva le n t to
th a t  o f o th e r la rge  socio-econom ic pressure groups. I f  however
they continue to  see themselves as rep resen ta tives o f the
dependent c lass in  a c a p i ta l is t  so c ie ty  then they may be
expected to  "have the  courage to  s t r iv e  fo r  U top ia" in  pursuing
119the idea l o f  democracy in  p o l i t ic a l  and economic l i f e .
The arguments presented by Stammer and Hirsch-Weber in  favou r 
o f  the value o f tra d e  unions as p ro te c to rs  o f the  dem ocratic 
o rde r are supported by authors in  B r ita in  120 and in  Germany 121.
The suggestion is  th a t  dem ocratic trade unions are in  a p o s it io n  
to  assert democracy under a c o n s t itu t io n  which does not o th e r­
wise provide f o r  an equal d is t r ib u t io n  o f power between groups.
I t  is  assumed however th a t  the  trad e  unions themselves seek 
to  use th e ir  powers to  t h is  end and th a t they are t r u ly  dem ocra tic . 
In r e a l i t y ,  the  argument would seem to  f a i l  on both counts: 
according to  an an a lys is  by Bergmann e t a l 122, whereas the  
1949 DGB programme concentra ted upon p o l i t ic a l  re fo rm , the  
1955 programme o f  a c tio n  emphasised the importance o f the  
fu r th e r  development o f  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing ( T a r i f p o l i t i k ) .
The unions were a lready too  la te  w ith  t h e ir  reform  programme 
o f 1949 s ince the  CDU had a lready taken the re in s  o f  power 
in  the government, and, w ith  t h e i r  re luctance to  take  mass 
a c tion  to  secure re fo rm , the  unions were d riven  back to  t r a d i t io n a l  
pressure group ta c t ic s  and c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing . The la s t  
s tru g g le  o f any consequence by the  union movement was in  
1951, a f te r  which the  s o c ia l market economy was allowed to  
prosper. The Munich programme now no longer re le v a n t, the 
unions embarked upon a more pragm atic course o f securing 
sho rt-te rm  o b je c tiv e s  w ith in  the  framework o f the  c a p i ta l is t  
economy. The 1963 programme acknowledged Keynesianism as 
the  key to  successfu l c a p ita lis m ; a more te c h n ic a l approach 
to  the problem was to  be adopted by the unions, in v o lv in g  
a departure from the  theme o f c lass in te re s ts  in  favou r o f 
th a t  o f t o ta l  w e lfa re  and the  common good.12'3 C r it ic is m  
o f  the system was re s t r ic te d  to  the preamble o f the  1963 
programme which leads Bergmann e t  a l to  suggest th a t  in  the 
fu tu re  such concessions to  l e f t  wing ideology may be om itted  
from the DGB programmes a lto g e th e r .124
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The question o f democracy w ith in  union o rgan isa tion s  is  one
which has given r is e  to  p r o l i f i c  d iscuss ion  among the  c r i t i c s .
H a r t f ie ld  d i r e c t ly  challenges Stammer's ana lys is  on th is  
125account and p o in ts  to  the  wealth  o f l i te r a tu r e  which over­
whelm ingly re je c ts  the no tion  th a t  such in te rn a l democracy
126 127e x is ts  in  p ra c t ic e . Fetscher and W a lra ff re la te  the
tendency towards o lig a rc h y  in  union o rg a n isa tio n  to  the
c o rp o ra t is t  b u rea ucra tic  trends  in  organised s o c ie ty  g e n e ra lly .
128 129Leminsky and Mandel however a t t r ib u te  the  b u re a u c ra ti-
sa tio n  o f trad e  unions to  a long -s tand ing  des ire  f o r  s e l f -
p re s e rv a tio n . Leminsky draws on the  h is to r ic a l con tex t o f
the  German unions in  proposing th a t  "the  o rg a n is a tio n " came
to  mean more than an instrum ent f o r  securing c e r ta in  o b je c tiv e s ,
bu t th a t  i t  bore the values o f the  labour movement and was
130 131th e re fo re  to  be preserved a t a l l  co s ts . W itje s  also
dates the growth o f union bureaucracy from 1906 when the
s treng th  o f  the union o rg a n isa tio n  was recognised by the
p a rty  over the  issue o f the  M assenstre ik debate. He suggests
moreover th a t  th is  b u re a u c ra tis a tio n  led to  the  d icho tom isa tion
o f  in te re s ts  o f  leadersh ip  and membership and a weakening
132o f democracy. B i ls te in  s tresses the  rec ru itm en t o f experts
by the  German trade  unions as c o n tr ib u t in g  to  a widening
o f the  g u l f  between the  leadersh ip  and the rank and f i l e ;
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o thers c i te  the more general aspect o f  p re s tig e , associated 
w ith  the p o s it io n  o f leadersh ip  as the  d iv is iv e  fa c to r .
Strong leadersh ip  however is  o f  the  essence in  L a s k i's  ana lys is  
13 4o f union fu n c tio n  . N e ithe r the  t r a d it io n a l l ib e r a l - p lu r a l is t  
theo ry  o f trade  union fu n c t io n , nor the  concept o f  the  trade  
unions as a dem ocratic fa c to r  in  the  process o f s o c ia l in te g ra tio n  
s u f f ic ie n t ly  exp la in  the  p o l i t ic a l  ro le  which Laski ascribes 
to  them:
" . . .  the trad e  union movement, in  a re v o lu tio n a ry  age l ik e  
our own, has a p o l i t ic a l  task  a t le a s t o f equal importance 
to  i t s  economic fu n c t io n " .
L a s k i's  ana lys is  re s ts  on the obse rva tion  th a t  the  in fluence  
o f monopoly c a p ita lis m  upon government leads to  the  sub jec tion
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o f workers and trad e  unions in  o rder to  avoid s o c ia l and 
p o l i t ic a l  c o n f l ic t :
"Th is enables p o l i t ic a l  democracy in large p a rt to  conceal 
the  fa c t  th a t ,  granted the p r iv a te  ownership o f the  means 
o f p ro d u c tio n , p o l i t i c a l  democracy is  not seldom a facade 
behind which the  g re a t co rpo ra tion s  prepare a s o c ia l o rd e r, 
the  cha rac te r o f  which is  no t u n lik e  th a t o f the  corpora te  
s t a t e . " 155
U lt im a te ly , in  a new c a p i ta l is t  c r is is ,  the economic powers 
w i l l  demand c o n tro l o f  the  s ta te  machinery and the  trad e  
unions w i l l  be t o t a l l y  unable to  redress the balance o f 
s ta te  power:
" I  am more convinced t h a t  the  character o f economic develop­
ment makes i t  im pera tive  th a t  the government, w ith  i t s  r ig h t  
to  exe rc ise  the  sovere ign power, must be in  the  hands o f 
those who are prepared, a t almost any co s t, to  preserve the
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e s s e n t ia lly  dem ocratic cha rac te r o f government."
The im p lic a tio n s  o f t h is  f o r  union p o lic y  and p ra c t ic e  are 
th a t  they should no t accommodate themselves to  c a p ita lis m , 
b u t, by preserv ing  t h e i r  autonomy, should seek to  counter 
the  in flu e n ce  exerted upon government by the in d u s t r ia l g ia n ts .
By "m o b ilis in g  tra d e  union power p o l i t ic a l ly  ____  i t  can
c a rry  ou t the  r e d e f in it io n  o f  the  re la t io n s  o f p roduction  
w ith  the s ta te  power in  i t s  hands, and not in  i t s  opponents' 
h a n d s ."137
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Abendroth , w h ile  acknowledging th a t i t  is  more l ik e ly  
th a t  the  unions w i l l  acquiesce to  the c a p i ta l is t  system, 
a lso  takes the view th a t  they have a re s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  democracy 
to  adopt a p o lic y  o f o p p o s itio n  to  the s ta te . On the  grounds 
th a t  the re  e x is ts  an inc rea s ing  divergence between the  le t t e r  
o f the C o n s titu tio n  (Basic Law, A r t . 20/28) and the  C o n s titu tio n  
in  p ra c t ic e , the  unions are ob liged  to  a c t iv e ly  defend democracy 
by the p u rs u it  o f fu r th e r  r ig h ts  o f codeterm ination in  in d u s try  
and by the  exe rc ise  o f s trong union democracy. By encouraging
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a p a r ty - p o l i t ic a l awareness among th e ir  membership o r by 
o rgan is ing  c o l le c t iv e  a c tio n  to  demonstrate worker power, 
the  unions may perceive the  a lte rn a t iv e  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  o f 
m a in ta in ing  t h e ir  p o s it io n  as a c o u n te rv a ilin g  power.
1 39S e ife r t  centres h is  ana lys is  around the a r t ic le  in  the 
Basic Law which le g it im is e s  union a c t iv i t y  (A r t.  9 :3 ) .  Un like 
Abendroth, S e ife r t  is  not co n fid e n t th a t the C o n s titu tio n  
guarantees the r ig h ts  and fu n c tio n s  which the unions have 
exercised since the  war and suggests th a t  they may y e t be 
d e b il i ta te d  by in c o rp o ra tio n  by the  s ta te .
The p o l i t ic a l  in te g ra tio n  o f trad e  unions has been the sub jec t 
o f  d iscussion  among academics and trad e  u n io n is ts  in  B r ita in  
as w e ll as in  West Germany. Crouch has sta ted  th a t the l ib e r a l -  
c o l le c t iv is t  model o f in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  which ex is ted  
u n t i l  the e a r ly  1960s can no longer be said to  e x is t  because 
the  cond ition s  which made i t  po ss ib le  no longer ho ld :
11 a s tra te g y  o f l ib e r a l c o lle c t iv is m  is  on ly  pursued
by. a dominant in te re s t  faced w ith  considerab le  c o u n te rv a ilin g  
power. The s u rv iv a l o f  dom ination is  in  fa c t  dependent on 
severa l fa c to rs  which are o u ts id e  i t s  own c o n tro l:  econom ica lly , 
on a high le v e l o f  growth and mass p ro s p e r ity ; p o l i t i c a l l y  
on a t le a s t some con tin u in g  background support; and id e o lo g i­
c a l ly  on l im ita t io n s  on workers* a s p ira tio n s  and use o f p re s s u re ."140
Brown adds th a t  the  in s t i tu t io n a l  framework fo r  in d u s tr ia l
re la t io n s  is  showing signs o f development in  a c o rp o ra t is t
d ire c t io n .  The des ire  o f governments fo r  a less r is k y  course
o f ac tion  leads them to  attem pt to  in vo lve  union leaders
141and employers in  t r i p a r t i t e  re la t io n s h ip s .  Most o f the
c o n s tra in ts  se t by the  s ta te  upon trad e  unions are in  defence 
142o f the  economy ; the in te g ra tio n  o f unions in to  the s ta te  
bureaucracy serves to  con ta in  union a c t iv i t y  in  tim es o f
143in f la t io n  and unemployment, the  two g rea t a ilm ents o f c a p ita lis m .
The unions face the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  having to  a r t ic u la te  oppos itio n
in  a system o f crum bling democracy: though they s t i l l  profess
144to  perform fu n c tio n s  o f both p ro te c tio n  and reform , th is  
has met c r i t ic is m  f i r s t  on the  grounds th a t the unions are
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already so in te g ra te d  in to  the  s ta te  th a t they can no longer
145
attem pt to  change the  system; and second, th a t they take 
too  s u b je c tiv e  a view o f t h e ir  own behaviour in  the economy 
and th e re fo re  any such assessment o f themselves is  open to  
q u e s tio n .145
The unions in  B r ita in  have been described as always having 
been on the  de fens ive , since they have never sought c o n t r o l .147 
The German unions, on the o th e r hand, d id  have the o p p o rtu n ity  
o f  in i t ia t in g  a new so c ia l o rde r in  1945 but were thwarted 
in  t h e ir  a ttem pts , c h ie f ly  by the  c o n tro ll in g  A l l ie s  who 
pressed fo r  a l ib e r a l - c a p i t a l i s t  economy. As a r e s u lt ,  t h e ir  
long-te rm  aim remains u n f u l f i l le d  and th e ir  ro le  in  the  short 
term is  a lso  reduced to  one o f accommodation and de fence .148
C le a r ly , the  p o l i t ic a l  and economic ro le s  o f trad e  unions 
as w e ll as t h e ir  l im ita t io n s  are c lo s e ly  linked  and operate 
a t d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls  o f  a n a ly s is . Much o f t h e ir  p o l i t i c a l  
freedom o f movement is  dependent upon th e ir  autonomy as economic 
agents, and v ice  versa . As Crouch in tim a te s , " i t  is  every 
b i t  as 'p o l i t i c a l '  f o r  unions to  accept wage re s t r a in t  in  
favour o f  a presumed 'n a tio n a l in te r e s t ' .  In modern s o c ie ty  
governments have an o v e rr id in g  concern fo r  the s ta te  o f the 
economy, and un ions ' c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  a c t iv i t ie s  have 
im p lic a tio n s  f o r  the  economy." 149
H
In h is  study o f B r i t is h  p o l i t ic s  and trade  unions, W. M u lle r
lin k s  "re spon s ib le  trad e  unionism " w ith  an increase in  a c t iv i t y
among non -in teg ra te d  m in o r ity  groups w ith in  the u n io n .150
Brasso a lso  takes the view th a t  the  c a n a lis a tio n  o f  in d u s t r ia l
c o n f l ic t  and the "m y s t if ic a t io n "  o f  worker consciousness
which re s u lts  from the  in te g ra t io n  o f trade  unions in to  s ta te
plann ing c a l ls  f o r  autonomous a c t iv i t y  by le f t  wing groups
ou ts ide  the  union to  take a c tio n  aga ins t the c a p i ta l is t  system
151and re v ive  the  working c lass  movement.
Mayer comments th a t  in c reas ing  s ta te  in te rv e n tio n  in  s o c ie ty  
a lso  means an in c reas ing  need f o r  compromise between s o c ia l 
groups. For any e va lu a tio n  o f union fu n c tio n  in  t h is  more
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complex so c ia l c o n te x t, i t  is  im portan t to  decide whether 
a s ta b i l is a t io n  o f the  system m erely serves to  b o ls te r  the 
present d is t r ib u t io n  o f power o r  whether the c o n f l ic t in g  
o b lig a tio n s  o f government in  the  w e lfa re  s ta te  do not provide 
new terms o f re fe rence fo r  n e g o tia t io n  between groups. Only 
c a re fu l ana lys is  o f the  areas o f s ta te  c o n tro l,  e m p irica l 
as w e ll as th e o re t ic a l can determ ine the areas where union 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  would be most e f fe c t iv e .152
Union Democracy and Workplace Representation
Throughout the d iscuss ion  o f the  p o l i t ic a l  fu n c tio n  o f unions, 
a t te n tio n  is  d ire c te d  to  the  problem o f in te rn a l union democracy 
and the m o tiva tion  o f the  rank and f i l e .  Crouch sums up 
the p o s it io n  o f the union bureaucracy in  the in te g ra te d  s ta te :
"How fa r  can they go in  responding to  the challenge and opportu­
n i t ie s  o f a p o l i t ic a l  ro le  w ith o u t s a c r if ic in g  t h e ir  p rim ary,
bed-rock task o f rep resen ting  t h e i r  members' immediate in te re s ts
153in  improved wages and co n d itio n s ? "
Weingart lin k s  the loss o f in te rn a l democracy d i r e c t ly  w ith
154the p r in c ip le  o f code te rm ina tion  in  Germany. His arguments 
in  support o f th is  p ro p o s it io n  are not u n lik e  those presented 
in  B r ita in  by A lle n  who contends th a t  the ro le  o f the  union 
leadersh ip  is  a confined one, co n s is te n t w ith  the  values 
and norms o f c a p i ta l is t  s o c ie ty .155
Union democracy is  d e a lt  w ith  in  some d e ta i l by L ip s e t, Trow
and Coleman in  t h e ir  study o f the  In te rn a tio n a l Typographical 
156Union. In rev iew ing the " iro n  law o f o lig a rc h y " ,  f i r s t  
proposed by M ichels in  1911157, L ip s e t e t  a l note th a t  i t  
is  g e n e ra lly  not the  o lig a rc h y  i t s e l f  which causes concern, 
but the misuse o f i t s  p o s it io n  and in flu e n c e . I t  is  th e re fo re  
no su rp rise  to  f in d  th a t  supposedly democratic o rg a n isa tio n s , 
such as the trade  -unions, a lso  obey the law o f o lig a rc h y ; 
but the re  should a lso  be a system w ith in  the union o rgan isa tion  
which checks the  misuse o f  power, a system based on a "Theory
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o f Democracy", as L ip se t e t a l  term  i t .  The Theory is  evolved
from an e va lu a tio n  o f  a number o f previous s tud ies  o f democracy.
They c i t e  th re e  instances o f dem ocratic c o n tro l w ith in  a
s o c ie ty :158 one is  the  A r is to t l ia n  th e s is  th a t democracy
can on ly  e x is t  in  a s o c ie ty  which is  predom inantly m iddle
c la ss . Only a more o r less even d is t r ib u t io n  o f income could
guarantee the in te l l ig e n t  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the mass o f the
popu la tion  in  p o l i t ic s .  A second p ro p o s itio n  is  th a t  democracy
works w e ll in  r e la t iv e ly  sm all u n its  where a c lose  observa tion
o f the  government by the  populace is  made p o s s ib le . The
au tho rs ' own p ro p o s it io n  however is  the  theory o f p o l i t i c a l
p lu ra lis m  whereby the  members o f the soc ie ty  belong to  organised
sub-groups which c o n s t itu te  autonomous centres o f power w ith in
159the s o c ie ty . This th e s is  is  expanded upon by M artin  who 
s ta tes th a t  '"The  s ta tu s  o f the  o p p o s itio n ' is  the  d is t in g u is h in g  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  democracy; democracy e x is ts  where organised 
oppos ition  is  to le ra te d ,  to ta l i ta r ia n is m  where i t  is  n o t" .
In disagreement w ith  L ip se t e t  a l ,  M artin  m ain ta ins th a t  
the o p p o s itio n  need not be in s t i tu t io n a l is e d ,  as is  the case 
in  the ITU, nor even th a t  i t  should be democratic -  "merely 
th a t i t  should su rv ive  as a recognised form o f p o l i t ic a l  
a c t iv i t y . "  Faction  w ith in  a union may be d ys fu n c tio n a l in  
th a t in te rn a l d iv is io n  weakens i t  barga in ing  p o s it io n ,  but 
i t  remains an e s s e n tia l fe a tu re  o f  democracy.
1 fin
In answer to  the  query "What are trad e  unions fo r? "  Flanders 
t r ie s  to  fo rg e  a th ir d  l in e  o f reasoning between the  conse rva tive  
and l i b e r a l is t  p o s it io n s  on union fu n c t io n . He re je c ts  both 
these v iew po in ts  on the  grounds th a t  they b e l i t t l e  th e  un ions ' 
prim ary fu n c t io n  o f re p re s e n ta tio n , which ob liges  them to  
act in  the  best in te re s ts  o f  t h e i r  members. F landers emphasises 
the importance o f  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  as the  medium o f 
union fu n c tio n  through which the  unions are able to  re g u la te  
the power and a u th o r ity  o f  the  employers. By extending the 
ru le  o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rg a in in g , the unions lessen the  dependence 
o f the  employees on market f lu c tu a t io n s  and the  w i l l  o f  manage­
ment. For Flanders th e re fo re , c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  is  more 
than a to o l o f  "aggressive economism", but is  a method o f 
e s ta b lis h in g  r ig h ts  in  in d u s try  which p ro te c t w orkers ' d ig n i ty ,
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"a s o c ia l o rder in  in d u s try " .  Moreover, the access to  p a r t ic i ­
pa tio n  in  the rule-m aking process granted to  the  unions in
c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  is  a more e f f ic ie n t  form o f democracy161than can be achieved by code te rm ina tion .
C o lle c tiv e  barga in ing is  thus an im portant fe a tu re  o f union
rep re se n ta tio n  a t the workplace and is  the m ainspring o f
the  movement's v i t a l i t y .  This is  apparen tly  not the  case
in  Germany. A re p o rt o f the  in d u s t r ia l p r in t in g  union o f
1974 complained th a t  the unions could no t con tinue  to  develop
th e i r  o b je c tiv e s  " in  a vacuum" w ith o u t recourse to  the wishes 16?
o f the  membership. Unions cannot cooperate in d e f in i te ly
in  a f re e  so c ie ty  w ith o u t a tte nd in g  to  t h e ir  members' immediate 
163needs. The in teg ra ted  unions have abandoned the o r ig in a l 
o b je c tiv e s  o f the German labour movement and are now reduced 
to  the  defensive ro le  o f insurance aga inst in d iv id u a l and 
c o l le c t iv e  r is k .  In a system where "the  s o c ia l c o n f l ic ts  
between employer and employee are resolved from issue to  
issue and not overcome" , the  unions a c t iv e ly  recognise 
the  system and s h ie ld  i t  from the  c r i t ic is m  o f the  w o rk fo rc e .165 
This negative assessment o f union behaviour was ignored by 
F landers but is  supported elsewhere in  the B r i t is h  l i te r a tu r e :
"C o lle c t iv e  ba rga in ing , where i t  operates w ith  reasonable 
success, f u l f i l l s  th re e  m ajor fu n c tio n s : f i r s t  i t  provides 
a p a r t ia l  means fo r  re s o lv in g  the  c o n f l ic t in g  economic in te re s ts  
o f management and labour; second, i t  g re a t ly  enhances the 
r ig h ts ,  d ig n ity  and worth o f workers as in d u s t r ia l c it iz e n s ;  
and, t h ir d  as a consequence o f  the  f i r s t  two fu n c t io n s , i t  
p rov ides one o f the  most im portan t bulwarks f o r  the  p rese rva tion  
o f the  p r iv a te  e n te rp r is e  sys tem ."166
In pursuing a p o lic y  o f aggressive economism, the  unions 
are encouraging a p a s s iv ity  among t h e ir  members which reduces 
th e i r  v i t a l i t y  and a c t iv i t y  as a movement.167 Moreover, 
s ince  cooperation a t s ta te  le v e l is  g e n e ra lly  conducted by 
the  c e n tra l o rg a n isa tio n  o f the  trade  union fe d e ra t io n , w ith ou t 
n e c e s s a rily  in v o lv in g  the  member unions, the re  is  some doubt
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as to  whether the  term  "movement" can s t i l l  be app lied  to  
the c o lle c t iv e  b o d y .158 The moment o f v i t a l i t y  has in  fa c t  
s h ifte d  to  the workplace where grievances about c o n d itio n s16Qare as much a source o f c o n f l i c t  as pay. In B r ita in  jo b
co n tro l issues form a s u b s ta n tia l p a rt o f shop f lo o r  ba rg a in in g .
They o f fe r  a means to  the  w orkforce  o f tak ing  de fensive a c tio n
in  the face o f a union o ff ic ia ld o m  which acquiesces to  the
170ru le  o f c a p ita lis m . In d iscuss ing  the causes o f s t r ik e s  
in  B r ita in ,  Turner concludes:
"One could say th a t  these d ispu tes  a l l  in vo lve  attem pts to  
submit managerial d is c re t io n  and a u th o r ity  to  agreed - o r 
f a i l in g  th a t ,  customary -  ru le s :  a lte rn a t iv e ly  th a t  they 
r e f le c t  an im p l ic i t  p ressure f o r  more democracy and in d iv id u a l 
r ig h ts  in  in d u s t r y . " 171
S im ila r  trends in  German in d u s try  have fo r  some c r i t i c s  im p lied
the need fo r  more p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f the trade unions in  c o n tro l
a t the workplace. Since the  la te  1960s, there  has been a
re v iv a l in  trade  union l i t e r a tu r e  o f the debate on the  Works
1 7?C o n s titu tio n  A c t. Lem insky '7^ observes th a t even code te rm ina tion
a t p la n t le ve l such as e x is ts  in  the metal and m ining in d u s tr ie s
has penetrated in to  the  shops and p i ts ,  which leads him to
conclude th a t union p a r t ic ip a t io n  a t d i f fe re n t  le v e ls  is
complementary ra th e r  than c o n f l ic t in g .  Codeterm ination a t
the workplace serves to  check the  fa i l in g s  o f c o l le c t iv e
barga in ing in  the absence o f  company b a rg a in in g .178 Up u n t i l
the la te  s ix t ie s ,  the  concepts o f c o lle c t iv e  ba rga in ing  and
codeterm ination remained independent o f  one ano ther; s ince
then, t h e ir  complementary a t t r ib u te s ,  i f  in s t i tu te d  a t company
174-le v e l,  have found re c o g n it io n . Leminsky p o in ts  ou t the 
m isconception o f code te rm ina tion  as necessarily  fo rg in g  coopera­
t io n ,  and c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , c o n f l i c t . 175 E xp lo ite d  
to  the f u l l ,  these ins trum ents  o f union fu n c tio n  could ensure 
th a t the unions m a in ta in  a s trong  autonomous p o s it io n  as 
c o u n te rv a ilin g  power a t the  workplace. Such a p o s it io n  provides 
the unions w ith  the  founda tions  to  re b u ild  union s o l id a r i t y  
and consciousness among t h e i r  working membership.
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According to  some c r i t i c s ,  however, n e ith e r codeterm ination
nor job  c o n tro l can o f themselves s e r io u s ly  challenge the 
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work process. Since job  re g u la tio n  issues are e s s e n tia lly
defensive in  ch a ra c te r, the unions are ob liged  to  adopt an
o ffe n s iv e  s tra te g y  which extends beyond the wages c o n f l ic t .
Gorz s ta te s  th a t the unions must adopt a r e a l is t ic  s tra te g y
towards ach ieving a s o c ia l is t  s o c ie ty . While con tin u in g
to  push fo r  h ighe r wages, they should fo rm u la te  and pursue
a concrete programme o f changes a t the le ve ls  o f p roduction  177
and the economy. As opponents o f the present s o c ia l system,
they should s t r iv e  fo r  i t s  removal in  the long term , w h ile
securing p a r t ia l  changes in . th e  sh o rt and m iddle term , such
178as education , s o c ia l se rv ices and so on.
A Union fo r  the Workers
The c h ie f question now remaining is  what do employees themselves
want from a trade  union? Broad p o l i t ic a l  aims may w e ll be
in  the in te re s ts  o f the membership, bu t on ly  in  the  long
run, and i t  is  not a t a l l  c le a r  whether the m a jo r ity  o f  working
people would recognise s o c ia l change as the  re s u lt  o f trade  
179union a c t iv i t y .  In the in te g ra te d  s ta te , unions have
to  choose between an acquiescent and a ra d ic a l p o l i t ic a l
ro le :  a ro le  as an o rg a n isa tio n  o r a movement.180 The form er
invo lves employing measures to  d is c ip l in e  the membership
in  o rder to  m ain ta in  power as a c e n t r a l is t  agent which may
take the form o f in cen tives  to  membership o r sanctions aga ins t
181non-compliance. E ickhof ' places such measures in  t h e ir  
h is to r ic a l con tex t in  d e sc rib in g  the "p o s it iv e "  and "nega tive " 
a c tio n  which the unions in  B r ita in  andin Germany undertook 
to  s ta b i l is e  th e i r  o rg a n is a tio n s .
Negative a c tio n , such as the  closed shop, although i l le g a l  
in  Germany, is  now w e ll e s tab lishe d  in  B r ita in  among the 
"New Unions" o f the  1890s as w e ll as among some o ld e r l ib e r a l 
unions, such as m in ing, where the  'agency' shop ex is ted  in  
some regions from 1870, and some e a r l ie r  c r a f t  unions. A f te r
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the  1890s the re  were s tr ik e s  and even sympathy s tr ik e s  aga ins t
the " fre e  r id e rs "  in  c o a l, s te e l,  s h ip b u ild in g , gas, p r in t in g ,
182wool and t e x t i le s  and jo in e ry .  Other than the  closed 
shop, the unions in  Germany app lied  pressure upon the  workers 
by means o f  propaganda and personal con tact. This was p a r t ic u la r ly  
o v e rt in  m ining where pressure from fa m ilie s  and o th e r s o c ia l 
contacts remains t r a d i t io n a l ly  s trong and pressure from  non­
union o rg a n is a tio n s , such as churches and p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s  
more l i k e ly .
P o s it iv e  a c tio n  took the  form o f s e le c tiv e  economic and s o c ia l 
a t t ra c t io n s .  In B r i ta in  as in  Germany, unions, from the  
very e a r ly  days o f  t h e i r  o rg a n is a tio n , ran courses in  the 
trad e  o r c r a f t  to  encourage prom otion; they issued t h e i r  
own in d u s tr ia l p u b lic a tio n s  and se t up l ib r a r ie s .  They ran 
t h e ir  own lega l departm ents, provided s t r ik e  pay, "tram p ing" 
allowances and w e lfa re  b e n e fits .  Even the "New Unions" although 
c h ie f ly  m otivated by "pragm atic in d u s tr ia lis m " in  p u rs u it  
o f c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , found th a t  they had to  o f fe r  personal 
se rv ices to  the membership in  o rde r to  a tta in  some s t a b i l i t y .
In Germany, the Lassa llean s o c ia l is t  unions, because o f th e ir  
p o l i t i c a l  aims, o ffe re d  m ain ly s t r ik e  b e n e fit,  bu t were not 
so strong as the  B ebel-L iebknecht o rgan isa tion s , which aimed 
to  provide a lte rn a t iv e  b e n e fits .  In many instances the  unions 
were unable to  pay o u t; however the  p r in c ip le  had been es tab lishe d  
and was m ainta ined by the  new o rg an isa tion  formed in  1875.
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Van de V a il terms the  re la t io n s h ip  between the  unions 
and t h e ir  members t h e i r  "m ic ro -s o c ia l fu n c t io n " . Van de 
V a il proposes th a t  changes in  the  consciousness and expecta tions 
o f the unions and t h e i r  members, re s u lt in g  from changes in  
the parameters o f tra d e  union fu n c tio n  a t the "m acro -soc ia l" 
le v e l,  in e v ita b ly  m odify union fu n c tio n  a t the m ic ro -s o c ia l 
le v e l.  He describes the  s h i f t  in  the  le ve l o f in d u s t r ia l 
c o n f l ic t ,  which has occurred as a re s u lt  o f the w e lfa re  s ta te , 
as having a lte re d  the  na ture  o f  trad e  unionism towards "the  
o rg a n is a tio n " . In d u s tr ia l c o n f l ic t  has lo s t i t s  c lass  c h a ra c te r184
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and the  trad e  unions have been ins trum en ta l in  i t s  in s t i t u t io n a l i ­
s a t io n . In the  in te g ra te d  s ta te ,  h igh concen tra tion  o f union 
o rg a n is a tio n , as e x is ts  in  in d u s t r ia l unionism , encourages 
"re sp o n s ib le  trad e  un ion ism ". T h is , and the  absorp tion  o f 
the  t r a d i t io n a l  se rv ice  fu n c tio n s  o f  trad e  un ions, such as 
s o c ia l insurance, by the  w e lfa re  s ta te ,  weaken the t ie s  between 
the  unions and t h e i r  members. The unions have to  develop 
new " in te r n a l"  fu n c tio n s  in  the  form o f serv ices to  a t t r a c t  
the  lo y a lty  o f t h e i r  membership.1^ 5 For Van de V a il th is  
presents a much more serious problem to  the  union leadersh ip  
than how they should best secure m a te ria l advantages fo r  
t h e i r  members.
I t  is  in te re s t in g  to  note th a t  the  measures which Van de 
V a il suggests to  s trengthen the  trad e  union o rg a n isa tio n  
are an extension o f  those described by E ickho f. In view ing 
c lass  c o n f l ic t  s im ply in  terms o f a c lash o f va lues, Van 
de V a il assumes th a t  i f  trade  union values a t the  workplace 
can be changed and brought more in to  l in e  w ith  those o f manage­
ment, the  c lass  c o n f l ic t  w i l l  no longer be apparent. There 
is  no d iscuss ion  in  h is  ana lys is  o f  tra d e  unionism as a "movement"; 
the  problem, as he sees i t ,  is  an o rg a n is a tio n a l one. I f  
d is c ip l in e  could be achieved on the  basis o f membership support 
in  the  way described , the  unions would be in  a p o s it io n  to  
share management values to  the  e x te n t th a t  c lass c o n f l ic t  
a t the  p lace o f work would be removed.
Van de V a i l 's  study c le a r ly  p o in ts  to  a cons ide ra tion  o f
the  values and m o tiv a tio n  o f the  members in  any ana lys is
o f union fu n c t io n . I f  worker consciousness is  changing,
then the  trad e  unions must respond a cco rd ing ly  in  o rde r to
s u rv iv e . I t  is  argued th a t  in  the  w e lfa re  s ta te , the a f f lu e n t
worker is  no longer concerned w ith  the  w ider id ea ls  and aims
o f t r a d i t io n a l  trad e  unionism , but is  m otivated by an "in s trum en ta l 186c o l le c t iv is m " .  In  the Van de V a il study the p ro p o rtio n
o f the  sample in te re s te d  in  c o lle c t iv is m  a t a l l  was very
187 188low. Goldthorpe found th a t  o th e r than craftsm en, the
m a jo r ity  o f  a f f lu e n t  workers view the fu n c tio n s  o f unions
as being re s t r ic te d ,  having no meaning e ith e r  in  terms o f
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worker p a r t ic ip a t io n  o r as a p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e . The trade  
unions are o f more s ig n if ic a n c e  in  economic and lo c a lis e d  
issues. The o r ie n ta t io n  o f  the  workers towards unionism 
r e f le c t  t h e ir  o r ie n ta t io n  towards work, leading Goldthorpe 
to  conclude th a t  tra d e  unionism in  B r ita in  is  not lo s in g  i t s  
hold but is  adapting to  the  needs and expecta tions o f  i t s  
members:
"  these w orkers ' re lia n c e  upon such ( c o l le c t iv e ) *  a c tio n
remains c lo s e ly  associated w ith  t h e i r  p o s itio n  and ro le  as
men who s e l l  t h e i r  labour power to  an employer in  re tu rn  
1 gnfo r  wages."
In h is  assessment o f  the  s itu a t io n  o f the a f f lu e n t  workers 
in  the  new s o c ie ty , Goldthorpe suggests th a t the re  is  a new 
"openness" o f s o c ia l consciousness in  the absence o f  images 
o f s o c ia l o rde r o th e r than money. This has c e r ta in  im p lic a tio n s  
fo r  purposive a c tio n  on the  p a r t  o f  so c ia l e l i te s  and o rg a n isa tio n s  
such as tra d e  unions : they should endeavour to  eva lua te  
the  " s p e c if ic  and p o l i t i c a l l y  re le v a n t meaning" o f peop le 's  
grievances, demands and t h e i r  a s p ira tio n s  in  o rder to  ra is e  
t h e ir  fu n c t io n  above th a t  o f  " in s tru m e n ta l c o l le c t iv is m " .
The problem is  viewed as a much more complex one by Clements
191in  h is  study o f trad e  union consciousness. He argues
th a t  the l im i t s  o f  w orkers ' frames o f reference are s tru c tu re d
by the  process o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  and the dominant
ideo logy o f  c a p ita lis m , which the  s tru c tu re  o f c o l le c t iv e
192barga in ing  r e f le c ts .  A t the  "m ic ro - le v e l" ,  w orkers ' trade  
union consciousness may be equated w ith  fa c to ry  c lass  conscious­
ness. Trade union a c tio n  a t th is  le ve l cannot be in te rp re te d  
as sim ply economic, bu t a coherent ideology is  necessary 
i f  workers are to  overcome se c tio n a lism  and perceive the  
re la t io n  between economic and p o l i t ic a l  issues. In agreement 
w ith  so many o th e r c r i t i c s ,  Clements reg re ts  th a t ,  a t the  
"m a c ro - le v e l" , " tra d e  union o rg a n is a tio n  has been su b je c t 
to  in te g ra t iv e  pressures both s t r u c tu r a l ly  and id e o lo g ic a l ly " .
Thus he concludes th a t  th e  re la t io n s h ip  o f m icro- and macro­
le v e l trad e  union consciousness "has to  date been a complex
189
*  A u tho r's  brackets
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d ia le c t ic  o f  pressure and counterpressure" on which the a s p ira tio n s  
and trade  union consciousness o f the membership depends; 
a t any given tim e , under changing economic and p o l i t ic a l  
c o n d it io n s , a spectrum o f consciousness w i l l  be held by d i f fe r e n t  
groups w ith in  the  movement.
The com p le x itie s  o f worker a t t i tu d e  and m o tiva tio n  towards 
tra d e  unionism so described render i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  assess 
the  fu n c t io n  o f tra d e  unions w ith o u t o v e rs im p lif ic a t io n .
An attem pt has been made however in  th is  chap ter to  review 
the c r i t ic is m  o f tra d e  union fu n c tio n  a t d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls  
o f  a n a ly s is , out o f which some c e n tra l themes emerge.
Summary
In view o f the d is p a r ity  in  the p o l i t ic a l  c u ltu re s  o f B r ita in  
and Germany, i t  may be a n tic ip a te d  th a t the id e o lo g ie s  which 
s tru c tu re  and c o n d itio n  the  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  systems 
in  the  two coun trie s  should a lso  d i f f e r .
In i t s  h is to r ic a l co n te x t, the  German Trade Union movement 
has developed as one in te re s t  group among a r e la t iv e ly  la rge 
number o f  o th e rs . F in a n c ia lly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  disadvantaged, 
however, the  o rg a n isa tio n  o f Labour in  Germany never acceded 
to  a p o s it io n  o f power equal to  th a t o f organised C a p ita l.  
Conventional wisdom in  German p o l i t ic a l  though t found i t s  
p lace in  the  co n ce p tu a lis a tio n  o f the S ocia l Market Economy 
in  which the  s tren g th  accorded the  s ta te  was re f le c te d  in  
a l l  the economic and le g a l recommendations. Yet, under the 
auspices o f  O rdo -L ibe ra lism , the  complexion o f in te re s t  group 
a c t iv i t y  has changed w ith  the n u rtu r in g  o f mass o rgan isa tion s  
o f Labour and C a p ita l by the  quas i-co rpo ra tism  o f the  modern 
in d u s t r ia l s ta te . In encouraging the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f so c ie ty  
and i t s  re p re s e n ta tiv e s , the  t r a d it io n a l German concept 
o f  s ta te  and s o c ie ty  can be sa id to  have made some concession 
a t le a s t to  the Anglo-saxon no tio n  o f s o c ia l o rd e r, and i t  
is  th is  s o c io -p o l i t ic a l model to  which the post-w ar trad e  
union movement owes i t s  c re d e n tia ls  and id e n t i t y .
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In B r i t is h  p o l i t ic a l  ph ilo sophy , the  s ta te  remains subord inate 
to  the so c ie ty  which crea tes i t s  own o rde r by the  responsi­
b i l i t y  o f i t s  in d iv id u a ls  and s o c ia l groups. This ' I n d iv id u a l is t ic  
L ibe ra lism * se t the  parameters o f  trad e  union ideo logy and 
growth in  th is  co u n try . Once a c t iv e ,  the trade  union movement 
grew strong in  re la t io n  to  employer o rgan isa tion  and ben e fite d  
from accommodation to  the  p o l i t i c a l  system. By the  same 
token , the B r i t is h  tra d e  unions succumbed more re a d ily  than 
t h e ir  German coun te rpa rts  to  s ta te  in te g ra t io n , a process 
acce lera ted by the  precepts o f  Keynesianism and the  W elfare 
S ta te .
As the  syn thes is  o f  O rdo -L ibe ra lism , Neo-Socialism and C a tho lic ism , 
the  ideo logy o f the  S oc ia l Market Economy a ffo rded  the  e va lu a tio n  
o f the trad e  union ro le  in  s o c ie ty  on th ree  a lte rn a t iv e  counts, 
a l l  o f which de v ia te  from  the precedent set by the  t ra d it io n s  
o f B r i t is h  L ib e ra lis m . The divergence o f p o l i t ic a l  ideo logy 
between B r ita in  and Germany im p lie s  an in c o m p a ra b ility  o f 
the  p re s c r ip t iv e  fu n c tio n s  o f t h e i r  Labour o rg a n is a tio n s .
However they do appear to  have c e r ta in  a n a ly t ic a l q u a li t ie s  
in  common: in  both c o u n tr ie s , the  unions and t h e ir  c r i t i c s
fo rm u la te  t h e i r  assumptions o f union behaviour on the  basis 
o f an antagonism towards the  c a p i ta l is t  p r in c ip le ,  whether 
in  terms o f in d u s try  o r  the  s ta te .  In the German co n te x t, 
th is  has been in te rp re te d  in  re v o lu tio n a ry  M a rx is t term s; 
in  B r i ta in ,  o p p o s itio n  is  observed to  be t r a d i t io n a l ly  re fo rm is t .
In both the  German and the  B r i t is h  case, the unions c a rry  
out an a d d it io n a l and e q u a lly  im portan t fu n c tio n  o f p ro te c tin g  
t h e ir  members agains the  r ig o u rs  o f  C a p ita lism ; and in  both 
cases the  unions have been accused o f denying th e ir  fu n c tio n  
o f o pp os itio n  in  fa vo u r o f th is  second, more de fensive  ro le .
C onse rva tive -C a tho lic  and L ib e r a l is t  c r i t i c s ,  who have expressed 
the des ire  fo r  g re a te r s ta te  c o n tro l o f the  trade  unions 
as in te re s t  groups, concen tra te  t h e i r  d iscussion  a t the  one 
p o l i t ic a l  le v e l o f  a n a ly s is . In doing so they overlook the  
main centres o f trad e  union a c tio n  before the macro-economic 
le v e l .
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More l ik e ly  the re  is  a spectrum o f union behaviour between 
the  l im its  o f conservatism  and m ilita n c y  to  be perceived 
a t d i f fe re n t  le v e ls  w ith in  and among the various union o rg a n i­
sa tio n s ; and since opera tions a t the in d iv id u a l union le v e l 
are c h ie f ly  concerned w ith  c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing and code te r­
m ina tion , such in d ic a tio n s  o f union a t t i tu d e  are to  be found 
in  the degree o f coopera tion  o r c o n fro n ta tio n  demonstrated 
in  any barga in ing  process. This emphasis on barga in ing  im p lies  
th a t the  fu n c tio n  o f a trad e  union may best be observed in  
i t s  behaviour in  the  p o te n t ia l c o n f l ic t  s itu a t io n .  The c o n f l ic t  
need not be o f c la s s , but can a r is e  a t any le v e l where th e re  
is  a c lash o f in te re s ts  in v o lv in g  the members o f a trad e  
union o rg a n isa tio n  o r i t s  o f f ic e r s .  I f  i t  is  assumed th a t  
c o n f l ic t  is  endemic to  the l ib e r a l - p lu r a l i s t  s o c ia l model, 
in  vary ing degrees as between the managers and the managed, 
the soc ie ty  and the  s ta te ,th e  execu tive  and non-executive , 
there is  scope f o r  the ro le  o f the  trad e  union. The W elfare 
State may w e ll have rendered unnecessary some o f the  form er 
fu c tio n s  o f the unions, y e t t h e i r  ro le  as p ro ta g o n is ts  o f 
in d u s tr ia l c o n f l ic t ,  a lso arguably o f so c ia l c o n f l ic t  remains 
undim inished. In th is  in te rp re ta t io n ,  the source o f c o n f l ic t  
is  taken to  be the unequal d is t r ib u t io n  o f a u th o r ity  and 
decision-m aking power in  the  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and workplace 
s itu a t io n .  On these term s, the  fu n c tio n  o f the  trad e  union 
is  assured in  any system, c a p i ta l is t ,  te ch n o c ra tic  o r  neo­
s o c ia l is t .  The ideology on which i t  is  founded is ,  as Flanders 
proposes, trade  unionism fo r  i t s  own sake, less concerned 
w ith  the re d is t r ib u t io n  o f incomes o r p ro f it -s h a r in g  as such, 
bu t more p a r t ic u la r ly  concerned w ith  the p r in c ip le s  o f s o c ia l,  
p o l i t ic a l  and in d u s tr ia l power.
The coo rd ina tion  o r  in c o rp o ra tio n  o f the o b je c tiv e s  o f in d iv id u a l 
union o rgan isa tion s  fo r  macro-economic o r o th e r p o l i t ic a l  
purposes is  l i k e ly  to  be reg ress ive  w ith in  th is  model, s ince 
i t  would e f fe c t iv e ly  narrow the  terms o f re fe rence o f each 
by denying the s p e c if ic  areas o f c o n f l ic t  w ith in  p a r t ic u la r  
in d u s tr ie s  o r workplaces. Moreover, i t  may be argued th a t  
to  attempt to  remove c o n f l ic t  by r e s t r ic t in g  i t s  expression 
a t one le ve l o f trad e  union a c t iv i t y  w i l l  on ly  augment c o n f l ic t
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a t o the r le v e ls . The determ inan ts o f any such sequence o f events 
would be the a t t i tu d e s ,  expe c ta tio ns  and trad e  union consciousness 
o f the  worker groups d i r e c t ly  o r  in d ir e c t ly  a ffe c te d , and the methods 
a v a ila b le  to  them fo r  expressing o r  e xe rc is in g  t h e ir  c o l le c t iv e  w i l l .
Factiona lism  and e f fe c t iv e  o p p o s itio n  a t a l l  le ve ls  o f trade
union a c t iv i t y  have been presented as the  safeguards o f s o c ia l
and in d u s tr ia l democracy, w h ils t  C o lle c t iv e  B arga in ing, p a r t ic u la r ly
a t the workplace appears as the  most e f fe c t iv e  method o f
trad e  unionism in  responding to  the  immediate demands o f
the  membership w ith in  a re a d ily  recogn isab le  s itu a t io n  o f
c o n f l ic t .
I t  would be m is lead ing th e re fo re  to  equate reformism w ith  
acquiescence. The " in te g ra t iv e  pragmatism" which cha rac te rises  
modern trade unionism in  both Germany and B r ita in  requ ires  
c lo s e r ana lys is  before i t  may be den ig ra ted  as a p o l i t ic a l  
f a i lu r e .  The f u l l  im p lic a tio n s  o f in te g ra tio n  are d i f f i c u l t  
to  assess in  advance o f h is to r y ;  th e re fo re , c a lls  from some 
p o l i t ic a l  c r i t i c s  fo r  more co de te rm ina tion , o r even the  p o l i t ic a l  
s t r ik e ,  appear as an inadequate response to  the pau c ity  o f 
trad e  union p o l i t ic a l  ph ilosophy du rin g  the  decade in  que s tion .
Even w ith in  a framework o f in te g ra t io n ,  the unions are able 
to  m ainta in a p o s it io n  o f in flu e n c e  as a c o u n te rv a ilin g  power
by m o tiva ting  th e ir  members to  a c t ,  to  express t h e ir  grievances
and demonstrate t h e ir  d is s a t is fa c t io n .  However, m ilita n c y  
remains o f the essence in  perfo rm ing  a ra d ic a l p o l i t ic a l  
fu n c tio n  which is  w ith in  the  w o rke rs ' pe rspec tive , and f a i lu r e  
by the trade  union o rg a n isa tio n s  to  harness th is  m ilita n c y  
may deprive the movement o f  i t s  unique democratic fu n c tio n  
in  s o c ia l,  p o l i t ic a l  and in d u s t r ia l  a f fa i r s .
In the next chap te r, the  re s u lts  o f  an in v e s tig a tio n  o f trade
union p ra c tic e  in  Germany serve to  i l lu s t r a t e  the themes 
expounded above, and lead to  some conclusions on trad e  union 
a c t iv i t y  drawn in  the  f in a l  ch a p te r.
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Some Observations o f Trade Union P ra c tic e s : A Case Study 
o f the German 'M odel1_____________________________________
CHAPTER 6
During October and November 1979, a number o f reg iona l and
-k
d i s t r i c t  o f f i c ia ls  o f the  unions IG Bergbau und Energie 
(IGBE), Gewerkschaft T e x til-B e k le id u n g  (GTB) and Gew. O ffe n tlic h en
Dienste , T ransport aud Verkehr (OTV) were in te rv ie w ed . The 
questions were aimed a t o b ta in in g  in fo rm a tio n  about the 
a c t iv i t ie s  o f the  o f f ic e r s  a t the  d i f fe r e n t  le v e ls  o f 
o rg a n isa tio n  and the na ture  o f the  support they re lie d  
upon to  ca rry  out t h e i r  fu n c t io n .  The in fo rm a tion  provided 
by the  survey was e s s e n t ia lly  d e s c r ip t iv e ,  based on the 
responses to  a mixed schedule o f closed and open ques tions .
An attem pt was made in  p a r t  to  "measure" reg iona l v a r ia t io n  in  
the  a c t iv i t ie s  by p resen ting  in  g raph ic  form those responses 
which could be re a d ily  ta b u la te d  (see page be low ). This 
in fo rm a tion  is  included in  the  Appendix to  the  Study, 
along w ith  the  question schedule used.
The re p o rt o f these obse rva tions d e lib e ra te ly  avoids 
any d ire c t  in v e s tig a t io n  o f union d e n s ity , o r indeed the 
fa c to r  o f  trad e  union s tru c tu re  which Turner re fe rre d  to  
as "m orphology", s ince such in fo rm a tio n  was not thought 
to  be e s s e n tia l to  the  o b je c t o f  i l lu s t r a t io n  which th is  
chapter seeks to  ach ieve, i . e .  to  demonstrate the in te ra c t io n  
in  p ra c tic e  o f trad e  union government w ith  a c t iv i t y ,  m otivated 
by various "power" fa c to rs .  The nature  o f th is  re la t io n s h ip , 
to  be explored in  the  f in a l  chapter, is  not intended to  
be seen as a conclusion  o f these recorded obse rva tions, 
but is  not thought to  c o n tra d ic t  them.
*  P ro fess iona l Fu ll-T im e  O ff ic e rs  (FTO)
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1 Trade Union S truc tu re  
I C o n s titu t io n a l S truc tu re
In  accordance w ith  the C o n s titu tio n s  o f the  th ree  unions, they 
may a l l  be described as having a sim ple rep resen ta tive  s tru c tu re  
p ro v id in g  an a d m in is tra tiv e  h ie ra rch y  on fo u r  o r f iv e  le v e ls ,  
as fo llo w s  :
1. N a tiona l
2. Regional
3. D is t r ic t
4. Local (IGBE)
5. P lan t
C loser observa tion  revea ls wide v a r ia t io n s  in  o rg a n isa tio n a l 
behaviour according to  com position o f personnel, s ize  and 
geographica l d is t r ib u t io n  o f the  a d m in is tra tiv e  centres 
which make up the  h ie ra rc h y . One hypothesis o f th is  study 
is  th a t  such s t ru c tu ra l v a r ia t io n s  may to  a degree be re la te d  
to  the  fu n c tio n s  which the  unions are able to  ca rry  out 
a t the various a d m in is tra tiv e  le v e ls .
In p ra c t ic e , the a d m in is tra tiv e  s tru c tu re  o f the unions 
tends to  accord w ith  the in d u s tr ia l-o rg a n is a t io n a l s tru c tu re  
o f i t s  membership. Below the  le v e l o f  execu tive , GTB has 
e ig h t reg iona l o f f ic e s ,  each supported by a network o f 
V e rw a ltungss te llen  ( d is t r i c t  o f f ic e s ) .  The number o f 
V e rw a ltungss te llen  was reviewed in  the  1970s and reduced in  l in e  
w ith  the rap id  ra t io n a lis a t io n  o f the  in d u s try , thus concen­
t r a t in g  the a d m in is tra tiv e  manpower in  the  areas where i t  
was assumed to  be more e f fe c t iv e .
i
U n like  GTB, the  OTV regions are organised s t r i c t l y  in  accordance 
w ith  the German s ta te s  o r Lander. The s tru c tu re  o f the  
p u b lic  sec to r on d i s t r i c t ,  Land and fe d e ra l le ve ls  provides 
the  g u id e lin e s  fo r  union a d m in is tra tio n .
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IGBE on the  o the r hand has to  deal w ith  an in d u s t r ia l con­
c e n tra tio n  which does not e a s ily  lend i t s e l f  to  the  fo u r -  
t i e r  a d m in is tra tiv e  system. In  d is t in c t  c o n tra s t to  theii
re c ru itm e n t f ie ld  o f OTV, and to  a le sse r degree o f GTB, 
the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f m ining and qua rry in g  in  the Federal Republic 
is  uneven. In a d d itio n  to  th is  conce n tra tio n  o f the  in d u s try  
in  the  n o rth , IGBE was faced w ith  heavy and rap id  ra t io n a lis a t io n  
in  c e r ta in  se c to rs , no tab ly  hard c o a l, during the  1960s which 
re s u lte d  in  a d ra s t ic  re o rg a n is a tio n  o f i t s  a d m in is tra tio n .
For th e  purposes o f the  study th e re fo re , the reg io na l s tru c tu re  
o f IGBE was surveyed on a d i f f e r e n t  basis to  the  o th e r two 
un ions: the  regions se lected  f o r  observa tion  were grouped 
under the ca tegories  o f RUHR, STRONG NON-RUHR and WEAK NON- 
RUHR; the STRONG NON-RUHR area then had to  be subdivided 
in to  one reg ion w ith o u t d i s t r ic t s  (Rheinland) and one w ith  
d is t r ic t s  (N iedersachsen).
Such des igna tion  by the  researcher is  in  re la t io n  to  the 
s tre n g th  o f  the in d u s try  in  terms o f  r e la t iv e  commercial 
value and p roduction  expectancy, ra th e r  than trad e  union 
o rg a n is a tio n .
IGBE devia tes fu r th e r  in  i t s  s tru c tu re  from a l l  o the r unions 
by the  a d m in is tra tio n  o f lo c a l branches by lay o f f i c ia l s .
These lo c a l branches (O rtsgruppen) have t h e ir  own finances 
and e f fe c t iv e ly  supplement the  work o f the  d i s t r i c t  o r 
reg io na l o f f ic e  and the work o f  the  la y  o f f ic e r s  a t the 
w orkplace.
Union a d m in is tra tio n  a t the  p lace o f work is  c a rr ie d  outH
u n o f f ic ia l ly  by the  Works C o u n c illo rs  (B e tr ie b s ra te ) ; 
o f f i c i a l l y  by the  Union Stewards (V e rtra u e n s le u te ). The 
degree to  which the  union is  ab le to  make use o f the  works 
c o u n c il lo rs  as th e i r  re p re se n ta tive s  ra th e r  than t h e ir  own 
stewards va rie s  from union to  union and is  on ly  d e a lt  w ith  
in  p a r t by th is  s tudy.
Thus i t  is  proposed th a t  union fu n c tio n  is  examined 
a t the various le v e ls  o f a d m in is tra tio n  and in  the l ig h t  
o f  the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th a t  a d m in is tra tio n . The 
observa tion  o f union fu n c t io n  th e re fo re  pursues 
the  fo llo w in g  s t ru c tu ra l p a tte rn s :
GTB/OTV
(P la n t)
B ez irk /  Landesbezirk _ - -  -^F unctions(Region)
( D is t r ic t )  V e rw a ltu n g ss te lle  /  K reis - ......................... Functions
Functions
IGBE
Strong Non-Ruhr Weak Non-Ruhr
(Region) Ruhr Rheinland Niedersachsen Germany _ S o u th — >
( D is t r ic t ) G e s c h a ftss te lle  Geschaf s s t e l l e  )
( L o c a l ) ------------------------------- O rts g ru p p e -------------------------------------------------- _>
(P la n t) ->
I I  Functional S tru c tu re
From the in fo rm a tion  gathered in  the  survey, the re  are two areas
o f union fu n c tio n  fo r  which a d m in is tra tiv e  s tru c tu re s  have been
created over and above the  bas ic  f o u r - t ie r  h ie ra rch y . These
are the functions o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  and in d iv id u a l,
o fte n  lega l re p re s e n ta tio n . Both requ ire  o f f ic e r  e x p e rtis e
o r s p e c if ic a l ly  appointed com m ittees .fo r the everyday
handling o f d isputes and are th e re fo re  regarded as an
in te g ra l p a rt o f union s tru c tu re  and fu n c tio n . The p a tte rn
o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  and the  handling o f d isputes
a r is in g  out o f agreements is  found to  vary from union
to  union in  accordance w ith  the  in d u s try  and membership s tru c tu re s ,
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In IGBE the  d is t r ib u t io n  o f ba rga in ing  r ig h ts  va rie s  among the  
reg ion types . The re g io na l o f f ic e r s  in  the  Ruhr have no 
n e g o tia tin g  r ig h ts  a t a l l ,  s ince n e g o tia tio n s  in  the hard 
coal in d u s try  are conducted by the c e n tra l execu tive  in  Bochum 
w ith  the Coal Board. T he ir fu n c tio n  th e re fo re  centres upon 
supporting  the work o f the la y  o f f i c ia l s  in  the  lo c a l branch 
and the  workplace. In the  p la n t the  works c o u n c il lo rs ,  ove r­
whelm ingly IGBE members, have the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  in  some 
instances fo r  n e g o tia t in g  the  t r a d i t io n a l  m ining in c e n tiv e  bonus 
schemes (Gedinge) and c e r ta in ly  n e g o tia te  any a d d it io n a l p iece-work 
ra te s , tim e ra tes  o r spec ia l bonuses as a v a ila b le . Under 
the  German Coal and S teel le g is la t io n  on in d u s tr ia l democracy 
(Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz), the  works c o u n c il lo rs ,  and 
in  p ra c tic e  p a r t ic u la r ly  the  chairman o f the  c o u n c il,  have 
s u b s ta n tia l r ig h ts  in  the decis ion-m aking in  the p la n t and 
they are able to  use these r ig h ts  to  s trengthen the u n ion 's  
p o s it io n  in  the  in d u s try .
In a l l  the  Non-Ruhr areas, the  p a tte rn  o f c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing  
is  d i f fe r e n t .  In these areas the  re g io n a l,  and in  the  Weak 
Non-Ruhr areas, the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  have barga in ing r ig h ts .
Where the re  is  l i t t l e  hard c o a l, and lower p ro d u c t iv ity  (Gedinge) 
the  aim o f the union o f f ic e r s  is  to  remove what there  remains 
o f p la n t barga in ing  and t i e  up a l l  n e g o tia tio n s  in  con trac tu a l 
agreements between union and employer. U n like  the Ruhr, the 
le sse r m ining areas do not en joy the  Hontanmitbestimnungsgesetz. 
Thus, w ith  very l i t t l e  p la n t b a rg a in in g , the  ro le  o f the 
works c o u n c il lo r  is  much reduced w h ile  th a t  o f the  d i s t r i c t  
o r reg io na l o f f ic e r  is  enhanced, s ince he is  then d i r e c t ly  
respons ib le  f o r  most n e g o tia tio n s  w ith  the  employers. One 
m ight expect th e re fo re  to  f in d  some d iscrepancy in  the fu n c tio n s  
o f the o f f ic e r s  in  these areas from those in  the Ruhr. Yet 
a l l  o f f ic e r s  in te rv iew ed reported  th a t  the  m a jo r ity  o f t h e ir  
tim e was given to  p la n t d ispu tes over the in te rp re ta t io n  o f 
c o n tra c tu a l agreements, ir re s p e c t iv e  o f  whether they had 
been responsib le  f o r  barga in ing  o r n o t. Moreover,, the ranking
The Bargaining Role of the Unions GTB, IGBE and OTV.
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o f p r io r i t ie s  by the  respondents were found to  be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  
c o rre la te d  th roughout the  un ion . (See Appendix).
C o lle c tiv e  B arga in ing in  the p u b lic  secto r is  g e n e ra lly  c a rr ie d  
out a t fe d e ra l le v e l o r  re g io n a l le v e l,  according to  the 
a u th o r i t ie s ' s t ru c tu re .  The reg iona l o f f ic e  o f OTV has 
the d is c re t io n  to  hand down to  the d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s  (K re ise ) 
the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  ba rga in ing  in  c e rta in  in d iv id u a l areas 
o f the p u b lic  and /o r p r iv a te  se c to r. Thus w h ile  th e  e x ten t 
o f c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  a t reg io na l leve l may be f a i r l y  
evenly d is t r ib u te d ,  th e  ba rga in ing  r ig h ts  o f the d is t r i c t s  
can vary enormously. Th is can be v e r if ie d  by s t a t i s t i c a l  
in fo rm a tion  a v a ila b le  from the  c e n tra l a d m in is tra tio n  in  
S tu t tg a r t .
i
There are some cases o f  p la n t barga in ing w ith in  OTV in  the 
form o f in c e n tiv e  bonus schemes w ith in  the p r iv a te  sec to r 
fo r  which the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r  is  responsib le  f o r  oversee ing ,H
but th is  was n e g lig ib le  a t the  tim e o f the survey. OTV is  
ge n e ra lly  more lim ite d  in  i t s  barga in ing r ig h ts  than the 
o the r two unions s ince  a s u b s ta n tia l section  o f i t s  member­
sh ip  are c i v i l  se rvan ts  whose sa la ry  and c o n d itio n s  o f  work 
are not n e g o tia b le . However, as w ith  the o the r un ions, problemsi
which are p e c u lia r  to  OTV members do appear to  extend the 
fu n c tio n s  o f t h e i r  o f f ic e r s :  one such problem fre q u e n t ly  
ra ised  by the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  was th a t o f d ispu tes  a t the 
workplace over jo b  e v a lu a tio n . This type o f d isp u te  is  more 
p reva len t in  the  p u b lic  se rv ices  because o f the e x te n t o f 
w h ite -c o lla r  employment in  th a t  s e c to r. The in c re a s in g  ra t io n a ­
l is a t io n  o f w h ite -c o l la r  employment has led to  a w ide r awareness 
on the p a rt o f  the  union n e g o tia to rs  a t fe de ra l and Land 
le ve ls  o f jo b  s e c u r ity  and the  improvement in  c o n d itio n s  
o f employment in  p lace  o f the  more narrow wages p o lic y  o f 
the  1960s. One( respondent d id  comment however on the  s tra te g ic  
l im ita t io n s  o f OTV c o l le c t iv e  barga in ing p o lic y  which aims 
to  harmonise c o n d it io n s  o f employment between b lu e - and w h ite -  
c o l la r  employees w h ile  a t the  same tim e seeking to  remove 
c i v i l  servant s ta tu s  and p r iv i le g e .  Such fundamental d iv is io n s  
in  the membership serve no t on ly  to  weaken s o l id a r i t y  w ith in
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the o rg a n isa tio n  but m u lt ip ly  the workload fo r  the  FTOs.
The pressure f e l t  by the FTOs p a r t ic u la r ly  a t d i s t r i c t  le ve l 
is  augmented by the  complex le g a l framework which governs 
OTV a c t iv i t y  in  the  p u b lic  and p r iv a te  in d u s tr ie s  and which 
again de rives from the  d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f the membership by 
le g a l s ta tu s . Added to  t h is ,  many respondents in d ica ted  
a development in  the  p u b lic  s e c to r towards the " p r iv a t is a t io n "  
o f some se rv ices  and were concerned, in  vary ing  degrees, 
about the  e ffe c ts  o f th is  tre n d  and the  impact o f  new technology 
on the  jo b  s e c u r ity  and c o n d itio n s  o f employment o f t h e ir  
members.
The d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s  o f GTB have no barga in ing  r ig h ts  w ith  
any organised employers but do e n te r in to  separate con trac ts  
w ith  in d iv id u a l f irm s  (H a u s ta r ife ) . P lan t barga in ing is  
however unavoidable in  both branches o f  te x t i le s  and c lo th in g .
The various systems o f work s tudy , in troduced by the  employers, 
are long-s tand ing  and accepted by the  union. Although such 
s tud ie s  tend to  l im i t  the c o n tro l o f  the  union over workplace 
c o n d it io n s , the  FTOs are prepared to  work w ith  them and see 
t h e i r  own ro le  as one o f oversee ing , o f  supporting and t ra in in g  
the  lay o f f i c ia ls  d i r e c t ly  invo lved  in  n e g o tia tio n , i . e .  
the  works c o u n c il lo rs .  The employees, the  union members, 
are t o t a l ly  dependent upon the  experience and s k i l l s  o f the 
works c o u n c il lo rs ;  thus the union is  ob liged  to  e x p lo it  i t s  
r ig h ts  o f access to  the  works c o u n c il lo rs ,  as provided under 
the 1972 Works C o n s titu tio n  A ct (B e triebsve rfassungsgese tz ), 
to  in flu e n ce  and encourage them. GTB o f f i c ia ls ,  l ik e  IGBE 
o f f i c ia l s ,  do however aim to  reduce the  ex ten t o f p la n t 
barga in ing  in  favour o f a w ider a p p lic a tio n  o f c o l le c t iv e  
agreements.
A t reg io na l le v e l,  GTB o f f ic e r s  are not on ly responsib le  
f o r  n e g o tia tin g  agreements in  t e x t i le s  bu t provide the advisoryi
e x p e rtis e  to  the d is t r i c t s .  As in  the  case o f the OTV reg ions,
GTB o f f ic e r s  a lso  commented on th e  increased workload produced
by the  a p p lic a tio n  a t the  workplace o f more numerous and
more complex c o l le c t iv e  ba rga in ing  agreements. As more barga in ing
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is  taken o u ts id e  the  p la n t ,  the  s tron ge r th is  trend  w i l l  
become and the  g re a te r w i l l  be the  s h i f t  in  trade  union fu n c tio n  
a t a l l  le v e ls  o f  o rg a n is a tio n .
The Barga in ing Role o f the  Unions - Summary
From the  in fo rm a tio n  provided by the FTOs in te rv iew ed in  
the  survey, the  ba rga in ing  s tru c tu re s  described in  the  s ta tu te s  
o f the th re e  unions would appear to  be weighted in  fa vo u r 
o f p a r t ic u la r  in d iv id u a l o r  groups o f n e g o tia to rs . Such 
v a r ia t io n s  in  the  ba rga in ing  p a tte rn s  are caused in  p a r t 
by the  inadequacies o f the  a d m in is tra tiv e  s tru c tu re  bu t r e s u lt  
much more d i r e c t ly  from changes in  in d u s tr ia l s tru c tu re s  
and developments in  labour le g is la t io n .
This is  most c le a r ly  i l lu s t r a te d  by the reg iona l v a r ia t io n s  
in  IGBE. The in d u s t r ia l r e la t io n s  le g is la t io n  in  coal and 
s te e l g ran ts  much g re a te r power to  the employee re p re se n ta tive s  
in  the  p la n t and to  those s i t t in g  on the management and 
supe rv iso ry  boards. T h is , combined w ith  c e n tra lis e d  ba rga in ing  
as in  the Ruhr, presents the  re g io n a l o f f ic e rs  o f IGBE w ith  
a frame o f re fe rence  which is  fundam enta lly d i f fe r e n t  to  
th a t  o f  union o f f ic e r s  e lsewhere, even w ith in  IGBE i t s e l f .
They, in  c o n tra s t,  w h ile  able to  nego tia te  d i r e c t ly ,  have 
recourse on ly  to  the  Works C o n s titu tio n  A ct. There is  no 
in d ic a t io n  th a t  the  one group o f o f f ic e rs  o r the o th e r has
a g re a te r day to  day workload as a re s u lt  o f these v a r ia t io n s ;
however, i t  may be assumed th a t  t h e ir  tasks o r fu n c tio n s  
are d i f fe r e n t ,  g iven  such c le a r  dev ia tion s  in  the parameters 
o f these fu n c t io n s .  (A fu r th e r  in v e s tig a tio n  o f the  expend itu re  
p a tte rn s  o f the  va rious  union o f f ic e s  and o f union a c t iv i t ie s
in  the  p la n t m ight w e ll o f fe r  up the d e ta i l necessary to
complete the  p ic tu re ,  b u t such in v e s tig a tio n  is  not inc luded 
in  th is  s tu d y ).
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A p a ra l le l s itu a t io n  has developed in  the  a d m in is tra tiv ei
s tru c tu re  o f OTV. W h ils t barga in ing  is  c a rr ie d  ou t a t  reg iona l 
and fe d e ra l le v e ls ,  the ongoing problem o f the  p ra c t ic a l 
a p p lic a tio n  o f the  barga in ing  agreements is  d e a lt  w ith  to  a 
la rge  ex ten t by those no t d i r e c t ly  respons ib le  f o r  the  n e g o tia tio n s , 
i . e .  the d is t r i c t s .  The d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r  represents a b u ffe r  
between the p la n t re p re s e n ta tiv e s , and in  some cases the  membership 
d i r e c t ly ,  and the  n e g o tia to rs  h igher up the  a d m in is tra tiv e  h ie ra rch y . 
Since the sheer volume o f  work handled by the  d i s t r i c t  in  d a y -to - 
day d isputes a t the  workplace is  in c re a s in g , the  reg io na l o f f ic e  
is  a l l  the more fre q u e n tly  having to  take on i t s  ta s k s , which may 
be seen as a s h i f t  in  fu n c t io n  from the d i s t r i c t  to  the  reg ion .
Much o f th is  increased workload re s u lts  from the com plexity  
o f labour re la t io n s  in  a sec to r which is  predom inantly w h ite - 
c o l la r  and which inc ludes the  c i v i l  s e rv ic e . The v a r ia t io n s  
in  lega l s ta tu s  which d iv id e s  the membership, and the  added 
com p lica tion  o f the  law on s ta f f  re p resen ta tion  as the  basis 
f o r  workplace re la t io n s  in  the p u b lic  se rv ice s , overload 
the  fu n c tio n  o f the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e  in  th is  union in  comparison 
to  o the r unions a t th is  le v e l o f o rg a n is a tio n .
Workplace n e g o tia tio n s  predominate in  the  a c t iv i t y  o f  the d i s t r i c t  
o f f ic e s  o f GTB. Because o f ex tens ive  p iece work and work study 
in  the  in d u s tr ie s , the  ac tua l pay ra tes  depend very much on p la n t 
ba rga in ing . U n like  much o f the  m ining in d u s try  o u ts id e  the Ruhr,
GTB has not y e t succeeded in  reducing the  number o f non-union 
agreements. In th is  c o n te x t, the fu n c tio n  o f the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e  
is  to  work w ith  the  works c o u n c il lo rs  under the  co n d itio n s  o f the 
Works C o n s titu tio n  A c t. As work study makes labour re la t io n s  in  
the  p la n t in c re a s in g ly  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the works c o u n c il lo r ,  
the  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e  is  c a lle d  upon more and more to  advise and 
support t h e ir  a c t iv i t y .  This dependence upon the  union is  
in te n s if ie d  by the  growing number o f c o l le c t iv e  agreements 
negotia ted  a t reg io na l and fe d e ra l le v e ls .  The ro le  o f the 
reg io na l o f f ic e  in  GTB is  a lso more o f a suppo rtive  one than 
is  apparent in  the o th e r two unions since so much wage 
barga in ing  is  concentrated a t the workplace.
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The a d m in is tra tiv e  s tru c tu re  o f a trad e  union demonstrates 
the ins trum en ta l framework which the union has a t i t s  d isposa l 
to  f u l f i l l  i t s  fu n c t io n  on beha lf o f i t s  members. However, 
union s tru c tu re  de fined  in  th is  way o ffe rs  an inadequate 
model fo r  te s t in g  fu n c t io n . In app ly ing  th is  in s trum en ta l 
framework to  the  f ie ld  o f a c tiv e  in d u s tr ia l re la t io n s  c e r ta in  
power re la t io n s ,b y  way o f a u th o r ity ,  in fluence  o r p re s t ig e , 
emerge,which c o lo u r the  s tru c tu re  o f the union in  the  l ig h t  
o f i t s  fu n c t io n . These power re la t io n s  were assessed by 
in v e s tig a t in g  the  parameters o f tra d e  union fu n c t io n , o th e r 
than s tru c tu re ,  based on in fo rm a tion  obtained from  the FTOs 
about t h e ir  a c t iv i t i e s .
I Power in  Rules
2
The " ru le s "  o f in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  are assumed to  in c lude  
a l l  agreed o r acknowledged procedures which govern the p a tte rn  
o f employer-employee re la t io n s  and which re s tra in  the a c t iv i t y
o f e ith e r  p a r ty . In the  German c o n te x t, the procedures which
co n d itio n  trad e  union a c t iv i t y  are dominated by the  system 
o f labour law and the apparatus a v a ila b le  fo r  c o n c i l ia t io n  
and a r b it r a t io n .
FTOs a t each le v e l were questioned about t h e ir  a t t i tu d e s  
towards the  system o f re g u la tio n s  and the use they made o f 
the apparatus a v a ila b le  to  them. From th e ir  responses, an 
assessment could be made o f the  various power re la t io n s h ip s  
a ffo rded  by the  re g u la tio n s  and how trad e  union fu n c tio n  
is  a ffe c te d  by t h is .
In view o f the  advantages a iready won in  the coal and s te e l
in d u s tr ie s  and th e  ra is in g  o f union s ta tus  which re su lte d  
from i t ,  the  o v e ra ll union a t t i tu d e  towards labour le g is la t io n  
is  not a nega tive  one. As m ight be expected, t h is  view was 
most s tro n g ly  expressed by the  o f f ic e r s  o f IGBE where the  
gains from code te rm ina tion  are experienced a t f i r s t  hand.
Other trad e  unions and sectors  o f in d u s try  in  the survey
2 The Property of Power
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in c lu d in g  sections o f IGBE appear to  f a l l  a long way sho rt 
o f achieving th is  le v e l o f le ga l s e c u r ity ,  and th e ir  eva lua tio n  
o f  the ro le  which the  law has to  p lay in  the  f ie ld  o f in d u s tr ia l 
re la t io n s  must be viewed in  a con tex t o f  d is s a t is fa c t io n  
and f ru s t r a t io n ,  observed, as i t  is ,  in  the  la te  1970s aga inst 
a backcloth o f ra p id  economic and te ch n o lo g ica l change and 
consequent u n c e rta in ty .
W ith in  the strong regions o f IGBE, the  view was expressed 
th a t  the laws s im p lify  and s trengthen the r ig h ts  o f union 
o f f ic e r s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  la y  o f f ic e r s .  The Ruhr o f f ic e r s  acknow­
ledged weaknesses in  the  Works C o n s titu tio n  Act but since 
these weaknesses d id  not a f fe c t  t h e ir  sec tion  o f in d u s try , 
they thought i t  not th e ir  concern, but ra th e r a problem fo r  
the  DGB as a whole. This co n tra s ts  w ith  the  views o f the 
weak mining regions where the  Works C o n s titu tio n  Act is  e f fe c t iv e  
and where i t s  f a i l in g s  are f e l t ,  e s p e c ia lly  w ith  respect 
to  the small p la n t .  On a com parative ba s is , the weak m ining 
areas face problems more in  l in e  w ith  those fa c in g  GTB than 
o th e r regions o f IGBE. One m ight suppose th e re fo re  th a t  
t h e i r  com plaints are b e t te r  represented a t h igher le v e ls  
by sm a lle r unions such as GTB than by th e i r  own h ie ra rc h y .
W hile both the  weak m ining areas and GTB agreed th a t  because 
o f weak membership and weaker re p re se n ta tio n  o f union in te re s ts  
in  the p la n t, the  r ig h ts  a lready granted to  the workers by 
present le g is la t io n  were s t i l l  no t s u f f ic ie n t ly  e x p lo ite d , 
the  GTB o f f ic e rs  were more c r i t i c a l  o f the  law and more aware 
o f the  advances in  union r ig h ts  s t i l l  to  be fough t f o r .
A t both reg iona l and d i s t r i c t  le v e ls ,  GTB o f f ic e rs  demanded 
a change in  the 'f re e  r id e r '  P rov is ion  in  the  law on c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing  which a t present g ran ts  im plem entation f o r  a l l  
agreements nego tia ted  by unions on beh a lf o f  t h e ir  members 
to  a l l  workers in  the in d u s try , whether organised o r no t.
T h i s ’f ree  r i d e r ' c l a u s e m u s t ,  in t h e i r  view, be el iminated in
order to  increase the  s e c u r ity  o f the  organised workforce 
and thus th e ir  s o l id a r i t y .  W ithout spec ia l r ig h ts  o f co­
de te rm ina tio n , and under the  c o n d itio n s  o f the Works C o n s titu tio n  
Act the union has no means o f f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  ro le  o f rep resen ta tion
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and i t s  s ig n if ic a n c e  f o r  the  organised worker is  much under­
mined by the  'f re e  r id e r '  c la use .
A l l  non-Ruhr m ining reg ions jo in e d  w ith  the GTB regions 
and d is t r ic t s  in  demanding a re v is io n  o f the laws on workingH
hours (A rb e itsze ito rd n u n g ) and redundancy (Kundigungsschutzgesetz)
which are o f prim ary concern to  unions involved in  r a t io n a lis a t io n .  
This was p a r t ic u la r ly  commented upon by some o f f ic e r s  o f IGBE 
and GTB in  areas where, under th e  redundancy law, no adequate 
schemes could be n e g o tia te d .
A l l  th ree  unions, again w ith  the  no tab le  exception o f IGBE Ruhr, 
complained th a t  the  sheer volume o f  labour le g is la t io n  and 
case law made i t  in c re a s in g ly  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the n o n -p ro fe s s io n a lly  
tra in e d  d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  to  c a rry  ou t the law yer's  ro le .
This is  not n e c e s s a rily  always a disadvantage to  the  union 
in  p ra c t ic e , s ince in  many o f the  weaker in d u s tr ia l areas 
where the employers are themselves poo rly  organised, the  
works c o u n c il lo rs  and FTOs may s t i l l  regard themselves as in  
a su p e rio r p o s it io n  to  the  employers in  t h e ir  knowledge o f the 
law. By dem onstrating t h e i r  s u p e r io r ity ,  the union o f f i c ia l s  
prevent a g rea t many cases from reaching the labour c o u r ts .
Likew ise a t the  re g io n a l le v e l,  pressure can be app lied  by 
the  union upon the  em ployer's  a s s o c ia tio n , which, having assessed 
the lega l s itu a t io n ,  w i l l  o fte n  advise i t s  member to  e i th e r  
proceed o r w ithdraw .
Thus, a mere survey o f the  outcome o f proceedings in  the  labour 
cou rts  is  an inadequate measure o f power re la t io n s  es tab lishe d  
by ru le s . I t  would measure, in  fa c t ,  on ly  the balance o f  power 
d i r e c t ly  meted out by the  co u rts  and takes no account o f  the  
adjustments to  th a t  balance e ffe c te d  by in d iv id u a l and o rg a n i­
s a tio n a l s k i l l .  IGBE o f f i c ia l s  c ite d  on ly  ra re  cases o f  recourse 
to  the labour c o u rts , w h ile  the  FTOs o f  the  o the r two unions 
use th is  f a c i l i t y  seem ingly much more o fte n .
i
OTV o f f i c ia ls  expressed s im ila r  disenchantment w ith  the
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a d m in is tra tio n  o f labour le g is la t io n  as those o f the  o the r
11
unions, although the  p o s it io n  o f OTV v is  a v is  employment 
in  the  p u b lic  sec to r would appear a l l  the more complex, and 
th e re fo re  weaker, than in  the  case o f IGBE o r  GTB. Changes 
which the d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  would l ik e  to  see in  labour law 
in  the p u b lic  sec to r are those which would b rin g  the  basis 
o f labour re la t io n s  and the  r ig h ts  o f employees in  th a t  secto r 
in to  l in e  w ith  those in  p r iv a te  in d u s try . The S ta f f  Representa­
t io n  Act (P e rsona lve rtre tungsgese tz) is  weaker than the  Works 
C o n s titu tio n  A ct, p a r t ic u la r ly  in  the  way i t  seems to  be 
app lied  in  Bavaria and is  e s p e c ia lly  l im it in g  upon the r ig h ts  
o f c i v i l  se rvan ts . The union complains th a t  i t s  r ig h t  o f 
rep re se n ta tio n  is  fu r th e r  undermined by the  absence o f anyii
Health and Safety a t Work re g u la tio n  (A rbe itss ta ttenve ro rdu ng ) 
e q u iva le n t in  the  p u b lic  se c to r and the  lega l d i f fe r e n t ia t io n  
o f i t s  member groups by s ta tu s  i . e .  b lu e -c o lla r ,  w h ite -c o lla rit
and c i v i l  se rvan t. S u b s ta n tia l sections o f OTV membership 
are denied the  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  under the terms o f the Federal 
C o n s titu t io n .
i
Such lega l parameters d is t in g u is h  OTV from the o th e r two 
la rg e ly  b lu e -c o lla r  unions and the  c o n s tra in ts  on union a c t iv i t yi
which burden OTV encourage i t s  o f f ic e r s  to  seek o th e r means 
o f developing t h e ir  re p re s e n ta tiv e  ro le  and o f extending 
t h e i r  range o f in flu e n c e  and power.
i
The le ga l standing o f OTV as. a tra d e  union is  overshadowed 
and confused by i t s  own involvem ent in  the  governmental and 
a d m in is tra tiv e  systems. Not on ly  is  the  mass o f case law 
b u ild in g  up aga ins t unions in  general, as has a lready been 
suggested, but the  a d m in is tra tio n  o f the  ju d ic ia r y ,  as p a rt 
o f  the  p u b lic  se c to r, is  i t s e l f  em broiled in  the  power s tru g g le  
between organised and unorganised, and is  th e re fo re  in  ai
strong  p o s it io n  to  in flu e n c e  the  progress o f OTV w ith in  the 
law. How the  law is  adm in is te red , f o r  example, the  length 
o f labour cou rt proceedings, can work to  the advantage o r 
disadvantage o f the  un ion . This can a f fe c t  a l l  unions, 
o f course, but the  frequency and e x ten t o f  the dea lingsi
which OTV in  p a r t ic u la r  has w ith  governments and a d m in is tra tio n  
makes th is  problem more im m ediate ly apparent to  i t s  o f f ic e rs
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In c o l le c t iv e  b a rg a in in g , the  comparative mechanism fo r  s e t t l in g  
d isputes is  ra re ly  the  labour c o u rt but more o ften  the  processes 
o f c o n c il ia t io n  and a r b i t r a t io n ,  w ith  on ly the word "S ch lich tu n g " 
a t the d isposa l o f  the  researcher, i t  was o ften  unc lear du rin g  
the in te rv ie w s  whether th e  respondent was re fe rr in g  to  
a rb it r a t io n  o r c o n c i l ia t io n .  Moreover, d isputes in  the  p la n t 
m ight lead to  the  s e t t in g  up o f an E in ig u n g ss te lle  o r 
C o n c ilia t io n  Committee, bu t t h is  again tends more towards 
a r b it r a t io n .  However, both S ch lich tung  und Einigung were 
c ite d  by a l l  th re e  unions as e xce p tio n a l, though s ta t is t ic s  
would be requ ired  to  compare union p ra c tic e  more a c c u ra te ly .
The general view o f  IGBE o f f i c ia l s  towards the use o f 
S ch lich tung was th a t  i t  has no ro le  to  p lay . In the  Ruhr 
the  respondents t o t a l l y  re je c te d  a rb it r a t io n  and would p re fe r  
not to  c a l l  upon c o n c i l ia to rs  themselves. I f  a c o n c i l ia to r  
o ffe re d  h im se lf du rin g  deadlock in  neg o tia tion s  and he were 
acceptable to  both s ides o f in d u s try , they would not re fuse 
h is  he lp . O f f ic ia ls  in  th e  weak non-Ruhr areas commented 
th a t  both S ch lich tung  and E in igung provided an easy way out 
f o r  the ba rga in ing  p a r t ie s  which was very much "second-best" 
to  d ire c t  n e g o tia t io n , e s p e c ia lly  where the union was s tro n g .
A t the tim e o f in v e s t ig a t io n ,  IGBE had no record o f S ch lich tung  
and had ra re ly  been p a rty  to  an E in ig u n g ss te lle .
The reg iona l o f f ic e r s  o f  GTB expressed a fe a r th a t h a b itu a l 
recourse to  S ch lich tu n g  m ight become p a rt o f the n e g o tia tin g  
ta c t ic s  and would undermine the  un ions ' ro le  as ba rga in ing  
agent and p o l i t ic a l  c o u n te rp a rt. The handing over o f r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
to  a th ir d  p a rty  would a lso  have the e f fe c t  o f "co o lin g  o f f "  
the membership which would p ro g re ss ive ly  weaken the unions 
fu tu re  barga in ing  p o s it io n .  Einigung would appear however 
to  be a use fu l t a c t ic  in  p a r t ic u la r ly  weak areas o f o rgan isa ­
t io n  where pa te rna lism  remained the  in d u s tr ia l e th ic  and 
the  membership was u n w il l in g  o r a fra id  to  take lega l a c tio n  
aga inst a dev ian t em ployer. The lo ca l FTO might be ob liged  
to  pursue th is  course in  such instances as an a lte rn a t iv e  
to  preparing a le g a l case.
than to the officers of other unions.
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OTV was the on ly union in  the study which had an A rb it ra t io n  
Agreement (Schlichtungsabkoamen) w ith  the employers. By 
co n tra c tu a l agreement, both p a r t ie s  are prepared to  accept 
c o n c il ia t io n  as an a lte rn a t iv e  to  in d u s t r ia l a c t io n . Should 
the attem pts to  c o n c i l ia te  f a i l ,  then s t r ik e  may be consequen tia l.
GTB o f f i c ia ls  re je c te d  such a proposal and re lie d  much more 
on the  "s h o r t,  sharp shock" trea tm ent o f  warning s t r ik e si
as p a r t o f t h e i r  ba rga in ing  s tra te g y . While some OTV o f f i c ia ls  
agreed, many not on ly  regarded the  s t r ik e  as a s o c ia l ly  unaccept­
able weapon o f ba rga in ing  but even as a f a i r l y  in e ffe c tu a l 
one. This c r i t ic is m  seemed to  be le v e lle d  on ly  a t t h e ir  
own " in d u s try "  however, s ince they adm itted to  t h e i r  re lia n ce  
upon the  strong ta c t ic s  o f IG M e ta l1 as wage and s t r ik e  leaders.
Those respondents who spoke favou rab ly  o f S ch lich tung  were 
concerned th a t the  S c h lic h te r ,  o r chairman o f the  Einigungs- 
s te l le  should be a person acceptable to  both p a r t ie s .  They 
appeared to  be s a t is f ie d  th a t he should be a M in is te r  o f 
Labour o r some such p e rs o n a lity , but re je c te d  any fu r th e r  
in te rfe re n c e  in to  labour re la t io n s  by p o l i t ic ia n s  o r o the r 
th ir d  p a r t ie s .  The p u b lic  sec to r in  p a r t ic u la r  by i t s  very 
nature seems to  a t t r a c t  the  a tte n tio n  o f "o u ts id e rs "  who,i
in  t h e ir  concern fo r  p u b lic  w e lfa re , a re , according to  OTV 
o f f i c ia ls ,  seeking to  m anipulate labour re la t io n s  to  t h e ir  
own ends. Such o u ts id e rs  m ight in c lude  the  Federal Labour 
Court, Federal C o n s titu t io n a l C ourt, p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s ,  and 
indeed p u b lic  o p in io n . P o l i t ic a l  m an ipu la tion  in  the le g is la tu re ,i
ju d ic ia ry  and c o n c i l ia t io n  is  thus a problem to  which OTV 
is  perhaps more su sce p tib le  than any o th e r un ion, and which 
plays a s ig n if ic a n t  ro le  in  the  power game o f labour re la t io n s .
I I  Power from W ith in : In te rn a l Rules and O rgan isa tiona l
Independence
Based on the assumption th a t  the  union o f f ic e r  a t any le ve l 
o f o rg a n isa tio n  requ ire s  power in  the form o f a u th o r ity  in  
decision-m aking from w ith in  h is  own o rg a n is a tio n , respondents
i
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is  not sub jec t to  re -e le c t io n  and enjoys the unique o p p o rtu n ity  
o f b u ild in g  up immense power o f in flu e n ce  w ith in  and w ith o u t 
the union.
The more experienced and s k i I f u l 1 d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e rs  can a lso 
b u ild  up lo c a l "em pires" based on a successful tra c k  record 
and may then secure a c e r ta in  degree o f autonomy in  conducting 
lo c a l a f fa ir s .  The y a rd s t ic k  o f  success a t th is  le v e l o f 
o rgan isa tion  appears to  be the  re c ru itm e n t d r iv e . In c o n tra s t 
to  IGBE pressure is  app lied  from  the  executive downwards 
to  increase, o r a t le a s t m a in ta in  the  membership f ig u re s .
This pressure is  f e l t  most a c u te ly  a t the d i s t r i c t  le v e l 
and is  a source o f f r u s t r a t io n  f o r  the FTOs at th a t  le v e l.
As a re s u lt ,  very many d i s t r i c t s  and regions in ve s t a high 
p ropo rtion  o f tim e and fin a n ce  in  t ra in in g  schemes, conferences 
and the l ik e  as p a r t  o f  the  re c ru itm e n t d r iv e . In the  case 
o f IGBE, many o f these tasks are d iffu s e d  to  the p la n t o r 
the lo ca l branch which are run e n t ir e ly  by lay o f f i c ia l s ,  
thus ta k in g  some o f  the  pressure o f f  the FTOs.
Although a h o r iz o n ta l balance o f power is  maintained by an 
in fo rm a l f lo w  o f in fo rm a tio n  across region and d i s t r i c t s ,  
re la t io n s  up and down the  GTB h ie ra rch y  tend to  be kept on 
a more form al b a s is . In fo rm a lity  however is  the o rde r o f 
the  day where o f f ic e r s  work in  c lose  physica l p ro x im ity  to  
one another and personal f r ie n d s h ip s  can develop.
With the lack o f s p e c ia lis e d  personnel a t reg iona l le v e l,  
o f f ic e rs  a t d i s t r i c t  le v e l are ob liged  to  apply to  the  c e n tra lit
a d m in is tra tio n  in  D usse ldo rf f o r  advice on m atters o f law 
o r procedure and, s ince  most such problems a rise  a t t h is  
le ve l o f o rg a n is a tio n , the  re g io n a l o f f ic e  has l i t t l e  toi
do w ith  D usse ldorf on day-to -d ay  m atte rs . Both the  re g io n a l 
and d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s  are expected to  inform  th e ir  supe rio rs  
o f any dec is ions taken , which re f le c ts  the more a u th o r ita r ia n  
c e n t ra l i ty  o f GTB. On comparison w ith  IGBE, th is  s t r i c t e r  
d is c ip l in e  may be a d i r e c t  r e s u lt  o f the weakness o f GTB 
in  the p la n t and lo c a l i t y  and o f the more c e n tra lis e d  c o l le c t iv e  
barga in ing s tru c tu re  associa ted  w ith  th a t .
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were questioned about t h e ir  a d m in is tra tiv e  and p o l i t ic a l  
freedoms and upon communication and concensus w ith in  the  
un ion. The more a u th o r ity  vested in  the  o f f ic e r s  and the 
more concensus throughout the  h ie ra rch y , the more the  power 
o f o rg a n isa tio n  the  o f f ic e r  is  assumed to  w ie ld .
The most c lo s e ly  k n i t  and e f fe c t iv e  union o rg a n isa tio n  would 
appear to  be IGBE. This excep tiona l union s tru c tu re  w ith  
i t s  extremes o f m ining in  the  Ruhr and Bavaria seemed, from 
the  responses o f i t s  o f f ic e r s ,  the most coord ina ted  and i t s  
o f f ic e rs  the  le a s t f ru s t ra te d .  Run almost along p a te rn a l is t ic  
lin e s ,  IGBE vests a g rea t deal o f r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  in  i t s  reg iona l 
o f f ic e r s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  ou ts id e  the  Ruhr, w h ile  m a in ta in in g  
an "open channel" between them and th e ir  adv isors in  Bochum.
While no o f f ic e r  complained o f f r u s t r a t io n  w ith in  the h ie ra rch y , 
the weak non-Ruhr areas d id  acknowledge th a t  the  execu tive  
is  in  a p o s it io n  to  l im i t  the  in flu e n ce  o f re g io n a l o f f i c ia ls  
w ith o u t being aware o f doing so. The execu tive  p lays a very 
su b s ta n tia l ro le  in  supporting  and in fo rm ing  the  reg io na l 
o f f ic e r s :  on ly  one o f f i c ia l  claimed to  have sought advice
on occasion from  the DGB ra th e r  than, o r in  a d d it io n  to  Bochum. 
This dependence o f the re g io n a l o f f ic e r s  on Bochum and the 
high frequency o f communication throughout the  h ie ra rch y  
makes fo r  a h ig h ly  c e n tra lis e d  un ion. However, the  low degree 
o f f r u s t r a t io n  among the FTOs and the  s tren g th  o f  membership 
would seem to  suggest th a t i t  is  a c e n tra lis a t io n  o f consent 
ra th e r than o f d ic ta t io n .  The d is c ip l in e  which has come 
to  be c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f IGBE has la id  the  founda tion  fo r  
p rogressive  in d u s t r ia l re la t io n s  w ith o u t the  s a c r if ic e  o f 
the t r a d it io n s  o f an o ld  and es tab lished  labour movement.
The c o n s t itu t io n a l h ie ra rchy  o f GTB is  more obv ious ly  fu n c t io n a lly  
ope ra tive  than in  IGBE. The s t r i c t  o rg a n isa tio n  o f a d m in is tra tio n  
a t execu tive , reg io na l and d i s t r i c t  le v e ls  assigns s p e c if ic  
tasks to  each and grants the  o f f ic e r s  s u f f ic ie n t  freedom 
o f movement to  c a rry  out those ta sks . A l l  o f f ic e r s  are account­
able to  those above them, bu t the  a u th o r ity  vested in  the 
reg iona l o f f ic e r  is  perhaps g re a te r than anywhere e lse  in  
the union h ie ra rc h y : granted a g rea t deal o f autonomy in  
the c a rry in g  ou t o f h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  the  re g io n a l o f f ic e r
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The FTOs a t reg io na l and d i s t r i c t  le v e ls  who complained most o f 
f r u s t r a t io n  in  decis ion-m aking  were those o f the la rg e s t uniona i
in  the study, OTV. The d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  o f OTV have s t r i c t l y  
defined and lim ite d  fu n c t io n s  and the  f ru s t r a t io n  a rise s  
because, in  t h e i r  v iew , the  re a l powers o f decis ion-m aking 
are out o f t h e ir  g rasp. As a conglom eration o f many d i f fe r e n ti
groups, OTV centres i t s  po licy -m ak ing  in  S tu t tg a r t  where 
i t  attempts to  coord in a te  a u n if ie d  p o l i t ic a l  and economic 
s tra te g y . Whereas the  o th e r  unions may succeed in  ba lancingi
reg iona l d iffe re n c e s  by open d iscuss ion  and persuasion, OTV s u ffe rs  
d issension in  many dimensions o th e r than by re g io n . The upshot 
is  an attem pt by the  union to  w ring u n ity  by a u th o r ity ,  and f r u s t ­
ra t io n  on the  p a r t o f  th e  o f f ic e r s  who work under th a t  a u th o r ity .
Many o f the respondents recognised th is  d i f f i c u l t y  as an o rg a n i-i
sa tio n  inadequacy o f  OTV. Communication is  much weaker than 
in  a sm a lle r, less complex un ion , and th is  adds to  the  s itu a t io n  
o f f r u s t r a t io n  fo r  the  FTOs who fe e l c o n tin u a lly  th a t  S tu t tg a r t  
remains uninformed o f t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  This is  most a cu te ly  
f e l t  in  the weaker, more remote d is t r ic t s ,  run by perhaps one 
o r two FTOs. O ff ic e rs  in  th e  la rg e r  a d m in is tra tiv e  ce n tres , 
working more as a team o f  e x p e rts , tend to  behave more l ik e  the 
p u b lic  a u th o r it ie s  whom they  serve ; o fte n  having been tra in e d  in  
a d m in is tra tio n  o r the  c i v i l  s e rv ic e ,p a r t ic u la r ly  the  younger 
o f f ic e r s ,  they respond more lo y a l ly  to  the e th ic s  o f a m anagerial 
h ie ra rchy and pro fess an o v e ra ll respect fo r  the aims o f t h e i r  un ion .
N e ithe r the d i s t r i c t  nor the  re g io n a l o f f ic e r s  re fe r  to  S tu t tg a r t  
very o fte n , and then u s u a lly  in  w r it in g .  On m atters o f  c o lle c tv e  
barga in ing o r law, the  d i s t r i c t s  re fe r  e ith e r  to  the  experts 
a t Land le ve l o r ,  more f re q u e n t ly  than o th e r unions, to  the  
DGB. Thus the c o n ce n tra tio n  o f in fo rm a l communication in  
the d a ily  fu n c t io n in g  o f  the  union seems to  be d iffu s e d  away 
from the c e n tra l a d m in is tra tio n  in  such a way as to  encourage 
the very autonomy which the  union in  p r in c ip le  seeks to  suppress.
This is  a l l  the more encouraged by the almost unavoidable 
involvement o f union o f f i c ia l s  in  lo ca l a f fa ir s  and p o l i t ic s .
By b u ild in g  up a network o f  p o l i t i c a l  contacts and a cq u ir in g  
a p o s it io n  o f in flu e n c e  in  the  community, the  lo c a l OTV o f f i c ia l
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is  not on ly  serv ing  h is  u n io n 's  in te re s ts ,  but is  a lso  enhancing 
h is  own p e rs o n a lity  beyond th a t  o f  a subord inate in  the  union 
h ie ra rc h y . For him, as a p o l i t ic ia n  and a d m in is tra to r , lo ca l 
issues take precedence and co o rd in a tio n  w ith  an o v e ra ll union 
s tra te g y  becomes more d i f f i c u l t .  This is  a lso tru e  a t Land 
le ve l where p o lic ie s  and values become d iffu s e d  and in d iv id u a lis e d .■I
There is  some f r u s t r a t io n  in  the  Lander where the reg iona l 
o f f ic e r  fe e ls  more in  tune w ith  the  p o l i t ic s  o f  h is  d i s t r i c t  
o f f ic e r s  than w ith  S tu t tg a r t .  C le a r ly ,  th is  depends on the 
p o l i t ic a l  m o tiva tio n  o f the o f f ic e r  and the re g io na l v a r ia t io n s  
in  government p o lic y  and a d m in is tra tio n , and may a l te r  from 
issue to  issue .
I l l  Power from W ithout: R e la tions w ith  Works C o u n c illo rs ,
Management, and Government A u th o r it ie s
I f  the  power to  fu n c tio n  is  no t fo rthcom ing from w ith in ,  
then trad e  union o f f i c ia ls  must seek power from ou ts id e  th e ir  
o rg a n is a tio n  a t the le v e l a t which they ope ra te . Frequency 
o f con tac t w ith  ou ts ide  bodies is  no in d ic a tio n  o f the  d i s t r i ­
bu tio n  o f power but suggests where the  o f f i c ia ls  perhaps 
seek power in  the form o f in f lu e n c e . Figures fo r  the reg iona l■I
o f f ic e s  o f OTV were not a v a ila b le  s ince  the  respondents could 
no t account f o r  the  a c t iv i t ie s  o f t h e i r  many co lleagues a t 
th a t  le v e l o f  o rg a n is a tio n . The re g io n a l o f f ic e r  h im se lf 
has a s p e c ia l is t  ro le  as p o l i t i c a l  re p re se n ta tive  o f the 
union on p u b lic  bodies a t Land and, in  some ins tances, fe d e ra l 
le v e ls .  He is  respons ib le  f o r  the  management o f  h is  s ta f f  
and represents them a t the u n io n 's  c e n tra l o f f ic e .  In th is  
r o le ,  he comes in to  con tact very fre q u e n tly  w ith  the employers 
in  the p u b lic  sec to r as p o l i t ic a l  opponents, but is  ra re ly  
c a lle d  upon to  deal w ith  problems in  the workplace o r w ith  
em ployer's a sso c ia tio n s .
From the  bar ch a rt o f Estimated Frequency o f Contact w ith
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Management, i t  can be seen th a t ,  across the board, re la t io n s  
w ith  management are m ain ta ined on a la rg e ly  in fo rm a l basis 
in  so fa r  as th e re  is  very l i t t l e  con tact recorded in  w r i t in g .
The FTOs most f re q u e n t ly  in  con tact w ith  the workplace, 
e ith e r  fo rm a lly  o r in fo rm a lly  are the d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  
o f GTB. From f ig u re s  g iven  by the FTOs a t the tim e the  
f ie ld w o rk  was c a r r ie d  o u t,  v is i t s  to  the p la n t du ring  a 
s in g le  month ranged from  6 to  over 40, w h ile  the  h ighes t 
f ig u re  quoted by any o f  the  o f f ic e r s  o f the  o the r unions 
was 24 fo r  a d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e  o f OTV and " d a ily "  by theu
F ra n k fu rt o f f ic e  o f OTV. C e rta in ly  the frequency o f  v is i t si
by OTV d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  was high but the average estim ated 
frequency o f co n ta c t as shown by the  bar charts was much 
h igher fo r  GTB. (The estim ated frequency o f con tacts  w ith  
management by the  GTB d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r s  was even h ighe r 
than the estim ated frequency o f con tact w ith  a u th o r it ie s  andii
government bodies by the  OTV d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e s ,  w ith o u t 
F ra n k fu r t) .
Not a l l  con tacts  w ith  management nece ssa rily  mean n e g o tia t io n : 
GTB d i s t r i c t  o f f i c ia l s  regard frequen t con tac t w ith  the  
p la n t as a necessary p a r t o f  t h e ir  rec ru itm en t d r iv e .
Not on ly  do these v is i t s  s trengthen the c r e d ib i l i t y  o f  
the  FTO in  the  eyes o f the  works counc il and membership, 
but he is  a lso kept in form ed o f problems and developments 
in  the p la n t.  On these occasions he may con tact the  management 
e ith e r  as a m a tte r o f  co u rtesy , o r to  seek in fo rm a tio n  
about problems brought to  h is  a t te n t io n .  V is its  to  the  
workplace are thus an e s s e n tia l source o f power to  the 
d i s t r i c t  o f f ic e r  w ith o u t which the  union would cease to  
fu n c tio n  a t th a t  le v e l.
Of the IGBE re g io n s , th a t  which estim ated the most freq uen t 
con tact w ith  management and quoted the most fre q u e n t number 
o f  v is i t s  to  the  p la n t  in  the g iven month was the  s trong 
non-Ruhr area o f  Rheinland and Niedersachsen. The f ig u re s  
f o r  the Ruhr are in  some doubt, since the reg iona l o f f ic e s
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are staffed, like those of OTV , by a team of FTOs who 
are like ly  to be in contact with the workplace more often 
than could be estimated by the ir senior o ffice r. The 
purpose in IGBE for contacting the plant tended to be 
to seek out information or to deal with problems arising 
out of collective agreements, matters of procedure, or 
welfare issues. Only in the weak mining areas was the 
FTO involved with disputes over closures, lay-offs and 
redundancies.
Also in the weaker areas, IGBE o ffic ia ls  face problems 
of recruitment, and the ir function in v is iting  the plant 
comes much closer to that of the GTB d is tr ic t o ffice r.
Like them, they are denied the further sources of power 
available in heavy industry of strong employer organisation 
and union influence at higher levels of management.
H
Because of the vast membership of OTV, the d is tr ic t  officers 
of th is union have a more d i f f ic u lt  job to maintain close 
contact with the "works councillors" or s ta ff representatives 
{PersonaIrate). This union has specifically set up a 
steward system to help bridge the gulf between the members 
and the ir local union o ffice . The function of the steward 
(Vertrauensmann) seems to be to keep the members informed 
and to mediate between them and the ir s ta ff representative.
In other industries, where the works councillor is a union 
member and works closely together with the d is tr ic t o ffice , 
as is the case with IGBE and GTB, such stewards are, i f  
not undesirable, not essential. In local government however, 
not only is the law on s ta ff representation reported in 
some Lander considerably weaker than the Works Constitution
ii
Act, but OTV vies with other employee organisations in 
the election of s ta ff representatives and has comparatively
ii
less control over the ir conduct. The objectives of OTV 
in setting up a stronger steward system is to maintain 
and increase union influence at the place of work in the 
face of a strong s ta ff council. In some smaller d is tr ic ts , 
where the local OTV o ff ic ia l is long-standing and well- 
known, the function of the steward, and indeed the s ta ff
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representative, may be redundant in view of the closer, 
more direct relationship of the FTO with his membership.
The trus t which a d is tr ic t  o ffice r is able to build up 
between himself and the workforce fo r which he is respon­
sible is an important source of power in terms of influence 
with the membership and the employers. This trust is 
like ly  to be much greater in smaller d is tric ts  where the 
FTO is responsible for only a re la tive ly small section 
of employment, concentrated in a few establishments.
ii
In such situations, the OTV o ffice r has l i t t le  opposition 
from other employee organisations and can gain the respect 
and trust of the employers essential to good labour relations.
Most of the disputes which arise at d is tr ic t level are 
associated with employee rights with regard to job specifi­
cation, welfare or redundancy. Whereas in GTB, the specifi­
cation of the job is clear-cut while the payment for the
m
job remains negotiable, fo r the OTV o ffice r, the rates 
of pay are fixed but the job description and evaluation 
of the post may be subject to dispute. Such issues become 
confused with rapid technological change, shifts in personnel 
structures and continual attempts by the employer to rationalise 
working patterns.
Contacts between the unions and the employers' associations 
were reported to be fa r less frequent. There are under­
standably very few contacts between groups not engaged 
in collective bargaining. Of those groups who do not 
negotiate with the employers' organisations, i.e . IGBEn
Ruhr, GTB d is tr ic ts  and OTV d is tr ic ts , those who estimated 
least contact were the GTB d is tr ic ts . The officers reported 
that they use the employers' organisation as a second resort 
in cases of dispute with an employer, and particularly in 
negotiations over closures or proposed lay-offs, in order 
to settle the matter out of court. Subsequently of course, 
should th is fa i l ,  then the representatives of the union 
and the employers meet before a labour court. Most frequent 
contact comes about however because the d is tr ic t  officers 
s it  with employers' representatives on local committees 
and insurance boards, and not as the result of dispute.
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The Ruhr officers of IGBE also registered some contact 
with the employers' organisation. The one o ff ic ia l did 
have some negotiating rights fo r one small d is tr ic t  under 
his ju risd ic tion  and had occasion to contact the employers' 
association over problems arising out of the collective 
agreements. A second regional o ffice r had additional 
cause to be in contact with the employers' association, 
which was that the employers' head office was in the same 
town and had as a consequence much more local contact 
with the union.
As can be seen from the bar chart however, contact in 
the Ruhr, where negotiations are handled centrally, between 
regional officers and the employers' associations is recorded 
as very low indeed.
Of the non-Ruhr areas of IGBE, the Giessen d is tr ic t  appears 
to have most contact with the employers' organisations.
Apart from a common committment to local affa irs and jo in t 
involvement in the mining administration, the FTO in th is 
d is tr ic t  found i t  necessary to maintain contact with the 
employers' organisation in view of the frequency of lay­
offs in the area and the number of disputes arising out 
of collective agreements. A sim ilar picture was presented 
by the strong non-Ruhr areas which, without the problems 
of closures and redundancy, s t i l l  raise considerable 
numbers of workplace disputes and welfare claims with 
the employers' association. They also tend to s it  on 
the same community and mining committees and even organise 
jo in tly  some social events on behalf of the workforce.
Only the southern mining regions have no dealings at a ll 
with an employers' organisation, since there the employers 
remain unorganised.
H n
Of the OTV d is tr ic ts  only Frankfurt and Koln, the two 
largest single d is tr ic ts  in the survey in terms of member­
ship, could estimate the ir contacts with the employers' 
organisations. In such big c it ie s , the extent of private 
enterprise in the service industries is much more widespread,
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whereas in other municipalities, OTV deals almost entirely
ii
with the public sector. As with the other unions, OTVit
respondents in Frankfurt and Koln claimed that most of 
the ir dealings with the employers' associations were concerned 
with matters arising out of the legal and constitutional 
complexity of public sector employment, or more exactly 
attempts to keep such matters out of court before they 
progress thst fa r.
ii
At both regional and d is tr ic t  levels, OTV is much more 
involved and has very many more contacts with the authorities 
and government bodies. Because of the overlapping of 
the authorities as employers, as administrators and, indeed,
it
as OTV members, i t  becomes very d if f ic u lt  for the union 
officers themselves to pinpoint a ll the reasons fo r such 
contact. In dealing with the authorities and government
ii
bodies as employers, the regional officers of OTV aimn
to maintain discussions with the governments of the Lander 
and heads of the c iv i l service with a view to influencing 
patterns of public expenditure and policy changes. Their 
success in doing so depends very largely upon the government 
in power and the p o litica l climate, but clearly, the influence
ii
wielded by OTV officers in public administration and govern­
ment could be assumed to outweigh that of any other single 
union.
H
The estimated frequency of contact between OTV regions 
and .the government administration could not be monitored, 
but the contacts as estimated by the Frankfurt d is tr ic t 
above may give an indication of how ongoing the ir involvement 
was at the time of the survey.
The estimates fo r the :IGBE regions of contacts with the 
authorities varies. The Ruhr officers seem to depend 
more on personal contacts, whereas the strong non-Ruhr 
areas tend to be more formal in the ir dealings with the 
authorities. The weak areas seem overall to have more 
contacts with the authorities, perhaps again in connection
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with regional development, closures and so on. This correlates 
with the information provided by the d is tr ic t o ffice r 
in Giessen whose ac tiv ities  brought him into more frequent 
contact with the local planning committees and the Land 
m inistries. In Rheinland and Niedersachsen too, the FTOs 
are consulted by the authorities on proposed changes in 
energy planning, such as the development of new power 
stations, and so on.
Otherwise, contacts between IGBE officers and the authorities 
tend to be formally restricted to matters of welfare and 
mining management, unless the private po litica l involvement 
of the FTOs extends beyond th is .
Influence vis a vis the authorities, most particularly 
the social insurance offices, is a feature of the function 
of the GTB d is tr ic t .  With a higher proportion of female 
members, many of them on part-time work, and an industry 
which continues to shrink at an alarming rate, GTB has had to 
shoulder the responsibility of supporting the unemployment 
and other welfare claims of a particularly weak and defenseless 
social group. In an e ffo rt to protect the working interests 
of the ir members, the d is tr ic t  FTOs like the regional 
FTOs, seek to influence local and Land authorities responsible 
for job creation, trade protection and the system of social 
welfare. As in the other unions, the regional officers 
of GTB engage in p o litic a l ac tiv ity , particularly at Land 
level, to try  to influence the po litic ians in regional 
planning and trade policy. However, there is no indication 
that they are any more active in th is respect than the ir 
d is tr ic t o fficers and they s t i l l  prefer to tackle these 
problems in discussions with the employers and the ir associa­
tions. Formal discussion between the employers' representa­
tives and the union regional officers on economic and 
industrial a ffa irs  is obviously more satisfactory in GTB 
than in other unions, when combined with po litica l action 
at federal level. This is borne out by the bar chart 
of estimated frequency of contacts of GTB regions with
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employers' associations and may be attributed to the structure 
of the industry which the employers and unionists alike 
have a deep concern to maintain. Also the structure of 
employer organisation may encourage discussion at th is  
level, as i t  has helped condition the pattern of 
collective bargaining and the settlement of legal disputes 
in the industry.
IV The Power of Information
Such contacts with outside organisations, as has been described 
above, provide the union officers with a source of power in 
the form of influence which they can apply to achieve the ir 
aims. Such contacts however may open up sources of information, 
also to be regarded as a form of power. The union officers 
were asked i f  they fe l t  that the information they required 
was withheld from them by the employers, or the authorities, 
and though th e ir responses were per force anecdotal 
they give an indication of where they believe the ir
strengths and weaknesses lie .
When questioned about the ir access to information, the IGBE 
seemed at variance with one another as to whether they were 
denied information. A ll the regions outside the Ruhr, and 
therefore outside the bounds of codetermination, fe l t  that 
the employers automatically and consciously withheld economic 
information. In the Ruhr, one of the officers claimed to be, 
on balance, more aware and have more information at his disposal 
than the employers, since the union was in a position to with­
hold its  information, but within the law, the employers were 
not. Only Niedersachsen complained that the government authorities 
withheld information; a ll others maintained that they had access 
to a ll the government information they required. The officers 
of the Rheinland region and the weak mining regions also admitted 
withholding information from the employers, but in the Rhein­
land, they saw no advantage in withholding information from 
the authorities.
246
GTB officers at regional and d is tr ic t  levels denied that i t  was 
everyday practice throughout the industry to attempt to withhold 
information on either side. They acknowledged that at the start 
of negotiations with the employers or the ir representatives, 
the la tte r would withhold financial information and attempt 
to exaggerate the economic situation. Only one regional o ffice r 
fe lt  that the authorities withheld information, but not consciously. 
They themselves did not withhold information from the authorities,
■and only some acknowledged withholding information from the 
employers.
n
For OTV officers, employers and government authorities are of 
necessity regarded as one and the same source of information.
Both the regional and d is tr ic t  o fficers asserted that the authorities 
continually try  to withhold information concerning public finance, 
staffing and even on occasion legal information. This however, 
in the opinion of the o fficers, was neither rea lis tic  nor a 
serious threat to the organisation since so many government
H
o ffic ia ls  and c iv i l servants are OTV members and the flow of 
information cannot be controlled. Staff representatives loyal 
to the union also pass on information made available to them,
ii
though th is channel is perhaps of less significance fo r OTV
ii
than fo r the other two unions. Thus, on balance, the OTV o ffic ia ls  
fe lt  that they had the upper hand in the control of information.
ii
OTV officers in particular also seem to be more extensively 
involved on a personal level in local p o litics . The officers 
of a ll three unions were active on councils and committees associated 
with the ir industry or services, but the access to information 
resulting from these peripheral ac tiv ities  was described as 
no greater than that which was available to the employers who 
carry out the same functions.
With the exception of one region in IGBE Ruhr, both IGBE and 
GTB seem to have more frequent contacts horizontally and vertica lly
ii
within the ir organisation than OTV. Officers in IGBE and GTB 
share information and coordinate the ir activ ities more often
ii
than is apparent in OTV. This is like ly  to be due to the size 
and structure of the industries they serve, but in consequence
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supports the view expressed earlier that the two older unions 
perhaps enjoy a greater concensus and cooperation than the
ii
younger, growing and diverse OTV.
3 The Issues
The function of a trade union and its  officers is subject not 
only to its  power to succeed but also to its  aims and objectives.
The issues which a union o ffice r must face are conditioned on 
the one hand by his own motivation and his conception of the 
role he has to play, and on the other hand by the industria l 
environment in terms of the industrial structure and membership 
expectations.
The FTOs were asked to rank the ir activ ities (12 headings in 
to ta l) in order of importance. The two categories of ac tiv ity  
which were ranked overall highest were collective bargaining
policy and employment law, and certain patterns emerged in the
ranking of these two by each union :
Rating of Collective IGBE GTB OTV
Bargaining Policy and Strong Weak Region D is tr ic t Region D is tric t 
Employment Law
Ranked 1 - 2 
Ranked 1 - 3 
Ranked 1 - 4
Ranking below 4 
Totals in Sample
From the to ta ls figure of the ranking by the FTOs of collective 
bargaining and labour law in the top four categories, i t  is 
understood that these categories figure dominantly in union
248
function. The only exceptions appear to be the southern weak
ii i*
regions of IGBE and the Frankfurt and Koln d is tr ic ts  of OTV.*
The figures for the weak mining areas are however somewhat mis­
leading, since collective bargaining was in fact ranked 1-2 
by the FTOs, but employment law fe l l  a long way behind. This 
may be attributed to the small scale of industry in these regions 
and the capacity of the union o ffice r and the employer to reach 
a settlement without resorting to law. The categories which 
took p rio r ity  over employment law were those of economic and 
social policy and social law (insurance, unemployment, etc)
ii. ,r
in a ll three d is tr ic ts . For OTV, the Frankfurt and Koln d is tric ts  
have stood out on a number of other counts in the survey already. 
Their p r io r ity  ranking deviates from a ll others, concentrating 
more on policy development in the economic and social fie lds .
The reasons for the low p r io r ity  of collective bargaining and 
employment law are unclear, unless they can be related to a 
close cooperation of the d is tr ic t  with the regional o ffice whereby 
much of the work in these fie lds  is handed over. ( I t  is also 
possible that the impression given by one FTO in a re lative ly 
large d is tr ic t  is a misleading one within the confines of th is 
sample, but further investigation would be required before the 
information is discounted as fa lse .)
A rank correlation was carried out on the p rio rity  lis tin g  of 
the respondents, and, as has already been suggested, the p rio ritie s  
of almost a ll the regions and d is tr ic ts  of the three unions, 
when grouped together, were s ign ifican tly  correlated. Thus, 
despite variations between unions in industrial and membership 
structures, the o ffic ia ls  in the survey ranked the ir activ ities 
in sim ilar orders of importance. Deviance from th is  overall
ii
pattern was only evident in the case of OTV Regions mapped against
ii
GTB Regions and IGBE Rheinland. As might be expected, OTV
ii
d is tric ts  Frankfurt and Koln were found to correlate significantly 
only with the weak non-Ruhr area of IGBE, while the other d is tric ts
)■ n
of OTV, with or without Frankfurt and Koln, were found to be 
significant with a ll groups.
(Only broad conclusions may be drawn from the variance in degrees 
of significance of the correlations, but i t  may be useful to
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compare these figures, drawn from the o ffice rs ' own assessment 
of the ir a c tiv ity , with correlations of expenditure patterns, 
or some other objective measure of union function. This may 
provide a more detailed explanation of the deviations found 
in this correlation analysis, although i t  was not possible to 
do so within the scope of th is  study).
Variations in the concerns of the different structural groups 
within the union hierarchy also became apparent in the o ff ic ia ls  
responses to questions about union policy. I t  is assumed here- 
that an FTO's evaluation of union policy is influenced by his 
function and his awareness of the needs of those whom he serves, 
also the degree of discussion and cooperation throughout the 
organisation.
The union displaying most unanimity in the understanding of 
its  officers of the industria l and p o litica l parameters of the ir 
function was again IGBE. Not only did the officers share an 
understanding of the p o litica l implications of industrial decline 
in terms of a desire fo r more dialogue between industry and 
labour at a ll levels, but also supported the overall strategy 
of the union in collective bargaining on wages and conditions.
Facing sim ilar economic decline, the d is tric ts  of GTB expressed 
a lower level of satisfaction with union policy than the officers 
of IGBE. Though the FTOs in the d is tr ic ts  were generally quite 
happy with aspects of union po litics  which did not concern them 
d irectly , fo r example international trade, and other such areas 
outside collective bargaining, dissatisfaction and dissension 
has arisen from regional discrepancies in earnings. This frustra ­
tion at the d is tr ic t  level is perhaps less marked at the regional 
level where the agreements and terms are negotiated. Although 
the regional officers are not themselves satisfied with the 
discrepancies, they do have the opportunity to participate in 
the bargaining process and may accept that they secured the 
best possible deal under circumstances which favour capital 
rather than labour. Interestingly, the regional officers of 
GTB were fa r less interested in cooperating with the employers
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as such than the ir d is tr ic t  o ffice rs . When asked d irectly , 
the regional officers expressed a greater mistrust of the 
principles of cooperation than the d is tr ic t  o fficers, but 
were correspondingly more interested in discussion at higher 
levels of economic and p o litica l matters of interest to both 
sides of industry. Notably only one regional o ffice r expressed 
a desire to see an intensity in the p o litica l ac tiv ity  of 
the union; a ll others fe l t  satisfied that GTB was doing a ll 
i t  could and had achieved as much as i t  could, given the p o litic a l, 
legal and industrial constraints upon i t .
A similar impression was also gained from the regional officers
n
of OTV of whom a ll but two were satisfied with the intensity 
of the union's p o litica l a c tiv ity . Unlike GTB, where the 
regional officers saw themselves limited in the pursuit of 
an aggressive wages policy by industria l and economic factors,
ii
OTV officers regarded the barriers to aggressive bargaining 
as largely p o lit ic a l. Many objected therefore to the overall 
union strategy in bargaining for being too defensive, though 
they were unclear as to whether the blame fo r this lay with 
the leadership or the membership. The "chicken-and-egg" dilemma
ii
fo r OTV was whether the absence of membership solidarity 
had denied the leadership the power of industrial action since 
1975 (except fo r some isolated instances), or whether the 
lack of leadership had deprived the membership of its  impetus 
since then.
ii
There was notably a growing desire among the FTOs of OTV, 
particularly at regional level to cooperate with the employers 
in matters of social concern. They have accepted a responsibility 
not only fo r the provision of public services but also for 
policy-making in areas such as energy, unemployment, and so 
on. The potential basis fo r cooperation with the employers
n
is much broader in the case of OTV than the other two unions 
because of the ill-de fined line between collective bargaining
ii
and p o litics . This often raises the expectations of the OTV 
o ffic ia ls  beyond those of other unionists, an observation 
which correlates with the widespread dissatisfaction in the
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it
OTV d is tric ts  registered by the respondents themselves. Discontent 
was expressed more in respect of the ir own union rather than 
the employers. Few respondents could recall any substantial 
success in collective bargaining since 1975 and a ll were dissatisfied 
with the union's p o litica l strategy. While a few were prepared 
to acknowledge the ir responsibility in the public sector and 
adopted a fa ir ly  moderate view towards the employers, only 
two respondents saw any advantage at a ll in cooperation fo r 
any other purpose.
4 Summary and Conclusions
1 I t  has been observed that the main core of trade union 
function at the level of the day to day activ ities of the 
organisation lies in the workload of the fu ll-tim e o ff ic ia l
in respect of collective bargaining (negotiation and consultation) 
and the progressing of individual grievances, ultimately through 
the courts.
2 The structure of collective bargaining is determined by
the structure of industry and the pattern of employer organisation. 
The formal process of collective bargaining gives rise to 
a particular operational structure, although a much greater 
proportion of union a c tiv ity  is given over to the application 
of agreements and the settlement of disputes associated with 
that.
3 As the complement to "formal" bargaining, the extent of 
plant bargaining is determined partly by the pattern of 
collective bargaining, partly by the nature of the production 
process, and partly by the conditions of legislation related 
to the industry.
4 Thus the responsibilities of FTOs, as a reflectionof the 
in ternal, operiiond structure of the union, correspond to
a very large extent with the formal and informal structures 
of collective bargaining.
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I t  is conceivable that attempts by the unions to extend the ir 
function of bargaining by removing its  incidence from the 
plant to the industry, or by extending the ir negotiating rights 
in the public sector w ill bring about a sh ift in the functions 
of the union officers by switching the responsibility for 
negotiations from one level of organisation to another. Moreover, 
the increased workload, particu larly  by way of legal and procedural 
matters associated with an extension of the bargaining role 
of unions is like ly  to cause an upward sh ift in responsibility 
as the officers at the base of the hierarchy become overburdened.
n
Such a trend is already evident in OTV where the problem is 
inflated by the m ultiplication of legal interests. Thus the 
relationship between structure and function within the bounds 
of collective bargaining may be expressed simply as follows:
Aspect of Collective 
Bargaining
Related Structure
Formal Collective Bargaining
Application of agreements/ 
handling of disputes
Plant Bargaining
District/Region/Industry 
D is tric t (— Region)
Lay Officers (-r--> D is tric t)
(The arrows show the direction of sh ifts  in the incidence of union 
ac tiv ity  already taking place as the bargaining function is extended).
5 The procedures laid down by labour legislation have offered union 
officers additional authority, though the extent of authority 
soderivedwill tend to vary from provision to provision and 
from industry to industry. Legislation which directs its e lf  
to the non-union aspects of the industria l relations fie ld  
is also of advantage to the trade union organisations, but 
only in so fa r as the ir o fficers can demonstrate a capacity 
to exploit i t .  This fa c il i ty  contributes to the de facto 
determination of union function, as demonstrated by the use 
GTB makes of the Works' Constitution Act in adopting responsibility
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fo r sponsoring and training works councillors in local bargaining 
and stewardship.
ii
At the time of the investigation, OTV did not enjoy th is  position 
within the provisions of the Staff Representation legislation 
which lays greater restric tion  on union access to management.
ii
Given such restric tions, OTV must extend its  functions in 
the direction of its  own attributes: the po litica l a c tiv ity
it
of OTV and its  in f i lt ra t io n  of the jud ic ia l and governmental 
administration provides a means of tempering the power of 
anti-union legislation and administration to minimise union 
weakness.
6 Union recognition is undermined and union function lim ited 
by the 'free rid e r' Provision (Effektivklausel) contained
in the law governing collective bargaining; other sections 
of employment leg is la tion, which prescribe procedure, eg the 
Redundancy Protection lim it union c re d ib ility  by the ir 
ine ffectua lity . I t  is understandable, therefore, that under 
changing industrial conditions, the trade unions should strive 
to change these laws in order to preserve the ir function.
7 The complexity of labour law, while presenting an obstacle 
to union power by requiring considerable expertise, only becomes 
a relevant problem in the context of comparative employer 
expertise. Union power then is also a function of s k il l  and 
expertise on an individual basis as well as on an organisational 
one. Simplification of the law might strengthen the positions 
of the union o ff ic ia l confronted by an organised and well- 
equipped opponent. Under such conditions, the system of labour 
law could be streamlined, and a higher proportion of grievances 
resolved by the union d is tr ic ts  with less recourse to legal 
expertise within the union hierarchy.
8 In an e ffo rt to preserve the ir bargaining function, the 
unions reject recourse to conciliation or arbitration other 
than in exceptional circumstances. Despite the fact that
n
OTV is party to an Arbitration Agreement with the employers,
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which is respected and upheld by them, the use made of this 
procedure of settlement remains infrequent.
Third party intervention is an option which either negotiating 
party may wish to exploit in order to secure the best possible 
position from which to influence the negotiating process.
In that context, for the trade union i t  is an option of last 
resort short of industrial action, or as an alternative to 
industrial action, in circumstances where other sources of
H
influence are denied or lim ited, eg fo r OTV in certain public 
services.
9 The structure of the union has been seen to fa c ilita te  
a distribution of the power which the organisation can wield, 
which is maximised at a ll levels of bargaining i f  the union 
enjoys internal discip line and cooperation. Union discipline 
can be achieved by
a. Consensus, associated with strong membership
participation
b. Authority, associated with weak membership
participation
There are a number of component characteristics which have 
been found to be associated with these two union types:
Type of Discipline Associated Characteristics
Consensus High membership density. 
Feedback of so lidarity  from 
Members and FTOs.
Informal Communication. 
Interests directed within union
Authority Low membership density.
Feedback of frustration/dissension. 
Formal Communication.
Interests developed outside union.
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The factors which contribute towards greater consensus are 
the overall size of the union, the size and distribution 
of members groups in re lation to Full Time Officers, and 
the degree of open discussion fac ilita ted  within the hierarchy.
10 The lack of consensus and the subsequent loss of internal 
power causes the Full Time Officers to look elsewhere, i.e . 
outside the union, fo r sources of power. The exploitation 
of personal contacts by union officers is a means of building 
up individual power in the form of influence and information 
within the rules of the system. Although an analysis of 
the personal contacts of FTOs is no measure of th is  power, 
i t  demonstrates the direction of FTO activ ity  and locates 
union function. The pattern of contacts corresponds with 
the structure of the industry: from the monthly estimates 
of the respondents in the survey, the following relationships 
were established:
OTV
GTB
IGBE
Region -----  Land Govts./
Public Authorities
D is tr ic t -----  Public Authorities/
Local Govt.
Region
D is tr ic t
Ruhr
SNR
WNR
  Employers' Associations/
— - Plant (plant
Authorities
Authorities/Plant
Authorities
Largely p o litica l 
and administrative
Largely
industrial
Largely
administrative
11 The pattern of contacts reflects the function of the 
union in the sense that i t  locates the sources of additional 
power and the areas towards which union representation must 
be directed. The power the o ff ic ia ls  seek in pursuing these 
contacts appears to be influence based on trust, or simply 
information. The bias towards informality in most of these 
relations results from a desire to build up th is trus t with 
least commitment. I t  is  assumed that the union officers
w ill try  to improve contacts where a relationship is regarded 
as necessary but weak and that they w ill not pursue contacts 
where they are not thought f ru it fu l either as sources of 
information or influence. I t  is further proposed that where 
unions are not denied information, they may no longer regard 
i t  as a source of power; where information is denied, then 
other groups ( i.e . employers, government bodies) have control 
over that power source and the o ffice r feels disadvantaged.
I t  could be argued that the union is also disadvantaged in 
comparison with another group when i t  feels the need to with­
hold information from that group. The communication between 
the union and outside groups was found to be generally as 
follows:
Union Accessibility of Information from
Outside Bodies
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IGBE Ruhr Not withheld
IGBE Non-Ruhr Withheld
IGBE Niedersachsen Withheld by Authorities 
GTB Not withheld ultimately
it
OTV Communication unavoidable
12 Thus, the flow of information between the union and outside
groups is either dependent upon a relationship of trus t (IGBE
<1
Ruhr) or is unavoidable (OTV). In the case of the Ruhr o fficers, 
the strength of the relationship is to a large extent a ttr ib u t­
able to the labour legislation in the mining industry; in
ii
OTV the relationship results from the location of the member­
ship in public service and government. In both cases, the 
union FTOs fe lt  that they, as actors in the system, held 
the net balance of power vis a vis the employers and authorities.
13. From such observations of union ac tiv ity  in 1979, i t  
appears that the function of union representation in the 
areas of labour law and collective bargaining is d irectly 
related to the personal c re d ib ility  o ftheofficers involved; 
and such c re d ib ility  is dependent upon the various "power"
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factors of influence, authority and access to information 
as suggested in th is  chapter. Union activ ity and policy was 
to be directed towards extending and making more effective 
the ir function of representation and therefore the ir c re d ib ility . 
Measures proposed by the interviewees to expand the ir function 
are:
( i)  Shifts in collective bargaining, to encompass more 
aspects of negotiation in contractual agreements.
( i i )  The removal of the Effectiveness Provision from the 
law on collective bargaining.
( i i i )  The extension of codetermination in industry.
(iv ) The improvement of laws on union activ ity  at the work­
place; changes to the law on Staff Representation; removal 
of class status; introduction of workplace regulations in 
the white-collar sector; extension of the right to s trike .
(v) The extension of union contacts and involvement to 
gain new spheres of influence fo r union ac tiv ity .
14 Measures which would increase the effectiveness of functions 
already established would include:
( i)  Changes in present labour and social law (eg redundancy, 
conditions of employment, etc.)
( i i )  Simplification of legal administration.
( i i i )  Redirection of the current emphasis of ju d ic ia l law, particularly 
in respect of the Federal Labour Court.
( iv ) Improvement of contacts and involvement in spheres where 
trade union representation is already established (eg public 
bodies, welfare supervisory councils, etc) in order to gain more 
influence or information, in the industrial, p o litica l or admin­
is tra tive  fie lds .
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15 Moves in this directon have already indicated sh ifts  in 
structure which accompany such changes in function (eg IGBE).
The changes which have been categorised here as expansions of 
union function (chiefly under ( i)  and ( iv )) are expected to bring 
with them a sh ift in responsibility away from the shop floor and, 
therefore, up the union hierarchy to the regions. The changes
in the effectiveness of union functions would increase the power 
of FTOs at a ll levels of representation and any sh ifts in activ ity  
would follow in the direction of resultant shifts in the new power 
balanace.
Any changes which effect an improvement in advocacy at the d is tr ic t 
level would increase the proportion of cases handled successfully 
at that level. This would exert a downward sh ift in union activ ity  
in respect of legal representation and may contribute towards 
a deceleration of the trend towards centralisation induced by 
the shifts in collective bargaining.
16 In a critique of trade union function published in Germany
3
during the second half of the 1970s i t  was proposed that unions 
w ill pursue whatever course is open to them to influence the situation 
with which the ir member groups are faced. In the German context, 
th is  has involved a greater emphasis on collective bargaining 
policy than the p o litica l pursuit of greater industrial democracy.
The recognition of the lim its in terms of returns to the membership 
in the short and medium term of the pursuit of broad p o litica l 
objectives has forced the trade union movement as a whole to concentrate 
on attacking the power of business at company and local level 
through what might be more s im p lis tica lly  termed the "B ritish  
trad ition" of collective bargaining. Certainly no evidence emerged 
from the present survey to contradict th is  proposition, and the 
high ranking of collective bargaining policy by the respondents 
would seem to support i t .
17 As part of the survey, respondents were invited to rank 12 
trade union policy objectives in order of predominance at the ir 
particular level within the organisation. The twelve were:
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Employment Law
Production/Technology
Training/Apprenticeship
Education Programme 
Local Policy 
Regional Policy
Social Policy 
Welfare Law
Psychology/Sociology/Education
Science
Collective Bargaining 
Works Constitution 
Economic Policy
The responses of d iffe ren t levels of union organisation in the 
different locations were grouped then cross-referred by means 
of correlation analysis, the results of which are presented in 
the Appendix to th is  study. Those areas of organisation whose 
activ ities  so ranked are shown to be very highly s ign ifican tly  
correlated with those of others seem to reflect common union 
structure and function. They are:
IGBE Ruhr 
IGBE Other4 
OTV D istricts 
OTV Districts 
IGBE Ruhr 
IGBE Hannover 
IGBE Hannover 
IGBE Other 
IGBE Other
IGBE Hannover 
IGBE Hannover
u
OTV Regions 
IGBE Rheinland 
OTV Districts 
OTV Regions 
OTV Districts
H
OTV Regions 
OTV Districts
The responses of the interviewees were intended to give an indication 
of the ir perception of the union's organisational structure and 
the ac tiv ities  they would wish to carry out from the ir position 
in i t .  The information provided by th is area of questioning 
would not sustain rigourous s ta tis tica l analysis, but the 
rank correlation of the group responses is thought to o ffer a 
broad illu s tra tio n  of the commonality of ac tiv ity  and power within 
the union organisations within the survey and the pressures upon 
d ifferent parts of the union structure, in many instances irrespective 
of industrial differences.
18 Finally, the survey demonstrates that the structure and function 
of a trade union organisation are governed by factors other than
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the p o litica l and ideological trad itions of the country or even 
industry; that the day-to-day ac tiv itie s  and p rio ritie s  of the 
organisation at different levels are determined largely in response 
to essentially " local" pressures and conditions, be they from 
within the organisation its e lf  or external to i t .  This suggests 
that the union organisations within the survey are conscious of 
and, in varying degrees, actively responding to the immediate 
requirements of the working membership, in contrast and as a counter­
balance to the increasing p o lit ic a l and industrial drive towards 
greater centralisation.
The empirical observations presented above are considered, in 
conjunction with the propositions put forward by previous chapters, 
as a basis for hypothesis on the comparative study of trade union 
structure and function. The pursuit of such analysis is discussed 
in the fin a l chapter.
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1 Turner op c i t
2 The concept of ’ r u l e s 1 within a system of industr ia l  re la t ion s  was f i r s t
devised by J T Dunlop, Industr ia l  Relat ions Systeas ,  1958, and more fu l l y
explored by Flanders (1965) op c i t
n
3 WSI Studien Be tr ieb l i che  Beschaf t igungspo l i t ik  und gewerkschaft l i che  
Interessenvertretung ,  1977
it IGBE Other comprised responses from o f f i c e r s  other than
R E F E R E N C E S
i ) IGBE Ruhr
i i ) IGBE Rheinland
i i i ) IGBE Hannover
CHAPTER 7
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Conclusions
I The decade of the 1970s represents a period of considerable 
change for the free trade union movement of Britain and Europe.
The period was marked by deep economic recession which brought 
even higher levels of in fla tion  and unemployment. Such in s ta b ility  
persuaded governments to ins titu te  increased levels of corporate 
control over wages and incomes, accompanied by in itia tive s  to 
regulate employment conditions and job security. In Britain the 
1970s saw a series of legislative moves to render industrial relations 
and practices to bring them more consistently in line with the 
perceived national interest. Whilst the 1974 Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act (TULRA), the 1975 Employment Protection Act (EPA), 
consolidated in 1978 (EPCA), and the 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act (HASAWA) established and extended collective rights, enforce­
ment of the provisions of the legislation was confined to procedure 
through the industria l tribunal or the Central Arbitration Committee 
of ACAS. This undoubtedly reflected the need of the legislature 
to support the non-judicial voluntary system of industrial relations 
whilst meeting the popular requirements of collective responsibility, 
recognition and control. In the fie ld  of individual employee rights 
however, the effect of jud ic ia l intervention at the levels of Appeal 
has been to greatly augment the lega lis tic  application of the stat­
utory provisions. The consequent reliance of individual employees 
upon professional legal representation has stretched the resources 
of trade unions whilst d ilu ting the ir impact as collective organ­
isations.
The Codes of Practice issued by ACAS under the statutory provisions 
served to establish and support a 'model' of good industrial 
relations. The professionalisation of personnel and industrial 
relations management was to take account of these recommendations 
at a time when economic recession and diminishing p ro fita b ility  
were forcing employers to review the ir bargaining arrangements.
Company restructures, advances in technology, the introduction
of work study and job evaluation a ll contributed to an integrat­
ion of trade unions at plant and company level as part of 
the rationalisation of the "largely fragmented and informal" 
patterns of collective bargaining.
In contrast, the TUC’s involvement in policy-making at governmental 
level lost c re d ib ility  and impact once the value of incomes 
policy was called into question by its  constituent unions.
Without statutory or trad itional support as in Germany, the 
B ritish TUC enjoys l i t t le  bargaining power at national level 
but fo r the consensus of its  membership. At local and regional 
levels, trade union nominees are participant on other quasi­
jud ic ia l or administrative bodies such as industrial tribunal 
panels, the Manpower Services Commission, the Health and Safety 
Commission, ACAS, the Equal Opportunities Commission and the 
Race Relations Board. Each of these bodies, independent of 
government, fu lly  recognises trade union responsibility in 
its  tr ip a r t ite  structure, and i t  would be reasonable to assume 
that these structures would remain unchanged for some time 
to come. I t  is through such bodies that trade unions can 
exert influence outside the more d irectly  representative 
collective bargaining channels. Conversely, they have ensured 
union acquiesence in decision-making over a considerable range 
of employment and welfare issues which the traditional method 
of industrial bargaining would have scarcely delivered.
Over the same period, and continuing at the time of the empirical 
investigations which support th is strategy, the German trade 
union movement had been under comparable pressure to control 
aggressive and sectoral wage bargaining in favour of corporate 
s ta b ility . The collapse of the "Concerted Action" forum in 
1977 contributed to the now transnational academic debate 
of trade union behaviour and the management of con flic t as 
a central feature of industrial relations.
I t  was an original hypothesis of th is study that the behavioural 
patterns of trade unions are a function of structural factors
j
which are determined by social history and po litica l trad ition . 
Secondly that the structural characteristics of trade unions 
underlie the relationship between the distribution of power 
and the conflic t inherent within the industrial relations
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system. Thirdly that the po litica l and social history of 
a trade union movement s ign ifican tly  influence the structures, 
perceptions, aims and methods of the organisations which compose 
i t .  Fourthly, that conventional trade union behaviour is 
determined by trad itional sources and distribution of power 
which enable different structures to pursue different objectives 
within the overall purpose of trade unionism.
The intention of the study undertaken is to investigate the 
principles contained in these various hypotheses by specific 
reference to the conditions in which the trade unions found 
themselves in the 1970s. From this i t  should be possible 
to draw up guidelines for the cross-national comparison of 
trade union behaviour and function which take into account 
the whole system of industrial relations in its  historical 
context by reference to its  structural development and character.
I I  The histories of the trade union organisations in Germany 
and Britain reveal a fundamental divergence of principle which 
may only superfic ia lly , and in the most recent period of economism, 
have been become veiled: that the trade unionism of Britain 
grew out of and fought to sustain the right to combine for 
bargaining purposes under capitalism; and that the movement 
in Germany developed amongst a proletariat whose ideology 
was essentially socia lis t and whose trade unionism was therefore 
an instrument of revolution.
The British trad ition of localised collective bargaining underlies 
the fragmented structure and seemingly limited ideology of the trade 
union movement. Once nationally organised, the movement became 
associated with social reform, but its  parliamentary a c tiv ity  remains 
ch iefly converged with industrial affa irs or other matters which 
d irec tly  impinge upon its  own bargaining role. This functional 
lim ita tion so establised in history confers upon British trade union­
ism a reputation of conservatism and protectionism which has consis­
ten tly  denounced as middle class ideologies of syndicalism, industrial 
unionism and the general strike.
The British trade unions have no overwhelming desire to govern.
Labour governments have brought only limited advantages to the 
industrial bargaining system, and have caused considerable conflicts 
of interest for the trade union movement, both as the proponent 
of wage restra int and as the major employer through the growing 
Welfare State. Not equipped or designed to address themselves to 
national issues, the unions are frequently regarded as contributory 
in no small way to the country's economic decline, whilst perceived 
as unwilling to co-operate in any corporate attempts to mitigate 
or reverse the damage in flic te d  from whatever source. In effect 
the sectoral self-perception of British trade unionism and the sympto­
matic fragmentation of industry bargaining has lent weight to the 
view that free collective bargaining is per se a negative social 
force:
"Work groups capable of mobilizing the necessary power 
have broken through a re la tive ly  larger area of reg­
ulation and imposed a re la tive ly  smaller one more 
favourable to themselves. And when faced with gaps 
in the normative system in respect of certain of 
the ir aspirations groups with suffic ient power have 
introduced the ir own. In both situations the rev­
ision and creation of norms has been improvised and 
piecemeal, has rested on a,very small area of agree­
ment and has not been related to larger units of 
regulation. This splintering of the normative order 
within the establishment and the piecemeal, hotch­
potch additions to i t ;  a ll determined by the accidents 
of power d istribution rather than by agreed principles 
of any sort, has greatly increased the probability of
o
disorder and loss of control . . . . "  (Fox & Flanders, 1969)
Traditionally p o lit ic a lly  organised and motivated, the German trade 
union movement suffers less from a reliance upon the primacy of 
collective bargaining than a heritage of ideological d iversity on 
the role of the mass organisation under capitalism. The p o litica l 
fact of alternative theories of socialist and catholic unionism 
instituted a p o litica l polarisation of the labour force in respect 
of the fundamental premises of the movement, its  objectives and 
its  methods. To that extent, the movement remained fragmented up 
to the time of its  p o litica l dissolution during the fascist period,
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and, by historical example, i t  is evident that sectionalism entered 
into and undermined the development of localised collective bargaining.
Organisationally, the German trade unions were commonly character­
ised by trade divisions, with a high degree of central control; 
designed to serve p o litica l idealism and aims, this model detracted 
considerably from effective plant bargaining, where the workgroup 
had l i t t l e  authority to pursue more pragmatic but uncoordinated 
goals. The ideological struggles which characterise the history 
of the German labour movement therefore predetermine modern trade 
union theory on the use of the strike, collective bargaining, and, 
indeed, democratic control of the union organisation. The f i r s t  
of these, the use of the strike, and particularly the General Strike, 
remained controversial with the socia list movement up to 1906.
Up to this point, the Party had remained sceptical as to the value 
of 'pa rtia l* action, but then conceded that the risk of a fa iled 
p o litica l strike by dint of organisational weakness was of no value. 
Only at th is point were the trade unions able to take control of 
industrial policy without direct party po litica l interference.
By contrast, and to the overall detriment of trade unionism as a 
unified social force, the catholic unions espoused industrial peace 
as a v ita l principle of social order. In 1889, the mineworkers 
had demonstrated the power of common action and the organisational 
requirements of i t ,  but in the context of a limited and defined 
objective. In spite of th is , however, many other sim ilar attempts 
were unsuccessful. The combined fa ilu re  of the major organisations 
to articulate and direct the mood and motivation of working groups 
denied them the fa c i l i ty  of the strike as an effective instrument, 
either for social change, or in support of industrial bargaining.
Whilst the unions remained sectorally divided, the employers had 
established an effective and comprehensive coordination structure, 
which ensured the ir supremacy in the bargaining process. The notion 
held by labour leaders that such a powerful coordination of capital 
interests would concede parity on po litica l grounds was, at best, 
naive. The common policy of cooperation with employers and govern­
ment which became strong during the f i r s t  war presumed that parity 
of interests in social, p o litica l and industrial a ffa irs would develop 
through goodwill, rather than the exercising of power. The new 
mass ideology of neo-conservatism which this embraced led the trade
unions unguarded into compliance with National Socialism. The legacy 
of sectionalism, which had stymied the articulation of an effective 
opposition to the industrial and p o litica l power blocks of the Right, 
was at the same time evidence of and a vehicle for the ideology and 
commitment of a trade union movement which owed much to its  po litica l 
mentors.
The essential principle of a centrally organised trade union movement 
for the purposes of securing social and economic reform and the fa ir  
and effective representation of the interests of working people was 
carried over into the re-establishment of trade union organisation 
in West Germany in 1945. Espousing for the f i r s t  time party po litica l 
neutra lity, trade union leaders recognised also the strategic and 
organisational strength to be derived from effective collective bargain­
ing at a ll levels of industrial organistion, not merely as a means 
to an alternative p o litica l end, but as an economic and social object­
ive in its  own righ t.
I l l  The basis of trade union organisation in the new West German state 
was therefore a synthesis of the po litica l heritage of the old main­
stream organisations with the bargaining principles of British trade 
unionism. More significant perhaps is that the new social and economic 
order of the Social Market Economy adopted from Anglo Saxon liberalism 
the concept of the society as a community in which individual rights 
and responsibilities are honoured. In this new model, the principles, 
economic efficiency and humanity are coordinated through the democratic 
control by pressure groups. The new status afforded such pressure 
groups emerges from the requirement of the mass society to create 
mass organisations to support i t :  the model Einheitsgewerkschaft
and Volkspartei. The obvious implication of this fo r trade unionism 
as a social and p o litica l movement is that the primacy of social 
harmony and equity set certain lim itations upon group a c tiv ity  which 
are then subject to scrutiny by the state be i t  the legislature, 
executive or judiciary. Within the British po litica l trad ition , 
the post-war Keynesian social and economic order underlined the 
abstention of the state from industrial relations, within an overall 
corporate structure, pressuring the state not to be competent to 
regulate sa tis fac to rily  the bargaining between groups. Indeed the 
reverse is deemed more desirable, that independent inter-group
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bargaining provides a check on government behaviour and objectives.
This divergence of p o litica l principle between the two countries 
in respect of the public functions of the trade unions as major interest 
groups is like ly  to condition the ir own self-perception and organ­
isational p r io r it ie s . In West Germany, the socio-political function 
of trade unions as an integral component of the balanced social order 
of modern pluralism suggests unequivocally the maintenance of the 
present cap ita lis t system and the consequential institu tiona lisa tion  
of conflicts of interest between recognised groups. In B rita in, 
the p o litica l function of the trade unions is less comfortably pre­
scribed. Principly, the purpose and tradition of British trade unionism 
rest upon the need to protect the terms and conditions of worker 
groups. In the short-term, th is  implies the maintenance by the trade 
unions of the cap ita lis t order no less so than for the ir German counter­
parts. I t  is unclear whether either movement is able to actively 
work towards a non-capitalist p o litica l and economic system as a 
long-term objective.
The pragmatic pursuit by B ritish trade unions of short-term objectives 
at the industrial rather than the po litica l level is bolstered by 
the commitment of the parties to obey the rules of bargaining at 
that level. This self-determining mechanism reflects the legal status 
of trade union a c tiv ity  in Britain as compatible with voluntariStic 
regulation; which contrasts with that of trade union a c tiv ity  in 
Germany, as determined by the theory of equity between groups and 
thereby res tric tive  of the use of the strike and lock-out.
The nature of self-regulation imposes a conservatism upon collective 
bargaining as both parties endeavour to adhere to the rules. The 
degree to which they can compromise in pursuit of consensus depends 
on the ir a b ility  to persuade the ir respective memberships towards 
that commitment. This proposition has implications, f i r s t  for the 
internal democratic structure of union organisations, secondly, for 
the notional p r io r ity  of the 'national in terest1 or the p a rtia lly  
planned economy, wherein unions are required to seek consensus on 
issues outside the ir immediate term of reference. The question then 
arises as to how unions may achieve internal governmental structures 
suited to the pursuit of such objectives.
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I t  may be argued in the converse that in a system of industrial 
relations where reliance upon voluntary regulation is less evident, 
the requirement for internal democracy and consensus is also reduced.
In the absence of p o litica l or industrial con flic t, the role of the 
trade union is reduced to that of 'communicator'. However, the tota l 
absence of con flic t at a ll levels is in practice unlikely, and the 
critic ism  levelled at the trade union organisations of Britain and 
Germany, particu la rly  in the 1970s, was largely on account of their 
apparent "integrative pragmatism", associated with the avoidance 
of con flic t, leading to the ir greater depoliticisation for want of 
a p o litica l theory. The suggestion that the integration of the unions 
into the corporate state its e lf  opens up new bargaining horizons 
remains largely unsubstantiated.. The apparent new opportunity to 
advance the class struggle at a political-economic level is delusion 
i f  i t  does not meet the aspirations of the membership.
Irrespective of whether the trade unions in Britain or Germany would 
wish to engage in p o litica l con flic t in order to secure a redis­
tribu tion of social and economic power within the present p lu ra lis tic  
p o litica l order, there is some doubt as to the adequacy of the demo­
cratic structures within the organisations support such a course 
of action. I t  is arguable that the internal democracy of trade unions 
is not organised in such a way as to provide for a mobilisation of 
the membership in support of policies of opposition to either industry 
or the state, but for the role played by the left-wing activists 
inside and outside the union organisation, which activate the machinery 
of democracy by factionalism. I t  is however important to observe 
that the modern trade unions possess the organisational structures 
to remain the dominant representatives of the workforce. The s ta b ility  
of those structures is maintained by disciplinary rules, the offer 
of welfare and commercial benefits, and in Brita in, to a limited 
degree also by the operation of the 'closed shop'. I t  is speculative 
to suppose that such measures alone w ill be enough to hold together 
the membership under a ll p o litica l circumstances, in the absence 
of some mechanism of internal democratic control. In Brita in, the 
predominance of collective bargaining as a trade union function at 
local and industria l level has been maintained by effective workplace 
representation. This trad itional and accepted form of worker
involvement in the major a c tiv ity  and purpose of the union has provided 
the medium for democratic expression, which can enhance as well as 
undermine the strength of the leadership.
IV In the ligh t of such comment, observations and speculation on the 
possible interaction o f.co llective bargaining and the democratic structure 
of the trade union organisation, the empirical work carried out in 
Germany in 1979 concentrated on the activ ities of the fu ll-tim e  
officers of the selected unions in respect of collective bargaining, 
welfare and legal services, and other such methods available to them 
to maintain democracy and so lidarity  within their section of the 
organisation. As a resu lt, anumberof features of trade union a c tiv ity  
within the Einheitsgewerkschaft model drew parallels with behavioural 
characteristics more tra d itio n a lly  and h is to rica lly  associated with 
the British trade union organisation.
Collective bargaining and employment law issues were found to pre­
dominate at a ll levels of union ac tiv ity , irrespective of the nature 
of the industry or the member structure. The pattern of collective 
bargaining was determined by factors which varied between industries 
and over time, ie
the industrial and commercial structures 
the production processes
the employment legislation applied to the industry
the time allocated by FTOs to the pursuit of local 
bargaining.
Third party intervention in collective bargaining by way of arbi­
tration or conciliation, associated as a method of con flic t regulation 
with the principle of social equity, which lay behind the Einheits­
gewerkschaft model, was also reported to be less useful to f u l l ­
time officers, although s t i l l  regarded as preferable to the strike.
The processing of individual member claims under the provisions of 
the employment legislation was encroaching increasingly upon union 
time whilst contributing l i t t l e  to the development of collective 
action and so lidarity . The complexity and consequent weakness of 
the law in th is regard persuaded the union organisations within the 
survey to direct the ir e fforts towards lobbying the po litic ians, 
not so much for social change, but for industrial purposes.
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Alternative sources of influence or authority beyond the ir members' 
support was found to be of limited value ot the officers interviewed, 
and that which was available was largely industry-related. Further­
more, i t  seems unlikely from the evidence that the officers had any
greater access to information related to the ir industry or sector 
of industry than their counterparts in the major British trade unions.
Under pressure of po litica l and economic change during the 1970s, 
the p o litica l and industrial influence, whether real or apparent, 
wielded by the Einheitsgewerkschaft as a model feature of the Social 
Market Economy, and therefore a ‘ social e l i te ',  had begun to wane, 
and by the particular time of the investigation towards the end of 
that period, trade union o ffic ia ls  recognised the need to harness 
members' support as the only real source of power available to the ir
organisations. I f  such support were not automatically forthcoming
out of union discipline and trad itional so lidarity , then the quasi- 
democratic instruments of greater communication, accessibility of 
fu ll-tim e  officers and more frequent forums for open debate and comment 
had to be made available. Union officers fe lt  a personal responsi­
b i l i t y  fo r effecting union policy, to which end they required cred­
ib i l i t y ,  to be seen to perform a unique function in the interests 
of the ir members. I t  was found that, in the perceptions of the 
officers, union function or effectiveness could, for th is purpose, 
be extended (horizontally) or intensified (ve rtica lly ).
Any changes in function were observed to be accompanied by adaptations 
of the organisational structures; furthermore, in order to retain 
the s ta b ility  of the whole organisation, such adaptations must 
balance, ie the tendency to centralise operations in pursuit of one 
objective must be counterbalanced by decentralisation over other 
issues, lest the mechanisms for ensuring member support be sacrificed.
From these observations of p o litica l history and trade union practice, 
drawn primarily from the experiences of the 1970s, i t  is possible 
to advance a theory of trade union ac tiv ity , based on the in te r­
relation of organisational structure and function.
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I f  one method of trade union function loses c re d ib ility , then, i t  
is suggested, union organisations w ill tend to develop new dimensions 
to the ir ac tiv ity  as a means of maintaining their social purpose.
During the 1970s, union organisations in both Britain and West Germany 
were able to do this in varying degrees by exploiting openings created 
by legislative change to advance or intensify their bargaining role.
They have been c ritic ised  from time to time for the ir lack of p o litica l 
insight yet the ir reluctance to aggressively pursue the aim of a new 
p o litica l order does not presume the ir acquiescence in the status 
quo at a ll levels, nor the ir in a b ility  to articulate opposition at 
some of them.
By extending the ir p o litica l role, unions may be instrumental in 
preserving the p lu ra lity  on which the ir central function of bargaining 
depends, although the fine balance between the "integrative pragmatism" 
of aggressive wage bargaining and the role of trade unions as autonomous 
po litica l in itia to rs  has proved a d if f ic u lt  one to strike .
The degree of integration of the trade union movement into the corporate 
system may be one factor which determines its  a b ility  to strike such 
a balance; another may be detected in the implications of corporatism 
for trade union structure. I t  has already been proposed that the 
integration of trade unions into the regulatory machinery of state 
or industry by the ir compliance to incomes policies or other forms 
of institu tionalised cooperation requires at the same time the 
acquiescence of the membership and a compatible bureaucratic structure. 
Conversely, trade union militancy is dependent upon a decentralised 
decision-making system which can operate alongside the machinery 
for coordinated action.
The changing patterns of collective bargaining which have come about 
in both Germany and Britain are obviously central to the changes in 
structures and functions of union organisations. Collective bargain­
ing remains the most meaningful method of trade unionism for the 
worker-member, and is to that extent a primary instrument of democracy. 
Any changes in the system of industrial relations which a lter or 
diminish the collective bargaining structure would need to be met 
by the trade unions by adaptations in the ir structures or functions
V Towards a Framework o f A n a lys is : Trade Union Behaviour
to sustain the ir representative role and minimise the adverse effects 
of change on the v ita l ity  of the membership. In terms of collective 
bargaining therefore there is of necessity a relationship between 
the democratic and bargaining structures of the trade unions.
3
Writing as early as 1962, Turner pinpointed the complex link between 
trade union structures and the ir functions:
"We have at any rate, two sets of trade union 
problems. On the one hand, there are problems, 
in a sense, of form. This includes the relation 
between trade unionism and the general labour 
movement, between individual trade unions them­
selves, and between the individual union and its  
members. On the other hand, there are problems of 
policy - in effect of what unions do, should do, 
or of why they do i t .  In any organisation, form 
and function condition, i f  they do not quite deter­
mine each other. So the two groups of problems can­
not rea lly be separated."
In considering Turner's term "form", i t  is useful to refer back also
4
to the Webbs' defin ition of trade union structures:
i)  Democratic structure - termed "morphology" by Turner 
- the defin ition of trade union by membership boundaries 
and d istribution;
i i )  Trade union government - the systems of representation 
of that membership and structures for decision-making;
i i i )  Inter-union relations - the channels fo r cooperation 
and riva lry  between organisations in pursuit of trade 
union objectives.
Each of these suggested aspects of trade union structure determines 
or is determined by the organisational requirements to meet the wishes 
of the member group. Such wishes govern also the purpose or function 
of the organisation, defined by the Webbs as corporate se lf-he lf, 
particu larly  with respect to the maintaining or improving of conditions 
of employment. This relationship between the structures of trade 
union organisations and the ir functions is thought to be fundamental
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to the s ta b ility  of the industrial relations system and worthy of 
investigation within an analytical framework.
In order to define trade union function, i t  may be argued that the 
determination of the levels and dimensions of ac tiv ity  is its e lf  
a function of the methods chose by the unions to achieve the ir object­
ives. In the ir evidence to the Donovan Commission, the TUC offered
5
the following de fin itive  scheme for trade union behaviour :
E ffic ient
bargaining
structure
Education/
Research
Communication
High Membership
E ffic ient
Organisation
Representati veness
Means to 
bargain
Objectives
Methods
Used
The means to achieve trade union objectives at any given level of 
of operation may be described as trade union "power". The re la tion­
ships between trade unions and other actors in the industrial relations 
system, and therefore trade union function, are governed by the 
actor’ s a b ility  to exert "power" over others. This rather broad 
term thus requires closer examination and distinction for i t  to 
be of analytical use.
VI Towards a Framework of Analysis: Power and Authority in
Industrial Relations Systems
The property of power in a social relationship has been defined
as the possib ility  of one or a group of actors imposing his or the ir
w ill upon others to secure binding obligations within a system of
6collective organisation . Power can only be said to exist where
recalcitrance on the part of opposing parties is met with positive
or negative sanction, irrespective of the source or agency of such 
7
sanction. The d istribu tion of power sources may be uneven, but
in the context of an interdependence among actors, 'power over' becomes
8an exchangeable quantity. The exercise of power in exchange rests 
upon a complex system of communication to exact compliance from the
9
subordinate.
In the ligh t of h istorica l discussion, trade union recognition, as 
the basis of communication in the industrial relations system, is 
thought to be an important conditioning factor of trade union function: 
in any social or p o litica l context, a trade union must establish 
functions which are recognised as desirable and which cannot be carried 
out by other groups. Such desirab ility  and exclusivity need not 
necessarily emanate from the same source, but must be acknowledged 
by one or more other actor groups in the same system in order to 
lend c re d ib ility  to trade union activ ity . This suggests that the 
raison d'etre of trade unionism is self-perpetuation: by extending 
the ir function in both scope and depth, trade unions adopt recog­
nition as both the instrument and the objective of the ir behaviour.
Within the industrial relations system the 'power' variables can 
be said to operate at two levels of analysis. The f i r s t  level is 
termed the micro- or sub-system analysis, which identifies the levels 
of power related to ac tiv ities  within the trade union organisation 
resulting from the interaction of membership and leadership groups.
The macro-level of analysis deals with the interaction of these trade 
union power centres with actors in the system. Thus the 'power' 
which a union administration requires to function within the system 
is a property of its  relationship with actors within its  own organisa­
tional sub-system (trade union officers and members) and with other 
actors in the industrial relations system as a whole (employers and
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government bodies). The leadership qualities necessary fo r a trade 
union to function within a context of responsible trade unionism 
in an integrated state, as characterised by institutionalised industrial 
conflic t and the welfare state, are recognised as s ign ifican tly  con­
tributing to the property of 'power' so described, as the re la tion­
ship between the union administration and the membership is otherwise 
10eroded. This point was brought out clearly in the work carried
11out by Kirkwood and Mewes on the 'mediating role' of trade union 
leadership in Germany:
" .......  the power of a union movement in the welfare
state seems inextricably tied to the a b ility  and
effectiveness with which its  leadership exercises 
a mediating function between the interests of its  
members on the one hand and those of business and 
the state on the other."
Thus, i t  may be argued that the a b ility  of a trade union to function
on one level is d irectly  influenced by its  behaviour on another,
and the key or pivot on which the 'model' hangs together is the
c re d ib ility  of the administration to succeed in its  aims. In terms
of trade union 'power' within the system, the union bureaucracy requires
legitimacy in order to act, irrespective of the source of such le g it-
12imacy. Legitimate power in the form of authority or influence 
furnishes the macro-system of industrial relations and the micro­
system of trade union organisation with an order based on consensus
13or rights of sanction (d iscip line). Beyond this 'legitimate order',
the union administration may have the resources to grant i t  the power
14 15 16of coercion or threat, termed 'ille g itim a te ' or 'naked' power,
dependent to ta lly  fo r its  effectiveness upon the enforcement of purely
negative sanctions. In an advanced system of industrial relations,
as in European and American nations, the trade union organisation
requires strength in terms of so lidarity  and finance as a source
of illeg itim ate  power in the last resort, when rights of authority
and influence are denied. As a de fin itive  factor of trade union
power, legitimacy thus becomes a central feature of trade union
function, both as an end and as a means, within the union organisation
and beyond.
I t  is suggested that legitimate power is derived essentially from 
the regulations, positive and normative, of the system or sub-system.
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Its realisation is furthermore dependent upon the machinery for com- 
17munication employed by the would-be powerful agent. This would 
suggest that trade union function, as a reflection of the power sources 
available, is codetermined by:
i)  the structural and regulatory characteristics of the system 
and sub-system which distribute rights of authority and 
influence and the resources of negative sanction; and
i i )  the machinery by means of which such rights are com­
municated to the subordinate and the la tte r 's  means to
articulate opposition.
The articulation of opposition within an organisation, whether real 
or apparent, may be expressed through the democratic or represent­
ative channels which run parallel to the administrative structures.
How such channels operate and the legitimacy they afford the admin­
istration w ill determine the basis of authority and influence wielded, 
be i t  by union consensus or discipline.
Finally, i t  could be argued that the conditions which have given
rise to certain structural and regulatory features of the industrial 
relations systems of d ifferent countries are also responsible for 
the variety of issues and modes of action available to govern be­
haviour of the actors involved. The example of the 1970s, a period 
of rising unemployment in both Britain and West Germany met with 
progressive changes in the legal regulation of employment conditions 
witnessed an increase in union recognition, particu larly  in the work­
place, an extension in the scope of collective bargaining, and the 
consequent "professionalisation" of industrial relations, the last 
particularly in Britain where employee relations had remained hitherto, 
for the most part, a minor responsibility of line management.
In both countries, the consolidation of shop floor bargaining and 
the development of the steward system represent changes in the struct­
ural features of the actor components of union and employer organ­
isations, as well as in the range of issues dealt with in the interests 
of those represented, within the framework of law, collective bargain­
ing and economic change.
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Thus trade union function, ie the methods they employ and the ac tiv ities
they pursue, is determinable by the interaction of the structural
and regulatory characteristics of the particular system in the
context of given or short term issues. I f  the union structure
is demonstrably compatible with the regulations which govern its
relations with other actors (employers and government bodies), the
suggestion is that union recognition within the system is high and
therefore its  legitimate power is potentia lly high. With such resources,
the union is in a better position to exchange advantages (positive 
18sanction) with the employers and is therefore like ly  to take 
19a more cooperative stand in negotiations. Union structure is
subject to an internal "trade-off" of power within the organisation,
such that i f  internal cohesion is not apparent, the union structure
is less like ly  to attain compatibility with the regulations of
the system. I f  a reduction in union recognition is the result,
then the union may be forced to bargain on the basis of negative
sanction at its  own cost. The trade-off between the trade union
20and other actors w ill be of losses rather than of advantages, 
and the bargaining situation w ill be competitive rather than coop­
erative.
The pattern of relationships can be shown diagramatically in the
form of a multi-dimensional "model". The term "model" is chosen
here to describe an analytical framework, but i t  is not intended
to mislead the reader by suggesting that i t  offers any more than a
demonstration of the location of certain unstructured relationships
between selected variables. The model is of no predictive value,
21but merely seeks to illu s tra te  the hypotheses discussed above.
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VII The 1970s brought economic and po litica l pressure to bear upon 
both the German (centralised) and the British (fragmented) models 
of trade union organisation.
The German culture produced a trade union tradition more highly 
po litic ised than that of B rita in , out of which was born the centrist 
principle of the Einheitsgewerkschaft. How far the 'in terests ' 
of working people extend beyond terms and conditions of employment 
in the 1970s' model of trade union representation in Germany is 
unclear, but i t  would be reasonable to presume that i t  includes 
a wider po litica l dimension. The British model of trade unionism 
has no such tradition and, whilst acknowledging its  structural 
diffic iencies in the p o litica l context, has never rea lly succeeded 
in imposing a reordering of its  ranks.
The polarity of the two structures was reflected in the aspects 
of the industrial relations systems which showed the highest degree 
of incompatibility with the structure during periods of economic 
and po litica l change. In the German case, the pressure on the 
Einheitsgewerkschaft structure has thrown into re lie f an incompat­
ib i l i t y  at the micro-level; that the pursuit of national objectives 
by the organisation threatens its  internal cohesion and means have 
to be found of representing the interests of the membership in 
membership rather than leadership terms. Such means are, however, 
hampered by the increase in the representation of member interests 
at the "grassroots^' on an individual, rather than collective basis 
by the processes of law.
In the British case, the incompatibility between the structure 
of the union organisation and the national interest is self-evident, 
but th is is unlikely to threaten internal cohesion in the short 
run whilst the union is able to concentrate on the pursuit of short­
term objectives which meet with the members' perceptions of the ir 
interests.
In both systems, i t  seems that the compatibility of the micro­
order (trade union structure) with the macro-order (industrial 
relations system) is more lik e ly  achieved when the issues are industrial 
rather than p o litic a l, since at the two levels, industrial effectiveness
is more immediate to the actor groups and sub-groups than po litica l 
change.
In industrial terms, then, compatibility within the German system 
would appear to be uncertain, i f  the structure of collective bargain­
ing fa ils  to respond to the collective interests of the member 
groups, thereby fa ilin g  to harness their potential power resources.
Any fa l l  in the degree of compatibility between the structure of 
the union and the changing industrial relations system w ill in itia te  
moves away from cooperative relations towards competition, and 
there is no evidence from the 1970s that the union structure is 
equipped to use the resource of negative sanction, eg the strike 
weapon, at the level of bargaining where i t  may be most effective.
By contrast, within the British system, any change in the perceptions 
by the workforce of the ir interests which removes the incidence 
of bargaining away from the traditional levels of group ac tiv ity  
is like ly  to diminish the use of negative sanctions in support 
of tradtional collective issues, thereby changing the nature of 
the power available within the union organisation and its  distribution.
I t  has been the purpose of this study to demonstrate that a relation­
ship exists between the trade union structure and function, and 
to indicate the nature of that relationship within the historical 
context of the industrial relations system in two countries. By 
observing the circumstances facing trade unions during the 1970s, 
and by investigating in particular, the activ ities  of selected 
organisation in West Germany, i t  has been possible to construct 
a simple dynamic model of trade union behaviour based on a number 
of hypotheses, that
trade union methods are constrained by the structural 
characteristics of the particular organisation, as related 
to the structures of other actors in the system and 
the conditions which regulate their relationship;
the structures of the actors within any industrial relations 
system, hence the nature of the relationship which exists 
between them, are largely predetermined by the social 
and p o litica l evolution of that system;
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the structural characteristics of trade unions prescribe 
the nature and d istribu tion of the power resource available 
to them, and thereby condition the levels of cooperation 
or conflic t potential in the industrial relations system;
the po litica l and social history of a trade union movement 
significantly influences the long and short term aims, 
objectives and methods of the organisations which compose 
i t ;
traditional trade union behaviour is determined by trad­
itional sources of power which enable the given structures 
of organisation to pursue particular objectives in the 
interests of the membership;
the s ta b ility  of the industrial relations system rests 
on the retention of a high degree of compatibility between 
the micro- and macro-level subsystems and the ir a b ility  
to continue to "trade" on give issues.
Whilst the model is not intended to possess any particular predictive 
quality, i t  is thought to o ffer a framework for future observations 
of trade union behaviour within comparative industrial relations 
systems by analysis of the internal and external 'trade o ff ' factors.
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APPENDIX
1 L ist of Trade Union Offices used in the interview surveys 
in 1978 and 1979.
2 Questionaires applied in
( i)  1979
( i i )  1978
3 Simple graphic presentations of the rank correlation of
union ac tiv ity  centres, as based on information obtained 
from Table 2 of the 1979 survey.
4 Executive functions and levels of responsibility : 
Constitution and Rules of GTB, IGBE and OTV.
5 Patterns of collective bargaining and union profiles at
the time of the empirical surveys.
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1 List of Trade Union Offices in West Germany which participated 
in the 1979 survey.
* Those also interviewed the previous year in a p ilo t survey. 
** Those available only fo r the p ilo t study in 1978.
APPENDIX
1.1 IG Bergbau und Energie
ii
Geschaftsstellen
Baden-Wurttemberg
Gartenstrasse 64 
7100 HEILBRONN
ii
Sudbayem
Schwanthalerstrasse 64 
8 MUNCHEN 2
Giessen
ii
Eichgartenallee 5 
6300 GIESSEN 1
Celle
Fuhrbergerstrasse 21 
31 CELLE
Helmstedt
ii
Sudstrasse 2 
3330 HELMSTEDT
Bezirke
Niedersachsen
Dreyerstrasse 6 
3000 HANNOVER
Rheinland
Otto-Brenner-Strasse 4 
5100 ALSD0RF
Kollege Schmidt
Kollege Kapfer
Kollege Lang
Kollege Rust
Kollege Steinbach
Kollege Hartwig
Kollegen W o lff ,  Hempel, Link
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Ruhr-Mitte
Schutzenbahn 11-13 
4300 ESSEN
Ruhr-Ost
Kronprinzenstrasse 95 
4600 DORTMUND
Kollege Baumer
Koliege Brenne
Hauptvorstand
Assistant to the Chairperson 
Officer for International Affairs Kollege W Muller'
,2 Gew. TextiI-Bekleidung
Verwaltungsstellen
Frankfurt a.M.
Wilhelm-Leuschner-Strasse 69-77 
6000 FRANKFURT a.M.
Fulda
Goethestrasse 11 
6400 FULDA
Marktredwitz
n
Durnbergerstrasse 34 
8590 MARKTREDWITZ
Kollege Truhe
Kollege Spriestersbach
Kollege Nuss
Augsburg**
Schaezlerstrasse 131/111 
8900 AUGSBURG
Kollege Paintner
Grenzland
Rheydterstrasse 328 
4050 MONCHENGLADBACH
Kollege Schiffers
Gronau-Schuttorf
Am Ollenkamp 1 
4432 GRONAU/WESTFALEN
H
Hof-Munchberg-Naila
Weissenburgstrasse 11 
8670 HOF-
Bocholt
Wesemannstrasse 10 
4290 BOCHOLT
Kollege Cosse
Kollege Taubald
Kollege Radenaker
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Bezirke
Frankfurt a.M.
Wilhelm-Leuschner-Strasse 69-77 
6000 FRANKFURT a.M.
ii
Sudbayern**
Schaezlerstrasse 13£/III 
8900 AUGSBURG
Kollege Kaiser
Kollege Anders
Nordbayern
Weissenburgstrasse 11 
8670 HOF 2
ii
Munster-Arnsberg
Bahnhofstrasse 15 
4400 MUNSTER/WESTFALEN
Nordrhein
Brucknerallee 11 
4050 MONCHENGLADBACH
Kollege Gosel
Kollege Schewzyk
Kollege Georgi
Hauptvorstand
Officer fo r Economic and 
Womens Affairs
Kollegin Dr W Kruer-Buchholz*
,3 Gew. Offent.Dienste, Transport u. Verkehr
Kreisverwaltungen
Wilhelmshaven
Kielerstrasse 63 
2940 WILHELMSHAVEN
Bottrop-Gladbeck
Kirchellenerstrasse 60 
4250 BOTTROP
Verden-Rotenburg/Syke-
Diepholz-Osterholz
Nikolaiwall 18 
3090 VERDEN/ALLER
a
Nurnberg
Am Kornmarkt 5-7 
8500 NURNBERG
Kollege KobeIt
Kollege Oles
Kollege Berkelmann
Kollege S p itznage l
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Fulda
Goethestrasse 11 
6400 FULDA
Landshut
ti
Hans-Bockler-Strasse 1 
8300 LANDSHUT
Koln
H
Hans-Bockler-Platz 1 
5000 KOLN
Frankfurt a.M.
Wilhelm-Leuschner-Strasse 69-77 
6000 FRANKFURT a.M.
ii
Munster
Bahnhofstrasse 6 
4400 MUNSTER/WESTFALEN
Bezirke
Landesbezirk Bayern
Schwanthalerstrasse 64 
8000 MUNCHEN
Weser-Ems
Bahnhofsplatz 22-28 
2800 BREMEN
Nordrhein-Westfalen I
Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse 34-38 
4000 DUSSELDORF
Nordrhein-Westfalen IIti
Bruckstrasse 48 
4630 BOCHUM
Hessen
Wilhelm-Leuschner-Strasse 69-77 
6000 FRANKFURT a.M.
Hauptvorstand
Kollegen Hofmann, Malkmus
Kollege Huber
Kollege Kaiser
Kollege Jungmann
Kollege Rosenbach
Kollege Piesche (retired)
Kollege Hubrich
Kollege Mosch
Kollege Liersch
Kollegen Engel, Faust
Officer responsible for 
Constitutional Issues
Kollege H V itz th u m **
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In te rv ie w  Sheet
( i )  1979
Date .....................
Name .....................
Union ....................
Position in Union
Place of Interview
1 Wie lange sind Sie schon Bezirksleiter/Geschaftsftlhrer?
2 Wann sind Sie dieser Gewerkschaft beigetreten?
3 Haben Sie einmal einer anderen Gewerkschaft angehbrt?
Ja
Nein
KA
4 Wenn ja, welche war das?
5 Hatten Sie vorher schon andere hauptanrfliche Funktionen? 
Ja
Nein
KA
6 Welche waren diese Funktionen?
7 Sehen Sie die Chance, als hauptamtlicher Funktionar in
Ihrer Gewerkschaft weiter vorw&rts zu kommen?
Ja
Nein
KA/WN
8 Wenn ja, in welche Richtung geht Ihre Interesse?
9 Sehen Sie Chance bei anderen Gewerkschaften?
Ja
Nein
KA/WN
10 Hatten Sie Arbeitsniederlegungen schon miterlebt, bevor
Sie Ihre jetzige Stellung angenommen haben?
Ja
Nein
KA
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11 Und seitdem?
Jcl
Nein
KA
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1 Welche Gesetze schrSnken Ihre TStigkeit als    ein?
2 Erleichtern die Gesetze Ihre TStigkeit in irgendeine Weise? 
Ja
Nein
KA/WN
3 Wenn ja , kflnnten Sie n&her darauf eingehen?
4 Wtlrden Sie eine Einwirkung in Arbeitsstreitigkeiten (zum B 
Schlichtung/Arbeitsgericht) von d r itte r Seite positiv oder 
negativ beurteilen?
Positiv
Negativ
KA/WN
5 Gibt es Ihrer Meinung nach irgendwelche Verschiedenheiten 
bei denenSie Sich besonders gegen einen E ingriff einer 
dritten Partei wehren wtlrden?
Ja
Nein
KA/WN
6 Wenn ja , welche?
7 Gibt es irgendwelche andere Grtinde ausser der besonderen 
Beschaffenheit der Verschiedenheit, die Sie dazu veranlassen 
wUrde, den E ing riff einer dritten Partei abzulehnen?
Ja
Nein
I
KA/WN
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8 Wenn ja , welche?
ii
9 WUrden Sie gerne Anderungen am Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 
bzw. Personalvertretungsgesetz vornehmen?
Ja
Nein
KA/WN
10 Wenn ja , was im besonderen hStten Sie gerne verSndert?
11 Gibt es irgendwelche anderen Gesetze auf dem Gebiet der 
Arbeitsbeziehungen, die Sie gerne verabschiedet oder verftn- 
dert sehen wflrden?
12 In welcher Weise wtirden diese Ihre Arbeit erleichtern?
13 In welchem Ausmasse stUtzen Sie Sich eher auf informelle 
Kontakte als auf sch rift lich  niedergelegte Vereinbarungen 
in Ihren Beziehungen zu den folgenden?
(siehe Tabelle 1)
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Hat es Situationen egeben, in denen Sie sich auf Grund 
Ihrer Stellung in der Gewerkschaftshierarchie fru s tr ie r t 
fuhlten?
Ja
Nein
KA
ii
Wenn ja , lag der Grund h ierfur in den Richtlinien der
n
Gewerkschaft oder in den starken Person!ichkeiten Ihrer 
Vorgesetzten?
Richtlinien
Vorgesetzten
Unzutr
ii
Spielt sich der Einfluss starker Personlichkeiten 
innerhalb des Rahmens der Gewerkschaftseigenen Vorschriften 
ab, oder gehen sie aus Gewohnheitsrecht bei der Auslegung
H
Ihrer Funktion uber die Vorschriften hinaus?
Nach Vorschrift
Aus Gewohnheitsrecht
KA
Unzutr
Siehe Tabelle 2
Wenn Sie an die letzten 3 Monaten denken, von wem haben
a ii
Sie uberwiegend Rat/Unterstutzung eingeholt, urn Entsch- 
eidungen zu treffen?
Bitte in jedem Fall angeben
Tabelle 2
ii
Stehen Si e/in standi gem in f ormellem Kontakt mit wenigen/ 
vielen/allen/keinem der folgenden:
ii
a Betriebsrate
b Vertrauensleute
c Mitglieder der TK
n
d Mitglieder anderer Ausschusse
7 Wie o ft haben Sie letzten Monat einen Betrieb besucht?
8 Welche Art waren die Probleme, die Sie zu diesen Besuchen 
veranlassten?
9 Wie o ft im letzten Monat hatten Sie Kontakt mit einem
anderen_________  ?
n
10 Aus welchen Grunden tun Sie das?
11 Wie weitverbreitet is t  in diesem Bezirk/Ort das Problem
n ii
der organisation -KonnenSie mir schatzweise die Zahl 
der Arbeitnehmer angeben, die davon betroffen sind?
12 In welchen Branchen/orten is t  Sie besonders
ii
13 Sind die Betriebsrate in der Lage auf anderen Wegen Einfluss
n
auf solche Verhandlungen auszuuben?
Ja
Nein
Wenn ja , bei welchen Streitigkeiten/Angelegenheiten is t
ii
ihnen gelungen, gewissen Einfluss auszuuben?
14 Kommen Ihrer Erfahrung nach cinungsverschiedenheiten
n
zwischen hauptamtlichen und ehrenpautlichen Funktionaren 
auf?
Ja
Nein
15 Wenn ja , urn welche Probleme geht es dabei?
16 An wen wenden Sie Sich im Falle eines Scheiterns der
ii
Verhandlungen mit dem Arbeitgeber/um mehr Spielraum fur 
Ihre Verhandlungen zugestanden zu bekommen?
ii
17 Werden die Mitglieder uber alle/viele/wenige/keine Entschei-
jungen inform iert, die auf dieser Organisationsebene 
getroffen werden?
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18 Bei welchen Angelegenheiten werden sie inform iert, bei 
welchen nicht?
19 Sind Sie mit dem Interesse der Mitgliedschaft dieses 
Bezirks/Orts an ihrer Gewerkschft zufrieden/nicht zufrieden?
ii u
20 Wenn nicht, was meinen Sie, sind die Grunde fur dieses 
Desinteresse?
21 Wie weitverbreitet is t das Problem der Organisation? In 
welchen Branchen bzw. Orten is t sie besonders schwach?
I l l
298
1 Haben Sie ausser wahrend der Tarifverhandlungen andere
H
Kontakte mit Vertretern der Arbeitgeberverbande?
Ja
Nein
KA
ii ii
2 Konnen Sie Beispiele geben, fur Angelegenheiten, die zu
ii
solchen Kontakten fuhren?
ii
3 Wenn ja , konnten Sie mir eine Vorstellung von der Forma
und Haufigkeit dieser Kontakte geben: (Tabelle 3)
H
4 Konnen Sie die unterschiedlichen Formen dieser Kontakte 
b itte  aufzahlen?(siehe oben)
ii
5 i)  Konnen Sie unterschiedl iche Arten von Angelegen-
ii ii
heiten nennen die Sie mit den Fuhrungskraften der Unternefv 
men diskutieren?
i i )  Unterscheiden sie sich von denen der Arbeitgeberverb-
ii
anden?
n
6 Konnen Sie die unterschiedlichen Formen der Kontakte
it
mit den staatlichen Behorden b itte  aufzahlen? (Siehe 
oben. )
7 Wo tauchen Ihrer meinung nach die Problemebereiche
H
zwischen Ihnen und den staatlichen Behorden auf den 
verschiedenen Ebenen auf?
IV
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1 E n t h a l t e n  I h r e r  G e g e n s p i e l e r  b e i  d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r n  w a h r e n d
d e r  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  I h n e n  b e w u s s t  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  v o r ?
J a
N e i n
K A
2  W e n n  j a ,  w e l c h e  A r t  v o n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n ?
ii
3  U n d ,  I n  w e l c h e r  W e i s e  h a t t e n  d i e s e  I h n e n  g e n u t z t ,  w e n n
n
s i e  I h n e n  z u  B e g i n n  d e r  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  z u g e s t a n d e n  h a t t e n ?
n n
4  W e r d e n  I h n e n  a u c h  w a h r e n d  d e r  u b r i g e n  Z e i t  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  
v o r e n t h a l t e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
ii
5  E n t h a l t e n  d i e  B e h o r d e n  w o v o n  w i r  s c h o n  g e s p r o c h e n  h a b e n  
( s i e h e  o b e n ) ,  I h n e n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  v o r ?
A u f  B u n d e s e b e n e  J a / N e i n / W N
A u f  L a n d e b e n e  J a / N e i n / W N
A u f  a n d e r e n  E b e n e n  J a / N e i n / W N
ll
6  W e n n  j a ,  w a r e  e s  v o n  k l e i n e m  o d e r  g r o s s e m  W e r t  f u r  S i e  
i m  B e s i t z  d i e s e r  I n f o r m a t i o n e n ?
K l e i n e m  W e r t / G r o s s e m  W e r t / W N / K A
n
7  E n t h a l t e n  S i e  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  d e n  B e h o r d e n  J a / N e i n / K A
ii
d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r v e r b a n d e n  J a / N e i n / K A
d e n  B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g e n  J a / N e i n / K A
8  H a b e n  S i e  Z u g a n g  z u  a l l  d e n j e n i g e n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  i n n e r h a l b
ii
d e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t s o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  d i e  S i e  g e r n e  m o c h t e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
n
9  V o n  w e m  e r h a l t e n  S i e  n o r m a l e r w e i s e  d e n  u b e r w i e g e n d e n
T e i l  I h r e n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n ?
( s i e h e  T a b e l l e  5 )
it
1 0  K o n n e n  S i e  m i r  n o c h  a n d e r e  I n f o r m a t i o n s q u e l l e n  n e n n e n ?
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1 E r i n n e r n  S i e  s i c h  a n  e i n e n  b e s o n d e r e n  E r f o l g  I h r e r  G e w e r k -  
s c h a f t  i n  d e n  l e t z t e n  2 - 3  J a h r e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
2  W o r a n  d e n k e n  S i e  d a b e i  u n d  w a n n  w a r  d a s ?
I!
3  W i e  b e u r t e i l e n  S i e  p e r s o n l i c h  d i e  T a r i f p o l i t i k ,  d i e  I h r e
G e w e r k s c h a f t  i n  d e n  l e t z t e n  2 - 3  J a h r e n  g e m a c h t  h a t ?
W a r e n  S i e  m i t  i h r  i n s g e s a m t  e h e r  z u f r i e d e n  o d e r  e h e r  
u n z u f r i e d e n ?
E h e r  z u f r i e d e n  
E h e r  u n z u f r i e d e n  
K A
4  W a r u m  w a r e n  S i e  b e s o n d e r s  u n z u f r i e d e n ?
a
5  S o i l  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  s i c h  f u r  p r o z e n t u a l e  L o h n e r -ii n
h o h u n g e n  o d e r  E r h o h u n g e n  urn d e n  g l e i c h e n  P f e n n i g b e t r a g  
e i  n s e t z e n ?
P r o z e n t u a l
G l e i c h e r  P f e n n i g b e t r a g  
K A
6  W a r u m  s i n d  S i e  d i e s e r  M e i n u n g ?
8  W e n n  n e i n ,  w a r u m  n i c h t ?
n
9  B e f a s s e n  s i c h  h a u p t a m t l i c h e  o d e r  b e t r i e b l i c h e  F u n k t i o n a r e
I h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  m i t  d e r  A n w e n d u n g  v o n  L e i s t u n g s b e w e r t u n g s  
s y s t e m e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
1 0  W e n n  j a ,  i n  w e l c h e n  I n d u s t r i e z w e i g e n  o d e r  O r g a n i s a t i o n s -
b e r e i c h e n ?
n
1 1  W e l c h e  I h r e r  F u n k t i o n a r e  s i n d  a n  d i e s e n  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  
d i r e k t  b e t e i l i g t ?
ii n
1 2  W u r d e n  d i e s e  S c h e m a t a  b z w .  V e r a n d e r u n g e n  d i e s e r  S c h e m a t a  
v o n  d e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  o d e r  v o n  d e r  A r b e i t g e b e r s e i t e  i n s  
L e b e n  g e r u f e n ?
G e w e r k s c h a f t  
A r b e i t g e b e r s e i t e  
K A
II
1 3  W e n n  A r b e i t g e b e r s e i t e ,  f u h l t e  s i c h  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  d a z u
ii
g e z w u n g e n  z u  k o o p e r i e r e n  o d e r  h a b e n  I h r e  F u n k t i o n a r e  
f r e i w i l l i g  i n  d i e s e  S c h e m a t a  e i n g e w i l l i g t ?
G e z w u n g e n  V e r s c h i e d e n
F r e i w i l l i g
K A
1 4  M e i n e n  S i e ,  d a s s  m i t  e i n e m  A r b e i t s b e w e r t u n g s s t y s t e m  e i n e  
g e r e c h t e  E n t l o h n u n g  e r r e i c h t  w i r d ?
J a
N e i n
K A / W N
ii
1 5  E s  w i r d  h a u f i g  g e s a g t ,  d a s s  A r b e i t g e b e r  u n d  A r b e i t n e h m e r
ii
i n  e i n e m  B o o t  s i t z e n ,  d a  s i e  g l e i c h e  o d e r  a h n l i c h e  I n t e r e s s e n  
v e r f o l g e n .  1 s t  d a  e t w a s  d a r a n ,  o d e r  h a l t e n  S i e  d i e s e
ii
M e i n u n g  f u r  f a l s c h ?
E t w a s  d a r a n
F a l s c h
K A
1 6  ( E t w a s  d a r a n )  U n d  w o  b e s t h e n  a m  e h e s t e n  g e m e i n s a m e  I n t e r e s s e n  
z w i s e h e n  A r b e i t g e b e r n  u n d  A r b e i t n e h m e r n ?
ii
1 7  ( F a l s c h )  G i b t  e s  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  n a c h  u b e r h a u p t  g e m e i n s a m e  
I n t e r e s s e n  z w i s e h e n  A r b e i t g e b e r n  u n d  A r b e i t n e h m e r n ?
J a  -  W e l c h e ?
N e i n
K A
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1 8  W e n n  u b e r h a u p t ,  g a n z  a l l g e m e i n  b e t r a c h t e t ,  g i b t  e s  m e h r
it
g e m e i n s a m e  o d e r  m e h r  g e g e n s a t z l i c h e  I n t e r e s s e n  z w i s c h e n  
A r b e i t g e b e r n  u n d  A r b e i t n e h m e r n ?
M e h r  g e m e i n s a m e
it
M e h r  g e g e n s a t z l i c h e  
W N / K A
ii
1 9  H a l t e n  S i e  d i e  A u s p e r r u n g  f u r  g e r e c h t f e r t i g t ?
J a
N e i n
K A
2 0  W a r u m  s i n d  S i e  d i e s e r  M e i n u n g ?
2 1  H a b e n  S i e  j e m a l s  e i n e  A u s p e r r u n g  e n t w e d e r  a l s  A r b e i t n e h m e r
it
o d e r  a l s  G e w e r k s c h a f t s f u n k t i o n a r  m i t e r l e b t ?
A l s  A r b e i t n e h m e r  -  J a / N e i n
it
A l s  G e w e r k s c h a f t s f u n k t i o n a r  -  J a / N e i n  
K A
2 2  W e l c h e  P a r t e i  o d e r  P a r t e i e n k o a l i t i o n  d i e n t  d e n  I n t e r e s s e n
n
I h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  a m  e h e s t e n ?  K o n n e n  S i e  I h r e  A n w o r t
ii
b i t t e  e r k l a r e n .
ii
2 3  A n g e n o m m e n  e i n e  a n d e r e  R e g i e r u n g  w u r d e  d i e  M a c h t  i n n e h a b e n ,
■I ii n
w a r e n  S i e  u n t e r  d i e s e n  U m s t a n d e n  i n  e i n e m  g r o s s e r e m  M a s s e
d a z u  b e r e i t  m i t  d i e s e r  R e g i e r u n g  u n d  d e r  I n d u s t r i e
z u s a m m e n z u a r b e i t e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
n
2 4  W a r e n  S i e  d a z u  b e r e i t ,  d i e  K o n z e r t i e r t e  A k t i o n  u n t e r
it
d e r  g e g e n w a r t i g e n  R e g i e r u n g w i e d e r  a u f l e b e n  z u  l a s s e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
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ii
ii n
2 5  W u r d e n  S i e  d i e  B e d i n g u n g e n  f u r  e i n e  Z u s a m m e n a r b e i t  u n t e r
ii it
e i n e r  n e u e n  U b e r e i n k u n f t  a n d e r n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
2 6  W e n n  j a ,  a u f  w e l c h e  W e i s e ?
2 7  M e i n e n  S i e ,  d a s s  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  d u r c h  I h r e  L o h n p o l i t i k
ii
d a z u  b e i t r a g e n  k o n n e n ,  d a s s  d i e  P r e i s e  s t a b i l e r  w e r d e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
2 8  W e n n  j a ,  w e l c h e  S t r a t e g i e  s o l l e n  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  
v e r f o l g e n ?
2 9  W e n n  n i c h t ,  w a r u m  n i c h t ?
3 0  S o l l t e n  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  a u f  L o h n e r h o h u n g e n  v e r z i c h t e n ,
ii n
w e n n  d i e  K o n k u r r e n z f a h i g k e i t  d e s  I n d u s t r i e z w e i g e s  g e f a h r d e t  
i s t ?
J a
N e i n
K A
3 1  M a n c h e  L e u t e  m e i n e n ,  d a s s  s i c h  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  n u r
ii
urn d i e  s o z i a l e n  A n g e l e g e n h e i t ' e n  d e r  A r b e i t n e h m e r  k u m m e r n  
s o l l e n .  A n d e r e  m e i n e n ,  d a s s  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  a u c h
ii
i n  p o l i t i s c h e  A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g e n  ( w i e  z . B .  u b e r  d i e  
N o t s t a n d s g e s e t z e  u n d  a n d e r e  p o l i t i s c h e  S t r e i t f r a g e n )  
a k t i v  e i n g r e i f e n  s o l l t e n .  W e l c h e  A u f a s s u n g  s i n d  S i e ?
N u r  s o z i a l e  A n g e l e g e n h e i t e n
A u c h  p o l i t s c h e  A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g e n
W N / K A
3 2  H a l t e n  S i e  d i e  p o l i t s c h e  A k t i v i t a t  I h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t
ii ii
g e g e n w a r t i g  f u r  a u s r e i c b e n d  o d e r  s o l l t e  s i e  I h r e r  M e i n u n g
ti
n a c h  v e r s t a r k t  w e r d e n ?
*
A u s r e i c h e n d
it
V e r s t a r k t
K A
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3 3  G i b t  e s  i r g e n d w e l c h 3  G e b i e t e  i n  d e n e n  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  
s c h o n  a k t i v  g e w o r d e n  i s t ,  d i e  v o n  a n d e r e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  
w e i t g e h e n d  i g n o r i e r t  w e r d e n ?
J a
N e i n
K A
3 4  W e n n  j a ,  w e l c h e  s i n d  d i e s e  G e b i e t e  u n d  w a r u m  h a t  s i c h  
g e r a d e  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  s p e z i e l l  d i e s e  a n g e n o m m e n ?
3 5  B i e t e t  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  i h r e n  M i t g l i e d e r n  i r g e n d e i n e  
s p e z i e l l e  D i e n s t l e i s t u n g  a n ,  d i e  d e n  M i t g l i e d e r n  a n d e r e r  
G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  n i c h t  z u r  V e r f u g u n g  s t e h t ?
J a
N e i n
K A
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3 6 W e n n  j a ,  w a s ?
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Tabelle  1
it
H a u p t s a c h l i c h  
i n f o r i n e l l e  
i K o n t a k t e
N a c h
V o r s c h r i f t
V o r g e s e t z t e n
U n t e r g e o r d n e t e n
a n d e r e n
M i t g l i e d e r n  d e r  
K d m m i s s i o n e n  u n d
i i
a n d e r e n  A u s s c h u s s e n
i i
A r b e i  t g e b e r v e r b a n d e r i
B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g
i i
B e h o r d e n  a u f  : 
B u n d e s e b e n e
L a n d e s e b e n e
a n d e r e  E b e n e n
i i
S o n s t i g e n  B e h o r d e n
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ii
K o n n e n  S i e  b i t t e  d i e  f o l g e n d e n  B e r e i c h e  I h r e r  A r b e i t  n a c h  U m f a n g
ii
a u f s c h l u s s e i n  :
Tabe lle  2
1 - 1 2
i i
K o n n e n  S i e  a u c h  h i e r  b i t t e  h i n =  
h i n s c h r e i b e n ,  v o n  w e m  S i e  R a t  b z w .  
U n t e r s t u t z u n g  e i n h o l e n ,  u m  i n  F a l l e n  
1 b i s  6  E n t s c h e i d u n g e n  z u  t r e f f e n :
A r b e i t s r e c h t
A r b e i t s w i s s e n s c h a f t
B e r u f s b i I d u n g
B i l d u n g s p o l i t i k
K o m m u n a l p o l i t i k
R e g i o n a l p o l i t i k
S o z i a l p o l i t i k
S o z i a l r e c h t
i i
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1 W i e  l a n g e  s i n d  S i e  s c h o n  B e z i r k s l e i t e r / G e s c h S f t s f U h r e r ?
2  W a n n  s i n d  S i e  d i e s e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  b e i g e t r e t e n ?
3  H a b e n  S i e  e i n m a l  e i n e r  a n d e r e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t  a n g e h b r t ?
4  W e n n  j a ,  w e l c h e  w a r  d a s ?
5  H a t t e n  S i e  s c h o n  v o r h e r  a n d e r e  h a u p t a m t l i c h e  F u n k t i o n e n ?
6  W e l c h e  w a r e n  d i e s e  F u n k t i o n e n ?
7 S e h e n  S i e  d i e  C h a n c e ,  a l s  h a u p t a m t l i c h e  F u n k t i o n & r  i n  I h r e r  
G e w e r k s c h a f t  w e i t e r  v o r w & r t s  z u  k o m m e n ?
8  W e n n  j a ,  i n  w e l c h e  R i c h t u n g  g e h t  I h r e  I n t e r e s s e ?
9  S e h e n  S i e  d i e  C h a n c e n  b e i  a n d e r e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n ?
1 0  H a t t e n  S i e  A r b e i t s n i e d e r l e g u n g e n  s c h o n  m i t e r l e b t ,  b e v o r  
S i e  I h r e  j e t z i g e  S t e l l u n g  a n g e n o m m e n  h a b e n ?
1 1  U n d  s e i t d e m ?
I
I I
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1 F t l h l e n  S i e  S i c h  v o n  d e n  A r b e i t s g e s e t z e n  i n  i r g e n d  e i n e r  
W e i s e  b e l a s t e t ?  B e t r a c h t e n  S i e  d i e  G e s e t z e  a l s  e i n  E r s c h -  
w e r n i s  f t l r  I h r e  A r b e i t ?
2  E r l e i c h t e r n  d i e  G e s e t z e  I h r e  A r b e i t  i n  i r g e n d e i n e  W e i s e ?
ii it
3  W e n n  j a ,  k o n n e n  S i e  n a h e r  d a r a u f  e i n g e h e n ?
4  W t l r d e n  S i e  e i n e  E i n w i r k u n g  i n  A r b e i t s s t r e i t i g k e i t e n  v o n  
d r i t t e r  S e + t e p o s i t i v  o d e r  n e g a t i v  b e u r t e i l e n ?
5  G i b t  e s  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  n a c h  i r g e n d w e l c h e  V e r s c h i e d e n h e i t e n  
b e i  d e n e n  S i e  S i c h  b e s o n d e r s  g e g e n  e i n e n  E i n g r i f f  e i n e r  
d r i t t e n  P a r t e i  w e h r e n  w t l r d e n ?
6  G i b t  e s  i r g e n d w e l c h e  a n d e r e  G r t i n d e  a u s s e r  d e r  b e s o n d e r e n
B e s c h a f f e n h e i t  d e r  V e r s c h i e d e n h e i t ,  d i e  S i e  d a z u  v e r a n -
H
l a s s e n  w u r d e n ,  d e n  E i n g r i f f  e i n e r  d r i t t e n  P a r t e i  a b z u l e h n e n ?
ii
7  W t l r d e n  S i e  g e r n e  A n d e r u n g e n  a m  B e t r i e b s v e r f a s s u n g s g e s e t z
b z w .  P e r s o n a l s v e r t r e t u n g s g e s e t z  v o r n e h m e n ?
8  W e n n  j a ,  w a s  i m  b e s o n d e r e n  h a t t e n  S i e  g e r n e  v e r & n d e r t ?
9  G i b t  e s  i r g e n d w e l c h e  a n d e r e  G e s e t z e  a u f  d e m  G e b i e t  d e r
A r b e i t s b e z i e h u n g e n ,  d i e  S i e  g e r n e  v e r a b s c h i e d e t  o d e r  v e r S n -  
d e r t  s e h e n  w t l r d e n ?
1 0  I n  w e l c h e  W e i s e  w t l r d e n  d i e s e  I h r e  A r b e i t  e r l e i c h t e r n ?
11 Siehe Tabe lle  1.
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1 H a t  e s  S i t u a t i o n e n  g e g e b e n ,  i n  d e n e n  S i e  S i c h  a u f  G r u n d  
I h r e r  S t e l l u n g  i n  d e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t s h i e r a r c h i e  f r u s t r i e r t  
f u h l t e n ?
ii
2  W e n n  j a ,  l a g  d e r  G r u n d  h i e r f u r  i n  d e n  R i c h t l i n i e n  d e r
ii
G e w e r k s c h a f t  o d e r  i n  d e n  s t a r k e n  P e r s o n l i c h k e i t e n  I h r e r  
V o r g e s e t z t e n ?
ti
3  S p i e l t  s i c h  d e r  E i n f l u s s  s t a r k e r  P e r s o n l i c h k e i t e n  i n n e r h a l b
d e s  R a h m e n s  d e r  g e w e r k s c h a f t s e i g e n e n  V o r s c h r i f t e n  a b ,
11
o d e r  g e h e n  d i e  a u s  G e w o h n h e i t s r e c h t  u b e r  d i e  V o r s c h r i f t e n  
h i n a u s ?
4  S i e h e  T a b e l l e  2 .
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5  S t e h e n  S i e  i n  s t a n d i g e m  K o n t a k t  m i t  w e n i g e n / v i e l e n / a l l e n  
d e r  f o l g e n d e n :
H
a  B e t r i e b s r a t e
b  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e
c  M i t g l i e d e r  d e r  T a r i f k o m m i s s i o n e n
ii
d  M i t g l i e d e r  a n d e r e r  A u s s c h u s s e
6  W i e  o f t  h a b e n  S i e  l e t z t e n  M o n a t  e i n e n  B e t r i e b  b e s u c h t ?
7  W e l c h e  A r t  w a r e n  d i e  A n g e l e g e n h e i t e n ,  d i e  S i e  z u  d i e s e n  
B e s u c h e n  v e r a n l a s s t e n ?
8  W i e  o f t  i m  l e t z t e n  M o n a t  h a t t e n  S i e  K o n t a k t  m i t  e i n e m
a n d e r e n  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ?
ii
9  A u s  w e l c h e n  G r u n d e n  t u n  S i e  d a s ?
ii
1 0  N e h m e n  d i e  B e t r i e b s r a t e  j e m a l s  a n  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  t e l l ,
ii
d i e  u b e r  b e t r i e b s e i g e n e  p r o b l e m e  h i n a u s g e h e n ?
H
1 1  S i n d  d i e  B e t r i e b s r a t e  i n  d e r  L a g e  a u f  a n d e r e n  W e g e ntl
E i n f l u s s  a u f  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  a u s z u u b e n ?
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1 2  W e n n  j a ,  b e i  w e l c h e n  S t r e i t i g k e i t e n / A n g e l e g e n h e i t e n '  i s t  
e s  i h n e n  g e l u n g e n ,  g e w i s s e n  E i n f l u s s  a u s z u d b e n ?
1 3  K o m m e n  I h r e r  E r f a h r u n g  n a c h  M e i n u n g s v e r s c h i e d e n h e i t e n  
z w i s e h e n  h a u p t a m t l i c h e n  u n d  e h r e n a m t l i c h e n  F u n k t i o n S r e n  
a u f ?
1 4  W e n n  j a ,  u m  w e l c h e  P r o b l e m e  g e h t  e s  d a b e i ?
1 5  A n  w e n  w e n d e n  S i e  S i c h  i m  F a l l e  e i n e s  S c h e i t e r n s  d e r  
V e r h a n d l u n g e n  m i t  d e m  A r b e i t g e b e r ?
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ti
1 H a b e n  S i e  a u s s e r  w a h r e n d  d e r  T a r i f v e r h a n d l u n g e n  K o n t a k t e
m i t  V e r t r e t e r n  d e r  A r b e i t g e b e r v e r b c b i d e ?
2  K d n n e n  S i e  b e i s p i e l e  v o n  A n g e l e g e n h e i t e n  g e b e n ,  d i e  z u
s o l c h e n  K o n t a k t e n  f l l h r e n ?
3  S i e h e  T a b e l l e  3 .
4  S i e h e  T a b e l l e  4 .
5  W i e  u n t e r s c h e i d e n  s i c h  d i e  D i s k u s s i o n e n ,  d i e  S i e  m i t  d e n
B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g e n  f d h r e n ,  v o n  d e n e n  m i t  d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r -  
v e r b & n d e n ?
6  S i e h e  T a b e l l e  5 .
7  Wo t a u c h e n  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  n a c h  d i e  P r o b l e m b e r e i c h e  m i t  d e n  
B e h O r d e n  u n d  R e g i e r u n g s s t e l l e n  a u f ?
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1 E n t h a l t e n  I h r e  G e g e n s p i e l e r  b e i  d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r n  w a h r e n d  
d e r  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  I h n e n  b e w u s s t  I n f o r m a t i o n  v o r ?
2  W e n n  j a ,  w e l c h e  A r t  v o n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n ?
3  W e r d e n  I h n e n  w a h r e n d  d e r  U b r i g e n  Z e i t  I n f o r m a t i o n e n
v o r e n t h a l t e n ?
4  E n t h a l t e n  d i e  B e h d r d e n  b z w .  R e g i e r u n g s s t e l l e n  I h n e n  I n f o r m  
a t i o n e n  v o r ?
A u f  w e l c h e n  E b e n e n ?
5  W e n n  j a ,  w a r e  e s  v o n  k l e i n e m  o d e r  g r o s s e m  W e r t  f U r  S i e  
i m  B e s i t z  d i e s e r  I n f o r m a t i o n e n ?
6  E n t h a l t e n  S i e  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  d e n  R e g i e r u n g s s t e l l e n
d e n  B e h d r d e n
d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r v e r b d n d e n  
d e n  B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g e n
v o r ?
7  H a b e n  S i e  Z u g a n g  z u  a l l  d e n j e n i g e n  I n f o r m a t i o n e n  i n n e r h a l b  
d e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t s o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  d i e  S i e  g e r n e  m d c h t e n ?
8  H a b e n  S i e  i m m e r  F i n a n z e n  g e n u g ,  u m  I h r e  A r b e i t  a u s z u t r a g e n  
w i e  S i e  w o l l e n ?
9 H a b e n  S i e  s o n s t i g e  I n f o r m a t i o n s q u e l l e n ?
Funktion A
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1 W a s  i s t  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  n a c h  d i e  H a u p t f u n k t i o n  e i n e r  G e w e r k ­
s c h a f t ?
2  W e l c h e  w i r t s c h a f t l i c h e n  o d e r  g e s e l l s c h a f t l i c h e n  F a k t o r e n  
k d n n e n  e i n e  V e r S n d e r u n g  d i e s e r  H a u p t f u n k t i o n  b e w i r k e n ?
3  W a s  b e t r a c h t e t  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  a l s  w e s e n t l i c h e s  Z i e l  
v o n  T a r i f v e r h a n d l u n g e n ?
4  H a b e n  I h r e r  A n s i c h t  n a c h  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  a u c h  e i n e  R o l l e  
a l s  O r d n u n g s f a k t o r  i n  d e r  G e s a m t g e s e l I s c h a f t  z u  s p i e l e n ?
W i e  s t e h e n  S i e  z u m  W i e d e r a u f n e h m e n  d e r  K o n z e r t i e r t e n  A k t i o n ?
5  S o l l t e  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  w e i t e r h i n  a u f  d e n  A u s b a u  d e r  
w i r t s c h a f t l i c h e n  M i t b e s t i m m u n g  h i n w i r k e n ?
6  Wo l i e g e n  d i e  G r e n z e n  g e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e r  M i t b e s t i m m u n g ?
7  W a s  s i n d  d i e  w e s e n t l i c h e n  A u f g a b e n  i h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  i n  
d e r  Z u k u n f t ?
8  H a l t e n  S i e  g e s e t z g e b e r i  s c h e  M a s s n a h m e n  f d r  e i n  H i n d e r n i s  
o d e r  f d r  e i n e  H i l f e  b e i  d e r  D u r c h s e t z u n g  g e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e r  
M a s s n a h m e n ?
F u n k t i o n  B
1 G i b t  e s  i n  I h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  b e s t i m m t e  s o z i a l e  G r u p p e n ,  
d i e  s i e  v o n  a n d e r e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  u n t e r s c h e i d e n ?
2  I n w i e f e r n  b e e i n f  1 u s s t d i e s  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t s p o l i t i k ?
3  W e l c h e  b e s o n d e r e n  S t r u k t u r p r o b l e m e  i h r e r  I n d u s t r i e z w e i g e  
b e s t i m m e n  d i e  P o l i t i k  i h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t ?
4  H S l t  s i c h  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  a n  d i e  a l l g e m e i n e n R t i c b t l i n d e n  
d e s  D G B s ?
5  G i l t  d a s  a u c h  f d r  a n d e r e  D G B - G e w e r k s c h a f t e n  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  
n a c h ?
6  I s t  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  i n  d e r  L a g e , E i n f l u s s  a u f  d i e  P o l i t i k  
d e s  D G B s  a u s z u d b e n ?
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ii
7  V o n  w e l c h e n  F a k t o r e n  h a n g t  d i e s  a b ?
I n n e r g e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e  D e m o k r a t i e
318
1 W a s  i s t  I h r e  g e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e  F u n k t i o n  i n  d e r  O r t s - b z w .  
B e z i r k s v e r w a l t u n g ?
2  M i t  w e l c h e r  A r t  g e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e r  T d t i g k e i t  s i n d  S i e  
a u f  d i e s e r  E b e n e  b e s o n d e r s  b e f a s s t ?
3  W e l c h e  d i e s e r  T S t i g k e i t e n  k o m m t  I h r e r  M e i n u n g  n a c h  a u f  
d i e s e r  E b e n e  b e s o n d e r e  B e d e u t u n g  z u ?
4  H a t  e s  d a b e i  i n  d e n  l e t z t e n  z e h n  J a h r e n  V e r s c h i e b u n g e n  
i n  d e r  B e d e u t u n g  d i e s e r  T c i t i g k e i t e n  g e g e b e n ?  -  W e n n  j a ,  
w e l c h e ?
5  H a t  d i e s  z u  V e r d n d e r u n g e n  h i n s i c h t l i c h  d e r  R o l l e  d e r  
O r t s -  b z w .  B e z i r k s v e r w a l t u n g  i n  d e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  g e f U h r t ?
6  W e r  i s t  b e r e c h t i g t ,  b e i  d e m  G e w e r k s c h a f t s t a g  z u  s p r e c h e n ?
7  W e r  v o n  d e n  h a u p t a m t l i c h e n  F u n k t i o n S r e n  n i m m t  a m  G e w e r k ­
s c h a f t s t a g  t e i l ?
8  S i n d  a l l e  A n w e s e n d e n  s t i m m b e r e c h t i g t ?  W i e  i s t  d i e  S t i m m -  
b e r e c h t i g u n g  g e r e g e l t ?
9  I n  w e l c h e r  W e i s e  w i r d  d a s  S t i m m r e c h t  a u s g e t l b t ?
( a )  H a n d e l t  e s  s i c h  urn e i n  f r e i e s  M a n d a t ?
( b )  G i b t  e s  S t i m m b i n d u n g e n ?
( c )  G i b t  e s  F o r m e n  d e s  i m p e r a t i v e n  M a n d a t s ?
1 0  G i b t  e s  F c H l e ,  i n  d e n e n  G e w e r k s c h a f t s m i t g l i e d e r  a u f
B e t r i e b s e b e n e  m i t  E n t s c h e i d u n g e n  v o n  D e l e g i e r t e n v e r s a m m -  
l u n g e n  a u f  B e z i r k s -  b z w . B u n d e s e b e n e  n i c h t  U b e r e i n s t i m m e n ?
1 1  W e n n  j a ,  w i e  w i r d  e i n  s o l c h e r  K o n f l i k t  g e l f l s t ?
1 2  W e l c h e  K o n t a k t e  b e s t e h e n  z w i s c h e n  F u n k t i o n S r e n  d e r
v e r s c h i e d e n e n  g e w e r k s c h a f t ! i c h e n  E n t s c h e i d u n g s e b e n e n ?
( a )  o f f i z i e l l
( b )  i n f o r m e l l
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G e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e  O r g a n i s a t i o n
T a r i f v e r h a n d l u n g e n
1 W e l c h e  O r g a n e  I h r e r  G e w e r k s c h a f t  s i n d  f d r  T a r i f v e r h a n d -  
l u n g e n  b e s t a n d i g ?
2  A u f  w e l c h e r  E b e n e  w e r d e n  s i e  t a t i g ?
3  W e r  g e h t i r t  d i e s e n  O r g a n e n  a n ?
4  S i n d  d i e  M i t g l i e d e r  d i e s e s  O r g a n s  g e w a h l t  o d e r  v o n  A m t s  
w e g e n  e n t s a n d t ?
W e n n  g e w a h l t  -
5  V o n  w e m ?  I n  w e l c h e n  Z e i t a b s t a n d e n ?
6  W i e  w i r d  d e r  V o r s i t z e n d e  b e s t i m m t ?
7  W e l c h e r  E i n f l u s s  h a t  d e r  V o r s i t z e n d e  a u f  d i e  E n t s c h e i d u n g e n  
d i e s e s  O r g a n s ?
8  H a b e n  a n d e r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t s o r g a n e  o d e r  F u n k t i o n s t r a g e r .  
V e t o - R e c h t e  g e g e n t l b e r  d i e  E n t s c h e i d u n g e n  d i e s e s  O r g a n s ?
D i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t l i c h e  R e p r a s e n t a t i o n  I m  B e t r i e b
1 W i e  o f t  g e h e n  S i e  i n  d i e  B e t r i e b e ?  
Z u  w e l c h e n  Z w e c k ?
320
2  S e i t  w a n n  h a t  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  e i n e n  V e r t r a u e n s k d r p e r  
i m  B e t r i e b ?
3 W i e  h a b e n  d i e  A u f g a b e n  d e r  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  s e i t d e m  
e n t w i c k e l t ?
4 W i e  w e r d e n  d i e  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  b e s t i m m t ?
( a )  V o n  w e m ?
( b )  W i e  o f t ?
5 W i e  v i e l e  G e w e r k s c h a f t s m i t g l i e d e r  r e p r f t s e n t i e r t  e i n  
V e r t r a u e n s m a n n ?
6  H S t t e n  S i e  l i e b e r  m e h r  o d e r  w e n i g e r  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  i n  
d e n  B e t r i e b e n ?
7  V e r h a n d e l n  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  j e m a l s  d i r e k t  m i t  d e r  
B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g ?
8  W e n n  j a ,  w a s  i s t  i n  d i e s e n  F a l l e n  G e g e n s t a n d  d e r  V e r h a n d -  
l u n g e n ?
9 I n  w e l c h e m  A n t e i l  s i n d  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  z u g l e i c h  A n g e h d r i g e  
d e s  B e t r i e b s r a t s ?
1 0  W e l c h e  K o n f l i k t e  e r g e b e  s i c h  f U r  d i e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  a u s  
d i e s e r  D o p p e l f u n k t i o n ?
1 1  W e l c h e  F o r m e n  d e r  K o m m u n i k a t i o n  d e r  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  
u n t e r e i n a n d e r  g i b t  e s ?
( a )  W i e  o f t  t r e f f e n  d i e  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e  z u s a m m e n ?
( b )  Z u  w e l c h e m  Z w e c k ?
1 2  W i e  s t e h t  I h r e  G e w e r k s c h a f t  z u r  F r a g e  d e r  s o g e n a n n t e n  
" b e t r i e b s n a h e n  T a r i f p o l i t i k " ?
321
1 3  W e l c h e  K o n t a k t e  b e s t e h e n  z w i s c h e n  d e n  V e r t r a u e n s l e u t e n  
u n d  d e n  g e w e r k s c h a f t ! i c h e n  O r t s v e r w a l t u n g e n ?
( a )  o f f i  z i  e l  1
( b )  i n f o r m e l l
1 4  W e l c h e  K o n t a k t e  b e s t e h e n  z u  h d h e r e n  E b e n e n  d e r  G e w e r k ­
s c h a f t s v e r w a l t u n g e n ?
322
Tabe lle  1
n
H a u p t s a c h l i c h
i n f o r m e l l e
K o n t a k t e
N a c h
V o r s c h r i f t
V o r g e s e t z t e n
U n t e r g e o r d n e t e n
a n d e r e n
M i t g l i e d e r n  d e r  
K o m m i s s i o n e n  u n dit
a n d e r e n  A u s s c h u s s e n
i i
A r b e i t g e b e r v e r b a n d e n .
B e t r i e b s l e i t u n g
ll
B e h o r d e n  a u f  : 
B u n d e s e b e n e
L a n d e s e b e n e
a n d e r e  E b e n e n
ii
S o n s t i g e n  B e h o r d e n
323
u
K o n n e n  S i e  b i t t e  d i e  f o l g e n d e n  B e r e i c h e  I h r e r  A r b e i t  n a c h  U m f a n g
ii
a u f s c h l u s s e l n  :
Tabelle  2
A r b e i t s r e c h t
A r b e i t s w i s s e n s c h a f t
B e r u f s b i l d u n g
B i l d u n g s p o l i t i k
K o m m u n a l p o l i t i k
R e g i o n a l p o l i t i k
S o z i a l p o l i t i k
S o z i a l r e c h t
ii
P s y c h o l o g i e / S o z i o l o g i e / P a d a g o g i k
T a r i f p o l i t i k
U n t e r n e h m e n s v e r f a s s u n a
W i r t s c h a f t s p o l i t i k
324
» » II
K o n t a k t e  m i t  d e n  A r b e i t g e b e r v e r b a n d e n  /  F u h r u n g s k r a f t e n  d e r
ii
U n t e r n e h m e n  /  s t a a t l i c h e n  B e h o r d e n
Tabellen 3 /4 /5
ii
p e r s o n l i c h t e l e f o n i s c h s c h r i f t l i c h
i n  d e r  W o c h e
m o n a t l i c h
i m  J a h r
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R a n k  C o r r e l a t i o n  o f  U n i o n  A c t i v i t y  C e n t r e s
P
I G B E  R u h r / I G B E  H a n n o v e r 0 . 8 5 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / I G B E  R h e i n l a n d 0 . 7 7 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / I G B E  O t h e r 0 . 7 5 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / I G B E  H a n n o v e r 0 . 7 1 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / I G B E  O t h e r 0 . 6 3 S i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  O t h e r / I G B E  H a n n o v e r 0 . 9 3 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l e / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 5 9 S i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  K r e i s / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 8 7 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  K r e i s / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l eit 0 . 8 1 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 4 8 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  K r e i s / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 6 2 S i g n i f i c a n t
11
O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l  l e  0 . 8 2 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  O t h e r  K r e i s e / O T V  F r a n k f u r t  & K o l n 0 . 5 4 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  F r a n k f u r t  & K o l n / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 4 5 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  F r a n k f u r t  & K o l n / I G B E  R h e i n l a n d 0 . 2 3 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 7 5 H i g h l y  s i g n i g i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l e 0 . 7 7 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 7 3 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R u h r / O T V  K r e i s 0 . 8 6 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 7 3 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l e 0 . 7 6 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 5 2 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  R h e i n l a n d / O T V  K r e i s 0 . 9 1 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  H a n n o v e r / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 7 7 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
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I G B E  H a n n o v e r / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l e 0 . 7 7 H i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
ii
I G B E  H a n n o v e r / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 8 4 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  H a n n o v e r / O T V  K r e i s 0 . 9 4 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  O t h e r / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 6 3 S i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  O t h e r / G T B  V e r w a l t u n g s s t e l l e 0 . 6 7 S i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  O t h e r / O T V  L a n d e s b e z i r k 0 . 8 5 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
I G B E  O t h e r / O T V  K r e i s 0 . 9 2 V e r y  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t
O T V  F r a n k f u r t  & K o l n / G T B  B e z i r k 0 . 2 9 N o t  s i g n i f i c a n t
327
(1) Very h ig h ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  c o r re la t io n s
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( 2 )  A l l  o t h e r  c o r r e l a t i o n s
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5
Centres o f C o l le c t iv e  Bargain ing in  the Union O rganisa tion
IGBE GTB OTV
2  H A U < T V E R W A L T U N G
/ ( S t e i n k o h l )
/  /  /  /  /  A /'
4 H A U P T V E R W A L T U N G /
/ / / f B u n d )
M a i n  c e n t r e s  o f  o f f i c i a l  u n i o n  b a r g a i n i n g  
a s  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  n u m b e r  o f  e m p l o y e e s  
c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  a g r e e m e n t s
342
U n i o n  P r o f i l e s  
1 I G B E
T h e  m i n i n g  i n d u s t r y  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  R e p u b l i c  i s  d e p e n d e n t  t o  a  
v e r y  g r e a t  e x t e n t  o n  t h e  e x t r a c t i o n  o f  h a r d  c o a l .  T h i s  b r a n c h  
o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  w a s  a t  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  c o a l  c r i s i s  
i n  t h e  m i d - S i x t i e s ,  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  b y  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n  
o f  o i l  a s  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o u r c e  o f  e n e r g y .
i
A c c o r d i n g  t o  a  s t u d y  o f  t h e  u n i o n  i n  1 9 7 7  b y  E c k b e r t  T r e u ,  a l t h o u g h  
g r o w t h  r a t e s  i n  g e n e r a l  w e r e  d o w n  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  o n  r a t e s  o f  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  d e c a d e ,  o n l y  m i n i n g  s h o w e d  a  n e t  v o l u m e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
m e a s u r e d  a t  1 9 6 2  p r i c e s ,  i n  1 9 7 0  w h i c h  w a s  l o w e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  
1 9 6 0 .  T h e  i n d u s t r y  b e c a m e  d e p e n d e n t  o n  g o v e r n m e n t  s u p p o r t ,  a n d  
t h e  u n i o n ,  f o r  i t s  o w n  s u r v i v a l ,  h a d  t o  f o l l o w  s u i t .
U n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  l o n g - t e r m  e n e r g y  p l a n ,  t h e  
c r i s i s  b r o u g h t  t h e  e m p l o y e r s  i n  t h e  R u h r  t o  a g r e e  t o  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  u n i o n  o f  a  " c o o p e r a t i v e " E i n h e i t s g e s e l l s c h a f t ) .  T h i s  
i n c r e a s e d  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  u n i o n  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  e n a b l e d  
t h e m  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  f u r t h e r  b y  i n t r o d u c i n g  ' c h e c k ­
o f f 1 f o r  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  u n i o n  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  d i r e c t  f r o m  w a g e s .  
C o d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w a s  e x t e n d e d  a t  p l a n t  l e v e l  w i t h  t h e  a p p o i n t m e n t  
o f  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  W o r k e r  D i r e c t o r  r e p o r t i n g  t o  t h e  M a n a g i n g  D i r e c t o r  
o f  t h e  p l a n t  a n d  t h e  s e n i o r  m a n a g e r s  w e r e  n o w  g r a n t e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
b y  t h e  W o r k e r  D i r e c t o r  o n  t h e  M a i n  B o a r d .  T h e  i m p o r t a n t  p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e  h a r d  c o a l  s e c t o r  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  t h e  u n i o n  c a n  b e  u n d e r -
•k
s t o o d  f r o m  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f i g u r e s  f o r  1 9 7 5 .
E m p l o y e e s I G B E  m e m b e r s %
H a r d  C o a l 2 0 9  3 6 9 1 9 2  3 0 2 9 1 . 8
L i g n i t e 2 1  7 5 5 1 7  7 8 2 8 1 . 7
P e t r o l e u m 8  4 7 3 3  8 7 0 4 5 . 7
M e t a l  O r e 4  9 0 1 4  6 1 7 9 4 . 2
P o t a s h  & R o c k  S a l t 1 3  0 3 1 1 0  1 7 7 7 8 . 1
O t h e r  M i n e r a l s 2 3  4 3 9 1 4  9 5 4 6 3 . 8
*  F i g u r e s  a s  a t  3 1 . 1 2 . 1 9 7 5
I G B E  J a h r b u c h  ( A n n u a l  R e p o r t )  1 9 7 4 / 7 5
343
C l e a r l y  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  u n i o n  g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  i s  d i c t a t e d  
l a r g e l y  b y  t h e  g e o l o g i c a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  u p o n  t h e  i n d u s t r y .
Geographic S truc tu re  o f the Union
T h e  m a i n  a r e a s  o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  u n i o n  m a y  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
a s  f o l l o w s  { l e a d i n g  a r e a s  i n  b o l d  s c r i p t ) :
H a r d  C o a l
L i g n i t e
P e t r o l e u m
M e t a l  O r e
P o t a s h  & R o c k  S a l t  -
R u h r ,  S a a r ,  A c C h a n ,  N i e d e n s a c h s e n
R h e i n l a n d ,  H e s s e n ,  N i e d e r s a c h s e n . ,  B a y e r n
N i e d e r s a c h s e n ,  B a y e r n  ( c o n c e n t r a t e d  
m a i n l y  i n  a  f e w  c o m p a n i e s ,  M o b i l  A G ,  
D e u t s c h e  T e x a c o  A G ,  N o r d d e u t s c h e  E r d g a s -  
A u f b e r e i t u n g s  G m b H )
N o r d r h e i n -  W e s t f a l e n ,  N i e d e r s a c h s e n ,  
B a y e r n
N i e d e r s a c h s e n ,  N o r d r h i e n - W e s t f a l e n
G T B
L i k e  m i n i n g ,  t e x t i l e s  h a s  s u f f e r e d  h e a v y  c u t - b a c k s  s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  
1 9 6 0 s ,  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  
p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h a t  t i m e .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
l a b o u r s  u n d e r  t h e  h e a v y  c o m p e t i t i o n  o f  i m p o r t e d  t e x t i l e s  f r o m  
l e s s  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  c l o t h i n g  i n d u s t r y  s u r v i v e s  
a  l i t t l e  b e t t e r  b y  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  o n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  q u a l i t y  
g o o d s .  M o r e o v e r ,  r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  h a s  h a d  l e s s  i m p a c t  u p o n  t h e  
c l o t h i n g  i n d u s t r y  t h a n  t h e  n o w  h i g h l y  a u t o m a t e d  t e x t i l e s  i n d u s t r y .  
B o t h  i n d u s t r i e s  c o m p r i s e  m i d d l e - s i z e d  f i r m s ,  b e s i d e s  w h i c h  t h e  
u n i o n  o r g a n i s e  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  s m a l l  p r o d u c e r s  i n  a  h o s t  o f  
a s s o c i a t e d  f i e l d s :
D r y  c l e a n i n g  &  d y e i n g
L a u n d r i e s
S a c k i n g  &  s a i 1 - c l o t h  
i n d u s t r i e s  ( i n c l u d i n g  
m a n - m a d e  & h e a v y  f a b r i c s )
C o r s e t r y
H a n d - k n i t t i n g  &  c r o c h e t  
( i n c l u d i n g  h o m e  w o r k )
R a w  m a t e r i a l s  i n d u s t r y  
( N o r t h - R h e i n - W e s t f a l e n )
F u r r i e r s
U m b r e l l a  i n d u s t r y  
E i d e r d o w n  i n d u s t r i e s  
U p h o l s t e r y  
M i  1 1 i  n e r y  
T a i l o r i n g
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Geographic d is t r ib u t io n  o f members
B e z i r k  N i e d e r s a c h s e n / N o r d m a r k
1974
R e g i s t e r e d  2 8 7  6 4 1
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  1 7 5  1 3 3
C l o t h i n g  7 3  5 7 6
O t h e r  1 0  6 8 0
T o t a l  2 5 9  3 8 9
A s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 6 . 6 %
e m p l o y e e s
1 9 7 4
R e g i s t e r e d  2 2  2 9 8
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  9  8 6 9
C l o t h i n g  7  4 8 9
O t h e r  2  2 3 7
T o t a l  1 9  5 9 5
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 6 . 8 %
e m p l o y e e s
B e z i r k  M i n d e n - L i p p e
1 9 7 4
R e g i s t e r e d  2 2  5 1 0
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  7  6 9 2
C l o t h i n g  1 1  9 0 7
O t h e r  7 8 9
T o t a l  2 0  3 8 8
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  4 3 . 5 %
e m p l o y e e s
1 9 7 7  
2 8 6  9 7 1
1 6 6  9 4 2  
7 8  6 9 6  
1 2  8 4 5
2 5 8  4 8 3
4 2 . 7 %
1 9 7 7  
2 2  2 3 6
9  6 0 7  
7  5 5 6  
2  5 9 3
1 9  7 5 6
4 1 . 3 %
1 9 7 7  
2 4  0 2 2
7  3 5 8  
1 3  0 9 4  
1 3 0 1  
2 1  7 5 3  
5 5 . 8 %
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B e z i r k  M u n s t e r - A r n s b e r g
1974
R e g i s t e r e d  5 2  2 5 3
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  3 5  8 8 2
C l o t h i n g  8  2 7 5
O t h e r  2  6 4 0
T o t a l  4 6  7 9 7
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  5 6 . 8 %
e m p l o y e e s
B e z i r k  N o r d r h e i n
R e g i s t e r e d  3 7  0 3 3
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  2 6  7 1 7
C l o t h i n g  5  4 5 5
O t h e r  7 4 3
T o t a l  3 2  9 1 5
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 4 . 4 %
e m p l o y e e s
B e z i r k  F r a n k f u r t
R e g i s t e r e d  2 3  6 9 7
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  1 1  9 3 9
C l o t h i n g  9  9 5 8
O t h e r  3 7 6
T o t a l  2 2  2 7 3
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 4 . 0 %
e m p l o y e e s
1 9 7 7  
5 0  9 4 9
3 3  5 7 3  
8  5 1 0  
2  8 7 4  
4 4  9 5 7  
6 3 . 3 %
3 6  5 6 7
2 5  2 0 7  
6  3 0 7  
1 1 3 3  
3 2  6 4 7  
4 2 . 4 %
2 4  2 2 7
1 1  0 7 5  
1 1  0 6 0  
6 3 0  
2 2  7 6 5  
4 0 . 7 %
346
B e z i r k  B a d e n - W u r t t e m b e r g
1974
R e g i s t e r e d  5 9  1 0 1
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  4 4  4 4 1
C l o t h i n g  1 0  0 2 9
O t h e r  7 2 4
T o t a l  5 5  1 9 4
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 3 . 9 %
e m p l o y e e s
B e z i r k  N o r d - B a y e r n
R e g i s t e r e d  3 3  9 0 8
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  1 8  5 8 3
C l o t h i n g  9  0 1 3
O t h e r  1 2 4 4
T o t a l  2 8  8 4 0
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 1 . 9 %
e m p l o y e e s
B e z i r k  S u d f c a y e r n
R e g i s t e r e d  3 1  8 4 1
M e m b e r s h i p
M e m b e r s  i n  w o r k
T e x t i l e s  1 8  1 1 8
C l o t h i n g  9  2 7 9
O t h e r  1 4 8 9
T o t a l  2 8  8 8 6
A s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  3 5 . 2 %
e m p l o y e e s
1 9 7 7  
5 7  6 7 2
4 3  3 1 5  
9  4 0 4  
1 0 1 0  
5 3  7 2 9  
3 7 . 6 %
3 3  9 0 3
1 6  5 9 2  
1 0  7 9 5  
1 3 9 0  
2 8  7 7 7  
3 5 . 1 %
3 3  1 8 5
1 8  3 6 0  
1 0  5 8 7  
1 4 1 8  
3 0  3 6 5  
3 9 . 4 %
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'6tv
T h e  l a r g e s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  O T V  m e m b e r s h i p  i s  i n  p u b l i c  e m p l o y m e n t .  
I n d e e d ,  t h o u g h  w o r k e r s  i n  p r i v a t e  t r a n s p o r t  a r e  w e l l  o r g a n i s e d ,  
t h e y  f o r m  o n l y  a  s m a l l  g r o u p  a n d  h a v e  c o m p l a i n e d  o f  n e g l e c t  b y
ii
t h e i r  u r i o n .  T h e  f i e l d  o f  r e c r u i t m e n t  o f  O T V  o v e r a l l  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
F e d e r a l  G r o u p
L a n d e r  G r o u p
M u n i c i p a l i t i e s
W e l f a r e
g e n e r a l  f e d e r a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s  
f e d e r a l  f i n a n c e
f e d e r a l  t r a n s p o r t  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  ( n o t  
p o s t  o r  r a i l w a y s )
f e d e r a l  b a n k
a r m e d  f o r c e s :  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  s o l d i e r s ,  
c i v i l i a n  s e r v i c e s
s t a t i o n s  o f  f o r e i g n  t r o o p s
g e n e r a l  L a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d  c o r p o r a t i o n s
L a n d  f i n a n c e
j u d i c i a r y
r o a d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  m a i n t e n a n c e  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
s c i e n c e  a n d  r e s e a r c h  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
g e n e r a l  m u n i c i p a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
f i r e  b r i g a d e
s c h o o l s  a n d  o t h e r  c u l t u r a l  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  
s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s
g a r d e n s ,  c e m e t r i e s ,  p a r k l a n d s ,  f o r e s t r y  
m u n i c i p a l  c a r  p a r k s  &  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  h e a l t h  
o t h e r  p u b l i c  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s  &  s e r v i c e s  
m u n i c i p a l  s a v i n g s  b a n k s
e m p l o y m e n t  c e n t r e s
s i c k n e s s  i n s u r a n c e  o f f i c e s
p e n s i o n  o f f i c e s  i n c l u d i n g  s e a m e n ' s  p e n s i o n s
m i n e r s '  i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e
s a l a r i e d  e m p l o y e e s '  i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e s
o t h e r  i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e s  f o r  e m p l o y e d  g r o u p s  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
w o r k e r s
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Health Services
E n e r g y  &  W a t e r  
S u p p l i e s  G r o u p
L o c a l  T r a n s p o r t
T r a n s p o r t  &  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
-  F e d e r a t i o n  o f  u n i o n  d o c t o r s  
n u r s i n g
m e d i c a l  t e c h n i c i a n s  &  a s s i s t a n t s  
h y g i e n e  &  s a n i t a t i o n  s e r v i c e s  
h o s p i t a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  &  s e r v i c i n g
-  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  e n e r g y  &  w a t e r  s u p p l i e s  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  e n e r g y  s u p p l i e s  
a t o m i c  e n e r g y
-  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  m u n i c i p a l  t r a n s p o r t
l o c a l  r a i l w a y ,  m o u n t a i n  &  f u n i c u l a r  r a i l w a y s
-  h a r b o u r s ,  p o r t s  &  f i s h  m a r k e t s  
i n l a n d  w a t e r w a y s  
s e a / c o a s t a l  v e s s e l s  &  f i s h i n g  
p r i v a t e  f r e i g h t
h a u l a g e ,  s h i p p i n g  &  w a r e h o u s i n g
p r i v a t e  p a s s e n g e r  t r a n s p o r t
a i r - t r a v e l  &  a i r p o r t s :  g r o u n d / a i r  p e r s o n n e l
a i r  p i l o t i n g  &  n a v i g a t i o n
o t h e r  g e n e r a l  s e r v i c e s
U n e m p l o y e d ,  r e t i r e d  
a n d  o t h e r s
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M E M B E R S H I  P  ( 1 9 7 5 )
F i e l d
M a n u a l
S t a f f
S a l a r i e d
S t a f f
C i v i l
S e r v a n t s T o t a l
F e d e r a l  G r o u p 4 8  1 9 8 2 4  4 0 2 6  4 1 3 7 9  0 1 3
L a n d e r  G r o u p 3 2  5 8 1 4 7  8 7 0 1 3  9 7 9 9 4  4 3 0
M u n i c i p a l i t i e s 1 4 0  4 7 6 1 1 0  9 2 7 3 4  3 9 9 2 8 5  8 0 2
W e l f a r e 2  6 8 7 2 7  6 6 4 1 1  6 2 1 4 1  9 7 2
H e a l t h  S e r v i c e s 3 3  4 8 0 6 7  8 9 2 2  2 6 2 1 0 3  6 3 4
E n e r g y  &  W a t e r  
S u p p l i e s  G r o u p
8 3  7 3 1 3 9  6 8 9 9 9 4 1 2 4  4 1 4
L o c a l  T r a n s p o r t 6 7  1 9 8 1 0  8 7 1 2 2 2 7 8  2 9 1
T r a n s p o r t  &  
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
6 1  4 5 9 2 0  9 5 6 2 5 8 2  4 4 0
U n e m p l o y e d ,  r e t i r e d  
a n d  o t h e r s
7 8  2 5 6 5 1  9 5 1 1 8  4 6 5 1 4 8  6 7 2
1 0 3 8  6 5 0 *
*  E x c l u d i n g  P o l i c e  S e c t i o n
1 E Treu, Geverkschafliche Organisation in einer Schruepfenden Branche,
Soziale Welt, 1977 Vol 28 pp 167-186
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B I B L I O G R A P H Y
B R I T I S H  S O U R C E S  
A a r o n  B ,
W e d d e r b u r n  K  W ( e d s )  
A b e l l  P
A l l e n  V L  
A l l e n  V  L  
A l l e n  V L
A l l e n  V L  
A l m o n d  G A
B a i n  G S
B a i n  G S ,  C o a t e s  D ,  
E l l i s  V
I n d u s t r i a l  C o n f l i c t  :  a  c o m p a r a t i v e  l e g a l  
s u r v e y
L o n g m a n  1 9 7 2
O r g a n i s a t i o n s  a s  B a r g a i n i n g  a n d  I n f l u e n c e  
S y s t e m s
L o n d o n  1 9 7 5
M i l i t a n t  T r a d e  U n i o n i s m
L o n d o n  1 9 6 6
P o w e r  i n  T r a d e  U n i o n s
L o n d o n  1 9 5 4
T r a d e  U n i o n s  i n  C o n t e m p o r a r y  C a p i t a l i s m
M i l i b a n d  & S a v i l l e  ( e d s )
T h e  S o c i a l i s t  R e g i s t e r  
L o n d o n  1 9 6 4
T r a d e  U n i o n s  a n d  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t
L o n d o n  1 9 6 0
P o l i t i c a l  D e v e l o p m e n t :  E s s a y s  i n  H e u r i s t i c  
T h e o r y
B o s t o n  1 9 7 0
T h e  G r o w t h  o f  W h i t e  C o l l a r  U n i o n i s m
O x f o r d  1 9 7 0
S o c i a l  S t r a t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  T r a d e  U n i o n i s m :  
a  c r i t i q u e
L o n d o n  1 9 7 3
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B a i n  G S  > E l s c h e i k  F
B a r n e s  D ,  R e i d  E
B a r r e t t  B ,  R h o d e s  E ,  
B e i s h o n  j  ( e c j s )
B e l l  D V J
B l a u  P M ,
S c h o e n h e r r  R  A
B o r a s t o n  I ,  C l e g g  H A ,  
R i m m e r  M
B u r g e s s  K
C a r e w  A
C a r t w r i g h t  D  
C h i l d  J
C l a r k e  T s C l e m e n t s  L  
( e d s )
C l e g g  .H A
U n i o n  G r o w t h  a n d  t h e  B u s i n e s s  C y c l e :
A n  E c o n o m a t i v e  A n a l y s i s
O x f o r d  1 9 7 6
G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  T r a d e  U n i o n s :  T h e  B r i t i s h  
E x p e r i e n c e  1 9 6 4 - 1 9 7 9
L o n d o n  1 9 8 0
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  W i d e r  S o c i e t y
T h e  O p e n  U n i v e r s i t y  1 9 7 5
P o w e r  I n f l u e n c e  a n d  A u t h o r i t y
O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  1 9 7 5
T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  O r g a n i s a t i o n s
B a s i c  B o o k s  1 9 7 1
W o r k p l a c e  a n d  U n i o n :  A  S t u d y  o f  L o c a l  
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  F o u r t e e n  U n i o n s
L o n d o n  1 9 7 5
T h e  O r i g i n s  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s
L o n d o n  1 9 7 5
D e m o c r a c y  a n d  G o v e r n m e n t  i n  E u r o p e a n  
T r a d e  U n i o n s
L o n d o n  1 9 7 6
S t u d i e s  i n  S o c i a l  P o w e r
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i c h i g a n  1 9 5 9
M a n  a n d  O r g a n i s a t i o n
L o n d o n  1 9 7 3
T r a d e  U n i o n s  U n d e r  C a p i t a l i s m
F o n t a n a  1 9 7 7
G e n e r a l  U n i o n  i n  a  C h a n g i n g  S o c i e t y
O x f o r d  1 9 6 4
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C l e g g  H A
C l e g g  H A
C l e g g  H A
C l e g g  H A ,  
T h o m p s o n  A
C l e g g  S
C o l e  G D H
C o l e  G D H
C o l e  G D  H  
C r o u c h  C  
D a h l  R A  
D a h r e n d o r f
T h e  C h a n g i n g  S y s t e m  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  
i n  G r e a t  B r i t a i n
B l a c k w e l l  1 9 7 9
T h e  S y s t e m  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  i n  
G r e a t  B r i t a i n
B l a c k w e l l  1 9 7 6
T r a d e  U n i o n s  u n d e r  C o l l e c t i v e  B a r g a i n i n g :  
a  t h e o r y  b a s e d  o n  c o m p a r i s o n s  o f  s i x  c o u n t r i e s
O x f o r d  1 9 7 6
F o x  A , A  H i s t o r y  o f  B r i t i s h  T r a d e  U n i o n s  s i n c e  1 8 8 9
F  V o l  1 1 8 8 9 - 1 9 1 0
O x f o r d  1 9 6 4
P o w e r ,  R u l e  a n d  D o m i n a t i o n
L o n d o n  1 9 7 5
A n  I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  T r a d e  U n i o n i s m
L o n d o n  1 9 5 5
A t t e m p t s  a t  a  G e n e r a l  U n i o n
A  S t u d y  i n  B r i t i s h  T r a d e  U n i o n  H i s t o r y
1 8 1 8 - 1 8 3 4
L o n d o n  1 9 5 3
B r i t i s h  T r a d e  U n i o n i s m  T o d a y
L o n d o n  1 9 3 9
T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s
F o n t a n a  1 9 7 9
M o d e r n  P o l i t i c a l  A n a l y s i s
P r e n t i c e  H a l l  1 9 6 5
R C l a s s  a n d  C l a s s  C o n f l i c t  i n  I n d u s t r i a l  S o c i e t y
L o n d o n  1 9 6 9
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D e u t s c h  M
D u n l o p  0  T
D u n l o p  J  T » 
C h a m b e r l a i n  N
E h r m a n n  H W 
F l a n d e r s  A
F l a n d e r s  A  D  
F l a n d e r s  A  D  
F l a n d e r s  A  D  
F o x  A
G a l b r a i t h  0  K  
G o l d s t e i n  J
De Reuck A V : T h e o r i e s  o f  P o w e r ,  I n f l u e n c e  a n d  A u t h o r i t y
A  J  R  G r o o m  & C R M i t c h e l l
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e l a t i o n s  T h e o r y .  A  B i b l i o g r a p h y
L o n d o n / N e w  Y o r k  1 9 7 8
R e s o l u t i o n  o f  C o n f l i c t
Y a l e  1 9 7 3
I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s  S y s t e m s
N e w  Y o r k  1 9 5 8
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